Search results for 'Mind, brain' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2001). Operational Architectonics of the Human Brain Biopotential Field: Toward Solving the Mind-Brain Problem. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 2 (3):261-296.score: 246.0
    The understanding of the interrelationship between brain and mind remains far from clear. It is well established that the brain's capacity to integrate information from numerous sources forms the basis for cognitive abilities. However, the core unresolved question is how information about the "objective" physical entities of the external world can be integrated, and how unifiedand coherent mental states (or Gestalts) can be established in the internal entities of distributed neuronal systems. The present paper offers a unified methodological (...)
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  2. Mostyn W. Jones (2010). How To Make Mind-Brain Relations Clear. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (5-6):5 - 6.score: 240.0
    The mind-body problem arises because all theories about mind-brain connections are too deeply obscure to gain general acceptance. This essay suggests a clear, simple, mind-brain solution that avoids all these perennial obscurities. (1) It does so, first of all, by reworking Strawson and Stoljar’s views. They argue that while minds differ from observable brains, minds can still be what brains are physically like behind the appearances created by our outer senses. This could avoid many obscurities. But to clearly (...)
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  3. Jakob Hohwy (2011). Mind–Brain Identity and Evidential Insulation. Philosophical Studies 26 (3):261-286.score: 240.0
    Is it rational to believe that the mind is identical to the brain? Identity theorists say it is (or looks like it will be, once all the neuroscientific evidence is in), and they base this claim on a general epistemic route to belief in identity. I re-develop this general route and defend it against some objections. Then I discuss how rational belief in mind–brain identity, obtained via this route, can be threatened by an appropriately adjusted version of the (...)
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  4. Zachary Stein & Kurt W. Fischer (2011). Directions for Mind, Brain, and Education: Methods, Models, and Morality. Educational Philosophy and Theory 43 (1):56-66.score: 240.0
    In this article we frame a set of important issues in the emerging field of Mind, Brain, and Education in terms of three broad headings: methods, models, and morality. Under the heading of methods we suggest that the need for synthesis across scientific and practical disciplines entails the pursuit of usable knowledge via a catalytic symbiosis between theory, research, and practice. Under the heading of models the goal of producing usable knowledge should shape the construction of theories that provide (...)
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  5. Gabriel Vacariu & Vacariu (2013). The Mind-Brain Problem in Cognitive Neuroscience (Only Content).score: 234.0
    (June 2013) “The mind-body problem in cognitive neuroscience”, Philosophia Scientiae 17/2, Gabriel Vacariu and Mihai Vacariu (eds.): 1. William Bechtel (Philosophy, Center for Chronobiology, and Interdisciplinary Program in Cognitive Science University of California, San Diego) “The endogenously active brain: the need for an alternative cognitive architecture” 2. Rolls T. Edmund (Oxford Centre for Computational Neuroscience, Oxford, UK) “On the relation between the mind and the brain: a neuroscience perspective” 3. Cees van Leeuwen (University of Leuven, Belgium; Riken (...) Science Institute, Japan) “Brain and mind” 4. Kari Theurer (Trinity College) and John Bickle (Philosophy, Mississippi State University) “What’s old is new again: Kemeny-Oppenheim reduction at work in current molecular neuroscience” 5. Bernard Andrieu (Staps Université de Lorraine) “Sentir son cerveau? Les dispositifs neuro-expérientiels en 1er personne” 6. Corey Maley and Gualtiero Piccinini (Philosophy, University of Missouri – St. Louis) “Get the latest upgrade: Functionalism 6.3.1” 7. Paula Droege (Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University) “Memory and consciousness” 8. Gabriel Vacariu and Mihai Vacariu (Philosophy, University of Bucharest) “Troubles with cognitive neuroscience”. (shrink)
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  6. Clive Vernon Borst (1970). The Mind-Brain Identity Theory: A Collection of Papers. New York,St Martin's P..score: 234.0
    Mind body, not a pseudo-problem, by H. Feigl.--Is consciousness a brain process? by U. T. Place.--Sensations and brain processes, by J. J. C. Smart.--The nature of mind, by D. M. Armstrong.--Materialism as a scientific hypothesis, by U. T. Place.--Sensations and brain processes: a reply to J. J. C. Smart, by J. T. Stevenson.--Further remarks on sensations and brain processes, by J. J. C. Smart.--Smart on sensations, by K. Baier.--Brain processes and incorrigibility, by J. J. C. (...)
