Search results for 'Mind, brain' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  83
    Patricia S. Churchland (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward A Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. MIT Press.
    This is a unique book. It is excellently written, crammed with information, wise and a pleasure to read.' ---Daniel C. Dennett, Tufts University.
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  2. W. Teed Rockwell (2005). Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
    In this highly original work, Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory. He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world. The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a "behavioral field" that fluctuates within this brain-body-world nexus. If we reject the dominant form of the mind-brain identity theory -- which Rockwell calls "Cartesian (...)
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  3. Mostyn W. Jones (2010). How To Make Mind-Brain Relations Clear. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (5-6):5 - 6.
    The mind-body problem arises because all theories about mind-brain connections are too deeply obscure to gain general acceptance. This essay suggests a clear, simple, mind-brain solution that avoids all these perennial obscurities. (1) It does so, first of all, by reworking Strawson and Stoljar’s views. They argue that while minds differ from observable brains, minds can still be what brains are physically like behind the appearances created by our outer senses. This could avoid many obscurities. But to clearly (...)
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  4.  73
    Andrew A. Fingelkurts & Alexander A. Fingelkurts (2001). Operational Architectonics of the Human Brain Biopotential Field: Toward Solving the Mind-Brain Problem. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 2 (3):261-296.
    The understanding of the interrelationship between brain and mind remains far from clear. It is well established that the brain's capacity to integrate information from numerous sources forms the basis for cognitive abilities. However, the core unresolved question is how information about the "objective" physical entities of the external world can be integrated, and how unifiedand coherent mental states (or Gestalts) can be established in the internal entities of distributed neuronal systems. The present paper offers a unified methodological (...)
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  5.  24
    Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (forthcoming). Of Brains and Planets: On a Causal Criterion for Mind-Brain Identities. Synthese:1-13.
    Whether mental properties are identical with neural properties is one of the central questions of contemporary philosophy of mind. Many philosophers agree that even if mental properties are identical with neural properties, the mind-brain identity thesis cannot be established on empirical grounds, but only be vindicated by theoretical philosophical considerations. In his paper ‘When Is a Brain Like the Planet?’, Clark Glymour proposes a causal criterion for local property identifications and claims that this criterion can be used to (...)
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  6. Jakob Hohwy (2011). Mind–Brain Identity and Evidential Insulation. Philosophical Studies 26 (3):261-286.
    Is it rational to believe that the mind is identical to the brain? Identity theorists say it is (or looks like it will be, once all the neuroscientific evidence is in), and they base this claim on a general epistemic route to belief in identity. I re-develop this general route and defend it against some objections. Then I discuss how rational belief in mind–brain identity, obtained via this route, can be threatened by an appropriately adjusted version of the (...)
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  7.  2
    Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (2016). Of Brains and Planets: On a Causal Criterion for Mind-Brain Identities. Synthese 193 (4):1177-1189.
    Whether mental properties are identical with neural properties is one of the central questions of contemporary philosophy of mind. Many philosophers agree that even if mental properties are identical with neural properties, the mind-brain identity thesis cannot be established on empirical grounds, but only be vindicated by theoretical philosophical considerations. In his paper ‘When Is a Brain Like the Planet?’, Clark Glymour proposes a causal criterion for local property identifications and claims that this criterion can be used to (...)
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  8.  5
    David A. Booth (1978). Mind-Brain Puzzle Versus Mind-Physical World Identity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3):348-349.
    To maintain my neutral monist or multi-aspect view of human reality (or indeed to defend the Cartesian dualism assumed by Puccetti & Dykes, it is wrong to relate the mind to the brain alone. A person's mind should be related to the physical environment, including the body, in addition to the brain. Furthermore, we are unlikely to understand the detailed functioning of an individual brain without knowing the history of its interactions with the external and internal environments (...)
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  9.  18
    Zachary Stein & Kurt W. Fischer (2011). Directions for Mind, Brain, and Education: Methods, Models, and Morality. Educational Philosophy and Theory 43 (1):56-66.
    In this article we frame a set of important issues in the emerging field of Mind, Brain, and Education in terms of three broad headings: methods, models, and morality. Under the heading of methods we suggest that the need for synthesis across scientific and practical disciplines entails the pursuit of usable knowledge via a catalytic symbiosis between theory, research, and practice. Under the heading of models the goal of producing usable knowledge should shape the construction of theories that provide (...)
