While much of James O. YoungÂ’sÂ Art and Knowledge is devoted to showing how works of art might be of cognitive value, we will focus on a prior claim, defended in the first chapter of Art and Knowledge, that Â“artÂ” ought to be defined such that only works with cognitive value count as artworks. We begin by noting that it is not very clearÂ—despite the considerable attention Young devotes to the matterÂ—just what it is for an artwork to have cognitive (...) value. If by this claim he means only that we can learn something from a work, then the claim is trivial. We might learn from Marcel DuchampÂ’s Fountain, for example, that a urinal can become an artwork. But Young assumes that if Fountain is a work of art, then some works of art do not have cognitive value. So he must have a richer, narrower conception of cognitive value in mind. For the moment let us not worry what this richer, narrower conception of cognitive value is. Rather, let us just assume, along with Young, that Fountain does not have cognitive value. Why, then, is this not a counterexample to YoungÂ’s claim that Â“artÂ” ought to be defined such that only works with cognitive value counts as artworks? ShouldnÂ’t we define Â“art,Â” if we are going to define it, such that all and only works of art count as art? Why ought we adopt a definition of something which excludes from the category being defined things that, on the definerÂ’s own grounds, are properly within that category. Surely, for any definiendum the definiens ought to pick out all and only those things that have the necessary and sufficient properties for being labeled by the definiendum. (shrink)
The dominant view about the nature of aesthetic value holds it to be response-dependent. We believe that the dominance of this view owes largely to some combination of the following prevalent beliefs: 1 The belief that challenges brought against response-dependent accounts in other areas of philosophy are less challenging when applied to response-dependent accounts of aesthetic value. 2 The belief that aesthetic value is instrumental and that response-dependence about aesthetic value alone accommodates this purported fact. 3 The belief that response-dependence (...) about aesthetic value alone accommodates the widely acknowledged anthropocentricity of aesthetic value. 4 The belief that response-dependence about aesthetic value alone accommodates aesthetic normativity. We argue that each of these beliefs is false, and that the dominance of response-dependent accounts of aesthetic value is therefore largely without foundation. (shrink)
Recent criticisms of non-reductive accounts of color assume that the only arguments for such accounts are a priori arguments. I put forward a posteriori arguments for a non-reductive account of colors which avoids those criticisms.
Intentionalism holds that two experiences differ in their representational content if and only if they differ in phenomenal character. It is generally held that Intentionalism cannot allow for the possibility of spectrum inversion without systematic error, unless it abandons the idea that, for example, the qualitative character of color experience is inherited from the qualitative character of colors. The paper argues that the conjunction of all three -- the possibility of spectrum inversion, Intentionalism, and the inheritance thesis -- can be (...) consistently, and plausibly, accepted. (shrink)
By treating colours as sui generis intrinsic properties of objects we can maintain that (1) colours are causally responsible for colour experiences (and so agree with the physicalist) and (2) colours, along with the similarity and difference relations that colours bear to one another, are presented to us by casual observation (and so agree with the dispositionalist). The major obstacle for such a view is the causal overdetermination of colour experience. Borrowing and expanding on the works of Sydney Shoemaker and (...) Stephen Yablo, the paper offers a solution. (shrink)
Argues that although the phenomenon of negative recency in secondary memory is usually attributed to the reduced amount of rehearsal associated with recency items, this phenomenon can be explained by the adoption of a different type of processing for recency items. An experiment with 122 undergraduates is reported in which the recall of recency items was reduced in an immediate test, but increased in a subsequent test, under conditions in which the recency items could not be identified as such during (...) their presentation. Results support the conclusion that the mode of processing items for an immediate free-recall test is normally modified for recency items. ((c) 1997 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved). (shrink)