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Michael Williams [85]Michael Stuart Williams [5]Michael J. Williams [2]Michael C. Williams [2]
Michael Allen Williams [2]Michael S. Williams [1]Michael David Williams [1]Michael de Courcy Williams [1]

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Profile: Michael Williams (Johns Hopkins University)
Profile: Michael Paul Williams
  1. Michael Williams (2001). Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology. OUP Oxford.
    In this exciting and original introduction to epistemology, Michael Williams explains and criticizes traditional philosophical theories of the nature, limits, methods, possibility, and value of knowing. All the main contemporary perspectives are explored and questioned, and the author's own theories put forward, making this new book essential reading for anyone, beginner or specialist, concerned with the philosophy of knowledge.
     
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  2.  33
    Michael Williams (1991). Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism. B. Blackwell.
    In Unnatural Doubts, Michael Williams constructs a masterly polemic against the very idea of epistemology, as traditionally conceived.
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  3. Huw Price, Simon Blackburn, Robert Brandom, Paul Horwich & Michael Williams (2013). Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism. Cambridge University Press.
    Pragmatists have traditionally been enemies of representationalism but friends of naturalism, when naturalism is understood to pertain to human subjects, in the sense of Hume and Nietzsche. In this volume Huw Price presents his distinctive version of this traditional combination, as delivered in his René Descartes Lectures at Tilburg University in 2008. Price contrasts his view with other contemporary forms of philosophical naturalism, comparing it with other pragmatist and neo-pragmatist views such as those of Robert Brandom and Simon Blackburn. Linking (...)
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  4.  3
    Michael Williams (1977). Groundless Belief: An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology. Yale University Press.
    Inspired by the work of Wilfrid Sellars, Michael Williams launches an all-out attack on what he calls "phenomenalism," the idea that our knowledge of the world rests on a perceptual or experiential foundation.
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  5. Michael Williams (2007). Why (Wittgensteinian) Contextualism Is Not Relativism. Episteme 4 (1):93-114.
    This article distinguishes Wittgensteinian contextualism from epistemic relativism. The latter involves the view that a belief ’s status as justified depends on the believer’s epistemic system, as well as the view that no system is superior to another. It emerges from the thought that we must rely, circularly, on our epistemic system to determine whether any belief is justified. Contextualism, by contrast, emerges from the thought that we need not answer a skeptical challenge to a belief unless there is good (...)
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  6. Michael Williams (1999). Meaning and Deflationary Truth. Journal of Philosophy 96 (11):545-564.
  7.  38
    Michael Williams (2015). What's so Special About Human Knowledge? Episteme 12 (2):249-268.
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  8.  16
    Christopher Hookway & Michael Williams (1993). Unnatural Doubts. Philosophical Quarterly 43 (172):389.
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  9. Michael Williams (2011). Pragmatism, Minimalism, Expressivism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (3):317-330.
    Although contemporary pragmatists tend to be sympathetic to expressivist accounts of moral, modal and other problematic vocabularies, it is not clear that they have any right to be. The problem arises because contemporary pragmatists tend to favour deflationary accounts of truth and reference, thereby seeming to elide the distinction between expressive and repressentational uses of language. To address this problem, I develop a meta-theoretical framework for understanding what is involved in explanations of meaning in terms of use, and why some (...)
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  10. Michael Williams (2003). 3 Rorty on Knowledge and Truth. In Charles B. Guignon & David R. Hiley (eds.), Richard Rorty. Cambridge University Press 61.
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  11.  5
    Marc Hauser, Susan Perry, Joseph H. Manson, Helen Ball, Michael Williams, Erik Pearson & John Berard (1991). It's All in the Hands of the Beholder: New Data on Free-Ranging Rhesus Monkeys. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (2):342-344.
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  12. Michael Williams (2006). Science and Sensibility: McDowell and Sellars on Perceptual Experience. European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):302–325.
  13.  24
    Michael Williams (2015). The Agrippan Problem, Then and Now. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (2):80-106.
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  14. Michael Williams (2008). Responsibility and Reliability. Philosophical Papers 37 (1):1-26.
    ‘Responsibilist' approaches to epistemology link knowledge and justification with epistemically responsible belief management, where responsible management is understood to involve an essential element of guidance by recognized epistemic norms. By contrast, reliabilist approaches stress the de facto reliability of cognitive processes, rendering epistemic self-consciousness as inessential. I argue that, although an adequate understanding of human knowledge must make room for both responsibility and reliability, philosophers have had a hard time putting them together, largely owing to a tendency, on the part (...)
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  15. Michael Williams (2001). Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards. Philosophical Studies 103 (1):1 - 23.
    I want to discuss an approach to knowledge that I shall call simple conversational contextualism or SCC for short. Proponents of SCC think that it offers an illuminating account of both why scepti- cism is wrong and why arguments for scepticism are so intuitively appealing. I have my doubts.
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  16. Michael Williams (2004). Scepticism and the Context of Philosophy. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):456–475.
  17. Michael Williams (2004). Context, Meaning, and Truth. Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):107-130.
  18.  63
    Michael Williams (1986). Do We (Epistemologists) Need a Theory of Truth? Philosophical Topics 14 (1):223-242.
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  19. Richard Rorty, Michael Williams & David Bromwich (2008). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature: Thirtieth-Anniversary Edition. Princeton University Press.
    When it first appeared in 1979, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature hit the philosophical world like a bombshell. In it, Richard Rorty argued that, beginning in the seventeenth century, philosophers developed an unhealthy obsession with the notion of representation: comparing the mind to a mirror that reflects reality. Rorty's book is a powerful critique of this imagery and the tradition of thought that it spawned. Thirty years later, the book remains a must-read and stands as a classic of twentieth-century (...)
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  20. Michael A. Williams (forthcoming). Book Review: Gnosis and Faith in Early Christianity: An Introduction to Gnosticism. [REVIEW] Interpretation 55 (1):96-98.
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  21. Michael Williams (1988). Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism. Mind 97 (387):415-439.
  22. Michael Williams (2013). Skepticism, Evidence and Entitlement1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):36-71.
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  23.  31
    Michael Williams (2014). Knowledge, Reasons, and Causes: Sellars and Skepticism. In Andrea Kern & James Conant (eds.), Varieties of Skepticism: Essays After Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell. De Gruyter 59-80.
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  24. Michael Williams (2012). Wright Against the Sceptics. In Crispin Wright & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press
     