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  10.  20
    Joseph M. Notterman (2000). Note on Reductionism in Cognitive Psychology: Reification of Cognitive Processes Into Mind, Mind-Brain Equivalence, and Brain-Computer Analogy. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):116-121.
    This note brings together three phenomena leading to a tendency toward reductionism in cognitive psychology. They are the reification of cognitive processes into an entity called mind; the identification of the mind with the brain; and the congruence by analogy of the brain with the digital computer. Also indicated is the need to continue studying the effects upon behavior of variables other than brain function. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
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  11.  4
    Mark Crooks (2002). Intertheoretic Identification and Mind-Brain Reductionism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):193-222.
    A recurrent candidate for exemplification of intertheoretic reduction, put forward over past decades within philosophy of science, is the proposition "pitch is identical with sound-frequency." Paul Churchland revives this nominal ontological reduction, placing it beside others as "lightning is an electrical discharge," and "heat is high kinetic energy." Yet no matter whether frequency is considered physically or merely semantically, there is no conceivable format in which such an identity is viable. An analysis of objective qualia said to represent the ground (...)
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  12. Clive Vernon Borst (1970). The Mind-Brain Identity Theory: A Collection of Papers. New York,St Martin's P..
    Mind body, not a pseudo-problem, by H. Feigl.--Is consciousness a brain process? by U. T. Place.--Sensations and brain processes, by J. J. C. Smart.--The nature of mind, by D. M. Armstrong.--Materialism as a scientific hypothesis, by U. T. Place.--Sensations and brain processes: a reply to J. J. C. Smart, by J. T. Stevenson.--Further remarks on sensations and brain processes, by J. J. C. Smart.--Smart on sensations, by K. Baier.--Brain processes and incorrigibility, by J. J. C. (...)
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  13. M. L. Lonky (2003). Human Consciousness: A Systems Approach to the Mind/Brain Interaction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (1):91-118.
    The Journal of Mind and Behavior, Winter 2003, Volume 24, Number 1, Pages 91–118, ISSN 0271–0137 This paper focuses on a logical systems flow-down of a set of consciousness requirements, which together with biological quantification of human brain anatomy sets limits on the neurological network in the cerebrum in order to produce the mind. It employs data to validate inferences, or when data do not exist, proposes methods for acquiring valid evidence. Many of these systems requirements will be imposed (...)
     
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  14. Gabriel Vacariu & Vacariu (2013). The Mind-Brain Problem in Cognitive Neuroscience (Only Content).
    (June 2013) “The mind-body problem in cognitive neuroscience”, Philosophia Scientiae 17/2, Gabriel Vacariu and Mihai Vacariu (eds.): 1. William Bechtel (Philosophy, Center for Chronobiology, and Interdisciplinary Program in Cognitive Science University of California, San Diego) “The endogenously active brain: the need for an alternative cognitive architecture” 2. Rolls T. Edmund (Oxford Centre for Computational Neuroscience, Oxford, UK) “On the relation between the mind and the brain: a neuroscience perspective” 3. Cees van Leeuwen (University of Leuven, Belgium; Riken (...) Science Institute, Japan) “Brain and mind” 4. Kari Theurer (Trinity College) and John Bickle (Philosophy, Mississippi State University) “What’s old is new again: Kemeny-Oppenheim reduction at work in current molecular neuroscience” 5. Bernard Andrieu (Staps Université de Lorraine) “Sentir son cerveau? Les dispositifs neuro-expérientiels en 1er personne” 6. Corey Maley and Gualtiero Piccinini (Philosophy, University of Missouri – St. Louis) “Get the latest upgrade: Functionalism 6.3.1” 7. Paula Droege (Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University) “Memory and consciousness” 8. Gabriel Vacariu and Mihai Vacariu (Philosophy, University of Bucharest) “Troubles with cognitive neuroscience”. (shrink)
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  15.  51
    W. R. Webster (2002). A Case of Mind/Brain Identity: One Small Bridge for the Explanatory Gap. Synthese 131 (2):275-287.
    Based on the technique of pressure blinding of the eye, two types of after-image were identified. A physicalist or mind/brain identity explanation was established for a negative a AI produced by moderately intense stimuli. These AI's were shown to be located in the neurons of the retina. An illusory AI of double a grating's spatial frequency was also produced in the same structure and was both prevented from being established and abolished after establishment by pressure blinding, thus showing that (...)
