The Dempster–Shafer approach to expressing beliefabout a parameter in a statistical model is notconsistent with the likelihood principle. Thisinconsistency has been recognized for some time, andmanifests itself as a non-commutativity, in which theorder of operations (combining belief, combininglikelihood) makes a difference. It is proposed herethat requiring the expression of belief to be committed to the model (and to certain of itssubmodels) makes likelihood inference very nearly aspecial case of the Dempster–Shafer theory.
Mikel Burley challenges that my essay, "Philosophy, Death and Immortality," in which I discussed the views of Dewi Phillips, fails to establish the case for a realist treatment of claims about the resurrection of Jesus and the general resurrection of human beings. I respond to these criticisms by again distinguishing between the analysis of the sense of religious claims and the determination of whether they purport to make reference beyond human language and practices. I consider particular texts drawn from (...) Christian scripture and argue that they are best understood in realist terms. I conclude by pointing out that a Wittgensteinean about meaning need not be a linguistic idealist. (shrink)
This article discusses Robin Le Poidevin's proposal that a commitment to the B-theory of time provides atheists with a reason to relinquish the fear of death. For the purposes of the article, I grant Le Poidevin's assertion that the B-theory gives us a sense in which our lives are 'eternally real'; but I deny that the B-theorist is entitled to regard this as sufficient to furnish a reason to cease fearing death. This is because, according to the most prevalent B-theoretic (...) conception of our emotional attitudes, A-theoretic (and not B-theoretic) beliefs are sufficient to ground these attitudes. I discuss this B-theoretic account of our emotions, which I call the Mellor–MacBeath model, and explain how it relates to the fear of death. I argue that, according to this model, the fear of death – in so far as it is a fear of one's personal annihilation – is warranted, and hence that, if Le Poidevin's proposal is to stand, then we must be given either a new B-theoretic account of the connection between beliefs and emotions, or an account of why the fear of death is unlike other emotional attitudes. (shrink)
This article contributes to the ongoing debate initiated by Bernard Williams’ claim that, due to the non-contingent finitude of the categorical desires that give meaning to our lives, an immortal life would necessarily become intolerably boring. Jeremy Wisnewski has argued that even if immortality involves periods in which our categorical desires have been exhausted, this need not divest life of meaning since some categorical desires are revivable. I argue that careful reflection upon the thought-experiments adduced by Wisnewski reveals that they (...) do not substantiate his proposal, and hence that a plausible reason for rejecting Williams’ position has not been provided. (shrink)
This Article critically discusses Clifford Williams’ claim that the A-theory and B-theory of time are indistinguishable. I examine three considerations adduced by Williams to support his claim that the concept of time essentially includes transition as well as extension, and argue that, despite its prima facie plausibility, the claim has not been adequately justified. Williams therefore begs the question against the B-theorist, who denies that transition is essential. By Williams’ own lights, he ought to deny that the B-theory is a (...) (realist) theory of time; and thus his claim that A-time and B-time do not differ significantly should be rejected. (shrink)
In his article 'The Evil of Death' (henceforth: ED) Harry Silverstein argues that a proper refutation of the Epicurean view that death is not an evil requires the adoption of a particular revisionary ontology, which Silverstein, following Quine, calls 'four-dimensionalism'.1 In 'The Evil of Death Revisited' (henceforth: EDR) Silverstein reaffirms his earlier position and responds to several criticisms, including some targeted at his ontology. There remain, however, serious problems with Silverstein's argument, and I shall highlight five major ones below. I (...) conclude that Silverstein has not shown that an appeal to four-dimensionalism facilitates a refutation of Epicurus, although a consideration of some of Silverstein's points helps to indicate the limited scope of the Epicurean thesis. (shrink)
This article questions the assumption, held by several philosophers, that the Epicurean argument for death's being “nothing to us” must be fallacious since its acceptance would undermine the principle that killing is (in general) wrong. Two possible strategies are considered, which the Epicurean-sympathizer might deploy in order to show that the non-badness of death (for the person who dies) is compatible with killing's being wrong. One of these is unsuccessful; the other is more promising. It involves arguing that the wrongness (...) of killing is a “basic moral certainty” and hence requires no underpinning by the judgement that death is bad. Problems for this proposal, and possible responses to those problems, are considered. Though the strategy is not decisive, it is deemed to be one that the Epicurean could plausibly adopt. (shrink)