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  25.  66
    Michael Williams (2000). Dretske on Epistemic Entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):607-612.
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  26.  29
    Michael J. Williams (2000). Is Contextualism Statable? Noûs 34 (s1):80-85.
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  27.  34
    Michael Williams (2004). The Unity of Hume's Philosophical Project. Hume Studies 30 (2):265-296.
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  28.  96
    Michael Williams (2004). Knowledge, Reflection and Sceptical Hypotheses. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):315 - 343.
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  29.  85
    Michael Williams (2003). Are There Two Grades of Knowledge? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):91–112.
    [Michael Williams] A response to Sosa's criticisms of Sellars's account of the relation between knowledge and experience, noting that Sellars excludes merely animal knowledge, and hopes to bypass epistemology by an adequate philosophy of mind and language. /// [Ernest Sosa] I give an exposition and critical discussion of Sellars's Myth of the Given, and especially of its epistemic side. In later writings Sellars takes a pragmatist turn in his epistemology. This is explored and compared with his earlier critique of givenist (...)
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  30. Michael C. Williams (2004). The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
     
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  31.  2
    Michael David Williams & James D. Hollan (1981). The Process of Retrieval From Very Long‐Term Memory. Cognitive Science 5 (2):87-119.
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  32. Michael Williams (2004). Wittgenstein's Refutation of Idealism. In Denis McManus (ed.), Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Routledge
  33.  39
    Michael Williams (1993). The Unreality of Knowledge. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (sup1):265-293.
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  34.  26
    Michael Williams (1980). Coherence, Justification, and Truth. Review of Metaphysics 34 (2):243 - 272.
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  35.  38
    Michael Williams (2011). Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Two Kinds of Knowledge. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (2):124-137.
    In his Reflective Knowledge, Ernest Sosa offers a theory of knowledge, broadly virtue-theoretic in character, that is meant to transcend simple ways of contrasting "internalist" with "externalist" or "foundationalist" with "coherentist" approaches to knowledge and justification. Getting beyond such simplifications, Sosa thinks, is the key to finding an exit from "the Pyrrhonian Problematic": the ancient and profound skeptical problem concerning the apparent impossibility of validating the reliability of our basic epistemic faculties and procedures in a way that escapes vicious circularity. (...)
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  36. Michael Williams (2008). Hume's Skepticism. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press
  37. Michael Williams (1998). Descartes and the Metaphysics of Doubt. In John Cottingham (ed.), Descartes. OUP Oxford
     
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  38.  44
    Michael Williams (1978). Inference, Justification, and the Analysis of Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 75 (5):249-263.
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  39.  4
    Michael Williams (2004). Knowledge, Reflection and Sceptical Hypotheses. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):315-343.
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  40. Michael Williams (2010). Descartes' Transformation of the Sceptical Tradition. In Richard Arnot Home Bett (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism. Cambridge University Press
  41.  7
    G. A. Reuten & Michael Williams (1992). [Book Review] Value-Form and the State, the Tendencies of Accumulation and the Determination of Economic Policy in Capitalist Society. [REVIEW] Science and Society 56 (2):223-225.
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  42. Michael Williams, Frederick F. Schmitt, Erin I. Kelly & Louis E. Loeb (2004). A Symposium on Louis E. Loeb, Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise. Hume Studies 30 (2):265-404.
     
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  43. Michael Williams (2004). The Agrippan Argument and Two Forms of Skepticism. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Pyrrhonian Skepticism. Oxford University Press 121--145.
     
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  44.  32
    Michael Williams (1988). Scepticism and Charity. Ratio 1 (2):176-194.
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  45.  14
    Michael Williams (1996). Understanding Human Knowledge Philosophically. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):359 - 378.
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  46.  15
    Michael Williams (1996). Review: Exorcism and Enchantment. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):99 - 109.
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  47.  4
    Michael Williams (2006). Realism: What's Left? In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press 77--99.
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  48.  35
    Michael Williams (1988). Scepticism Without Theory. Review of Metaphysics 41 (3):547 - 588.
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  49. Michael Williams (1977/1999). Groundless Belief: An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology: With a New Preface and Afterword. Princeton University Press.
    Inspired by the work of Wilfrid Sellars, Michael Williams launches an all-out attack on what he calls "phenomenalism," the idea that our knowledge of the world rests on a perceptual or experiential foundation. The point of this wider-than-normal usage of the term "phenomenalism," according to which even some forms of direct realism deserve to be called phenomenalistic, is to call attention to important continuities of thought between theories often thought to be competitors. Williams's target is not phenomenalism in its classical (...)
     
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  50.  22
    Michael Williams (1997). Still Unnatural. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:29-39.
    Professor Vogel claims that my responses to scepticism leave the traditional problems standing . I argue in reply that he fails to take sufficiently seriously the diagnostic character of my enterprise. My aim is not to offer direct refutations of sceptical arguments, taking such arguments at face value, but to undermine their plausibility by revealing their dependence on unacknowledged and contentious theoretical presuppositions. Professor Rorty is much more sympathetic to my approach but thinks that there is a simpler and more (...)
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