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Michael Smith [101]Michael A. Smith [12]Michael B. Smith [10]Michael P. Smith [6]
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Profile: Michael Smith (Alberta Vocational College - Calgary)
Profile: Michael Smith (Manchester Metropolitan University)
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Profile: Michael B. Smith
  1. Michael Smith (1994/1995). The Moral Problem. Blackwell.
    What is the Moral Problem? NORMATIVE ETHICS VS. META-ETHICS It is a common fact of everyday life that we appraise each others' behaviour and attitudes from ...
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  2. Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston (1989). Dispositional Theories of Value. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63:89-174.
  3. Michael Smith (1987). The Humean Theory of Motivation. Mind 96 (381):36-61.
  4.  94
    Michael Smith (2004). Ethics and the a Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
    Over the last fifteen years, Michael Smith has written a series of seminal essays about the nature of belief and desire, the status of normative judgment, and the relevance of the views we take on both these topics to the accounts we give of our nature as free and responsible agents. This long awaited collection comprises some of the most influential of Smith's essays. Among the topics covered are: the Humean theory of motivating reasons, the nature of normative reasons, Williams (...)
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  5. Michael Smith (2003). Rational Capacities, Or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion. In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press 17-38.
  6.  14
    Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (2000). Ethical Particularism and Patterns. In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism. Oxford University Press 79--99.
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  7. Michael Smith (1995). Internal Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):109-131.
    The idea that there is such an analytic connection will hardly come as news. It amounts to no more and no less than an endorsement of the claim that all reasons are 'internal', as opposed to 'external', to use Bernard Williams's terms (Williams 1980). Or, to put things in the way Christine Korsgaard favours, it amounts to an endorsement of the 'internalism requirement' on reasons (Korsgaard 1986). But how exactly is the internalism requirement to be understood? What does it tell (...)
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  8.  84
    Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (1996). Freedom in Belief and Desire. Journal of Philosophy 93 (9):429-449.
  9.  78
    Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.) (2005). The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy is the definitive guide to what's going on in this lively and fascinating subject. Jackson and Smith, themselves two of the world's most eminent philosophers, have assembled more than thirty distinguished scholars to contribute incisive and up-to-date critical surveys of the principal areas of research. The coverage is broad, with sections devoted to moral philosophy, social and political philosophy, philosophy of mind and action, philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of the sciences. This (...)
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  10.  67
    Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (1990). Backgrounding Desire. Philosophical Review 99 (4):565-592.
    Granted that desire is always present in the genesis of human action, is it something on the presence of which the agent always reflects? I may act on a belief without coming to recognize that I have the belief. Can I act on a desire without recognizing that I have the desire? In particular, can the desire have a motivational presence in my decision making, figuring in the background, as it were, without appearing in the content of my deliberation, in (...)
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  11.  95
    Michael Smith (1997). In Defense of "the Moral Problem": A Reply to Brink, Copp, and Sayre-McCord. Ethics 108 (1):84-119.
  12.  38
    Michael Smith (2003). Neutral and Relative Value After Moore. Ethics 113 (3):576-598.
  13.  82
    Michael Smith (2004). Instrumental Desires, Instrumental Rationality. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):93–109.
    The requirements of instrumental rationality are often thought to be normative conditions on choice or intention, but this is a mistake. Instrumental rationality is best understood as a requirement of coherence on an agent's non-instrumental desires and means-end beliefs. Since only a subset of an agent's means-end beliefs concern possible actions, the connection with intention is thus more oblique. This requirement of coherence can be satisfied either locally or more globally, it may be only one among a number of such (...)
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  14. Michael Smith & Frank Jackson (2006). Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty. Journal of Philosophy 103 (6):267-283.
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  15. Michael Smith (2003). Rational Capacities. In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Varities of Practical Irrationality. Oxford University Press 17-38.
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  16.  66
    Michael Smith (2006). Moore on the Right, the Good, and Uncertainty. In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press 2006--133.
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  17. Michael J. Smith (1998). Humanitarian Intervention: An Overview of the Ethical Issues. Ethics and International Affairs 12 (1):63–79.
    This essay analyzes the arguments justifying or opposing the notion of humanitarian intervention from realist and liberal perspectives and considers the difficulties of undertaking such interventions effectively and consistently.
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  18.  51
    Michael Smith (1994). Why Expressivists About Value Should Love Minimalism About Truth. Analysis 54 (1):1 - 11.
  19.  95
    Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith (1996). Frog and Toad Lose Control. Analysis 56 (2):63–73.
    It seems to be a truism that whenever we do something - and so, given the omnipresence of trying (Hornsby 1980), whenever we try to do something - we want to do that thing more than we want to do anything else we can do (Davidson 1970). However, according to Frog, when we have will power we are able to try not to do something that we ‘really want to do’. In context the idea is clearly meant to be that (...)
