Search results for 'Mind and body' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Shaun Gallagher (2005). How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    How the Body Shapes the Mind is an interdisciplinary work that addresses philosophical questions by appealing to evidence found in experimental psychology, neuroscience, studies of pathologies, and developmental psychology. There is a growing consensus across these disciplines that the contribution of embodiment to cognition is inescapable. Because this insight has been developed across a variety of disciplines, however, there is still a need to develop a common vocabulary that is capable of integrating discussions of brain mechanisms in neuroscience, (...)
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  2.  72
    Nicholas Humphrey (2000). In Reply [Reply to Commentaries on "How to Solve the Mind-Body Problem"]. Humphrey, Nicholas (2000) in Reply [Reply to Commentaries on "How to Solve the Mind-Body Problem"]. [Journal (Paginated)] 7 (4):98-112.
    Response to commentaries on ‘How to Solve the Mind Body Problem’ by Andy Clark, Daniel Dennett, Naomi Elian, Ralph Ellis, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Stevan Harnad, Natika Newton, Christian de Quincey, Carol Rovane and Robert van Gulick.
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  3. Thomas Nagel (1998). Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophy 73 (285):337-52.
    Intuitions based on the first-person perspective can easily mislead us about what is and is not conceivable.1 This point is usually made in support of familiar reductionist positions on the mind-body problem, but I believe it can be detached from that approach. It seems to me that the powerful appearance of contingency in the relation between the functioning of the physical organism and the conscious mind -- an appearance that depends directly or indirectly on the first- person (...)
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  4. Robert van Gulick (2001). Reduction, Emergence and Other Recent Options on the Mind/Body Problem: A Philosophic Overview. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10):1-34.
    Though most contemporary philosophers and scientists accept a physicalist view of mind, the recent surge of interest in the problem of consciousness has put the mind /body problem back into play. The physicalists' lack of success in dispelling the air of residual mystery that surrounds the question of how consciousness might be physically explained has led to a proliferation of options. Some offer alternative formulations of physicalism, but others forgo physicalism in favour of views that are more (...)
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  5.  30
    Edward Slingerland & Maciej Chudek (2011). The Prevalence of MindBody Dualism in Early China. Cognitive Science 35 (5):997-1007.
    We present the first large-scale, quantitative examination of mind and body concepts in a set of historical sources by measuring the predictions of folk mindbody dualism against the surviving textual corpus of pre-Qin (pre-221 BCE) China. Our textual analysis found clear patterns in the historically evolving reference of the word xin (heart/heart–mind): It alone of the organs was regularly contrasted with the physical body, and during the Warring States period it became less associated with (...)
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  6.  88
    Marleen Rozemond (2003). Descartes, Mind-Body Union, and Holenmerism. Philosophical Topics 31 (1/2):343-367.
    In this paper I analyze Descartes's puzzling claim that the mind is whole in the whole body and whole in its parts, what Henry More called "holenmerism". I explain its historical background, in particular in scholasticism. I argue that like his predecessors, Descartes uses the idea for two purposes, for mind-body interaction and for the union of body and mind.
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  7. Michael Heidelberger (2003). The Mind-Body Problem in the Origin of Logical Empiricism: Herbert Feigl and Psychophysical Parallelism. In Paolo Parrini, Wes Salmon & Merrilee Salmon (eds.), Logical Empiricism: Historical & Contemporary Perspectives. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 233--262.
    It is widely held that the current debate on the mind-body problem in analytic philosophy began during the 1950s at two distinct sources: one in America, de- riving from Herbert Feigl's writings, and the other in Australia, related to writings by U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart (Feigl [1958] 1967). Jaegwon Kim recently wrote that "it was the papers by Smart and Feigl that introduced the mind-body problem as a mainstream metaphysical Problematik of analytical (...)
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  8.  61
    Nathan Stemmer (2001). The Mind-Body Problem and Quine's Repudiation Theory. Behavior and Philosophy 29:187-202.
