19 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Michael S. Brady [18]Michael Sean Brady [1]
  1. Michael S. Brady (2013). Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience. Oup Oxford.
    Michael S. Brady offers a new account of the role of emotions in our lives. He argues that emotional experiences do not give us information in the same way that perceptual experiences do. Instead, they serve our epistemic needs by capturing our attention and facilitating a reappraisal of the evaluative information that emotions themselves provide.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Michael S. Brady (2011). Emotions, Perceptions, and Reasons. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Morality and the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Michael S. Brady (2010). Virtue, Emotion, and Attention. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):115-131.
    The perceptual model of emotions maintains that emotions involve, or are at least analogous to, perceptions of value. On this account, emotions purport to tell us about the evaluative realm, in much the same way that sensory perceptions inform us about the sensible world. An important development of this position, prominent in recent work by Peter Goldie amongst others, concerns the essential role that virtuous habits of attention play in enabling us to gain perceptual and evaluative knowledge. I think that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Michael S. Brady (2009). Curiosity and the Value of Truth. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oup Oxford.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Michael S. Brady (2009). The Irrationality of Recalcitrant Emotions. Philosophical Studies 145 (3):413 - 430.
    A recalcitrant emotion is one which conflicts with evaluative judgement. (A standard example is where someone is afraid of flying despite believing that it poses little or no danger.) The phenomenon of emotional recalcitrance raises an important problem for theories of emotion, namely to explain the sense in which recalcitrant emotions involve rational conflict. In this paper I argue that existing ‘neojudgementalist’ accounts of emotions fail to provide plausible explanations of the irrationality of recalcitrant emotions, and develop and defend my (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Michael S. Brady (2008). Value and Fitting Emotions. Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (4):465-475.
  7. Michael S. Brady (2007). Recalcitrant Emotions and Visual Illusions. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):273 - 284.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Michael S. Brady (2006). Appropriate Attitudes and the Value Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):91 - 99.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Michael Sean Brady (2005). The Value of the Virtues. Philosophical Studies 125 (1):85 - 113.
    Direct theories of the virtues maintain that an explanation of why some virtuous trait counts as valuable should ultimately appeal to the value of its characteristic motive or aim. In this paper I argue that, if we take the idea of a direct approach to virtue theory seriously, we should favour a view according to which virtue involves knowledge. I raise problems for recent “agent-based” and “end-based” versions of the direct approach, show how my account proves preferable to these, and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Penelope Davies & Michael S. Brady (2005). Ethics. Philosophical Books 46 (3):284-286.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Michael S. Brady (2004). Against Agent-Based Virtue Ethics. Philosophical Papers 33 (1):1-10.
    Abstract Agent-based virtue ethics is a unitary normative theory according to which the moral status of actions is entirely dependent upon the moral status of an agent's motives and character traits. One of the problems any such approach faces is to capture the common-sense distinction between an agent's doing the right thing, and her doing it for the right (or wrong) reason. In this paper I argue that agent-based virtue ethics ultimately fails to capture this kind of fine-grained distinction, and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Michael S. Brady (2003). Valuing, Desiring and Normative Priority. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):231 - 242.
    Judgement internalism claims that our evaluative judgements will motivate us to act appropriately, at least in so far as we are rational. I examine how this claim should be understood, with particular focus on whether valuing enjoys a kind of 'normative priority' over desiring. I consider and reject views according to which valuing something provides one with a reason to be moved; this claim of normative priority and the readings of internalism it suggests are too strong. I also reject an (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Michael S. Brady (2003). Some Worries About Normative and Metaethical Sentimentalism. Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):144-153.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Michael S. Brady & Duncan Pritchard (2003). Editor's Introduction. Metaphilosophy 34 (3):330-330.
  15. Michael S. Brady & Duncan Pritchard (2003). Moral and Epistemic Virtues. Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):1-11.
  16. Michael S. Brady (2002). Skepticism, Normativity, and Practical Identity. Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):403-412.
  17. Michael S. Brady (2000). How to Understand Internalism. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):91-97.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Michael S. Brady (1998). Can Epistemic Contextualism Avoid the Regress Problem? Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):317-328.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Michael S. Brady (1998). Reasons and Rational Motivational Access. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (2):99–114.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation