Search results for 'Mind-brain identity theory' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. W. Teed Rockwell (2005). Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
    In this highly original work, Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory. He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world. The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a "behavioral field" that fluctuates within this brain-body-world nexus. If we reject the dominant form of the mind-brain identity theory -- which Rockwell calls (...)
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  2. Clive Vernon Borst (1970). The Mind-Brain Identity Theory: A Collection of Papers. New York,St Martin's P..
    Mind body, not a pseudo-problem, by H. Feigl.--Is consciousness a brain process? by U. T. Place.--Sensations and brain processes, by J. J. C. Smart.--The nature of mind, by D. M. Armstrong.--Materialism as a scientific hypothesis, by U. T. Place.--Sensations and brain processes: a reply to J. J. C. Smart, by J. T. Stevenson.--Further remarks on sensations and brain processes, by J. J. C. Smart.--Smart on sensations, by K. Baier.--Brain processes and incorrigibility, by J. J. C. Smart.--Could mental states be brain (...)
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  3.  22
    Simon van Rysewyk, Critique of Max Velmans on Mind-Brain Identity Theory and Consciousness – Part I.
  4.  21
    Simon van Rysewyk, Mind-Brain Identity Theory, ‘Brain-Sex’ Theory of Transsexualism and the Dimorphic Brain.
  5.  20
    Simon van Rysewyk, Links Between the Intrauterine Theory of Gender Identity, Transsexualism and Mind-Brain-Body Identity.
  6. J. J. C. Smart, The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The identity theory of mind holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. Strictly speaking, it need not hold that the mind is identical to the brain. Idiomatically we do use ‘She has a good mind’ and ‘She has a good brain’ interchangeably but we would hardly say ‘Her mind weighs fifty ounces’. Here I take identifying mind and brain as being a matter of identifying processes and perhaps states (...)
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  7. W. Teed Rockwell (2007). Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory. A Bradford Book.
    In this highly original work, Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory. He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world. The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a "behavioral field" that fluctuates within this brain-body-world nexus. If we reject the dominant form of the mind-brain identity theory -- which Rockwell calls (...)
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  8.  61
    Jeffrey A. Gray (1971). The Mind-Brain Identity Theory as a Scientific Hypothesis. Philosophical Quarterly 21 (July):247-254.
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  9. Jakob Hohwy (2011). Mind–Brain Identity and Evidential Insulation. Philosophical Studies 26 (3):261-286.
    Is it rational to believe that the mind is identical to the brain? Identity theorists say it is (or looks like it will be, once all the neuroscientific evidence is in), and they base this claim on a general epistemic route to belief in identity. I re-develop this general route and defend it against some objections. Then I discuss how rational belief in mind–brain identity, obtained via this route, can be threatened by an appropriately adjusted version of (...)
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  10. Clive V. Borst (ed.) (1970). The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Macmillan.
  11.  10
    J. Bickle (2008). Review: W. Teed Rockwell: Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory. [REVIEW] Mind 117 (466):508-511.
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  12.  7
    J. J. C. Smart (1978). Cortical Localization and the Mind-Brain Identity Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3):365.
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  13.  7
    John R. Perry (1978). Defenses for the Mind-Brain Identity Theory: Causal Differences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3):362.
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  14.  28
    Steven Baldner (2006). Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory. Review of Metaphysics 60 (2):419-421.
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  15.  10
    Christine McCarthy (2006). Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Non-Dualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory (Review). Education and Culture 22 (2):83-86.
  16.  3
    Kendy M. Hess (2009). Review of “Neither Brain nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative to the Mind-Brain Identity Theory”. [REVIEW] Essays in Philosophy 10 (1):10.
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  17.  2
    Elizabeth Hindess (1971). The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Philosophical Books 12 (2):1-3.
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  18. C. P. Ruloff (2007). W. Teed Rockwell, Neither Brain Nor Ghost: A Non-Dualist Alternative to the Mind/Brain Identity Theory. Philosophy in Review 27 (6):143.
     
