Search results for 'Mindreading' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Shannon Spaulding (2010). Embodied Cognition and Mindreading. Mind and Language 25 (1):119-140.score: 18.0
    Recently, philosophers and psychologists defending the embodied cognition research program have offered arguments against mindreading as a general model of our social understanding. The embodied cognition arguments are of two kinds: those that challenge the developmental picture of mindreading and those that challenge the alleged ubiquity of mindreading. Together, these two kinds of arguments, if successful, would present a serious challenge to the standard account of human social understanding. In this paper, I examine the strongest of these (...)
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  2. Joel Smith (2013). The Phenomenology of Face‐to‐Face Mindreading. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2).score: 18.0
    I defend a perceptual account of face-to-face mindreading. I begin by proposing a phenomenological constraint on our visual awareness of others' emotional expressions. I argue that to meet this constraint we require a distinction between the basic and non-basic ways people, and other things, look. I offer and defend just such an account.
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  3. Joshua Shepherd (2012). Action, Mindreading and Embodied Social Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):507-518.score: 18.0
    One of the central insights of the embodied cognition (EC) movement is that cognition is closely tied to action. In this paper, I formulate an EC-inspired hypothesis concerning social cognition. In this domain, most think that our capacity to understand and interact with one another is best explained by appeal to some form of mindreading. I argue that prominent accounts of mindreading likely contain a significant lacuna. Evidence indicates that what I call an agent’s actional processes and states—her (...)
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  4. Armin W. Schulz (2011). Simulation, Simplicity, and Selection: An Evolutionary Perspective on High-Level Mindreading. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 152 (2):271 - 285.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I argue that a natural selection-based perspective gives reasons for thinking that the core of the ability to mindread cognitively complex mental states is subserved by a simulationist process—that is, that it relies on nonspecialised mechanisms in the attributer's cognitive architecture whose primary function is the generation of her own decisions and inferences. In more detail, I try to establish three conclusions. First, I try to make clearer what the dispute between simulationist and non-simulationist theories of (...) fundamentally is about. Second, I try to make more precise an argument that is sometimes hinted at in support of the former: this 'argument from simplicity' suggests that, since natural selection disfavours building extra cognitive systems where this can be avoided, simulationist theories of mindreading are more in line with natural selection than their competitors. As stated, though, this argument overlooks the fact that building extra cognitive systems can also yield benefits: in particular, it can allow for the parallel processing of multiple problems and it makes for the existence of backups for important elements of the organism's mind. I therefore try to make this argument more precise by investigating whether these benefits also apply to the present case—and conclude negatively. My third aim in this paper is to use this discussion of mindreading as a means for exploring the promises and difficulties of evolutionary arguments in philosophy and psychology more generally. (shrink)
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  5. John Michael (2011). Interactionism and Mindreading. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):559-578.score: 18.0
    In recent years, a number of theorists have developed approaches to social cognition that highlight the centrality of social interaction as opposed to mindreading (e.g. Gallagher and Zahavi 2008 ; Gallagher 2001 , 2007 , 2008 ; Hobson 2002 ; Reddy 2008 ; Hutto 2004 ; De Jaegher 2009 ; De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007 ; Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009 ; De Jaegher et al. 2010 ). There are important differences among these approaches, as I will discuss, (...)
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  6. John Michael, Wayne Christensen & Søren Overgaard (2013). Mindreading as Social Expertise. Synthese:1-24.score: 18.0
    In recent years, a number of approaches to social cognition research have emerged that highlight the importance of embodied interaction for social cognition (Reddy, How infants know minds, 2008; Gallagher, J Conscious Stud 8:83–108, 2001; Fuchs and Jaegher, Phenom Cogn Sci 8:465–486, 2009; Hutto, in Seemans (ed.) Joint attention: new developments in psychology, philosophy of mind and social neuroscience, 2012). Proponents of such ‘interactionist’ approaches emphasize the importance of embodied responses that are engaged in online social interaction, and which, according (...)
