Offering a new political theory combining elements from the Marxist and liberal traditions, this book presents a disturbing view of the contemporary state at war with itself. This internal conflict stems from the state's having the double task of spurring on the economy and protecting the welfare and rights of all its citizens. Such conflict does not end at national boundaries but extends through the system of any imperial state. This perspective illuminates the fractures and instability within the imperial system.
This essay attempts to interpret John Rawls's concept of the state in hisTheory of Justice. His concept is not an analysis of the existing monopoly capitalist state. Such an analysis can be found in, for example,The Fiscal Crisis of the State by James O'Connor. Rawls's concept is, by contrast, not one of the actual state but of an idealized state. Ideals, though, touch reality at some point. At what point does Rawls's concept of the state touch reality?The market is the (...) key to a realistic interpretation of Rawls's concept of the state. His view of the market is even at the basis of his renowned principles of justice. (shrink)
The following questions are discussed here. Is induction a reasonable procedure in the context of a denial of physically necessary connections? What is physical necessity? If induction does presuppose physical necessity, what amount of it is presupposed? It is argued that with logic as the only restriction on what is to count as a possible world, it is unreasonable to claim that observed connections, whether universal or statistical, will continue to hold. The concept of physical necessity is no more problematic (...) than that of logical necessity, once it is recognized that the necessity of physical and logical necessity is the same. A variant of Keynes' principle of limited independent variety answers the question of the amount of physical necessity presupposed. (shrink)
The view that analytic propositions are those which are true in virtue of rules of use is basically correct. But there are many kinds of rules of use, and rules of some of these kinds do not generate truth. There is nothing like a grammatical analytic, though grammatical rules are rules of use. So, this rules-of-use view falls short of being an explanatory account. My problem is to find what it is that is special about those rules of use which (...) do generate truth. I shall argue that they are distinguished from others by their purpose rather than their content. Given their special purpose, one can explain how they generate truth. It will follow that linguistic regularities, considered apart from the purposes of those who use language, fail to provide a basis for understanding analyticity. On my account of it, analyticity turns out to be a less important characteristic of propositions than necessity. This is be- cause necessity, unlike analyticity, has its roots, not just in a contemporary system of usage, but in a wide family of systems of belief and usage. My efforts to deflate the philosophical value of the analytic will be summed up in the conclusion that analytic propositions can be contingent. I think this conclusion is behind the feeling that the propositions of logic and arithmetic are not merely analytic. For, if they were merely analytic, that is, true only in virtue of transitory conventions, then they would be contingent. Justice can be done to this feeling by the view that they are both analytic and necessary. (shrink)
In his "on concept and language" frege holds "the concept horse is not a concept." he argues that expressions like "the concept f" are proper names and have as their reference a definite object, But not a concept. Fisk argues that the principles which constrain frege to deny that the concept horse is a concept lead to a contradiction. He concludes that this contradiction indicates the impossibility of drawing a distinction between the reference of a proper name and that of (...) a predicate in terms of frege's object-Concept duality. (staff). (shrink)