    Most scholars who presently deal with the Mind-Body problem consider themselves monist materialists. Nevertheless, many of them also assume that there exist (in some sense of existence) mental entities. But since these two positions do not harmonize quite well, the literature is full of discussions about how to reconcile the positions. In this paper, I will defend a materialist theory that avoids all these problems by completely rejecting the existence of mental entities. This is Quine's repudiation theory. According (...)
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  9. Michael G. F. Martin (2000). Beyond Dispute: Sense-Data, Intentionality, and the Mind-Body Problem. In Tim Crane & Sarah A. Patterson (eds.), The History of the Mind-Body Problem. Routledge
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  10.  14
    John Elias Nale (2015). Kant’s Racial MindBody Unions. Continental Philosophy Review 48 (1):41-58.
    Eric Voegelin’s writings on the historical development of the concept of race in the early 1930s are important to philosophy today in part because they provide a model upon which scholars can further integrate modern philosophy with the critical philosophy of race. In constructing his history, Voegelin’s methodological orientation depends on the centrality of both Kant’s work and the problem of the mindbody union to the concept of race. This essay asks how one might hold these premises if (...)
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  11.  15
    Gary Hatfield (2005). Rationalist Theories of Sense Perception and Mind-Body Relation. In Alan Nelson (ed.), A Companion to Rationalism (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy). Blackwell 31-60.
    This chapter compares rationalist theories of sense perception to previously held theories of perception (especially of vision) and examines rationalist accounts of sensory qualities and sensory representation, of the role of the sense-based passions in guiding behavior, of the epistemological benefits and dangers of sense perception, and of mindbody relations. Each section begins with Descartes, the first major rationalist of the seventeenth century. The other major rationalists, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz, and also lesser known figures such as Pierre (...)
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  12. Stevan Harnad (2000). Correlation Vs. Causality: How/Why the Mind-Body Problem is Hard. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):54-61.
    The Mind/Body Problem is about causation not correlation. And its solution will require a mechanism in which the mental component somehow manages to play a causal role of its own, rather than just supervening superflously on other, nonmental components that look, for all the world, as if they can do the full causal job perfectly well without it. Correlations confirm that M does indeed "supervene" on B, but causality is needed to show how/why M is not supererogatory; and (...)
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  13. J. Almog (2001). What Am I?: Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem. Oxford University Press.
    In his Meditations, Rene Descartes asks, "what am I?" His initial answer is "a man." But he soon discards it: "But what is a man? Shall I say 'a rational animal'? No: for then I should inquire what an animal is, what rationality is, and in this way one question would lead down the slope to harder ones." Instead of understanding what a man is, Descartes shifts to two new questions: "What is Mind?" and "What is Body?" These (...)
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  14. Tim Crane & Sarah Patterson (eds.) (2000). History of the Mind-Body Problem. New York: Routledge.
    This collection of new essays put the debates on the mind-body problem into historical context.
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  15.  16
    Olga Markic (2004). Crane on the Mind-Body Problem and Emergence. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):199-205.
    In his book Elements of Mind, Tim Crane gives us a very clear and interesting introduction to the main problems in the philosophy of mind. The central theme of his book is intentionality, but he also gives an account of the mind-body problem, consciousness, and perception, and then he suggests his own solutions to these problems. In this paper I will concentrate on a part in which he discusses the mind-body problem. My main aim (...)
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  16.  30
    Jesus Ezquerro & Agustin Vicente (2000). Explanatory Exclusion, Over-Determination, and the Mind-Body Problem. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Charlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr 13-21.
    Taking into account the difficulties that all attempts at a solution of the problem of causal-explanatory exclusion have experienced, we analyze in this paper the chances that mind-body causation is a case of overdetermination, a line of attack that has scarcely been explored. Our conclusion is that claiming that behaviors are causally overdetermined cannot solve the problem of causal-explanatory exclusion. The reason is the problem of massive coincidence, that can only be avoided by establishing a relation between (...) and body; that is, by denying overdetermination. The only way to defend that mind-body causation is a case of overdetermination would be by denying any modal force whatever to the principle of the causal closure of the physical, and this is a claim we would not like to reject. (shrink)
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  17.  51
    Janusz Sytnik-Czetwertyński (2013). Some Eighteenth Century Contributions to the MindBody Problem (Wolff, Taurellus, Knutzen, Bülfiger and the Pre-Critical Kant). Axiomathes 23 (3):567-577.