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  7. Leon de Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors (2014). Situating Emotions: From Embodied Cognition to Mindreading. Topoi 33 (1):173-184.score: 18.0
    In this article we analyze the strengths and weaknesses of mindreading versus embodied cognition approaches to emotion understanding. In the first part of the article we argue that mindreading explanations of how we understand the emotions of others (TT, ST or hybrid) face a version of the frame problem, i.e. the problem of how to limit the scope of the information that is relevant to mindreading. Also, we show that embodied cognition explanations are able to by-pass this (...)
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  8. Jennifer Nagel (2012). Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.score: 15.0
    To what extent should we trust our natural instincts about knowledge? The question has special urgency for epistemologists who want to draw evidential support for their theories from certain intuitive epistemic assessments while discounting others as misleading. This paper focuses on the viability of endorsing the legitimacy of Gettier intuitions while resisting the intuitive pull of skepticism – a combination of moves that most mainstream epistemologists find appealing. Awkwardly enough, the “good” Gettier intuitions and the “bad” skeptical intuitions seem to (...)
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  9. Cameron Buckner (forthcoming). The Semantic Problem(s) with Research on Animal Mindreading. Mind and Language.score: 15.0
    Philosophers have worried that research on animal mind-reading faces a “logical problem”: the difficulty of experimentally determining whether animals represent mental states (e.g. seeing) or merely the observable evidence for those states (e.g. line-of-gaze). The most impressive attempt to confront this problem has been mounted recently by Robert Lurz (2009, 2011). However, Lurz’ approach faces its own logical problem, revealing this challenge to be a special case of the more general problem of distal content. Moreover, participants in this debate do (...)
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  10. Peter Carruthers (2009). How We Know Our Own Minds: The Relationship Between Mindreading and Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):121.score: 15.0
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  11. Matteo Mameli & Lisa Bortolotti (2006). Animal Rights, Animal Minds, and Human Mindreading. Journal of Medical Ethics 32 (2):84-89.score: 12.0
    Do non-human animals have rights? The answer to this question depends on whether animals have morally relevant mental properties. Mindreading is the human activity of ascribing mental states to other organisms. Current knowledge about the evolution and cognitive structure of mindreading indicates that human ascriptions of mental states to non-human animals are very inaccurate. The accuracy of human mindreading can be improved with the help of scientific studies of animal minds. But the scientific studies by themselves do (...)
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  12. Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2013). Interacting Mindreaders. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):841-863.score: 12.0
    Could interacting mindreaders be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers? This paper argues that they could. Mindreading is sometimes reciprocal: the mindreader’s target reciprocates by taking the mindreader as a target for mindreading. The paper explains how such reciprocity can significantly narrow the range of possible interpretations of behaviour where mindreaders are, or appear to be, in a position to interact. A consequence is that revisions (...)
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  13. Alvin I. Goldman (2009). Mirroring, Simulating and Mindreading. Mind and Language 24 (2):235-252.score: 12.0
    Abstract: Pierre Jacob (2008) raises several problems for the alleged link between mirroring and mindreading. This response argues that the best mirroring-mindreading thesis would claim that mirror processes cause, rather than constitute, selected acts of mindreading. Second, the best current evidence for mirror-based mindreading is not found in the motoric domain but in the domains of emotion and sensation, where the evidence (ignored by Jacob) is substantial. Finally, simulation theory should distinguish low-level simulation (mirroring) and high-level (...)
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  14. Peter Carruthers (2009). Mindreading Underlies Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):164-182.score: 12.0
    This response defends the view that human metacognition results from us turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves, and that our access to our own propositional attitudes is through interpretation rather than introspection. Relevant evidence is considered, including that deriving from studies of childhood development and other animal species. Also discussed are data suggesting dissociations between metacognitive and mindreading capacities, especially in autism and schizophrenia.
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  15. Alvin I. Goldman, Mirroring, Mindreading, and Simulation.score: 12.0
    What is the connection between mirror processes and mindreading? The paper begins with definitions of mindreading and of mirroring processes. It then advances four theses: (T1) mirroring processes in themselves do not constitute mindreading; (T2) some types of mindreading (“low-level” mindreading) are based on mirroring processes; (T3) not all types of mindreading are based on mirroring (“high-level” mindreading); and (T4) simulation-based mindreading includes but is broader than mirroring-based mindreading. Evidence for the (...)
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  16. Susan Hurley (2008). The Shared Circuits Model (SCM): How Control, Mirroring, and Simulation Can Enable Imitation, Deliberation, and Mindreading. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):1-22.score: 12.0
    Imitation, deliberation, and mindreading are characteristically human sociocognitive skills. Research on imitation and its role in social cognition is flourishing across various disciplines. Imitation is surveyed in this target article under headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation. A model is then advanced within which many of the developments surveyed can be located and explained. The shared circuits model (SCM) explains how imitation, deliberation, and mindreading can be enabled by subpersonal mechanisms of control, mirroring, and simulation. (...)
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  17. Alvin I. Goldman, Jacob on Mirroring, Simulating and Mindreading.score: 12.0
    Jacob (2008) raises several problems for the alleged link between mirroring and mindreading. This response argues that the best mirroring-mindreading thesis would claim that mirror processes cause, rather than constitute, selected acts of mindreading. Second, the best current evidence for mirror-based mindreading is not found in the motoric domain but in the domains of emotion and sensation, where the evidence (ignored by Jacob) is substantial. Finally, simulation theory should distinguish low-level simulation (mirroring) and high-level simulation (involving (...)
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  18. A. Goldman (2006/2008). Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford University Press.score: 12.0
    People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which starts (...)
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  19. Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich (2003). Mindreading. An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds. Oxford University Press.score: 12.0
    The everyday capacity to understand the mind, or 'mindreading', plays an enormous role in our ordinary lives. Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich provide a detailed and integrated account of the intricate web of mental components underlying this fascinating and multifarious skill. The imagination, they argue, is essential to understanding others, and there are special cognitive mechanisms for understanding oneself. The account that emerges has broad implications for longstanding philosophical debates over the status of folk psychology. Mindreading is another (...)
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  20. Matteo Mameli (2002). Mindreading, Mindshaping, and Evolution. Biology and Philosophy 16 (5):595-626.score: 12.0
    I present and apply some powerful tools for studying human evolution and the impact of cultural resources on it. The tools in question are a theory of niche construction and a theory about the evolutionary significance of extragenetic (and, in particular, of psychological and social) inheritance. These tools are used to show how culturally transmitted resources can be recruited by development and become generatively entrenched. The case study is constituted by those culturally transmitted items that social psychologists call ‘expectancies’. Expectancy (...)
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  21. Shaun Nichols (2001). Mindreading and the Cognitive Architecture Underlying Altruistic Motivation. Mind and Language 16 (4):425-455.score: 12.0
    In recent attempts to characterize the cognitive mechanisms underlying altruistic motivation, one central question is the extent to which the capacity for altruism depends on the capacity for understanding other minds, or ‘mindreading’. Some theorists maintain that the capacity for altruism is independent of any capacity for mindreading; others maintain that the capacity for altruism depends on fairly sophisticated mindreading skills. I argue that none of the prevailing accounts is adequate. Rather, I argue that altruistic motivation depends (...)
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  22. Frédérique de Vignemont (2009). Drawing the Boundary Between Low-Level and High-Level Mindreading. Philosophical Studies 144 (3):457 - 466.score: 12.0
    The philosophical world is indebted to Alvin Goldman for a number of reasons, and among them, his defense of the relevance of cognitive science for philosophy of mind. In Simulating minds , Goldman discusses with great care and subtlety a wide variety of experimental results related to mindreading from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology and developmental psychology. No philosopher has done more to display the resourcefulness of mental simulation. I am sympathetic with much of the general direction of (...)