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  7. John Bickle (1992). Mental Anomaly and the New Mind-Brain Reductionism. Philosophy of Science 59 (2):217-30.score: 228.0
    Davidson's principle of the anomalousness of the mental was instrumental in discrediting once-popular versions of mind-brain reductionism. In this essay I argue that a novel account of intertheoretic reduction, which does not require the sort of cross-theoretic bridge laws that Davidson's principle rules out, allows a version of mind-brain reductionism which is immune from Davidson's challenge. In the final section, I address a second worry about reductionism, also based on Davidson's principle, that survives this response. I argue that (...)
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  8. Robert Rosen (1993). Drawing the Boundary Between Subject and Object: Comments on the Mind-Brain Problem. Theoretical Medicine 14 (2):89-100.score: 228.0
    Physics says that it cannot deal with the mind-brain problem, because it does not deal in subjectivities, and mind is subjective. However, biologists (among others) still claim to seek a material basis for subjective mental processes, which would thereby render them objective. Something is clearly wrong here. I claim that what is wrong is the adoption of too narrow a view of what constitutes objectivity, especially in identifying it with what a machine can do. I approach the problem in (...)
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  9. W. R. Webster (2002). A Case of Mind/Brain Identity: One Small Bridge for the Explanatory Gap. Synthese 131 (2):275-287.score: 228.0
    Based on the technique of pressure blinding of the eye, two types of after-image (AI) were identified. A physicalist or mind/brain identity explanation was established for a negative a AI produced by moderately intense stimuli. These AI's were shown to be located in the neurons of the retina. An illusory AI of double a grating's spatial frequency was also produced in the same structure and was both prevented from being established and abolished after establishment by pressure blinding, thus showing (...)
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  10. Ullin T. Place (2000). The Two Factor Theory of the Mind-Brain Relation. Brain and Mind 1 (1):29-43.score: 228.0
    The analysis of mental concepts suggests that the distinctionbetween the mental and the nonmental is not ontologically fundamental,and that, whereas mental processes are one and the same things as thebrain processes with which they are correlated, dispositional mentalstates depend causally on and are, thus, ''''distinct existences'''' fromthe states of the brain microstructure with which ''they'' are correlated.It is argued that this difference in the relation between an entity andits composition/underlying structure applies across the board. allstuffs and processes are the (...)
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  11. John Bickle (1997). From Sensory Neuroscience to Neurophilosophy: Reflections on Llinas and Churchland's Mind-Brain Continuum. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):523-530.score: 228.0
    Philosophers and psychologists seeking an accessible introduction to current neuroscience will find much value in this volume. Befitting the neuroscientific focus on sensory processes, many essays address explicitly the binding problem. Theoretical and experimental work pertaining to the “temporal synchronicity” solution is prominent. But there are also some surprising implications for current philosophical concerns, such as the intemalism/extemalism debate about representational content, epistemological realism, a “bottom-up” approach to naturalizing intentionality, Humean concerns about the self, and implications from phantom-limb phenomena. Higher-level (...)
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  12. Gabriel Vacariu (2005). Mind, Brain, and Epistemologically Different Worlds. Synthese 147 (3):515-548.score: 222.0
    The reason why, since Descartes, nobody has found a solution to the mind–body problem seems to be that the problem itself is a false or pseudo-problem. The discussion has proceeded within a pre-Cartesian conceptual framework which itself is a source of the difficulty. Dualism and all its alternatives have preserved the same pre-Cartesian conceptual framework even while denying Descartes’ dualism. In order to avoid this pseudo-problem, I introduce a new perspective with three elements: the subject, the observed object, and the (...)