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  20.  93
    Michael Smith (1996). The Argument for Internalism: Reply to Miller. Analysis 56 (3):175–184.
    Alexander Miller objects to the argument for moral judgement internalism that I provide in _The Moral Problem. Miller's objection suggests a misunderstanding of the argument. In this reply I take the opportunity to restate the argument in slightly different terms, and to explain why Miller's objection betrays a misunderstanding.
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  21. Michael A. Smith (1998). The Possibility of Philosophy of Action. In Jan Bransen & Stefaan Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Kluwer Academic Publishers 17--41.
    This article was conceived as a sequel to “The Humean Theory of Motivation.” The paper addresses various challenges to the standard account of the explanation of intentional action in terms of desire and means-end belief, challenges that didn’t occur to me when I wrote “The Humean Theory of Motivation.” I begin by suggesting that the attraction of the standard account lies in the way in which it allows us to unify a vast array of otherwise diverse types of action explanation. (...)
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  22.  48
    Michael Smith (2003). Humeanism, Psychologism, and the Normative Story. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):460–467.
    Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality is, I think, best understood as an attempt to undermine our allegiance to these two purported constitutive claims about action. If we must think that psychological states figure in the explanation of action then, according to Dancy, we should suppose that those psychological states are beliefs rather than desire-belief pairs. Dancy thus prefers pure cognitivism to Humeanism. But in fact he thinks that we have no business accepting any form of psychologism in the first place; no (...)
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  23.  58
    Michael Smith (2012). Four Objections to the Standard Story of Action (and Four Replies). Philosophical Issues 22 (1):387-401.
  24. Michael Smith (2009). Desires, Values, Reasons, and the Dualism of Practical Reason. Ratio 22 (1):98-125.
    In On What Matters Derek Parfit argues that facts about reasons for action are grounded in facts about values and against the view that they are grounded in facts about the desires that subjects would have after fully informed and rational deliberation. I describe and evaluate Parfit's arguments for this value-based conception of reasons for action and find them wanting. I also assess his response to Sidgwick's suggestion that there is a Dualism of Practical Reason. Parfit seems not to notice (...)
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  25.  49
    Michael Smith & Daniel Stoljar (2003). Is There a Lockean Argument Against Expressivism? Analysis 63 (1):76–86.
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  26.  79
    Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith (1997). Synchronic Self-Control is Always Non-Actional. Analysis 57 (2):123–131.
  27.  86
    Michael Smith (2001). Some Not-Much-Discussed Problems for Non-Cognitivism in Ethics. Ratio 14 (2):93–115.
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  28.  37
    Michael Smith (2009). Kinds of Consequentialism. In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 257-272.
  29.  2
    Güven Eken, Leon Bennun, Thomas M. Brooks, Will Darwall, Lincoln D. C. Fishpool, Matt Foster, David Knox, Penny Langhammer, Paul Matiku, Elizabeth Radford, Paul Salaman, Wes Sechrest, Michael L. Smith, Sacha Spector & Andrew Tordoff (2004). Key Biodiversity Areas as Site Conservation Targets. BioScience 54 (12):1110.
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  30.  56
    Michael Smith (2002). Evaluation, Uncertainty and Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):305-320.
    Evaluative judgements have both belief-like and desire-like features. While cognitivists think that they can easily explain the belief-like features, and have trouble explaining the desire-like features, non-cognitivists think the reverse. I argue that the belief-like features of evaluative judgement are quite complex, and that these complexities crucially affect the way in which an agent's values explain her actions, and hence the desire-like features. While one form of cognitivism can, it turns out that non-cognitivism cannot, accommodate all of these complexities. The (...)
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  31.  54
    Michael A. Smith (1997). A Theory of Freedom and Responsibility. In Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press 293-317.
  32.  57
    Michael Smith (1994). Minimalism, Truth-Aptitude and Belief. Analysis 54 (1):21 - 26.
  33.  96
    Michael Smith (2001). The Incoherence Argument: Reply to Schafer-Landau. Analysis 61 (3):254–266.
    Russ Schafer-Landau’s ‘Moral judgement and normative reasons’ is admirably clear and to the point (Schafer-Landau 1999). He presents his own version of the argument for the practicality requirement on moral judgement – that is, for the claim that those who have moral beliefs are either motivated or practically irrational – that I gave in The Moral Problem (Smith 1994), and he then proceeds to identify several crucial problems. In what follows I begin by making some comments about his presentation of (...)
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  34.  34
    Michael A. Smith (1995). Internalism's Wheel. Ratio 8 (3):277-302.