    This work speaks about very special solution of the mindbody problem. This solution based on the so-called Principle of Co-existence stands out as one of the most interesting attempts at solving the mindbody problem. It states that substances can only exert a mutual influence on one another if they have something in common. This does not have to be a common property but rather, a binding relationship. Thus, substances co-exist when they remain bound by a common (...)
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  18.  39
    Joseph A. Baltimore (2013). Careful, Physicalists: MindBody Supervenience Can Be Too Superduper. Theoria 79 (1):8-21.
    It has become evident that mindbody supervenience, as merely specifying a covariance between mental and physical properties, is consistent with clearly non-physicalist views of the mental, such as emergentism. Consequently, there is a push in the physicalist camp for an ontologically more robust supervenience, a “superdupervenience,” that ensures that properties supervening on physical properties are physicalistically acceptable. Jessica Wilson claims that supervenience is made superduper by Condition on Causal Powers (CCP): each individual causal power associated with a supervenient (...)
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  19.  73
    Giuseppina D'Oro (2005). Collingwood's Solution to the Problem of Mind-Body Dualism. Philosophia 32 (1-4):349-368.
    This paper contrasts two approaches to the mind-body problem and the possibility of mental causation: the conceptual approach advocated by Collingwood/Dray and the metaphysical approach advocated by Davidson. On the conceptual approach to show that mental causation is possible is equivalent to demonstrating that mentalistic explanations possess a different logical structure from naturalistic explanations. On the metaphysical approach to show that mental causation is possible entails explaining how the mind can intelligibly be accommodated within a physicalist universe. (...)
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  20.  44
    Jochen Fahrenberg & Marcus Cheetham (2000). The Mind-Body Problem as Seen by Students of Different Disciplines. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (5):47-59.
    The mind body problem is a continuing issue in philosophy. No surveys known to us have been conducted about the actual preferences of, for example, psychology students for particular preconceptions about the mind body relation. These preconceptions may have different practical implications for decisions concerning the object and method of research, the choice of explanatory device for psychological and other research data and for the approach of professionals in practice. A questionnaire comprising ten different preconceptions about (...)
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  21. Jaegwon Kim (2004). The Mind-Body Problem at Century's Turn. In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Clarendon Press 129-152.
    A plausible terminus for the mind-body debate begins by embracing ontological physicalism—the view that there is only one kind of substance in the concrete world, and that it is material substance. Taking mental causation seriously, this terminus also embraces conditional reductionism, the thesis that only physically reducible (i.e., functionalizable) mental properties can be causally efficacious. Intentional/cognitive properties (what David Chalmers calls “psychological” aspects of mind) are physically reducible, but qualia (“phenomenal” aspects of mind) are not. In (...)
     
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  22.  16
    Liam P. Dempsey (2006). Written in the Flesh: Isaac Newton on the MindBody Relation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (3):420-441.
    Isaac Newton’s views on the mindbody relation are of interest not only because of their somewhat unique departure from popular early modern conceptions of mind and its relation to body, but also because of their connections with other aspects of Newton’s thought. In this paper I argue that (1) Newton accepted an interesting sort of mindbody monism, one which defies neat categorization, but which clearly departs from Cartesian substance dualism, and (2) Newton took the (...)
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  23.  36
    Harold J. Morowitz (1987). The Mind Body Problem and the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Biology and Philosophy 2 (3):271-275.
    Cartesian mind body dualism and modern versions of this viewpoint posit a mind thermodynamically unrelated to the body but informationally interactive. The relation between information and entropy developed by Leon Brillouin demonstrates that any information about the state of a system has entropic consequences. It is therefore impossible to dissociate the mind's information from the body's entropy. Knowledge of that state of the system without an energetically significant measurement would lead to a violation of (...)
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  24.  14
    Stephen Jarosek (2013). Pragmatism, Neural Plasticity and Mind-Body Unity. Biosemiotics 6 (2):205-230.