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  13. Roland Puccetti & Robert W. Dykes (1978). Sensory Cortex and the Mind-Brain Problem. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3):337.score: 216.0
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  14. W. Teed Rockwell (2005). Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.score: 210.0
  15. Joseph M. Notterman (2000). Note on Reductionism in Cognitive Psychology: Reification of Cognitive Processes Into Mind, Mind-Brain Equivalence, and Brain-Computer Analogy. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):116-121.score: 210.0
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  16. Simon van Rysewyk, Critique of Max Velmans on Mind-Brain Identity Theory and Consciousness – Part I.score: 210.0
  17. Simon van Rysewyk, Links Between the Intrauterine Theory of Gender Identity, Transsexualism and Mind-Brain-Body Identity.score: 210.0
  18. Simon van Rysewyk, Mind-Brain Identity Theory, ‘Brain-Sex’ Theory of Transsexualism and the Dimorphic Brain.score: 210.0
  19. Anjum P. Saleemi, Ocke-Schwen Bohn & Albert Gjedde (eds.) (2005). In Search of a Language for the Mind-Brain: Can the Multiple Perspectives Be Unified? Aarhus University Press ;.score: 210.0
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  20. Paul Schweizer (1994). Intentionality, Qualia, and Mind/Brain Identity. Minds and Machines 4 (3):259-82.score: 206.0
    The paper examines the status of conscious presentation with regard to mental content and intentional states. I argue that conscious presentation of mental content should be viewed on the model of a secondary quality, as a subjectiveeffect of the microstructure of an underlying brain state. The brain state is in turn viewed as the instantiation of an abstract computational state, with the result that introspectively accessible content is interpreted as a presentation of the associated computational state realized by (...)
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  21. W. R. Webster (2003). Revelation and Transparency in Colour Vision Refuted: A Case of Mind/Brain Identity and Another Bridge Over the Explanatory Gap. Synthese 133 (3):419-39.score: 204.0
    Russell (1912) and others have argued that the real nature of colour is transparentto us in colour vision. It's nature is fully revealed to us and no further knowledgeis theoretically possible. This is the doctrine of revelation. Two-dimensionalFourier analyses of coloured checkerboards have shown that apparently simple,monadic, colours can be based on quite different physical mechanisms. Experimentswith the McCollough effect on different types of checkerboards have shown thatidentical colours can have energy at the quite different orientations of Fourierharmonic components but (...)
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  22. Herbert G. Bohnert (1974). The Logico-Linguistic Mind-Brain Problem and a Proposed Step Towards its Solution. Philosophy of Science 41 (March):1-14.score: 204.0
    This paper argues that if a person's beliefs are idealized as a set of sentences (theoretical, observational, and mixed) then the device of Ramsey sentences provides a treatment, of the mind-brain problem, that has at least four noteworthy characteristics. First, sentences asserting correlations between one's own brain state and one's own "private" experiences are, on such treatment, reconstrued as neither causal, coreferential, nor as meaning postulates, but as clauses in an overall hypothesis (Ramsey sentence) whose only nonlogical constants (...)
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  23. Mark Crooks (2002). Intertheoretic Identification and Mind-Brain Reductionism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):193-222.score: 204.0
  24. M. L. Lonky (2003). Human Consciousness: A Systems Approach to the Mind/Brain Interaction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (1):91-118.score: 204.0
     
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  25. Ralph L. Smith (1999). A Testable Mind-Brain Theory. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (4):421-436.score: 204.0
     
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  26. J. R. Smythies (2002). Comment on Crooks's Intertheoretic Identification and Mind-Brain Reductionism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):245-248.score: 204.0
     
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  27. Kaj Sotala & Harri Valpola (2012). Coalescing Minds: Brain Uploading-Related Group Mind Scenarios. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (01):293-312.score: 202.0
    We present a hypothetical process of mind coalescence, where arti cial connections are created between two or more brains. This might simply allow for an improved form of communication. At the other extreme, it might merge the minds into one in a process that can be thought of as a reverse split-brain operation. We propose that one way mind coalescence might happen is via an exocortex, a prosthetic extension of the biological brain which integrates with the brain (...)
