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Michael Tye [156]Michael John Tye [1]
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Profile: Michael Tye (University of Texas at Austin)
  1. Michael Tye (2009). Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts. MIT Press.
    Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal (...)
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  2. Michael Tye (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press.
    A further development of Tye's theory of phenomenal consciousness along with replies to common objections.
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  3.  67
    Michael Tye (2003). Consciousness, Color, and Content. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 235.
  4.  59
    Michael Tye (2003). Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity. MIT Press.
    In Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity, Michael Tye takes on the thorny issue of the unity of consciousness and answers these important questions: What exactly is the unity of consciousness? Can a single person have a divided consciousness? What is a single person? Tye argues that unity is a fundamental part of human consciousness -- something so basic to everyday experience that it is easy to overlook. For example, when we hear the sound of (...)
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  5. Michael Tye (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. MIT Press.
    Tye's book develops a persuasive and, in many respects, original argument for the view that the qualitative side of our mental life is representational in..
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  6. Michael Tye (2006). Nonconceptual Content, Richness, and Fineness of Grain. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press 504–30.
     
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  7. Michael Tye (2002). Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience. Noûs 36 (1):137-51.
    Representationalism is a thesis about the phenomenal character of experiences, about their immediate subjective ‘feel’.1 At a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character. So understood, the thesis is silent on the nature of phenomenal character. Strong or pure representationalism goes further. It aims to tell us what phenomenal character is. According to the theory developed in Tye 1995, phenomenal character is one and the same (...)
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  8. Brian Cutter & Michael Tye (2011). Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):90-109.
  9.  94
    Michael Tye (2010). Attention, Seeing, and Change Blindness. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):410-437.
  10. Alex Byrne & Michael Tye (2006). Qualia Ain't in the Head. Noûs 40 (2):241-255.
    Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head. 1 Intentionalism comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects have the same qualia. 2.
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  11. Michael Tye (2006). The Puzzle of True Blue. Analysis 66 (291):173–178.
    Most men and nearly all women have non-defective colour vision, as measured by standard colour tests such as those of Ishihara and Farns- worth. But people vary, according to gender, race and age in their per- formance in matching experiments. For example, when subjects are shown a screen, one half of which is lit by a mixture of red and green lights and the other by yellow or orange light, and they are asked to ad- just the mixture of lights (...)
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  12. Michael Tye (1999). Phenomenal Consciousness: The Explanatory Gap as a Cognitive Illusion. Mind 108 (432):705-25.
    The thesis that there is a troublesome explanatory gap between the phenomenal aspects of experiences and the underlying physical and functional states is given a number of different interpretations. It is shown that, on each of these interpretations, the thesis is false. In supposing otherwise, philosophers have fallen prey to a cognitive illusion, induced largely by a failure to recognize the special character of phenomenal concepts.
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  13.  55
    Michael Tye (2015). Yes, Phenomenal Character Really Is Out There In The World. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):483-488.
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  14. Michael Tye (2014). Transparency, Qualia Realism and Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):39-57.
    In this essay, I want to take another look at the phenomenon of transparency and its relevance to qualia realism and representationalism. I don’t suppose that what I have to say will cause those who disagree with me to change their minds, but I hope not only to clarify my position and that of others who are on my side of the debate but also to respond to various criticisms and objections that have arisen over the last 10–15 years or (...)
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  15. Michael Tye (1990). Vague Objects. Mind 99 (396):535-557.
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  16. Michael Tye (2009). A New Look at the Speckled Hen. Analysis 69 (2):258-263.
    We owe the problem of the speckled hen to Gilbert Ryle. It was suggested to A.J. Ayer by Ryle in connection with Ayer’s account of seeing. Suppose that you are standing before a speckled hen with your eyes trained on it. You are in good light and nothing is obstructing your view. You see the hen in a single glance. The hen has 47 speckles on its facing side, let us say, and the hen ap­ pears speckled to you. On (...)
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  17.  78
    Michael Tye (1993). Reflections on Dennett and Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):891-6.
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  18. Michael Tye (2007). Intentionalism and the Argument From No Common Content. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):589-613.
    Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in the snow. (...)
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  19. Michael Tye (2002). Visual Qualia and Visual Content Revisited. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press
    Experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is _like_ for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philoso- phers often use the term 'qualia' to refer to the introspectively accessible properties of experiences (...)