The concept of kaivalya (literally, 'aloneness') is of crucial importance to the systems of classical Indian philosophy known as Sākhya and Yoga. Indeed, kaivalya is the supreme soteriological goal to which these systems are directed. Various statements concerning this final goal appear in the classical texts - namely, the Sākhyakārikā and Yogastra - and yet there is no consensus within modern scholarship about how the concept is to be interpreted. More specifically, there appears to be a great deal of confusion (...) over the implications of kaivalya for the existence of the empirical world. In this article I discuss the principal difficulties encountered by existing interpretations of kaivalya, and propose that these difficulties result from an unwarranted assumption that Sākhya and Yoga take a realist view with regard to the empirical world. I further propose that these difficulties can, in large part, be overcome when the assumption of realism is set aside. (shrink)
This paper examines Wittgenstein’s conception of absolute safety in the light of two potential problems exposed by Winch. These are that, firstly: even if someone’s life has been virtuous so far, the contingency of its remaining so until death vitiates the claim that the virtuous person cannot be harmed; and secondly: when voiced from a first-person standpoint, the claim to be absolutely safe due to one’s virtuousness appears hubristic and self-undermining. I argue that Wittgenstein’s mystical conception of safety, unlike some (...) others, requires no claim about one’s own virtue and hence can be construed as avoiding these problems. (shrink)
Samkhya and Yoga are two of the oldest and most influential systems of classical Indian philosophy. This book provides a thorough analysis of the systems in order to fully understand Indian philosophy. Placing particular emphasis on the metaphysical schema which underlies both concepts, the author aptly develops a new interpretation of the standard views on Samkhya and Yoga. Drawing upon existing sources and using insights from both eastern and western philosophy and religious practice, this comprehensive interpretation is respectful to the (...) underlying spiritual purpose of the Indian systems. It serves to illuminate the relation between the theoretical and practical dimensions of Samkhya and Yoga. The book fills a gap in current scholarship. It will be of interest to those concerned with Indology as well as philosophies in general and their similarities and differences with other traditions. (shrink)
This paper discusses Robin Le Poidevin’s proposal that a commitment to the B-theory of time provides a reason to relinquish the fear of death. After outlining Le Poidevin’s views on time and death, I analyze the specific passages in which he makes his proposal, giving close attention to the claim that, for the B-theorist, one’s life is “eternally real.” I distinguish two possible interpretations of this claim, which I call alethic eternalism and ontic eternalism respectively, and argue, with reference to (...) statements by other B-theroists, that alethic eternalism is the only viable option. I highlight two problems for Le Poidevin’s proposal: firstly, even if alethic eternalism does provide a reason not to fear death, this same reason is available to A-theorists; and secondly, alethic eternalism does not in fact provide such a reason. Having critically assessed possible responses to these problems, I conclude that Le Poidevin’s proposal is unfounded. (shrink)
This paper responds to Severin Schroeder's recent charge that Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion contains an ‘unresolved tension’ between three propositions, namely: (1) ‘As a hypothesis, God's existence (&c) is extremely implausible’; (2) ‘Christian faith is not unreasonable’; and (3) ‘Christian faith does involve belief in God's existence (&c)’. I argue as follows: that the first of these propositions has no place in Wittgenstein's thinking on religion; that the second is ill-phrased and should be re-worded as the proposition that ‘Christian faith (...) is neither unreasonable nor reasonable’; and that the third proposition (contrary to what Schroeder seems to assume) tells us nothing about the nature of the objects of religious belief. It follows from my argument that Schroeder has not exposed a tension in Wittgenstein's thoughts on religion. I end with some positive remarks about Wittgenstein's method. (shrink)
According to Epicureans, anticipating one's own annihilation ought not to be a frightening experience. Non-existence precludes the possibility of sensation, and hence annihilation can be neither pleasant nor unpleasant. And that which cannot be felt is unworthy of fear. Certain objectors to this claim have asserted that one's own annihilation really is a terrifying prospect. Against this assertion, I argue that those who make it are guilty of precisely the kind of confusion that Epicurus and his disciples alert us to, (...) namely that of projecting ourselves into the thought of our own non-existence. A further objection to Epicureanism involves the claim that, since the fear of death is merely the converse of the love of life, the one cannot be extinguished without inevitably extinguishing the other (to inevitably disastrous effect). I argue that this objection relies upon an exaggeration of thanatological fear's power and an unduly pessimistic assessment of human reason's capacity to positively modify emotional states and dispositions. I conclude that neither of the objections considered here has vindicated the fear and anxiety commonly associated with anticipating one's annihilation, and that the Epicurean attempt to deflate these debilitating emotions remains valid. (shrink)
Author's Introduction The notion of the a -priori is one of the principal themes elaborated in Kant's philosophy, and is the very origin of his Copernican ...