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  28. Gilberto Gomes (1995). Self-Awareness and the Mind-Brain Problem. Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):155-65.score: 198.0
    The prima facie heterogeneity between psychical and physical phenomena seems to be a serious objection to psychoneural identity thesis, according to many authors, from Leibniz to Popper. It is argued that this objection can be superseded by a different conception of consciousness. Consciousness, while being conscious of something, is always unconscious of itself . Consciousness of being conscious is not immediate, it involves another, second-order, conscious state. The appearance of mental states to second-order consciousness does not reveal their true nature. (...)
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  29. Michael Lockwood (1989). Mind, Brain, and the Quantum. Oxford University Press.score: 198.0
  30. Patricia S. Churchland (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward A Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. MIT Press.score: 198.0
    This is a unique book. It is excellently written, crammed with information, wise and a pleasure to read.' ---Daniel C. Dennett, Tufts University.
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  31. George Graham (1999). Mind, Brain, World. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (3):223-225.score: 198.0
  32. Susan A. Greenfield (2002). Mind, Brain and Consciousness. British Journal of Psychiatry 181 (2):91-93.score: 198.0
  33. Patricia S. Churchland (1980). A Perspective on Mind-Brain Research. Journal of Philosophy 77 (April):185-207.score: 198.0
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  34. David Hunter (2001). Mind-Brain Identity and the Nature of States. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):366 – 376.score: 198.0
  35. Jan Srzednicki (1972). Some Objections to Mind-Brain Identity Theories. Philosophia 2 (July):205-225.score: 198.0
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  36. Irving Thalberg (1978). A Novel Approach to Mind-Brain Identity. Philosophy of Science 3 (April):255-72.score: 198.0
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  37. Karl H. Pribam (1979). Transcending the Mind/Brain Problem. Zygon 14 (June):103-124.score: 198.0
  38. J. L. Mackie (1979). Mind, Brain, and Causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):19-29.score: 198.0
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  39. Barbara Fajardo (2000). Breaks in Consciousness in the Psychoanalytic Process: A Dynamic Systems Approach to Change and a Bridge to Edelman's Mind/Brain Model. Annual of Psychoanalysis 28:21-45.score: 198.0
     
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  40. Stephen Harrison (1989). A New Visualization of the Mind-Brain Relationship. In The Case for Dualism. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.score: 198.0
     
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  41. William R. Stoeger (1999). The Mind-Brain Problem, the Laws of Nature, and Constitutive Relationships. In Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Notre Dame: University Notre Dame Press.score: 198.0
  42. K. R. Popper, B. I. B. Lindahl & P. Århem (1993). A Discussion of the Mind-Brain Problem. Theoretical Medicine 14 (2):167-180.score: 192.0
    In this paper Popper formulates and discusses a new aspect of the theory of mind. This theory is partly based on his earlier developed interactionistic theory. It takes as its point of departure the observation that mind and physical forces have several properties in common, at least the following six: both are (i) located, (ii) unextended, (iii) incorporeal, (iv) capable of acting on bodies, (v) dependent upon body, (vi) capable of being influenced by bodies. Other properties such as intensity and (...)
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  43. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Carlos F. H. Neves (2009). Phenomenological Architecture of a Mind and Operational Architectonics of the Brain: The Unified Metastable Continuum. In Robert Kozma & John Caulfield (eds.), Journal of New Mathematics and Natural Computing. Special Issue on Neurodynamic Correlates of Higher Cognition and Consciousness: Theoretical and Experimental Approaches - in Honor of Walter J Freeman's 80th Birthday. World Scientific. 221-244.score: 192.0
    In our contribution we will observe phenomenal architecture of a mind and operational architectonics of the brain and will show their intimate connectedness within a single integrated metastable continuum. The notion of operation of different complexity is the fundamental and central one in bridging the gap between brain and mind: it is precisely by means of this notion that it is possible to identify what at the same time belongs to the phenomenal conscious level and to the neurophysiological (...)
