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Profile: Mikael Janvid (Stockholm University)
  1. Mikael Janvid (2013). Anthony Brueckner Essays on Skepticism. Oxford University Press, 2010. Xi + 396 Pp. Isbn 978‐0‐19‐958586‐1. [REVIEW] Theoria 79 (4):378-382.
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  2. Mikael Janvid (2013). The Challenges of Traveling Without Itinerary: The Overrding Case. Grazer Philosophische Studien 87:59-73.
    As an important step towards a comprehensive model of challenges and defeat- ers, it is here argued that securing a previously held epistemic status for a belief in the face of an overriding challenge does not require us to reach a higher epistemic standard than the one the belief originally reached. In the course of the investigation, criteria for when the epistemic status of beliefs are challenged and defeated are suggested. At the end of the paper, these results are then (...)
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  3. Mikael Janvid (2013). Two Kinds of Skeptical Argument. Theoria 79 (4):378-382.
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  4. Mikael Janvid (2012). Knowledge Versus Understanding: The Cost of Avoiding Gettier. Acta Analytica 27 (2):183-197.
    In the current discussion on epistemic value, several philosophers argue that understanding enjoys higher epistemological significance and epistemic value than knowledge—the epistemic state the epistemological tradition has been preoccupied with. By noting a tension between the necessary conditions for understanding in the perhaps most prominent of these philosophers, Jonathan Kvanvig, this paper disputes the higher epistemological relevance of understanding. At the end, on the basis of the results of the previous sections, some alternative comparative contrasts between knowledge and understanding are (...)
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  5. Mikael Janvid (2012). Towards a Default and Challenge Model of A Priori Warrant. Journal of Philosophical Research 37:135-154.
    This paper outlines a default and challenge account of a priori warrant by unfolding the three stages of the epistemic dialectic in which such warrant comes to the fore. Among the virtues of this account is that it does not rely on controversial assumptions regarding non-experiential sources of warrant, like intellectual intuition, but instead relies on features of our epistemic practice, more precisely, its default and challenge structure. What distinguishes beliefs to which you are warranted a priori is not that (...)
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  6. Mikael Janvid (2010). Empirical Indefeasibility and Nonfactuality. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):183-197.
    Hartry Field has recently presented an original and interesting approach to the a priori. Its main theses are, first, that certain rules are empirically indefeasible and, second, that the reasonableness of these rules are not based on any factual property. After an introduction, Field’s approach is presented in section II. Section III examines his claims concerning empirical indefeasibility. It will be argued that his general argument for empirical indefeasibility fails along with the particular examples of rules he gives. Alternative ways (...)
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  7. Mikael Janvid (2009). The Value of Lesser Goods: The Epistemic Value of Entitlement. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 24 (4):263-274.
    The notion of entitlement plays an important role in some influential epistemologies. Often the epistemological motive for introducing the concept is to accommodate certain externalist intuitions within an internalist framework or, conversely, to incorporate internalist traits into an otherwise externalist position. In this paper two prominent philosophers will be used as examples: Tyler Burge as a representative of the first option and Fred Dretske as one of the second. However, even on the assumption that the concept of entitlement is sufficiently (...)
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  8. Mikael Janvid (2008). Defeaters and Rising Standards of Justification. Acta Analytica 23 (1):45-54.
    The purpose of this paper is to refute the widespread view that challenging a knowledge-claim always raises the original standards of justification–a view often associated with contextualism. To that purpose the distinction between undermining and overriding defeaters will be used. Three kinds of challenges will be considered that differ in their degree of specification. In all three kinds of challenges, the rising standards of justification model fails to capture the dialectic of justification in the case of undermining defeaters. At the (...)
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  9. Mikael Janvid (2008). The Experiential Defeasibility and Overdetermination of A Priori Justification. Journal of Philosophical Research 33:271-278.
    In a recent and interesting paper “Experientially Defeasible A Priori Justification,” Joshua Thurow argues that many a priori justified beliefs are defeasible by experience. The argument takes the form of an objection against Albert Casullo’s recent book, A Priori Justification, where Casullo, according to Thurow, denies that if a justified belief is non-experientially defeasible, then that belief is also experientially defeasible. This paper critically examines Thurow’s two arguments in the first two sections I–II. In the last section, III, an alternative (...)
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  10. Mikael Janvid (2006). Contextualism and the Structure of Skeptical Arguments. Dialectica 60 (1):63–77.
    In this paper a candidate for a rational reconstruction of skeptical arguments is presented and defended against a competitor called ‘The Argument from Ignorance’. On the basis of this defense, Michael Williams’ claims that foundationalism and epistemological realism serve as presuppositions for skepticism are criticized. It is argued that rejecting these two theses, as his version of contextualism does, is not sufficient for answering the skeptical challenge.
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  11. Mikael Janvid (2006). Contextualism in Doubt. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):197-217.
    This paper is a critical examination of epistemological contextualism as a response to the skeptical challenge with focus upon Michael Williams’ version. Unclarities in his response are initially pointed out and various unsatisfactory ways of elaborating upon them discussed. Next, it is argued that Williams’ candidate epistemological realism with the priority thesis at its core does not provide the key to how traditional epistemology becomes exposed to skepticism. The thesis that knowledge-claims necessarily are justified with recourse to sensory experience and (...)
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  12. Mikael Janvid (2006). Casullo on the Nature and Existence of A Priori Justification. SATS 7 (2).
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  13. Mikael Janvid (2006). Review Essay Casullo on the Nature and Existence of A Priori Justification. SATS 7 (2).
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  14. Mikael Janvid (2004). Epistemological Naturalism and the Normativity Objection or From Normativity to Constitutivity. Erkenntnis 60 (1):35-49.
    A common objection raised against naturalism is that a naturalized epistemology cannot account for the essential normative character of epistemology. Following an analysis of different ways in which this charge could be understood, it will be argued that either epistemology is not normative in the relevant sense, or if it is, then in a way which a naturalized epistemology can account for with an instrumental and hypothetical model of normativity. Naturalism is here captured by the two doctrines of empiricism and (...)
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