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Profile: Michael Morreau (University of Maryland, College Park, UiT The Arctic University of Norway)
Profile: Michael Paul Morreau (University of Tromsø)
  1. Michael Morreau (2013). Mr. Fit, Mr. Simplicity and Mr. Scope: From Social Choice to Theory Choice. Erkenntnis:1-16.
    An analogue of Arrow’s theorem has been thought to limit the possibilities for multi-criterial theory choice. Here, an example drawn from Toy Science, a model of theories and choice criteria, suggests that it does not. Arrow’s assumption that domains are unrestricted is inappropriate in connection with theory choice in Toy Science. There are, however, variants of Arrow’s theorem that do not require an unrestricted domain. They require instead that domains are, in a technical sense, ‘rich’. Since there are rich domains (...)
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  2. Michael Morreau (2010). It Simply Does Not Add Up: Trouble with Overall Similarity. Journal of Philosophy 107 (9):469-490.
    Comparative overall similarity lies at the basis of a lot of recent metaphysics and epistemology. It is a poor foundation. Overall similarity is supposed to be an aggregate of similarities and differences in various respects. But there is no good way of combining them all.
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  3. Michael Morreau (2009). The Hypothetical Syllogism. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (4):447 - 464.
    The hypothetical syllogism is invalid in standard interpretations of conditional sentences. Many arguments of this sort are quite compelling, though, and you can wonder what makes them so. I shall argue that it is our parsimony in regard to connections among events and states of affairs. All manner of things just might, for all we know, be bound up with one another in all sorts of ways. But ordinarily it is better, being simpler, to assume they are unconnected. In so (...)
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  4. Michael Morreau (2002). What Vague Objects Are Like. Journal of Philosophy 99 (7):333-361.
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  5. Alice Kyburg & Michael Morreau (2000). Fitting Words: Vague Language in Context. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (6):577-597.
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  6. Michael Morreau (1999). Kees van Deemter and Stanley Peters (Eds), Semantic Ambiguity and Under Specification. [REVIEW] Pragmatics and Cognition 7 (1):219-223.
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  7. Michael Morreau (1999). Other Things Being Equal. Philosophical Studies 96 (2):163Ð182.
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  8. Michael Morreau (1999). Supervaluation Can Leave Truth-Value Gaps After All. Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):148-156.
    Among other good things, supervaluation is supposed to allow vague sentences to go without truth values. But Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore have recently argued that it cannot allow this - not if it also respects certain conceptual truths. The main point I wish to make here is that they are mistaken. Supervaluation can leave truth-value gaps while respecting the conceptual truths they have in mind.
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  9. Michael Morreau (1998). For the Sake of the Argument. Journal of Philosophy 95 (10):540-546.
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  10. Michael Morreau (1998). Review of Isaac Levi, For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 95 (10):540-546.
  11. Michael Morreau & Sarit Kraus (1998). Syntactical Treatments of Propositional Attitudes. Artificial Intelligence 106 (1):161-177.
    Syntactical treatments of propositional attitudes are attractive to artificial intelligence researchers. But results of Montague (1974) and Thomason (1980) seem to show that syntactical treatments are not viable. They show that if representation languages are sufficiently expressive, then axiom schemes characterizing knowledge and belief give rise to paradox. Des Rivières and Levesque (1988) characterize a class of sentences within which these schemes can safely be instantiated. These sentences do not quantify over the propositional objects of knowledge and belief. We argue (...)
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  12. Michael Morreau (1997). Fainthearted Conditionals. Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):187-211.
  13. Michael Morreau (1996). Prima Facie and Seeming Duties. Studia Logica 57 (1):47 - 71.
    Sir David Ross introduced prima facie duties, or acts with a tendency to be duties proper. He also spoke of general prima facie principles, wwhich attribute to acts having some feature the tendency to be a duty proper. Like Utilitarians from Mill to Hare, he saw a role for such principles in the epistemology of duty: in the process by means of which, in any given situation, a moral code can help us to find out what we ought to do.After (...)
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  14. Michael Morreau (1992). Epistemic Semantics for Counterfactuals. Journal of Philosophical Logic 21 (1):33 - 62.
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  15. André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.) (1991). The Logic of Theory Change. Springer.
    The book presents the results of the joint annual conference of the four Operations Research Societies DGOR, GM\OR, \GOR and SVOR, held in Vienna in 1990.
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  16. Peter Gärdenfors, Sten Lindström, Michael Morreau & Wlodek Rabinowicz (1991). The Negative Ramsey Test. In André Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change. Springer.
    The so called Ramsey test is a semantic recipe for determining whether a conditional proposition is acceptable in a given state of belief. Informally, it can be formulated as follows: (RT) Accept a proposition of the form "if A, then C" in a state of belief K, if and only if the minimal change of K needed to accept A also requires accepting C. In Gärdenfors (1986) it was shown that the Ramsey test is, in the context of some other (...)
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