    Recent developments in cognitive science provide compelling leads that need to be interpreted and synthesized within the context of semiotic and biosemiotic principles. To this end, we examine the impact of the mind-body unity on the sorts of choices that an organism is predisposed to making from its Umwelt. In multicellular organisms with brains, the relationship that an organism has with its Umwelt impacts on neural plasticity, the functional specialisations that develop within the brain, and its behaviour. Clinical (...)
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    Hans Burkhardt & Guido Imaguire (2002). Mind-Body Dualism and the Compatibility of Medical Methods. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 23 (2):135-150.
    In this paper we analyse some misleading theses concerning the oldcontroversy over the relation between mind and body presented incontemporary medical literature. We undertake an epistemologicalclarification of the axiomatic structure of medical methods. Thisclarification, in turn, requires a precise philosophical explanation ofthe presupposed concepts. This analysis will establish two results: (1)that the mind-body dualism cannot be understood as a kind of biologicalvariation of the subject-object dichotomy in physics, and (2) that thethesis of the incompatibility between somatic (...)
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  26. Lynne Rudder Baker (2004). Should a Christian Be a Mind-Body Dualist? - No. In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing
    Through the ages, Christians have almost automatically been Mind-Body dualists. The Bible portrays us as spiritual beings, and one obvious way to be a spiritual being is to be (or to have) an immaterial soul. Since it is also evident that we have bodies, Christians naturally have thought of themselves as composite beings, made of two substances—a material body and a nonmaterial soul. Despite the historical weight of this position, I do not think that it is required (...)
     
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  27. Marleen Rozemond (1999). Descartes on Mind-Body Interaction: What's the Problem? Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (3):435-467.
    I argue that Descartes treated the action of body on mind differently from the action of mind on body, as was common in the period. Descartes explicitly denied that there is a problem for interaction but his descriptions of interaction seem to suggest that he thought there was a problem. I argue that these descriptions are motivated by a different issue, the seemingly arbitrary connections between particular physical states and the particular mental states they produce. Within (...)
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  28.  15
    Neeta Mehta (2011). Mind-Body Dualism: A Critique From a Health Perspective. Mens Sana Monographs 9 (1):202-209.
    Philosophical theory about the nature of human beings has far reaching consequences on our understanding of various issues faced by them. Once taken as self-evident, it becomes the foundation on which knowledge gets built. The cause of concern is that this theoretical framework rarely gets questioned despite its inherent limitations and self-defeating consequences, leading to crisis in the concerned field. The field, which is facing crisis today, is that of medicine, and the paradigmatic stance that is responsible for the crisis (...)
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  29. Arthur Efron (1992). Residual Asymmetric Dualism: A Theory of Mind-Body Relations. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (2):113-36.
    Progress in understanding the mind-body problem can be made without attempting to solve it as one unified problem, which it is not. Pepper's "Identity Theory" solution to the problem is now seen as not necessarily clarifying for the question of dualism. Residual asymmetrical dualism is proposed as a theory offering one very good way to think about this set of problems in a variety of modes of inquiry. These include neurophysiological research on the amygdala by LeDoux, research (...)
     
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  30.  45
    J. N. Wright & P. Potter (eds.) (2003). Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem From Antiquity to Enlightenment. Oxford University Press University Press.
    This is a multi-disciplinary exploration of the history of understanding of the human mind or soul and its relationship to the body, through the course of more than two thousand years. Thirteen specially commissioned chapters, each written by a recognized expert, discuss such figures as the doctors Hippocrates and Galen, the theologians St Paul, Augustine, and Aquinas, and philosophers from Plato to Leibniz.
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  31.  65
    Cynthia Macdonald (1989). Mind-Body Identity Theories. Routledge.
    Chapter One The most plausible arguments for the identity of mind and body that have been advanced in this century have been for the identity of mental ...
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  32. Michael Tye (2006). Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168.
    At the very heart of the mind-body problem is the question of the nature of consciousness. It is consciousness, and in particular _phenomenal_ consciousness, that makes the mind-body relation so deeply perplexing. Many philosophers hold that no defi nition of phenomenal consciousness is possible: any such putative defi nition would automatically use the concept of phenomenal consciousness and thus render the defi nition circular. The usual view is that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is one that (...)
