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Profile: Michael Tye (University of Texas at Austin)
  1.  443 DLs
    Michael Tye (2002). Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience. Noûs 36 (1):137-51.
    Representationalism is a thesis about the phenomenal character of experiences, about their immediate subjective ‘feel’.1 At a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character. So understood, the thesis is silent on the nature of phenomenal character. Strong or pure representationalism goes further. It aims to tell us what phenomenal character is. According to the theory developed in Tye 1995, phenomenal character is one and the same (...)
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  2.  380 DLs
    Alex Byrne & Michael Tye (2006). Qualia Ain't in the Head. Noûs 40 (2):241-255.
    Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates (in the same or different metaphysically possible worlds) have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head.1 Intentionalism (or representationalism) comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects (in the same or different metaphysically (...)
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  3.  337 DLs
    Michael Tye (2007). Intentionalism and the Argument From No Common Content. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):589-613.
    Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in the snow. (...)
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  4.  286 DLs
    Michael Tye (2000). Knowing What It is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press 223.
  5.  278 DLs
    Michael Tye (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press.
    A further development of Tye's theory of phenomenal consciousness along with replies to common objections.
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  6.  234 DLs
    Michael Tye (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. MIT Press.
    Tye's book develops a persuasive and, in many respects, original argument for the view that the qualitative side of our mental life is representational in..
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  7.  233 DLs
    Michael Tye (2006). Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168.
    At the very heart of the mind-body problem is the question of the nature of consciousness. It is consciousness, and in particular _phenomenal_ consciousness, that makes the mind-body relation so deeply perplexing. Many philosophers hold that no defi nition of phenomenal consciousness is possible: any such putative defi nition would automatically use the concept of phenomenal consciousness and thus render the defi nition circular. The usual view is that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is one that must be explained by (...)
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  8.  216 DLs
    Michael Tye (2009). Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts. MIT Press.
    Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal (...)
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  9.  208 DLs
    Michael Tye (forthcoming). What is the Content of a Hallucinatory Experience? In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception have Content? Oxford University Press
    Keith has just taken a hallucinogenic drug. A few minutes earlier, he was occupied with the beginning of H.H. Price's well-known book on perception. The combined effect of these activities is that Keith is now hallucinating a ripe tomato. This is not a de re hallucination. There is no particular tomato located elsewhere out of Keith's vision such that he is hallucinating that tomato as being before him. Keith is hallucinating a tomato without there being any particular tomato that he (...)
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  10.  165 DLs
    R. M. Sainsbury & Michael Tye (2011). An Originalist Theory of Concepts. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):101-124.
    We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...)
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  11.  159 DLs
    Michael Tye (2009). A New Look at the Speckled Hen. Analysis 69 (2):258 - 263.
    (forthcoming in Analysis) We owe the problem of the speckled hen to Gilbert Ryle. It was suggested to A.J. Ayer by Ryle in connection with Ayer’s account of seeing. Suppose that you are standing before a speckled hen with your eyes trained on it. You are in good light and nothing is obstructing your view. You see the hen in a single glance. The hen has 47 speckles on its facing side, let us say, and the hen ap­ pears speckled (...)
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  12.  158 DLs
    Michael Tye (1994). Why the Vague Need Not Be Higher-Order Vague. Mind 103 (409):43-45.
    Is higher-order vagueness a real phenomenon? Dominic Hyde (1994) claims that it is, and that it is part and parcel of vagueness itself. According to Hyde, any genuinely vague predicate must also be higher-order vague. His argument for this view is unsound, however. The purpose of this note is to expose the fallacy, and to make some related observations on the vague, the higher-order vague, and the vaguely vague.
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  13.  148 DLs
    Michael Tye (1986). The Subjective Qualities of Experience. Mind 95 (January):1-17.
  14.  145 DLs
    Michael Tye (1995). A Representational Theory of Pains and Their Phenomenal Character. Philosophical Perspectives 9:223-39.
  15.  138 DLs
    Michael Tye (1990). Vague Objects. Mind 99 (396):535-557.
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  16.  122 DLs
    Michael Tye (1999). Phenomenal Consciousness: The Explanatory Gap as a Cognitive Illusion. Mind 108 (432):705-25.
    The thesis that there is a troublesome explanatory gap between the phenomenal aspects of experiences and the underlying physical and functional states is given a number of different interpretations. It is shown that, on each of these interpretations, the thesis is false. In supposing otherwise, philosophers have fallen prey to a cognitive illusion, induced largely by a failure to recognize the special character of phenomenal concepts.
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  17.  118 DLs
    Michael Tye (2009). The Admissible Contents of Visual Experience. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):541-562.
    My purpose is to take a close look at the nature of visual content. I discuss the view that visual experiences have only existential contents, the view that visual experiences have either singular or gappy contents, and the view that visual experiences have multiple contents. I also consider a proposal about visual content inspired by Kaplan's well known theory of indexicals. I draw out some consequences of my discussion for the thesis of intentionalism with respect to the phenomenal character of (...)
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  18.  116 DLs
    Michael Tye (2009). Interview for Mind and Consciousness: 5 Questions. In Patrick Grim (ed.), Mind and Consciousness: 5 Questions. Automatic Press
    I went up to Oxford as an undergraduate to study physics. I chose Oxford over Cambridge at the urging of my school physics teacher who was an Oxford man. When I arrived, I found out that, as a physics student, I was expected to spend one day a week in the laboratory. This seemed to me extremely unappealing not only because it would interfere with my social life but also because the practical side of physics was, to my mind, deadly (...)
