Search results for 'Michaela Rosenthal' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Michaela Rosenthal (2003). Spinoza's Republican Argument for Toleration. Journal of Political Philosophy 11 (3):320–337.score: 240.0
  2. David M. Rosenthal & Wilfrid S. Sellars (1972). The Rosenthal-Sellars Correspondence on Intentionality. In Ausonio Marras (ed.), Intentionality, Mind and Language. University of Illinois Press.score: 180.0
    In response to your kind offer to read through portions of the typescript of my thesis pertaining to your views on intentionality, I am sending you a copy of an introductory section to such a chapter.{1} The enclosed typescript represents a first draft, for which I apologize, but I thought it might be useful to get any comments you might have in at the ground floor, so to speak.
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  3. Joan Stambaugh, James L. Muyskens & Abigail Rosenthal (1978). Henry M. Rosenthal 1906-1977. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 51 (5):583 - 584.score: 180.0
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  4. Andrew J. Reck, John E. Smith & Sandra B. Rosenthal (1987). Pragmatism's Shared Metaphysical Vision: A Symposium on Sandra B. Rosenthal's "Speculative Pragmatism". Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 23 (3):341 - 380.score: 180.0
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  5. Jw Rosenthal & A. S. H. Cj (1986). AHLBRANDT, G. And ZIEGLER, M., Quasi Finitely Axiomatiz-Able Totally Categorical Theories ASH, CJ and ROSENTHAL, JW, Intersections of Algebraically Closed Fields BAUDISCH, A., On Elementary Properties of Free Lie Algebras. [REVIEW] Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 30:321.score: 180.0
     
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  6. Robert Rosenthal & Donald B. Rubin (1978). Interpersonal Expectancy Effects: The First 345 Studies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3):377.score: 90.0
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  7. David M. Rosenthal (2005). Consciousness and Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.score: 60.0
    The first four essays develop various aspects of that theory.The next three essays present Rosenthal's homomorphism theory of mental qualities and qualitative ...
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  8. David M. Rosenthal (1968). Intentionality: A Study of the Views of Chisholm and Sellars. Philosophy.score: 60.0
    Edited in hypertext by Andrew Chrucky. Reprinted with the permission of Professor David Rosenthal. Editor's Note: Due to the limitation of current hypertext, the following conventions have been used. In general, if an expression has some mark over it, that mark is placed as a prefix to the expression. All Greek characters (except phi) are rendered by their names. Subscripts are placed in parentheses as concatenated suffixes: thus, e.g., H(2)O is the chemical formula for water. Sellars' dot quotes are (...)
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  9. Yitzhak Y. Melamed & Michael A. Rosenthal (eds.) (2010). Spinoza's 'Theological-Political Treatise': A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press.score: 60.0
    Machine generated contents note: List of contributors; Acknowledgements; List of abbreviations; Introduction Yitzhak Y. Melamed and Michael Rosenthal; Spinoza's exchange with Albert Burgh Edwin Curley; The text of Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus Piet Steenbakkers; Spinoza on Ibn Ezra's Secret of the Twelve Warren Zev Harvey; Reflections of the medieval Jewish-Christian debate in the Theological-Political Treatise and the Epistles Daniel J. Lasker; The early Dutch and German reaction to the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus: foreshadowing the Enlightenment's more general Spinoza reception? Jonathan Israel; G. (...)
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  10. Erwin Isak Jakob Rosenthal & Saʻadia ben Joseph (eds.) (1980). Saadya Studies. Arno Press.score: 60.0
    Hertz, J. H. Saadya gaon (882-942).--Altmann, A. Saadya's theory of revelation.--Herzog, D. The polemic treatise against Saadya.--Krauss, S. Saadya's Tafsir of the seventy hapax legomena explained and continued.--Leveen, J. Saadya's lost commentary on Leviticus.--Markon, I. (Exodus XXX, 23) explained by Saadya and his successors.--Marmorstein, A. The doctrine of redemption in Saadya's theological system.--Mittwoch, E. An unknown fragment by Gaon Saadya.--Rabin, C. Saadya gaon's Hebrew prose style.--Rawidowicz, S. Saadya's purification of the idea of God.--Robertson, E. The relationship of the Arabic (...)
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  11. Franz Rosenthal (1970/2007). Knowledge Triumphant: The Concept of Knowledge in Medieval Islam. Brill.score: 60.0
    In "Knowledge Triumphant," Franz Rosenthal observes that the Islamic civilization is one that is essentially characterized by knowledge ("'ilm"), for "ilm is ...
