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Profile: Michael Pace (Chapman University)
  1.  88
    Michael Pace (2007). Blurred Vision and the Transparency of Experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):328–354.
    This paper considers an objection to intentionalism (the view that the phenomenal character of experience supervenes on intentional content) based on the phenomenology of blurred vision. Several intentionalists, including Michael Tye, Fred Dretske, and Timothy Crane, have proposed intentionalist explanations of blurred vision phenomenology. I argue that their proposals fail and propose a solution of my own that, I contend, is the only promising explanation consistent with intentionalism. The solution, however, comes at a cost for intentionalists; it involves rejecting the (...)
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  2. Michael Pace (2011). The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James' 'Will To Believe'. Noûs 45 (2):239-268.
    A moral-pragmatic argument for a proposition is an argument intended to establish that believing the proposition would be morally beneficial. Since such arguments do not adduce epistemic reasons, i.e., reasons that support the truth of a proposition, they can seem at best to be irrelevant epistemically. At worst, believing on the basis of such reasoning can seem to involve wishful thinking and intellectual dishonesty of a sort that that precludes such beliefs from being epistemically unjustified. Inspired by an argument from (...)
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  3.  54
    Michael Pace (2008). Perceptual Knowledge and the Metaphysics of Experience. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):642-664.
    There is a long-Standing tradition in philosophy that certain metaphysical theories of perceptual experience, if true, would lead to scepticism about the external world, whereas other theories, if true, would develop a non-sceptkal epistemology. I investigate these claims in the context of current metaphysical theories of sense-perception and argue that choice of perceptual ontology is of very limited help in developing a non-sceptical epistemology. Theorists who hold that perception is an intentional state have some advantage in explaining how perceptual experiences (...)
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  4.  72
    Michael Pace (2010). Foundationally Justified Perceptual Beliefs and the Problem of the Speckled Hen. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3):401-441.
    Many epistemologists accept some version of the following foundationalist epistemic principle: if one has an experience as if p then one has prima facie justification that p. I argue that this principle faces a challenge that it inherits from classical foundationalism: the problem of the speckled hen. The crux of the problem is that some properties are presented in experience at a level of determinacy that outstrips our recognitional capacities. I argue for an amendment to the principle that adds to (...)
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    Michael Pace (2005). Review of Alva No, Action in Perception. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (11).
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  6.  11
    Michael Pace (1995). Against Method. Philosophy Now 14:42-43.
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    Michael Pace (2013). Introspective Justification and the Fineness of Grain of Experience. In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer 101--126.