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  33. Sydney Shoemaker (1994). The Mind-Body Problem. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell
    * Argument from authoritative self-knowledge 1. We have a "privileged access" to our own mental states in the sense we have the authority on what mental states we are in. 2. Through introspection, we are aware of our mental states but not aware of them as physical states of any sort or as functional states. 3. Therefore, our mental states cannot be physical states.
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  34. Douglas C. Long (1977). Disembodied Existence, Physicalism, and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Studies 31 (May):307-316.
    The idea that we may continue to exist in a bodiless condition after our death has long played an important role in beliefs about immortality, ultimate rewards and punishments, the transmigration of souls, and the like. There has also been long and heated disagreement about whether the idea of disembodied existence even makes sense, let alone whether anybody can or does survive dissolution of his material form. It may seem doubtful that anything new could be added to the debate at (...)
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  35.  26
    Jaegwon Kim (1998). The Mind-Body Problem After Fifty Years. In Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. New York: Cambridge University Press 3-21.
    It was about half a century ago that the mindbody problem, which like much else in serious metaphysics had been moribund for several decades, was resurrected as a mainstream philosophical problem. The first impetus came from Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind , published in 1948, and Wittgenstein's well-known, if not well-understood, reflections on the nature of mentality and mental language, especially in his Philosophical Investigations which appeared in 1953. The primary concerns of Ryle and Wittgenstein, however, (...)
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  36. Dale Jacquette (1987). Kripke and the Mind-Body Problem. Dialectica 41 (4):293-300.
    SummaryMind‐body identity theories are standardly supposed to be logically contingent. Kripke defends a quasi‐Cartesian property dualism by observing that bodies and minds or mental and neurophysiological events or event‐types can always be assigned distinct rigid designators. The concept of rigid designation implies that possibly nonidentical rigidly designated bodies and minds are necessarily and therefore actually nonidentical. But Kripke's argument does not refute materialist reductions that affirm the actual identity of minds and bodies while admitting only the possible nonidentity of (...)
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  37.  89
    Herbert Feigl (1971). Some Crucial Issues of Mind-Body Monism. Synthese 22 (May):295-312.
    Assuming that the qualities of immediate experience ('sentience') are the subjective aspect of the neurophysiological cerebral processes, And assuming that all behavior is ultimately susceptible to physical explanation, There are a number of ways in which mind-Body monism can be stated. But there are also a number of serious difficulties for a logically coherent formulation of the identity thesis of the mental and the physical.
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  38.  5
    Robert E. French (1987). The Geometry Of Vision And The Mind Body Problem. Lang.
    In this thesis, I both analyze the phenomenology of vision from a geometrical point of view, and also develop certain connections between that geometrical analysis and the mind body problem. In order to motivate the need for such an analysis, I first show, by means of a refutation of direct realism, that visual space is never identical with any of the physical objects being indirectly "seen" by constituting color arrangements in it. It thus follows that the geometry of (...)
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  39.  14
    Pheroze S. Wadia (1972). On a Refutation of Mind-Body Identity. Philosophical Studies 23 (February):113-115.
    In a previous article, Professor abelson contended that the mind-Body identity theory was 'mathematically impossible' inasmuch as the number of possible mental states of a finite thinking organism are infinite, While the number of possible bodily states of such an organism are necessarily finite. I argue that this refutation does not succeed because although it is true that a finite brain can have only a finite number of brain states, Abelson had not demonstrated that there was (...)
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  40. John Macnamara (1994). The Mind-Body Problem and Contemporary Psychology. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell
     
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  41.  14
    Keith Gunderson (1969). Cybernetics and Mind-Body Problems. Inquiry 12 (1-4):406-19.
    It is asked to what extent answers to such questions as ?Can machines think??, ?Could robots have feelings?? might be expected to yield insight into traditional mind?body questions. It has sometimes been assumed that answering the first set of questions would be the same as answering the second. Against this approach other philosophers have argued that answering the first set of questions would not help us to answer the second. It is argued that both of these assessments are (...)