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  12. David Rosenthal (web). Concepts and Definitions of Consciousness. In P W. Banks (ed.), Encyclopedia of Consciousness. Elsevier.score: 30.0
    in Encyclopedia of Consciousness, ed. William P. Banks, Amsterdam: Elsevier, forthcoming in 2009.
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  13. David M. Rosenthal (2002). How Many Kinds of Consciousness? Consciousness and Cognition 11 (4):653-665.score: 30.0
    Ned BlockÕs influential distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness has become a staple of current discussions of consciousness. It is not often noted, however, that his distinction tacitly embodies unargued theoretical assumptions that favor some theoretical treatments at the expense of others. This is equally so for his less widely discussed distinction between phenomenal consciousness and what he calls reflexive consciousness. I argue that the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, as Block draws it, is untenable. Though mental states that (...)
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  14. David M. Rosenthal (1986). Two Concepts of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.score: 30.0
    No mental phenomenon is more central than consciousness to an adequate understanding of the mind. Nor does any mental phenomenon seem more stubbornly to resist theoretical treatment. Consciousness is so basic to the way we think about the mind that it can be tempting to suppose that no mental states exist that are not conscious states. Indeed, it may even seem mysterious what sort of thing a mental state might be if it is not a conscious state. On this way (...)
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  15. David M. Rosenthal (2010). Consciousness, the Self and Bodily Location. Analysis 70 (2):270-276.score: 30.0
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  16. David M. Rosenthal (1997). Phenomenal Consciousness and What It's Like. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):156--57.score: 30.0
    be realized. Whatever gets access to phenomenal awareness (to consciousness and P-consciousness are almost always present or P-consciousness as described by Block) is represented within this absent together.
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  17. David Rosenthal (2012). Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function. Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation and Function 367 (1594):1424-1438.score: 30.0
    Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological (...)
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  18. David M. Rosenthal (1994). State Consciousness and Transitive Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (3):355-63.score: 30.0
  19. Cynthia Schupak & Jesse Rosenthal (2009). Excessive Daydreaming: A Case History and Discussion of Mind Wandering and High Fantasy Proneness. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):290-292.score: 30.0
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  20. David M. Rosenthal (2002). Consciousness and Higher-Order Thought. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.score: 30.0
    The problem of consciousness is to say what it is for some of our thoughts, feelings, and sensations to be conscious, given that others are not. This is different from saying what it is for a person to be conscious or not conscious. Even when people are conscious, many of their thoughts and sensations typically are not. And there's nothing problematic about a person's being conscious; it's just the person's being awake and responsive to sensory input.
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  21. David Rosenthal, Consciousness and its Function.score: 30.0
    MS, under submission, derived from a Powerpoint presentation at a Conference on Consciousness, Memory, and Perception, in honor of Larry Weiskrantz, City University, London, September 15, 2006.
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  22. David M. Rosenthal, The Kinds of Consciousness.score: 30.0
    I begin by considering Ned Block's widely accepted distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness. I argue that on Block's official characterization a mental state's being access conscious is not a way the state's being conscious in any intuitive sense; that if phenomenal consciousness itself corresponds to an intuitive way of a state's being conscious, it literally implies access consciousness; and that Block misconstrues the theoretical significance of the commonsense distinction. These considerations point to the view that mental states' being conscious (...)
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  23. David M. Rosenthal (2003). Unity of Consciousness and the Self. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):325-352.score: 30.0
    The so-called unity of consciousness consists in the compelling sense we have that all our conscious mental states belong to a single conscious subject. Elsewhere I have argued that a mental state's being conscious is a matter of our being conscious of that state by having a higher-order thought (HOT) about it. Contrary to what is sometimes argued, this HOT model affords a natural explanation of our sense that our conscious states all belong to a single conscious subject. HOTs often (...)
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  24. David Rosenthal, Aristotle's Hylomorphism.score: 30.0
    In these comments on Bernard Williams's probing and provocative paper, I shall first try to develop a line of response to the pair of problems Williams poses concerning Aristotle's account of soul. I shall then offer some reactions, of a more general sort, to his discussion of hylomorphism (henceforth "HMism"). In particular, I want to suggest that, though HMism is in part a form of inoffensive materialism, it is more than just that. And I want to urge also that HMism (...)