     
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  20.  54
    Michael Tye (2008). The Experience of Emotion: An Intentionalist Theory. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62:25--50.
    The experience of emotion is a fundamental part of human consciousness. Think, for example, of how different our conscious lives would be without such experiences as joy, anger, fear, disgust, pity, anxiety, and embarrassment. It is uncontroversial that these experiences typically have an intentional content. Anger, for example, is normally directed at someone or something. One may feel angry at one=s stock broker for provid- ing bad advice or angry with the cleaning lady for dropping the vase. But it is (...)
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  21.  59
    Michael Tye (2006). The Truth About True Blue. Analysis 66 (292):340–344.
    Cohen, Hardin, and McLaughlin (2006) complain that my solution to the puzzle of true blue (Tye 2006) depends upon my assuming that 'all variation in colour experience among standard perceivers in standard circumstances is at the level of fine-grained hues (4)'. That assumption, they say, is false: 'there is in fact variation in colour experience among.
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  22.  73
    R. M. Sainsbury & Michael Tye (2012). Seven Puzzles of Thought: And How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts. OUP Oxford.
    Sainsbury and Tye present a new theory, 'originalism', which provides natural, simple solutions to puzzles about thought that have troubled philosophers for centuries. They argue that concepts are to be individuated by their origin, rather than epistemically or semantically. Although thought is special, no special mystery attaches to its nature.
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  23. Michael Tye (forthcoming). What is the Content of a Hallucinatory Experience? In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception have Content? Oxford University Press
    Keith has just taken a hallucinogenic drug. A few minutes earlier, he was occupied with the beginning of H.H. Price's well-known book on perception. The combined effect of these activities is that Keith is now hallucinating a ripe tomato. This is not a de re hallucination. There is no particular tomato located elsewhere out of Keith's vision such that he is hallucinating that tomato as being before him. Keith is hallucinating a tomato without there being any particular tomato that he (...)
     
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  24.  63
    Brian P. McLaughlin & Michael Tye (1998). Is Content-Externalism Compatible with Privileged Access? Philosophical Review 107 (3):349-380.
  25.  89
    Michael Tye (2007). Intentionalism and the Argument From No Common Content. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):589–613.
    Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in the snow. (...)
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  26. Michael Tye (2009). The Admissible Contents of Visual Experience. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):541-562.
    My purpose is to take a close look at the nature of visual content. I discuss the view that visual experiences have only existential contents, the view that visual experiences have either singular or gappy contents, and the view that visual experiences have multiple contents. I also consider a proposal about visual content inspired by Kaplan's well known theory of indexicals. I draw out some consequences of my discussion for the thesis of intentionalism with respect to the phenomenal character of (...)
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  27.  69
    Michael Tye (1994). Sorites Paradoxes and the Semantics of Vagueness. Philosophical Perspectives 8:189-206.
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  28. Michael Tye (1992). Naturalism and the Mental. Mind 101 (403):421-441.
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  29.  32
    Michael Tye (2012). Cohen on Color Relationism. Analytic Philosophy 53 (3):297-305.
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  30.  49
    Michael Tye (1998). Externalism and Memory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (72):77-94.
    [Michael Tye] Externalism about thought contents has received enormous attention in the philosophical literature over the past fifteen years or so, and it is now the established view. There has been very little discussion, however, of whether memory contents are themselves susceptible to an externalist treatment. In this paper, I argue that anyone who is sympathetic to Twin Earth thought experiments for externalism with respect to certain thoughts should endorse externalism with respect to certain memories. /// [Jane Heal] Tye claims (...)
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  31. Michael Tye (2003). Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: New Problems for Representationalism? In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press
     
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  32. Michael Tye (1995). A Representational Theory of Pains and Their Phenomenal Character. Philosophical Perspectives 9:223-39.
  33. Michael Tye (1994). Why the Vague Need Not Be Higher-Order Vague. Mind 103 (409):43-45.
    Is higher-order vagueness a real phenomenon? Dominic Hyde (1994) claims that it is, and that it is part and parcel of vagueness itself. According to Hyde, any genuinely vague predicate must also be higher-order vague. His argument for this view is unsound, however. The purpose of this note is to expose the fallacy, and to make some related observations on the vague, the higher-order vague, and the vaguely vague.
