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Profile: Michelle Montague (Bristol University)
  1. Alex Gzrankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.) (forthcoming). Non-Propositional Attitudes.
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  2. Michelle Montague (2013). The Access Problem. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. 27.
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  3. Michelle Montague (2012). The Content, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Experience. In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag. 47--73.
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  4. Michelle Montague (2012). The Metaphysics & Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience: A Reply to Conduct. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):737-739.
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  5. Michelle Montague (2011). The Phenomenology of Particularity. In T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press, Usa. 121.
  6. Michelle Montague (2010). Recent Work: Recent Work on Intentionality. Analysis 70 (4):765 - 782.
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  7. Michelle Montague (2009). The Content of Perceptual Experience. In B. McLaughlin & A. Beckermann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.
  8. Michelle Montague (2009). The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):171-192.
    My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. (...)
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  9. Michelle Montague (2007). Against Propositionalism. Noûs 41 (3):503–518.
    'Propositionalism' is the widely held view that all intentional mental relations-all intentional attitudes-are relations to propositions or something proposition-like. Paradigmatically, to think about the mountain is ipso facto to think that it is F, for some predicate 'F'. It seems, however, many intentional attitudes are not relations to propositions at all: Mary contemplates Jonah, adores New York, misses Athens, mourns her brother. I argue, following Brentano, Husserl, Church and Montague among others, that the way things seem is the way they (...)
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