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  25. David Rosenthal & Josh Weisberg (2008). Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness. Scholarpedia 3 (5):4407.score: 30.0
  26. David M. Rosenthal (2004). Being Conscious of Ourselves. The Monist 87 (2):161-184.score: 30.0
  27. David M. Rosenthal (ed.) (1971). Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem. Prentice-Hall.score: 30.0
    An expanded and updated edition of this classic collection.
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  28. David Rosenthal (2011). Exaggerated Reports: Reply to Block. Analysis 71 (3):431-437.score: 30.0
  29. David M. Rosenthal, Consciousness.score: 30.0
    One phenomenon pertains roughly to being awake. A person or other creature is conscious when it's awake and mentally responsive to sensory input; otherwise it's unconscious. This kind of consciousness figures most often in everyday discourse.
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  30. David M. Rosenthal (2000). Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):203-214.score: 30.0
    Because metacognition consists in our having mental access to our cognitive states and mental states are conscious only when we are conscious of them in some suitable way, metacognition and consciousness shed important theoretical light on one another. Thus, our having metacognitive access to information carried by states that are not conscious helps con?rm the hypothesis that a mental state.
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  31. David Rosenthal (2004). Varieties of Higher-Order Theory. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.score: 30.0
    A touchstone of much modern theorizing about the mind is the idea, still tac- itly accepted by many, that a state's being mental implies that it's conscious. This view is epitomized in the dictum, put forth by theorists as otherwise di-.
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  32. David M. Rosenthal (2002). The Timing of Conscious States. Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):215-20.score: 30.0
    Striking experimental results by Benjamin Libet and colleagues have had an impor- tant impact on much recent discussion of consciousness. Some investigators have sought to replicate or extend Libet’s results (Haggard, 1999; Haggard & Eimer, 1999; Haggard, Newman, & Magno, 1999; Trevena & Miller, 2002), while others have focused on how to interpret those findings (e.g., Gomes, 1998, 1999, 2002; Pockett, 2002), which many have seen as conflicting with our commonsense picture of mental functioning.
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  33. David Rosenthal (2005). The Higher-Order Model of Consciousness. In Rita Carter (ed.), Consciousness. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.score: 30.0
    All mental states, including thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations, often occur consciously. But they all occur also without being conscious. So the first thing a theory of consciousness must do is explain the difference between thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and sensations that are conscious and those which are not.
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  34. David Rosenthal (2010). How to Think About Mental Qualities. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):368-393.score: 30.0
    It’s often held that undetectable inversion of mental qualities is, if not possible, at least conceivable. It’s thought to be conceivable that the mental quality your visual states exhibit when you see something red in standard conditions is literally of the same type as the mental quality my visual states exhibit when I see something green in such circumstances. It’s thought, moreover, to be conceivable that such inversion of mental qualities could be wholly undetectable by any third-person means. And since (...)
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  35. David M. Rosenthal (1991). The Independence of Consciousness and Sensory Quality. Philosophical Issues 1:15-36.score: 30.0
  36. Abigail L. Rosenthal (2004). What Ayer Saw When He Was Dead. Philosophy 79 (4):507-531.score: 30.0
    It was news verging on sensational when A. J. Ayer came back from four minutes of heart death with a report of what he saw. Especially since the philosopher, who publicized his near-death experience [NDE] in 1988, in the Telegraph and the Spectator, was known for his lifelong rejection of religion and the supernatural. But, as will be seen, Ayer's beliefs on that head were substantially unchanged, if more ambivalently expressed, and the interest of his NDE lies elsewhere— in what (...)
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  37. David M. Rosenthal, The Mind and its Expression.score: 30.0
    pain' and ┌I think that p┐ express the pain and the thought that p, themselves. The book is most impressive. It is packed with careful argument, and addresses a remarkable range of important issues about the mind. I have very much enjoyed studying it.
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  38. David Rosenthal (2010). Expressing One's Mind. Acta Analytica 25 (1):21 - 34.score: 30.0
    Remarks such as ‘I am in pain’ and ‘I think that it’s raining’ are puzzling, since they seem to literally describe oneself as being in pain or having a particular thought, but their conditions of use tend to coincide with unequivocal expressions of pain or of that thought. This led Wittgenstein, among others, to treat such remarks as expressing, rather than as reporting, one’s mental states. Though such expressivism is widely recognized as untenable, Bar-On has recently advanced a neo-expressivist view, (...)