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  19. Liz Stillwaggon (2006). W. Teed Rockwell: Neither Brain Nor Ghost: A Nondualist Alternative To The Mind-Brain Identity Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 73 (1):131-133.
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  20.  52
    Jan Srzednicki (1972). Some Objections to Mind-Brain Identity Theories. Philosophia 2 (July):205-225.
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  21.  16
    Robert R. Hoffman (1967). Malcolm and Smart on Brain-Mind Identity. Philosophy 42 (April):128-136.
    In ‘Scientific Materialism and the Identity Theory’ Malcolm argues that Smart's brain-mind identity theory is not even false, but is unintelligible. I want to comment on his arguments.
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  22.  10
    Massimiliano Lorenzo Cappuccio (forthcoming). Mind-Upload. The Ultimate Challenge to the Embodied Mind Theory. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-24.
    The ‘Mind-Upload’ hypothesis, a radical version of the Brain-in-a-Vat thought experiment, asserts that a whole mind can safely be transferred from a brain to a digital device, after being exactly encoded into substrate independent informational patterns. Prima facie, MU seems the philosophical archenemy of the Embodied Mind theory, which understands embodiment as a necessary and constitutive condition for the existence of a mind and its functions. In truth, whether and why MU and EM are ultimately incompatible is unobvious. This (...)
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  23.  13
    Norman M. Swartz (1974). Can the Theory of Contingent Identity Between Sensation-States and Brain-States Be Made Empirical? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (March):405-17.
  24. Mostyn W. Jones (2010). How To Make Mind-Brain Relations Clear. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (5-6):5 - 6.
    The mind-body problem arises because all theories about mind-brain connections are too deeply obscure to gain general acceptance. This essay suggests a clear, simple, mind-brain solution that avoids all these perennial obscurities. (1) It does so, first of all, by reworking Strawson and Stoljar’s views. They argue that while minds differ from observable brains, minds can still be what brains are physically like behind the appearances created by our outer senses. This could avoid many obscurities. But to clearly (...)
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  25. Terence Rajivan Edward, Defining Mind-Brain Token Identity.
    This paper disputes a common definition of token identity theory. It also observes that within the philosophical literature there are two significantly different definitions of token identity theory that are commonly used.
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  26.  2
    Riccardo Manzotti (2016). Experiences Are Objects. Towards a Mind-Object Identity Theory. Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):16-36.
    : Traditional mind-body identity theories maintain that consciousness is identical with neural activity. Consider an alternative identity theory – namely, a mind-object identity theory of consciousness. I suggest to take into consideration whether one’s consciousness might be identical with the external object. The hypothesis is that, when I perceive a yellow banana, the thing that is one and the same with my consciousness of the yellow banana is the very yellow banana one can grab and (...)
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  27.  51
    W. R. Webster (2002). A Case of Mind/Brain Identity: One Small Bridge for the Explanatory Gap. Synthese 131 (2):275-287.
    Based on the technique of pressure blinding of the eye, two types of after-image were identified. A physicalist or mind/brain identity explanation was established for a negative a AI produced by moderately intense stimuli. These AI's were shown to be located in the neurons of the retina. An illusory AI of double a grating's spatial frequency was also produced in the same structure and was both prevented from being established and abolished after establishment by pressure blinding, thus showing that (...)
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  28.  17
    Pheroze S. Wadia (1972). On a Refutation of Mind-Body Identity. Philosophical Studies 23 (February):113-115.
    In a previous article, Professor abelson contended that the mind-Body identity theory was 'mathematically impossible' inasmuch as the number of possible mental states of a finite thinking organism are infinite, While the number of possible bodily states of such an organism are necessarily finite. I argue that this refutation does not succeed because although it is true that a finite brain can have only a finite number of brain states, Abelson had not demonstrated that there was a limitation (...)
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  29.  6
    P. M. McGoldrick (1984). Causes, Correlations and Mind-Brain Identity. Philosophical Studies 30:230-232.
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  30. Brandon N. Towl (2011). Mind-Brain Correlations, Identity, and Neuroscience. Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):187 - 202.
    One of the positive arguments for the type-identity theory of mental states is an inference-to-the-best-explanation (IBE) argument, which purports to show that type-identity theory is likely true since it is the best explanation for the correlations between mental states and brain states that we find in the neurosciences. But given the methods of neuroscience, there are other relations besides identity that can explain such correlations. I illustrate some of these relations by examining the literature on (...)
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  31.  12
    Simon van Rysewyk, Why Are Pain Patients All Unique? A Type-Token Identity Theory Answer.
  32. Anjum P. Saleemi, Ocke-Schwen Bohn & Albert Gjedde (eds.) (2005). In Search of a Language for the Mind-Brain: Can the Multiple Perspectives Be Unified? Aarhus University Press ;.
  33.  35
    Kenneth G. Lucey (1975). The Testability of the Identity Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (August):142-147.
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  34.  20
    Simon van Rysewyk, Tania Lombrozo, 'The Mind is Just the Brain'.
  35. Mario Beauregard (2012). Brain Wars: The Scientific Battle Over the Existence of the Mind and the Proof That Will Change the Way We Live Our Lives. Harperone.
     
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  36. Rodney Cotterill (1989). No Ghost in the Machine: Modern Science and the Brain, the Mind, and the Soul. Heinemann.
     