    If an agent judges that she morally ought to PHI in certain circumstances C then, according to internalists, absent practical irrationality, she must be motivated, to some extent, to PHI in C. Internalists thus accept what I have elsewhere called the ‘practicality requirement on moral judgement’. There are many different theories about the nature and content of moral judgement that aspire to explain and capture the truth embodied in internalism, and these theories share little in common beyond that aspiration. Worse (...)
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  35. Michael B. Smith (2005). Toward the Outside: Concepts and Themes in Emmanuel Levinas. Duquesne University Press.
  36.  30
    Michael Smith (2007). In Defence of Ethics and the a Priori: A Reply to Enoch, Hieronymi, and Tannenbaum. Philosophical Books 48 (2):136-149.
  37.  3
    Michael Smith (1993). Objectivity and Moral Realism: On the Significance of the Phenomenology of Moral Experience. In John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.), Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford University Press 235-256.
  38. Michael Smith (2010). Beyond the Error Theory. In Richard Joyce & Simon Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values. Springer
    Mackie's argument for the Error Theory is described. Four ways of responding to Mackie's argument—the Instrumental Approach, the Universalization Approach, the Reasons Approach, and the Constitutivist Approach—are outlined and evaluated. It emerges that though the Constitutivist Approach offers the most promising response to Mackie's argument, it is difficult to say whether that response is adequate or not.
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  39.  48
    Michael Smith (1988). On Humeans, Anti-Humeans, and Motivation: A Reply to Pettit. Mind 97 (388):589-595.
  40.  27
    Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (2006). External Reasons. In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Mcdowell and His Critics. Blackwell Pub. 6--142.
  41.  54
    Daniel Stoljar & Michael Smith (2003). Is There a Lockean Argument Against Expressivism? Analysis 63 (1):76 - 86.
    It is sometimes suggested that expressivism in meta-ethics is to be criticized on grounds which do not themselves concern meta-ethics in particular, but which rather concern philosophy of language more generally. Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit (1998; see also Jackson and Pettit 1999, and Jackson 2001) have recently advanced a novel version of such an argument. They begin by noting that expressivism in its central form makes two claims—that ethical sentences are not truth evaluable, and that to assert an ethical (...)
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  42. Michael Smith (2010). On Normativity. Analysis 70 (4):715-731.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  43. Michael Smith (2011). Deontological Moral Obligations and Non-Welfarist Agent-Relative Values. Ratio 24 (4):351-363.
    Many claim that a plausible moral theory would have to include a principle of beneficence, a principle telling us to produce goods that are both welfarist and agent-neutral. But when we think carefully about the necessary connection between moral obligations and reasons for action, we see that agents have two reasons for action, and two moral obligations: they must not interfere with any agent's exercise of his rational capacities and they must do what they can to make sure that agents (...)
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  44.  12
    Michael Smith (2000). Moral Realism. In Hugh LaFollette - (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. Blackwell Publishers 15--37.
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  45.  68
    Michael Smith (2009). Kinds of Consequentialism. In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 257-272.
  46.  77
    Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (1993). Practical Unreason. Mind 102 (405):53-79.
    Some contemporary theories treat phenomena like weakness of will, compulsion and wantonness as practical failures but not as failures of rationality: say, as failures of autonomy or whatever. Other current theories-the majority see the phenomena as failures of rationality but not as distinctively practical failures. They depict them as always involving a theoretical deficiency: a sort of ignorance, error, inattention or illogic. They represent them as failures which are on a par with breakdowns of theoretical reason; the failures may not (...)
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  47.  11
    Michael Smith (2004). The Structure of Orthonomy. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:165-193.
    According to the standard story of action, a story that can be traced back at least to David Hume , actions are those bodily movements that are caused and rationalized by a pair of mental states: a desire for some end, where ends can be thought of as ways the world could be, and a belief that something the agent can just do, namely, move her body in the way to be explained, has some suitable chance of making the world (...)
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  48.  5
    Michael Smith (2004). Humean Rationality. In Piers Rawling & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press 75--92.
  49. Michael Smith (2009). Reasons with Rationalism After All. Analysis 69 (3):521-530.
    Kieran Setiya begins Reasons Without Rationalism by outlining and arguing for a schema in terms of which he thinks we best understand the nature of normative reasons for action. This is: " Reasons: The fact that p is a reason for A to ϕ just in case A has a collection of psychological states, C, such that the disposition to be moved to ϕ by C-and-the-belief-that-p is a good disposition of practical thought, and C contains no false beliefs. " As (...)
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  50. Michael Smith (2006). Is That All There Is? Journal of Ethics 10 (1-2):75 - 106.
    I take issue with two suggestions of Joel Feinberg's: first, that it is incoherent to suppose that human life as such is absurd, and, second, that a particular human life may be absurd and yet saved from being tragic by being fulfilled. I also argue that human life as such may well be absurd and I consider various responses to this.
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