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  16.  62
    John Bickle (1992). Mental Anomaly and the New Mind-Brain Reductionism. Philosophy of Science 59 (2):217-30.
    Davidson's principle of the anomalousness of the mental was instrumental in discrediting once-popular versions of mind-brain reductionism. In this essay I argue that a novel account of intertheoretic reduction, which does not require the sort of cross-theoretic bridge laws that Davidson's principle rules out, allows a version of mind-brain reductionism which is immune from Davidson's challenge. In the final section, I address a second worry about reductionism, also based on Davidson's principle, that survives this response. I argue that (...)
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  17.  71
    Robert Rosen (1993). Drawing the Boundary Between Subject and Object: Comments on the Mind-Brain Problem. Theoretical Medicine 14 (2):89-100.
    Physics says that it cannot deal with the mind-brain problem, because it does not deal in subjectivities, and mind is subjective. However, biologists still claim to seek a material basis for subjective mental processes, which would thereby render them objective. Something is clearly wrong here. I claim that what is wrong is the adoption of too narrow a view of what constitutes objectivity, especially in identifying it with what a machine can do. I approach the problem in the light (...)
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  18.  55
    Ullin T. Place (2000). The Two Factor Theory of the Mind-Brain Relation. Brain and Mind 1 (1):29-43.
    The analysis of mental concepts suggests that the distinctionbetween the mental and the nonmental is not ontologically fundamental,and that, whereas mental processes are one and the same things as thebrain processes with which they are correlated, dispositional mentalstates depend causally on and are, thus, ''''distinct existences'''' fromthe states of the brain microstructure with which ''they'' are correlated.It is argued that this difference in the relation between an entity andits composition/underlying structure applies across the board. allstuffs and processes are the (...)
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  19.  40
    John Bickle (1997). From Sensory Neuroscience to Neurophilosophy: Reflections on Llinas and Churchland's Mind-Brain Continuum. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):523-530.
    Philosophers and psychologists seeking an accessible introduction to current neuroscience will find much value in this volume. Befitting the neuroscientific focus on sensory processes, many essays address explicitly the binding problem. Theoretical and experimental work pertaining to the “temporal synchronicity” solution is prominent. But there are also some surprising implications for current philosophical concerns, such as the intemalism/extemalism debate about representational content, epistemological realism, a “bottom-up” approach to naturalizing intentionality, Humean concerns about the self, and implications from phantom-limb phenomena. Higher-level (...)
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  20.  81
    Gabriel Vacariu (2005). Mind, Brain, and Epistemologically Different Worlds. Synthese 147 (3):515-548.
    The reason why, since Descartes, nobody has found a solution to the mind–body problem seems to be that the problem itself is a false or pseudo-problem. The discussion has proceeded within a pre-Cartesian conceptual framework which itself is a source of the difficulty. Dualism and all its alternatives have preserved the same pre-Cartesian conceptual framework even while denying Descartes’ dualism. In order to avoid this pseudo-problem, I introduce a new perspective with three elements: the subject, the observed object, and the (...)
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  21.  6
    Roland Puccetti & Robert W. Dykes (1978). Sensory Cortex and the Mind-Brain Problem. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3):337.
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  22.  20
    Simon van Rysewyk, Critique of Max Velmans on Mind-Brain Identity Theory and Consciousness – Part I.
  23.  19
    Simon van Rysewyk, Mind-Brain Identity Theory, ‘Brain-Sex’ Theory of Transsexualism and the Dimorphic Brain.
  24.  17
    Simon van Rysewyk, Links Between the Intrauterine Theory of Gender Identity, Transsexualism and Mind-Brain-Body Identity.
  25. J. R. Smythies (2002). Comment on Crooks's Intertheoretic Identification and Mind-Brain Reductionism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):245-248.