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  34. Michael Tye (1992). Visual Qualia and Visual Content. In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press 158--176.
  35. Michael Tye (2000). Knowing What It is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press 223.
  36.  39
    Michael Tye (2000). Vagueness and Reality. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):195--210.
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  37.  99
    Michael Tye (2003). A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 91-105.
    1) There is widespread agreement that consciousness must be a physical phenomenon, even if it is one that we do not yet understand and perhaps may never do so fully. There is also widespread agreement that the way to defend physicalism about consciousness against a variety of well known objections is by appeal to phenomenal concepts (Loar 1990, Lycan 1996, Papineau 1993, Sturgeon 1994, Tye 1995, 2000, Perry 2001) . There is, alas, no agreement on the nature of phenomenal concepts.
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  38. Michael Tye (1984). The Adverbial Approach to Visual Experience. Philosophical Review 93 (April):195-226.
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  39. R. M. Sainsbury & Michael Tye (2011). An Originalist Theory of Concepts. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):101-124.
    We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...)
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  40. Michael Tye (1986). The Subjective Qualities of Experience. Mind 95 (January):1-17.
  41. Michael Tye (2006). Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168.
    At the very heart of the mind-body problem is the question of the nature of consciousness. It is consciousness, and in particular _phenomenal_ consciousness, that makes the mind-body relation so deeply perplexing. Many philosophers hold that no defi nition of phenomenal consciousness is possible: any such putative defi nition would automatically use the concept of phenomenal consciousness and thus render the defi nition circular. The usual view is that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is one that must be explained by (...)
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  42.  83
    Michael Tye (2001). Oh Yes It Is. Mind 110 (439):695-697.
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  43.  40
    Michael Tye (2014). Speaks on Strong Property Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):85-86.
    Strong property representationalism, as applied to visual experience, is the thesis that the phenomenal character of a visual experience is one and the same as the property complex or ‘sensible profile’ represented by that experience. Speaks discusses the following argument against this thesis:Let ‘RED’ stand for the phenomenal character of the experience of red.(1) Red = RED (strong property representationalism).(2) My pen has no representational properties, but is red.Hence,(3) My pen has a phenomenal character but no representational properties.Since (3) is (...)
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  44.  60
    Michael Tye (2007). True Blue Redux. Analysis 67 (1):92-93.
    A chip looks true blue to John and greenish blue to Jane. On the face of it, at least one of the two perceivers has an inaccurate colour experience; for the chip cannot be both true blue and greenish blue. But John and Jane are “normal” perceivers, and there is no privileged class of normal perceivers (Block 1999). This is the puzzle of true blue (Tye.
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    Michael Tye (1989). The Metaphysics of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    In this provocative book, Michael Tye presents his unique account of the metaphysical foundations of psychological discourse. In place of token identity theory or eliminative materialism, he advocates a generalisation of the adverbial approach to sensory experience, the 'operator theory'. He applies this to the analysis of prepositional attitudes, arguing that mental statements cannot involve reference to mental events or objects and that therefore causal statements about the mental cannot be regarded as asserting relations between events. This adverbial theory has (...)
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  46.  37
    Michael Tye (1996). Perceptual Experience is a Many-Layered Thing. Philosophical Issues 7:117-126.
  47.  37
    Michael Tye (1991). The Imagery Debate. Cambridge: MIT Press.
    Michael Tye untangles the complex web of empirical and conceptual issues of the newly revived imagery debate in psychology between those that liken mental...
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  48.  35
    Michael Tye & Briggs Wright (2011). Is There a Phenomenology of Thought? In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press 35.
  49.  72
    Peter Bradley & Michael Tye (2001). Of Colors, Kestrels, Caterpillars, and Leaves. Journal of Philosophy 98 (9):469-487.
    According to color realism, object colors are mind-independent properties that cover surfaces or permeate volumes of objects. In recent years, some color scientists and a growing number of philosophers have opposed this view on the grounds that realism about color cannot accommodate the apparent unitary/binary structure of the hues. For example, Larry Hardin asserts, " the unitary-binary structure of the colors as we experience them corresponds to no known physical structure lying outside nervous systems that is causally involved in the (...)
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  50. Michael Tye (2000). Shoemaker's the First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):461-464.
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