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  42. Brian O'Shaughnessy (1994). The Mind-Body Problem. In Richard Warner & Tadeusz Szubka (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Blackwell
     
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  43.  4
    Karen Carnabucci (2012). Integrating Psychodrama and Systemic Constellation Work: New Directions for Action Methods, Mind-Body Therapies, and Energy Healing. Jessica Kingsley Publishers.
    Systemic Constellation Work is a rapidly growing experiential healing process that is being embraced by a variety of helping professionals, both traditional and alternative, worldwide. This book explores the history, principles and methodology of this approach, and offers a detailed comparison with psychodrama - the original mind-body therapy - explaining how each method can enhance the other. Constellation work is based on the notion that people are connected by unseen energetic forces and suggests that the psychological, traumatic and (...)
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  44. Irving Krakow (2002). Why the Mind-Body Problem Cannot Be Solved: Some Final Conclusions in the Philosophy of Mind. University Press of America.
    In Why the Mind-Body Problem CANNOT Be Solved, Irving Krakow shows that a satisfactory scientific explanation of conscious experience isn't possible for methodological and semantic reasons. The reason is that sentences about conscious experience cannot be deduced from sentences about the brain's neurology without using brain-mind correlations.
     
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  45.  40
    Sergio Moravia & Scott Staton (eds.) (1995). The Enigma of the Mind: The Mind-Body Problem in Contemporary Thought. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Sergio Moravia's The Enigma of the Mind offers a broad and lucid critical and historical survey of one of the fundamental debates in the philosophy of mind - the relationship of mind and body. This problem continues to raise deep questions concerning the nature of man. The book has two central aims. First, Professor Moravia sketches the major recent contributions to the mind/body problem from philosophers of mind. Having established this framework (...)
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  46. Daniel Holbrook (1992). Descartes on Mind-Body Interaction. Southwest Philosophical Studies 14:74-83.
    In his "Meditations on First Philosophy", Descartes argues for there being a radical difference between mind and body. Yet, we know that mind and body interest. How is this possible? Descartes's answer tothis question is that human nature is a "substantial union" of mind and body. In this essay, Descartes's solution is explained and critically examined.
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  47.  84
    Michael Della Rocca (1996). Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza. Oxford University Press.
    This first extensive study of Spinoza's philosophy of mind concentrates on two problems crucial to the philosopher's thoughts on the matter: the requirements for having a thought about a particular object, and the problem of the mind's relation to the body. Della Rocca contends that Spinoza's positions are systematically connected with each other and with a principle at the heart of his metaphysical system: his denial of causal or explanatory relations between the mental and the physical. In (...)
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  48. Colin McGinn (1989). Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? Mind 98 (July):349-66.
  49.  16
    Gary Hatfield (2005). Force and MindBody Interaction. In Juan Jose Saldana (ed.), Science and Cultural Diversity: Proceedings of the XXIst International Congress of the History of Science. Autonomous National University of Mexico 3074-3089.
    This article calls into question the notion that seventeenth-century authors such as Descartes and Leibniz straightforwardly conceived the mind as something "outside" nature. Descartes indeed did regard matter as distinct from mind, but the question then remains as to whether he equated the natural world, and the world of laws of nature, with the material world. Similarly, Leibniz distinguished a kingdom of final causes (pertaining to souls) and a kingdom of efficient causes (pertaining to bodies and motions), but (...)
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  50.  26
    Fanny L. Epstein (1973). The Metaphysics of Mind-Body Identity Theories. American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (April):111-121.
    The article is an attempt to uncover the metaphysical assumptions implicit in the otherwise highly scientific contemporary identity theories. 1) the identity statement, Being a philosophical interpretation of dualistic psychophysical correspondence, Requires for its support a justificatory ontological or linguistic premise. 2) the conception of the mental as the hidden, Unobservable, Subjective and private is a metaphysical distortion with historical roots in an empiricist and positivist interpretation of the cartesian dichotomy of thinking and extended thing. 3) acceptance of an artificial (...)
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