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  44. Andrew A. Fingelkurts, Alexander A. Fingelkurts & Giorgio Marchetti (2010). Editorial: Brain, Mind and Language Functional Architectures. Open Neuroimaging Journal 4:26-29.score: 192.0
    The interaction between brain and language has been investigated by a vast amount of research and different approaches, which however do not offer a comprehensive and unified theoretical framework to analyze how brain functioning performs the mental processes we use in producing language and in understanding speech. This Special Issue addresses the need to develop such a general theoretical framework, by fostering an interaction among the various scientific disciplines and methodologies, which centres on investigating the functional architecture of (...)
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  45. Rodney M. J. Cotterill (2000). On Brain and Mind. Brain and Mind 1 (2):237-244.score: 192.0
    An easily-accessible introduction is provided for theauthor''s book Enchanted Looms , which is reviewedelsewhere in this volume by Jesse Prinz and by MarcelKinsbourne, and also for the article Didconsciousness evolve from self-paced probing of theenvironment, and not from reflexes? , which alsoappears in this volume and which summarises theauthor''s more recent thoughts on consciousness.
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  46. Gualtiero Piccinini (2004). The First Computational Theory of Mind and Brain: A Close Look at McCulloch and Pitts' Logical Calculus of Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity. Synthese 141 (2):175-215.score: 192.0
    Despite its significance in neuroscience and computation, McCulloch and Pitts's celebrated 1943 paper has received little historical and philosophical attention. In 1943 there already existed a lively community of biophysicists doing mathematical work on neural networks. What was novel in McCulloch and Pitts's paper was their use of logic and computation to understand neural, and thus mental, activity. McCulloch and Pitts's contributions included (i) a formalism whose refinement and generalization led to the notion of finite automata (an important formalism in (...)
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  47. Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2012). Mind as a Nested Operational Architectonics of the Brain. Physics of Life Reviews 9 (1):49-50.score: 192.0
    The target paper of Dr. Feinberg is a testimony to an admirable scholarship and deep thoughtfulness. This paper develops a general theoretical framework of nested hierarchy in the brain that allows production of mind with consciousness. The difference between non-nested and nested hierarchies is the following. In a non-nested hierarchy the entities at higher levels of the hierarchy are physically independent from the entities at lower levels and there is strong constraint of higher upon lower levels. In a nested (...)
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  48. Camilo J. Cela-Conde & Gisèle Marty (1997). Mind Architecture and Brain Architecture. Biology and Philosophy 12 (3):327-340.score: 192.0
    The use of the computer metaphor has led to the proposal of mind architecture (Pylyshyn 1984; Newell 1990) as a model of the organization of the mind. The dualist computational model, however, has, since the earliest days of psychological functionalism, required that the concepts mind architecture and brain architecture be remote from each other. The development of both connectionism and neurocomputational science, has sought to dispense with this dualism and provide general models of consciousness – a uniform cognitive architecture (...)
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  49. Singh Sa Singh Ar (2011). Brain-Mind Dyad, Human Experience, the Consciousness Tetrad and Lattice of Mental Operations: And Further, The Need to Integrate Knowledge From Diverse Disciplines. Mens Sana Monographs 9 (1):6.score: 192.0
    Brain, Mind and Consciousness are the research concerns of psychiatrists, psychologists, neurologists, cognitive neuroscientists and philosophers. All of them are working in different and important ways to understand the workings of the brain, the mysteries of the mind and to grasp that elusive concept called consciousness. Although they are all justified in forwarding their respective researches, it is also necessary to integrate these diverse appearing understandings and try and get a comprehensive perspective that is, hopefully, more than the (...)
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  50. H. Tristram Engelhardt (1977). Husserl and the Mind-Brain Relation. In. In Don Ihde & Richard M. Zaner (eds.), Interdisciplinary Phenomenology. M. Nijhoff. 51--70.score: 192.0
    The mind-body relation or, more particularly, the mind-brain relation 1 has been a perennial puzzle for philosophers—how can things so different be intimately related? Husserl dealt with the mind-brain relation in Section 63 of Ideen II, “Psychophysischer Parallelismus and Wechselwirkung,” 2 where he gave a critique of psychophysical parallelism. For Husserl, the mind-brain relation is to be understood not as a material or metaphysical relation, but as a relation between the presented sense or significance of two varieties (...)
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