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Profile: Michael Moore (San Francisco State University)
  1. Michael S. Moore (forthcoming). Stephen Morse on the Fundamental Psycho-Legal Error. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-45.
    Stephen Morse has long proclaimed there to be a “fundamental psycho-legal error” (FPLE) that is regularly made by legal and social/psychological/medical science academics alike. This is the error of thinking that causation of human choice by factors themselves outside the chooser’s control excuses that chooser from moral responsibility. In this paper, I examine Morse’s self-labelled “internalist” defense of his thesis that this is indeed an error, and finds such internalist defense incomplete; needed is the kind of externalist defense of Morse’s (...)
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  2. Michael S. Moore (forthcoming). The Quest for a Responsible Responsibility Test: Norwegian Insanity Law After Breivik. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-49.
    The Breivik case in Norway has motivated a reassessment of Norwegian insanity law by the Norwegian government. Because Norway since 2002 has utilized a “medical model” for legal insanity—a model according to which the legal excuse of insanity is identified with some medical concept such as psychosis—the Norwegian reexamination of its law is not without interest throughout the world. In this paper, I utilize the Anglo-American experience with different medical models for insanity to assess the current Norwegian law on insanity. (...)
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  3. Michael S. Moore (2013). Yaffe's Attempts. Legal Theory 19 (2):136-177.
    Yaffe's handling of two general questions is assessed in this review. The first question is why mere attempts (as opposed to successful wrongdoing) should be made punishable in a well-conceived criminal code. The second question is how attempt liability should be conceived in such a code. As to the first question, Yaffe's nonsubstantive mode of answering it (in terms of his ) is contrasted to answers based on some more substantive desert-bases; Yaffe's own more substantive kind of answer (in terms (...)
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  4. Michael S. Moore (2012). Four Friendly Critics: A Response. Legal Theory 18 (4):491-542.
    In this reply, I seek to summarize fairly the criticisms advanced by each of my four critics, Jonathan Schaffer, Gideon Yaffe, John Gardner, and Carolina Sartorio. That there is so little overlap either in the aspects of the book on which they focus or in the arguments they advance about those issues has forced me to reply to each of them separately. Schaffer focuses much of his criticisms on my view that absences cannot serve as causal relata and argues that (...)
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  5. Michael S. Moore (2012). Moore's Truths About Causation and Responsibility: A Reply to Alexander and Ferzan. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3):445-462.
    In this response to the review of Moore, Causation and Responsibility, by Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan, previously published in this journal, two issues are discussed. The first is whether causation, counterfactual dependence, moral blame, and culpability, are all scalar properties or relations, that is, matters of more-or-less rather than either-or. The second issue discussed is whether deontological moral obligation is best described as a prohibition against using another as a means, or rather, as a prohibition on an agent strongly (...)
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  6. Michael S. Moore (2012). Responsible Choices, Desert-Based Legal Institutions, and the Challenges of Contemporary Neuroscience. Social Philosophy and Policy 29 (1):233-279.
    Neuroscience is commonly thought to challenge the basic way we think of ourselves in ordinary thought, morality, and the law. This paper: (1) describes the legal institutions challenged in this way by neuroscience, including in that description both the political philosophy such institutions enshrine and the common sense psychology they presuppose; (2) describes the three kinds of data produced by contemporary neuroscience that is thought to challenge these commonsense views of ourselves in morals and law; and (3) distinguishes four major (...)
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  7. Michael S. Moore (2012). The Various Relations Between Law and Morality in Contemporary Legal Philosophy. Ratio Juris 25 (4):435-471.
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  8. Michael S. Moore (2010). Libet's Challenge (s) to Responsible Agency. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Lynn Nadel (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet. Oup Usa. 207.
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  9. Michael S. Moore (2009). Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics. OUP Oxford.
