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Profile: Michelle Montague (University of Texas at Austin)
  1. Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.) (2014). Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Does thought have distinctive experiential features? Is there, in addition to sensory phenomenology, a kind of cognitive phenomenology--phenomenology of a cognitive or conceptual character? Leading philosophers of mind debate whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology and whether it is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion.
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  2. Michelle Montague (2009). The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):171-192.
    My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. (...)
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  3. Michelle Montague (2007). Against Propositionalism. Noûs 41 (3):503–518.
    'Propositionalism' is the widely held view that all intentional mental relations-all intentional attitudes-are relations to propositions or something proposition-like. Paradigmatically, to think about the mountain is ipso facto to think that it is F, for some predicate 'F'. It seems, however, many intentional attitudes are not relations to propositions at all: Mary contemplates Jonah, adores New York, misses Athens, mourns her brother. I argue, following Brentano, Husserl, Church and Montague among others, that the way things seem is the way they (...)
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  4.  59
    Michelle Montague (forthcoming). Cognitive Phenomenology and Conscious Thought. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-15.
    How does mental content feature in conscious thought? I first argue that for a thought to be conscious the content of that thought must conscious, and that one has to appeal to cognitive phenomenology to give an adequate account of what it is for the content of a thought to be conscious. Sensory phenomenology cannot do the job. If one claims that the content of a conscious thought is unconscious, one is really claiming that there is no such thing (...)
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    Michelle Montague (2013). The Access Problem. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press 27.
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    Michelle Montague (2016). Cognitive Phenomenology and Conscious Thought. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):167-181.
    How does mental content feature in conscious thought? I first argue that for a thought to be conscious the content of that thought must conscious, and that one has to appeal to cognitive phenomenology to give an adequate account of what it is for the content of a thought to be conscious. Sensory phenomenology cannot do the job. If one claims that the content of a conscious thought is unconscious, one is really claiming that there is no such thing as (...)
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    Michelle Montague (2015). The Objects of Thought by Tim Crane. Analysis 75 (2):335-339.
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    Michelle Montague (2011). The Phenomenology of Particularity. In T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press 121--140.
  9.  9
    Michelle Montague (2012). The Metaphysics & Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience: A Reply to Conduct. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):737-739.
  10. Michelle Montague (2009). The Content of Perceptual Experience. In B. McLaughlin & A. Beckermann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP Oxford
  11.  26
    Michelle Montague (2010). Recent Work: Recent Work on Intentionality. Analysis 70 (4):765 - 782.
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  12. Alex Gzrankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.) (forthcoming). Non-Propositional Intentionality.
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  13. Michelle Montague (2012). The Content, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Experience. In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag 47--73.
     
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  14. Michelle Montague (2016). The Given Experience and its Content. Oxford University Press Uk.
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  15. Michelle Montague (2015). The Life of the Mind. In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousnss. Oxford University Press
     
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