Abstract: Critics of Havi Carel's 2008 book, Illness: The Cry of the Flesh, have contended that Carel's deployment of phenomenological philosophy adds little to commonsense views about illness and that Carel relies too heavily on emotion-laden autobiographical anecdotes. Against these contentions this article argues: first, that a perfectly respectable task of philosophy is to find reasons to support pre-existing beliefs; and secondly, that Carel's use of anecdotes, while certainly appealing to readers' emotions, constitutes part of a legitimate argumentative strategy. The (...) article links these proposals with broader debates concerning the proper task of philosophy and the role of emotionality and imagination in philosophical inquiry. (shrink)
This paper responds to John Haldane's recent criticisms of D. Z. Phillips' treatment of the Christian belief in eternal life. I argue that Haldane's attempt to show that Phillips only partially elucidates, and hence misrepresents, this belief is unsuccessful, the biblical and theological passages cited by Haldane being amenable to elucidation in terms of which Phillips would have approved. Haldane makes three points to support his main claim, and I argue that none of these has significant force against Phillips' position (...) unless we presuppose the truth of some realist account of meaning, which Phillips would, of course, reject. (shrink)
This paper critically discusses D. Z. Phillips’ use of literary works as a resource for philosophical reflection on religion. Beginning by noting Phillips’ suggestion, made in relation to Waiting for Godot , that the possibilities of meaning that we see in a literary work can reveal something of our own religious sensibility, I then proceed to show what we learn about Phillips from his readings of certain works by Larkin, Tennyson, and Wharton. Through exploring alternative possible readings, I argue that, (...) although Phillips’ discussions are of considerable philosophical interest, they undermine his claim to be deploying a purely contemplative hermeneutical method. (shrink)
In this article, I propose a narrative approach to moral experience through dramatic play and writing. Inspired by the narrative approach to moral conflicts recommended by Mark B. Tappan and Lyn Mikel Brown and by the Que?bec drama programme, this approach works with multiple dimensions of the students' lives and give them a chance to benefit from their own moral experience. This approach to moral education is based on action research conducted in secondary moral education classes in Que?bec (Canada) (...) and in Belgium. (shrink)
Howard Mounce and Peter Winch both made novel and illuminating contributions to discussions about how, or whether, we can understand societies very different from our own – societies that would, these days, be referred to as “indigenous,”“tribal,”“traditional” or “small-scale.” This paper aims to elucidate some disagreements between Mounce and Winch while also critically engaging in the debate. The concepts of “practice” and “language-game” are considered in connection with magic-related activities among the Azande of north-central Africa, and Mounce's contention that the (...) Azande's whole way of speaking about magic and witchcraft is “hardly intelligible” is examined. I challenge Mounce's interpretations of certain analogies that he uses, and propose that his argument relies on what is probably an underestimation of the degree to which magic and witchcraft are integral to Azande culture as a whole. (shrink)
This article addresses some issues concerning the relation between religious beliefs and the fruits of those beliefs, where ‘fruits’ implies certain relevant forms of behaviour and affective attitudes. My primary aim is to elucidate the dispute between D. Z. Phillips and theological realists, emphasizing the extent to which this dispute is symptomatic of a deeper disagreement over how words acquire their meanings. In the course of doing so, I highlight an important difference between two alternative realist claims, exemplified by Trigg (...) and Hick respectively, and draw attention to an infelicity in Phillips’ way of presenting his case. (shrink)
Our paper addresses matters such as the distinction between chronological time and the “internal time” (Mikel Dufrenne) of works of art, the possibility that artists may act as future art critics, the alleged unity of classic art versus fragmentary modern approaches and the validity of historical interpretation of works of art. We shall begin by studying the common apprehension of art history and what it entails so that we may afterwards observe the major difficulties that the research in this (...) domain faces. In the second half of the following paper we shall examine how representations are formed within works of art and what is the proper way to analyze them after applying the phenomenological epoché to artistic phenomena. We will finally attempt to offer a clear image on how phenomenological philosophy contributes to the historical research of art. (shrink)
This paper argues that we can fruitfully consider some central issues in philosophy of religion through the lens provided by the literature in aesthetics. Specifically, I argue that Mikel Dufrenne's theory of representation in the arts can be usefully applied to representations of the sacred. The paper seeks to trace some of the implications of this view for our understanding of religious language and the epistemology of religious belief. It also aims to throw light on the religious power of (...) art, including art which lacks any explicitly religious content. (shrink)
(2013). Andrew Gleeson, A Frightening Love: Recasting the Problem of Evil (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) Philosophical Papers: Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 127-131. doi: 10.1080/05568641.2013.774726.
Abstract This paper considers some of the implications of the ?postmodern condition? for the practice of moral education in the contemporary world. It argues that an explicitly critical dimension is a key element of the postmodern perspective and suggests that, from such a perspective, most of the efforts to engage in explicit moral education over the past 25 years have fallen short, because instead of pushing toward genuine critique and authentic change they have simply perpetuated the status quo. It proposes, (...) therefore, that a critical postmodern moral pedagogy must address the fundamental inter?relationship between language and power, and must adopt a dialogical attitude that does not grant exclusive access to power, knowledge and authority to the teacher, but instead seeks ways in which teachers and students can engage in genuine dialogue and mutual exchange. (shrink)
This book is the result of the contributions by some of the greatest authors of moutaineering literature: Pat Ament, Phil Bartlett, Arlene Blum, Margaret Body, ...