    The concept of causation is fundamental to ascribing moral and legal responsibility for events. Yet the relationship between causation and responsibility remains unclear. What precisely is the connection between the concept of causation used in attributing responsibility and the accounts of causal relations offered in the philosophy of science and metaphysics? How much of what we call causal responsibility is in truth defined by non-causal factors? This book argues that much of the legal doctrine on these questions is confused and (...)
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  10. Michael S. Moore (2008). Patrolling the Borders of Consequentialist Justifications: The Scope of Agent-Relative Restrictions. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 27 (1):35 - 96.
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  11. Michael S. Moore (2004). The Destruction of the World Trade Center and the Law on Event-Identity. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:259-342.
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  12. Michael S. Moore (2002). Legal Reality: A Naturalist Approach to Legal Ontology. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 21 (6):619 - 705.
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  13. Michael S. Moore (2001). Good Without God. In Robert George (ed.), Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality: Contemporary Essays. Oup Oxford.
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  14. Michael S. Moore (2001). Law as Justice. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (1):115-145.
    A perennial question of jurisprudence has been whether there is a relationship between law and morality. Those who believe that there is no such relationship are known as while those who hold that some such relationship exists are usually tagged with the label Unfortunately, the latter phrase has been used in quite divergent senses. Sometimes it is used to designate any objectivist position about morality; as often, it labels the view that human nature determines what is objectively good or right; (...)
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  15. Michael S. Moore (2000). Educating Oneself in Public: Critical Essays in Jurisprudence. Oxford University Press.
    This book is a sophisticated, detailed, and original examination of the main ideas that have dominated Anglo-American legal philosophy since the Second World War. The author probes such themes as: whether there can be right answers to all disputed law cases; how laws and other rules impact on the practical rationality of actors subject to their authority; whether general principles justifying the law must themselves be thought of as part of the law binding on legal actors; and the possibility of (...)
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  16. Michael S. Moore (1999). Causation and Responsibility. Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (02):1-.
    In various areas of Anglo-American law, legal liability turns on causation. In torts and contracts, we are each liable only for those harms we have caused by the actions that breach our legal duties. Such doctrines explicitly make causation an element of liability. In criminal law, sometimes the causal element for liability is equally explicit, as when a statute makes punishable any act that has “caused … abuse to the child….” More often, the causal element in criminal liability is more (...)
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  17. Michael S. Moore (1997/2010). Placing Blame: A Theory of the Criminal Law. Oxford University Press.
    Originally published: Oxford: Clarendon, 1997.
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  18. Michael S. Moore (1993). Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and its Implications for Criminal Law. Oxford University Press.
    This work provides, for the first time, a unified account of the theory of action presupposed by both British and American criminal law and its underlying morality. It defends the view that human actions are volitionally caused body movements. This theory illuminates three major problems in drafting and implementing criminal law--what the voluntary act requirement does and should require, what complex descriptions of actions prohibited by criminal codes both do and should require, and when the two actions are the "same" (...)
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  19. Michael S. Moore (1992). Law as a Functional Kind. In Robert P. George (ed.), Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays. Oxford University Press.
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  20. Michael S. Moore (1990). Choice, Character, and Excuse. Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (02):29-.
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  21. Michael S. Moore (1985). The Determinist Theory of Excuses:Madness and the Criminal Law. Norval Morris. Ethics 95 (4):909-.
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  22. Michael S. Moore (1985). Review: The Determinist Theory of Excuses. [REVIEW] Ethics 95 (4):909 - 919.
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  23. Michael S. Moore (1975). Some Myths About 'Mental Illness'. Inquiry 18 (3):233 – 265.
    Radical psychiatrists and others assert that mental illness is a myth. The opening and closing portions of the paper deal with the impact such argument has had in law and psychiatry. The body of the paper discusses the five versions of the myth argument prevalent in radical psychiatry: (A) that there is no such thing as mental illness; (B) that those called ?mentally ill? are really as rational as everyone else, only with different aims; that the only reasons anyone ever (...)
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