    This paper focuses on perception and surveys the scientific evidence that the theory of direct realism adopted by most contemporary philosophers is incorrect. This evidence is provided by experiments on the spatial and temporal "filling-in" of percepts. It also examines the myth of the projection of sensations. The conclusion is that we do not perceive the world as it actually is, but as the brain computes it most probably to be.
     
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  26. Anjum P. Saleemi, Ocke-Schwen Bohn & Albert Gjedde (eds.) (2005). In Search of a Language for the Mind-Brain: Can the Multiple Perspectives Be Unified? Aarhus University Press ;.
  27. Michael Lockwood (1989). Mind, Brain, and the Quantum. Oxford University Press.
  28.  59
    Patricia S. Churchland (1980). A Perspective on Mind-Brain Research. Journal of Philosophy 77 (April):185-207.
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  29.  71
    Paul Schweizer (1994). Intentionality, Qualia, and Mind/Brain Identity. Minds and Machines 4 (3):259-82.
    The paper examines the status of conscious presentation with regard to mental content and intentional states. I argue that conscious presentation of mental content should be viewed on the model of a secondary quality, as a subjectiveeffect of the microstructure of an underlying brain state. The brain state is in turn viewed as the instantiation of an abstract computational state, with the result that introspectively accessible content is interpreted as a presentation of the associated computational state realized by (...)
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  30.  38
    W. R. Webster (2003). Revelation and Transparency in Colour Vision Refuted: A Case of Mind/Brain Identity and Another Bridge Over the Explanatory Gap. Synthese 133 (3):419-39.
    Russell and others have argued that the real nature of colour is transparentto us in colour vision. It's nature is fully revealed to us and no further knowledgeis theoretically possible. This is the doctrine of revelation. Two-dimensionalFourier analyses of coloured checkerboards have shown that apparently simple,monadic, colours can be based on quite different physical mechanisms. Experimentswith the McCollough effect on different types of checkerboards have shown thatidentical colours can have energy at the quite different orientations of Fourierharmonic components but no (...)
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  31. Ralph L. Smith (1999). A Testable Mind-Brain Theory. Journal of Mind and Behavior 20 (4):421-436.
    Proceeding from the observation by Ryle that I cannot prepare myself for the next thought that I am going to think, I argue that conscious acts cannot control my bodily motions or thoughts. This position is not compatible with indeterminism. I also argue that consciousness represents the irreducible and multi-modal output of the behavioral control system sensors necessary for the control of human behavior demonstrated by Marken . My analysis supports one experimental result obtained by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl (...)
     
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  32. Gilberto Gomes (1995). Self-Awareness and the Mind-Brain Problem. Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):155-65.
    The prima facie heterogeneity between psychical and physical phenomena seems to be a serious objection to psychoneural identity thesis, according to many authors, from Leibniz to Popper. It is argued that this objection can be superseded by a different conception of consciousness. Consciousness, while being conscious of something, is always unconscious of itself . Consciousness of being conscious is not immediate, it involves another, second-order, conscious state. The appearance of mental states to second-order consciousness does not reveal their true nature. (...)
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  33. Gualtiero Piccinini (2004). The First Computational Theory of Mind and Brain: A Close Look at McCulloch and Pitts' Logical Calculus of Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity. Synthese 141 (2):175-215.
    Despite its significance in neuroscience and computation, McCulloch and Pitts's celebrated 1943 paper has received little historical and philosophical attention. In 1943 there already existed a lively community of biophysicists doing mathematical work on neural networks. What was novel in McCulloch and Pitts's paper was their use of logic and computation to understand neural, and thus mental, activity. McCulloch and Pitts's contributions included (i) a formalism whose refinement and generalization led to the notion of finite automata (an important formalism in (...)
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  34.  88
    Susan A. Greenfield (2002). Mind, Brain and Consciousness. British Journal of Psychiatry 181 (2):91-93.
  35.  15
    J. L. Mackie (1979). Mind, Brain, and Causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):19-29.
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  36.  4
    Gary Hatfield (2013). Introduction: The Evolution of Mind, Brain, and Culture. In Gary Hatfield & Holly Pittman (eds.), Evolution of Mind, Brain, and Culture. University of Pennsylvania Press 1-44.