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  39. David M. Rosenthal (1995). Multiple Drafts and the Facts of the Matter. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. 275--290.score: 30.0
  40. David Rosenthal, The Function and Facilitation of Consciousness.score: 30.0
  41. David M. Rosenthal (2001). Color, Mental Location, and the Visual Field. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):85-93.score: 30.0
    Color subjectivism is the view that color properties are mental properties of our visual sensations, perhaps identical with properties of neural states, and that nothing except visual sensations and other mental states exhibits color properties. Color phys- icalism, by contrast, holds that colors are exclusively properties of visible physical objects and processes.
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  42. Patrick L. Bourgeois & Sandra B. Rosenthal (1990). Scientific Time and the Temporal Sense of Human Existence: Merleau-Ponty and Mead. Research in Phenomenology 20 (1):152-163.score: 30.0
  43. David M. Rosenthal (2006). Experience and the Physical. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):117-28.score: 30.0
    Strawson’s challenging and provocative defence of panpsychism1 begins by sensibly insisting that physicalism, properly understood, must unflinchingly countenance the occurrence of conscious experiences. No view, he urges, will count as ‘real physicalism’ (p. 4) if it seeks to get around or soften that commitment, as versions of socalled physicalism sometimes do. Real physicalism (hereinafter physicalism tout court) must accordingly reject any stark opposition of mental and physical, which is not only invoked by many followers of Descartes, but even countenanced by (...)
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  44. Rogene A. Buchholz & Sandra B. Rosenthal (2004). Stakeholder Theory and Public Policy: How Governments Matter. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 51 (2):143-153.score: 30.0
    The Social Issues in Management Division has had a long history of research into various aspects of governmental influences on business. Recent years, however, have seen stakeholder theory sort of sweep the field, and under a stakeholder theory of capitalism, governments will matter less then they have in the past as stakeholder principles are implemented throughout the corporate world. This article will examine the nature of this claim by discussing problems with the implementation of stakeholder theory and examining the role (...)
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  45. David M. Rosenthal (2000). Metacognition and Higher-Order Thoughts. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):231-242.score: 30.0
    Because there is a fair amount of overlap in the points by Balog and Rey, I will organize this response topically, referring specifically to each commentator as rele- vant. And, because much of the discussion focuses on my higher-order-thought (HOT) hypothesis independent of questions about metacognition, I will begin by addressing a cluster of issues that have to do with the status, motivation, and exact formulation of that hypothesis.
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  46. Rogene A. Buchholz & Sandra B. Rosenthal (2005). Toward a Contemporary Conceptual Framework for Stakeholder Theory. Journal of Business Ethics 58 (1-3):137 - 148.score: 30.0
    . Atomic individualism is embedded in most definitions of stakeholder theory, and as a result, stakeholders are not integral to the basic identity of the corporation which is considered to be independent of, and separate from, its stakeholders. Feminist theory has been suggested as a way of developing a more relational view of the corporation and its stakeholders, but it lacks a systematically developed conceptual framework for undergirding its own insights. Pragmatic philosophy is offered as a way of providing this (...)
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  47. David Rosenthal (2001). Consciousness and Sensation: Philosophical Aspects. In N. J. Smelser & P. B. Baltes (eds.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Pergamon/Elsevier.score: 30.0
    consciousness. Such unconscious processing always
    Cambridge, UK
    tends to re?ect habitual or strong responses. From this.
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  48. David M. Rosenthal (2004). Subjective Character and Reflexive Content. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):191-198.score: 30.0
    I. Zombies and the Knowledge Argument John Perry.
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  49. David Rosenthal, Consciousness and Intrinsic Higher-Order Content.score: 30.0
    PowerPoint presentation at Tucson VII, Toward a Science of Consciousness 2006, session on Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness.
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  50. David Rosenthal, V. Consciousness, Interpretation, and Higher-Order-Thought.score: 30.0
    Few contemporary researchers in psychology, philosophy, and the cognitive sciences have any doubt about whether mental phenomena occur without being conscious. There is extensive and convincing clinical and experimental evidence for the existence of thoughts, desires, and related mental states that aren’t conscious. We characterize thoughts, desires, intentions, expectations, hopes, and many other mental states in terms of the things they are about and, more fully, in terms of their content, as captured by a sentence nominalization, such as a clause (...)
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