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  19.  114 DLs
    Michael Tye (1975). The Adverbial Theory: A Defence of Sellars Against Jackson. Metaphilosophy 6 (April):136-143.
  20.  109 DLs
    Michael Tye (1998). Inverted Earth, Swampman, and Representationalism. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):459-78.
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  21.  104 DLs
    Brian Cutter & Michael Tye (2011). Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):90-109.
  22.  93 DLs
    Michael Tye (1984). The Adverbial Approach to Visual Experience. Philosophical Review 93 (April):195-226.
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  23.  92 DLs
    Michael Tye (2001). Oh Yes It Is. Mind 110 (439):695-697.
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  24.  88 DLs
    Michael Tye (2006). The Puzzle of True Blue. Analysis 66 (291):173–178.
    Most men and nearly all women have non-defective colour vision, as measured by standard colour tests such as those of Ishihara and Farns- worth. But people vary, according to gender, race and age in their per- formance in matching experiments. For example, when subjects are shown a screen, one half of which is lit by a mixture of red and green lights and the other by yellow or orange light, and they are asked to ad- just the mixture of lights (...)
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  25.  85 DLs
    Michael Tye (2010). Attention, Seeing, and Change Blindness. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):410-437.
  26.  84 DLs
    Michael Tye (2014). Transparency, Qualia Realism and Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):39-57.
    In this essay, I want to take another look at the phenomenon of transparency and its relevance to qualia realism and representationalism. I don’t suppose that what I have to say will cause those who disagree with me to change their minds, but I hope not only to clarify my position and that of others who are on my side of the debate but also to respond to various criticisms and objections that have arisen over the last 10–15 years or (...)
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  27.  83 DLs
    Michael Tye (1996). The Function of Consciousness. Noûs 30 (3):287-305.
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  28.  81 DLs
    Michael Tye (1988). The Picture Theory of Images. Philosophical Review 97 (October):497-520.
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  29.  77 DLs
    Michael Tye (1994). Naturalism and the Problem of Intentionality. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (September):122-42.
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  30.  77 DLs
    Michael Tye (1983). On the Possibility of Disembodied Existence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (September):275-282.
  31.  76 DLs
    Michael Tye (2003). A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 91-105.
    1) There is widespread agreement that consciousness must be a physical phenomenon, even if it is one that we do not yet understand and perhaps may never do so fully. There is also widespread agreement that the way to defend physicalism about consciousness against a variety of well known objections is by appeal to phenomenal concepts (Loar 1990, Lycan 1996, Papineau 1993, Sturgeon 1994, Tye 1995, 2000, Perry 2001) . There is, alas, no agreement on the nature of phenomenal concepts.
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  32.  76 DLs
    Michael Tye, Precis of Color, Content, and Consciousness.
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  33.  72 DLs
    Michael Tye (1983). Functionalism and Type Physicalism. Philosophical Studies 44 (September):161-74.
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  34.  71 DLs
    Michael Tye, Qualia. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, (...)
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  35.  69 DLs
    Michael Tye (2010). Up Close with the Speckled Hen. Analysis 70 (2):283-286.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  36.  69 DLs
    Michael Tye (2007). The Problem of Common Sensibles. In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Erkenntnis. Kluwer 287 - 303.
    In _On The Soul_ (425a-b), Aristotle drew a distinction between those qualities that are perceptible only via a single sense and those that are perceptible by more than one. The latter qualities he called.
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  37.  67 DLs
    Michael Tye (1996). Orgasms Again. Philosophical Issues 7:51-54.
  38.  67 DLs
    Michael Tye (2000). Shoemaker's the First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):461-464.
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  39.  66 DLs
    Michael Tye (1993). Reflections on Dennett and Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):891-6.
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  40.  65 DLs
    Peter Bradley & Michael Tye (2001). Of Colors, Kestrels, Caterpillars, and Leaves. Journal of Philosophy 98 (9):469-487.
    According to color realism, object colors are mind-independent properties that cover surfaces or permeate volumes of objects. In recent years, some color scientists and a growing number of philosophers have opposed this view on the grounds that realism about color cannot accommodate the apparent unitary/binary structure of the hues. For example, Larry Hardin asserts, " the unitary-binary structure of the colors as we experience them corresponds to no known physical structure lying outside nervous systems that is causally involved in the (...)
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  41.  63 DLs
    Michael Tye (2012). Précis of Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):187-189.
  42.  59 DLs
    Michael Tye (1994). Sorites Paradoxes and the Semantics of Vagueness. Philosophical Perspectives 8:189-206.
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  43.  58 DLs
    Michael Tye (2003). Consciousness, Color, and Content. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 235.
  44.  57 DLs
    Michael Tye, “Qualia,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Revised 31 July 2007).
    Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, (...)
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  45.  56 DLs
    Michael Tye (1992). Naturalism and the Mental. Mind 101 (403):421-441.
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  46.  54 DLs
    Michael Tye (1993). Qualia, Content, and the Inverted Spectrum. Noûs 27 (2):159-183.
  47.  54 DLs
    Brian P. McLaughlin & Michael Tye (1998). Is Content-Externalism Compatible with Privileged Access? Philosophical Review 107 (3):349-380.
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  48.  53 DLs
    R. M. Sainsbury & Michael Tye (2012). Seven Puzzles of Thought: And How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts. OUP Oxford.
    Sainsbury and Tye present a new theory, 'originalism', which provides natural, simple solutions to puzzles about thought that have troubled philosophers for centuries. They argue that concepts are to be individuated by their origin, rather than epistemically or semantically. Although thought is special, no special mystery attaches to its nature.
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  49.  52 DLs
    Michael Tye (2003). Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity. MIT Press.
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