    This introductory chapter surveys some basic findings on primate evolution and the evolution of mind; examines socially transmitted traditions in relation to the concept of culture; recounts the sources of evidence regarding the evolution of mind and culture; charts the history of evolutionary approaches to mind and behavior since Darwin; reviews several prominent theoretical syntheses concerning the evolution of the human mind and behavior; and, along the way, introduces the specific questions examined in the individual chapters.
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  37.  57
    David Hunter (2001). Mind-Brain Identity and the Nature of States. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):366 – 376.
  38.  55
    George Graham (1999). Mind, Brain, World. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (3):223-225.
  39.  51
    Jan Srzednicki (1972). Some Objections to Mind-Brain Identity Theories. Philosophia 2 (July):205-225.
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  40.  28
    Karl H. Pribam (1979). Transcending the Mind/Brain Problem. Zygon 14 (June):103-124.
  41.  29
    Irving Thalberg (1978). A Novel Approach to Mind-Brain Identity. Philosophy of Science 3 (April):255-72.
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  42. Kaj Sotala & Harri Valpola (2012). Coalescing Minds: Brain Uploading-Related Group Mind Scenarios. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (01):293-312.
    We present a hypothetical process of mind coalescence, where arti cial connections are created between two or more brains. This might simply allow for an improved form of communication. At the other extreme, it might merge the minds into one in a process that can be thought of as a reverse split-brain operation. We propose that one way mind coalescence might happen is via an exocortex, a prosthetic extension of the biological brain which integrates with the brain (...)
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  43. Barbara Fajardo (2000). Breaks in Consciousness in the Psychoanalytic Process: A Dynamic Systems Approach to Change and a Bridge to Edelman's Mind/Brain Model. Annual of Psychoanalysis 28:21-45.
     
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  44. Stephen Harrison (1989). A New Visualization of the Mind-Brain Relationship. In The Case for Dualism. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia
     
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  45. William R. Stoeger (1999). The Mind-Brain Problem, the Laws of Nature, and Constitutive Relationships. In Neuroscience and the Person: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action. Notre Dame: University Notre Dame Press
  46.  41
    Bernard J. Baars (2003). How Brain Reveals Mind: Neural Studies Support the Fundamental Role of Conscious Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):100-114.
    In the last decade, careful studies of the living brain have opened the way for human consciousness to return to the heights it held before the behavioristic coup of 1913. This is illustrated by seven cases: the discovery of widespread brain activation during conscious perception; high levels of regional brain metabolism in the resting state of consciousness, dropping drastically in unconscious states; the brain correlates of inner speech; visual imagery; fringe consciousness; executive functions of the self; (...)
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  47.  18
    David A. Oakley (ed.) (1985). Brain and Mind. Methuen.
  48.  57
    Alfred Gierer (2008). Brain, Mind and Limitations of a Scientific Theory of Human Consciousness. Bioessays 30 (5):499-505.
    In biological terms, human consciousness appears as a feature associated with the func- tioning of the human brain. The corresponding activities of the neural network occur strictly in accord with physical laws; however, this fact does not necessarily imply that there can be a comprehensive scientific theory of conscious- ness, despite all the progress in neurobiology, neuropsychology and neurocomputation. Pre- dictions of the extent to which such a theory may become possible vary widely in the scien- tific community. There (...)
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  49.  44
    Todd E. Feinberg (2001). Why the Mind is Not a Radically Emergent Feature of the Brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10):123-145.
    In this article I will attempt to refute the claim that the mind is a radically emergent feature of the brain. First, the inter-related concepts of emergence, reducibility and constraint are considered, particularly as these ideas relate to hierarchical biological systems. The implications of radical emergence theories of the mind such as the one posited by Roger Sperry, are explored. I then argue that the failure of Sperry's model is based on the notion that consciousness arises as a radically (...)
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  50. K. R. Popper, B. I. B. Lindahl & P. Århem (1993). A Discussion of the Mind-Brain Problem. Theoretical Medicine 14 (2):167-180.
    In this paper Popper formulates and discusses a new aspect of the theory of mind. This theory is partly based on his earlier developed interactionistic theory. It takes as its point of departure the observation that mind and physical forces have several properties in common, at least the following six: both are located, unextended, incorporeal, capable of acting on bodies, dependent upon body, capable of being influenced by bodies. Other properties such as intensity and extension in time may be added. (...)
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