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  23. David M. Williams, Sophie E. Lind & Francesca Happé (2009). Metacognition May Be More Impaired Than Mindreading in Autism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):162-163.score: 12.0
    This commentary focuses on evidence from autism concerning the relation between metacognition and mindreading. We support Carruthers' rejection of models 1 (independent systems) and 3 (metacognition before mindreading), and provide evidence to strengthen his critique. However, we also present evidence from autism that we believe supports model 2 (one mechanism, two modes of access) over model 4 (mindreading is prior).
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  24. José Luis Bermúdez (2011). The Force-Field Puzzle and Mindreading in Non-Human Primates. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):397-410.score: 12.0
    What is the relation between philosophical theorizing and experimental data? A modest set of naturalistic assumptions leads to what I term the force-field puzzle. The assumption that philosophy is continuous with natural science, as captured in Quine’s force-field metaphor, seems to push us simultaneously towards thinking that there have to be conceptual constraints upon how we interpret experimental data and towards thinking that there cannot be such conceptual constraints, because all theorizing must be accountable to data and observation. The key (...)
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  25. Daniel D. Hutto, Mitchell Herschbach & Victoria Southgate (2011). Editorial: Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):375-395.score: 12.0
    Human beings, even very young infants, and members of several other species, exhibit remarkable capacities for attending to and engaging with others. These basic capacities have been the subject of intense research in developmental psychology, cognitive psychology, comparative psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind over the last several decades. Appropriately characterizing the exact level and nature of these abilities and what lies at their basis continues to prove a tricky business. The contributions to this special issue investigate whether and to (...)
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  26. Leon Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors (2011). Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):499-517.score: 12.0
    According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to (...)
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  27. Anna Papafragou (2002). Mindreading and Verbal Communication. Mind and Language 17 (1&2):55–67.score: 12.0
    The idea that verbal communication involves a species of mindreading is not new. Among linguists and philosophers, largely as a result of Grice’s (1957, 1967) influence, it has long been recognized that the act of communicating involves on the part of the communicator and the addressee mutual metarepresentations of each others’ mental states. In psychology, the coordination of common ground and attention in conversation has been pursued in a variety of studies (e.g. Clark and Marshall, 1981; Bruner, 1983).
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  28. Ben Wiffen & Anthony David (2009). Metacognition, Mindreading, and Insight in Schizophrenia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):161-162.score: 12.0
    Mindreading in schizophrenia has been shown to be impaired in a multitude of studies. Furthermore, there is increasing evidence to suggest that metacognition is damaged as well. Lack of insight, or the inability to recognise one's own disorder, is an example of such a failure. We suggest that mindreading and metacognition are linked, but separable.
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  29. Mikolaj Hernik, Pasco Fearon & Peter Fonagy (2009). There Must Be More to Development of Mindreading and Metacognition Than Passing False Belief Tasks. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):147-148.score: 12.0
    We argue that while it is a valuable contribution, Carruthers' model may be too restrictive to elaborate our understanding of the development of mindreading and metacognition, or to enrich our knowledge of individual differences and psychopathology. To illustrate, we describe pertinent examples where there may be a critical interplay between primitive social-cognitive processes and emerging self-attributions.
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  30. Kim Sterelny (2004). The Triumph of a Reasonable Man: Stich, Mindreading, and Nativism. In Michael A. Bishop & Dominic Murphy (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Blackwell. 14--152.score: 12.0
    Humans interpret others. We are able to anticipate both the actions and intentional states of other agents. We do not do so perfectly, but since we are complex and flexible creatures even limited success needs explanation. For some years now Steve Stich (frequently in collaboration with Shaun Nichols) has been both participant in, and observer of, debates about the foundation of these capacities (Stich and Nichols 1992; Stich and Nichols 1995). As a commentator on this debate, Stich (with Nichols) gave (...)