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  37.  5
    David A. Booth (1978). Mind-Brain Puzzle Versus Mind-Physical World Identity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3):348-349.
    To maintain my neutral monist or multi-aspect view of human reality (or indeed to defend the Cartesian dualism assumed by Puccetti & Dykes, it is wrong to relate the mind to the brain alone. A person's mind should be related to the physical environment, including the body, in addition to the brain. Furthermore, we are unlikely to understand the detailed functioning of an individual brain without knowing the history of its interactions with the external and internal environments during that person's (...)
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  38. Jack H. Ornstein (1972). The Mind and the Brain: A Multi-Aspect Interpretation. The Hague: Nijhoff.
  39.  37
    Stephen L. Nathanson (1972). Abelson's Refutation of Mind-Body Identity. Philosophical Studies 23 (February):116-118.
    R. Abelson argues that the identity theory is false because it is possible to have an infinite number of thoughts (e.G. Of natural numbers) while the number of possible brain states is finite. The refutation fails because it conflates the logical possibility of having infinite thoughts with the actual ability to have them. The latter depends on many contingent facts, One of which may be the number of possible brain states.
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  40.  63
    David Hunter (2001). Mind-Brain Identity and the Nature of States. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):366 – 376.
  41.  39
    W. R. Webster (2003). Revelation and Transparency in Colour Vision Refuted: A Case of Mind/Brain Identity and Another Bridge Over the Explanatory Gap. Synthese 133 (3):419-39.
    Russell and others have argued that the real nature of colour is transparentto us in colour vision. It's nature is fully revealed to us and no further knowledgeis theoretically possible. This is the doctrine of revelation. Two-dimensionalFourier analyses of coloured checkerboards have shown that apparently simple,monadic, colours can be based on quite different physical mechanisms. Experimentswith the McCollough effect on different types of checkerboards have shown thatidentical colours can have energy at the quite different orientations of Fourierharmonic components but no (...)
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  42.  29
    Irving Thalberg (1978). A Novel Approach to Mind-Brain Identity. Philosophy of Science 3 (April):255-72.
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  43. C. P. Presley (ed.) (1967). The Identity Theory of Mind. University of Queensland Press.
     
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  44. J. Brown (2000). Mind and Nature: Essays on Time and Subjectivity. Whurr Publishers.
    This collection of essays extends the microgenetic theory of the mind/brain state to basic problems in process psychology and philosophy of mind. The author's microtemporal model of brain activity and psychological events, which was originally based on clinical studies of patients with focal brain damage, is here extended to such topics as the concept of the moment in Buddhist philosophy, conscious and unconscious thought, the nature of the self, subjective time and aesthetic perception. The author develops a highly original (...)
     
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  45. U. T. Place (2004). Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. Oxford University Press.
    This is the one and only book by the pioneer of the identity theory of mind. The collection focuses on Place's philosophy of mind and his contributions to neighboring issues in metaphysics and epistemology. It includes an autobiographical essay as well as a recent paper on the function and neural location of consciousness.
     
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  46.  3
    James Cole (2015). Hominin Language Development: A New Method of Archaeological Assessment. Biosemiotics 8 (1):67-90.
    The question of language development and origin is a subject that is vital to our understanding of what it means to be human. This is reflected in the large range of academic disciplines that are dedicated to the subject. Language development has in particular been related to studies in cognitive capacity and the ability for mind reading, often termed a theory of mind. The Social Brain Hypothesis has been the only attempt to correlate a cognitive scale of complexity incorporating (...)
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  47. Gualtiero Piccinini (2004). The First Computational Theory of Mind and Brain: A Close Look at McCulloch and Pitts' Logical Calculus of Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity. Synthese 141 (2):175-215.
    Despite its significance in neuroscience and computation, McCulloch and Pitts's celebrated 1943 paper has received little historical and philosophical attention. In 1943 there already existed a lively community of biophysicists doing mathematical work on neural networks. What was novel in McCulloch and Pitts's paper was their use of logic and computation to understand neural, and thus mental, activity. McCulloch and Pitts's contributions included (i) a formalism whose refinement and generalization led to the notion of finite automata (an important formalism in (...)
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  48.  61
    Alfred Gierer (2008). Brain, Mind and Limitations of a Scientific Theory of Human Consciousness. Bioessays 30 (5):499-505.
    In biological terms, human consciousness appears as a feature associated with the func- tioning of the human brain. The corresponding activities of the neural network occur strictly in accord with physical laws; however, this fact does not necessarily imply that there can be a comprehensive scientific theory of conscious- ness, despite all the progress in neurobiology, neuropsychology and neurocomputation. Pre- dictions of the extent to which such a theory may become possible vary widely in the scien- tific community. (...)
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  49.  58
    Ullin T. Place (2000). The Two Factor Theory of the Mind-Brain Relation. Brain and Mind 1 (1):29-43.
    The analysis of mental concepts suggests that the distinctionbetween the mental and the nonmental is not ontologically fundamental,and that, whereas mental processes are one and the same things as thebrain processes with which they are correlated, dispositional mentalstates depend causally on and are, thus, ''''distinct existences'''' fromthe states of the brain microstructure with which ''they'' are correlated.It is argued that this difference in the relation between an entity andits composition/underlying structure applies across the board. allstuffs and processes are the same (...)
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  50.  74
    Paul Schweizer (1994). Intentionality, Qualia, and Mind/Brain Identity. Minds and Machines 4 (3):259-82.
    The paper examines the status of conscious presentation with regard to mental content and intentional states. I argue that conscious presentation of mental content should be viewed on the model of a secondary quality, as a subjectiveeffect of the microstructure of an underlying brain state. The brain state is in turn viewed as the instantiation of an abstract computational state, with the result that introspectively accessible content is interpreted as a presentation of the associated computational state realized by the brain. (...)
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