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  31. Leon de Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors (2011). Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading. [REVIEW] Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):499-517.score: 12.0
    According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to (...)
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  32. Nate Kornell, Bennett L. Schwartz & Lisa K. Son (2009). What Monkeys Can Tell Us About Metacognition and Mindreading. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):150-151.score: 12.0
    Thinkers in related fields such as philosophy, psychology, and education define metacognition in a variety of different ways. Based on an emerging standard definition in psychology, we present evidence for metacognition in animals, and argue that mindreading and metacognition are largely orthogonal.
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  33. Marta Halina (2013). Mindreading Animals: The Debate Over What Animals Know About Other Minds. Philosophical Psychology (2):1-5.score: 12.0
    (2013). Mindreading Animals: The Debate over What Animals Know about Other Minds. Philosophical Psychology. ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2012.746630.
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  34. Peter Carruthers (2013). Mindreading in Infancy. Mind and Language 28 (2):141-172.score: 12.0
    Various dichotomies have been proposed to characterize the nature and development of human mindreading capacities, especially in light of recent evidence of mindreading in infants aged 7 to 18 months. This article will examine these suggestions, arguing that none is currently supported by the evidence. Rather, the data support a modular account of the domain-specific component of basic mindreading capacities. This core component is present in infants from a very young age and does not alter fundamentally thereafter. (...)
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  35. Maurizio Tirassa, Francesca M. Bosco & Livia Colle (2006). Rethinking the Ontogeny of Mindreading. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):197-217.score: 12.0
    We propose a mentalistic and nativist view of human early mental and social life and of the ontogeny of mindreading. We define the mental state of sharedness as the primitive, one-sided capability to take one's own mental states as mutually known to an i nteractant. We argue that this capability is an innate feature of the human mind, which the child uses to make a subjective sense of the world and of her actions. We argue that the child takes (...)
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  36. Russell T. Hurlburt (2009). Unsymbolized Thinking, Sensory Awareness, and Mindreading. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):149-150.score: 12.0
    Carruthers views unsymbolized thinking as and, therefore, as a potential threat to his mindreading-is-prior position. I argue that unsymbolized thinking may involve (non-symbolic) sensory aspects; it is therefore not purely propositional, and therefore poses no threat to mindreading-is-prior. Furthermore, Descriptive Experience Sampling lends empirical support to the view that access to our own propositional attitudes is interpretative, not introspective.
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  37. Frédérique De Vignemont (2009). Review: Drawing the Boundary Between Low-Level and High-Level Mindreading. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 144 (3):457 - 466.score: 12.0
    The philosophical world is indebted to Alvin Goldman for a number of reasons, and among them, his defense of the relevance of cognitive science for philosophy of mind. In "Simulating minds", Goldman discusses with great care and subtlety a wide variety of experimental results related to mindreading from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology and developmental psychology. No philosopher has done more to display the resourcefulness of mental simulation. I am sympathetic with much of the general direction of Goldman's (...)
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  38. Philip Robbins (2009). Guilt by Dissociation: Why Mindreading May Not Be Prior to Metacognition After All. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):159-160.score: 12.0
    Carruthers argues that there is no developmental or clinical evidence that metacognition is dissociable from mindreading, and hence there is no reason to think that metacognition is prior to mindreading. A closer look at the evidence, however, reveals that these conclusions are premature at best.
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  39. J. Robert Thompson (2014). Signature Limits in Mindreading Systems. Cognitive Science 38 (2).score: 12.0
    Recent evidence that young children seem to both understand false belief in one sense, but not in another, has led to two-systems theorizing about mindreading. By analyzing the most detailed two-systems approach in studying social cognition—the theory of mindreading defended by Ian Apperly and Stephen Butterfill—I argue that that even when dutifully constructed, two-systems approaches in social cognition struggle to adequately define the mindreading systems in terms of signature processing limits, an issue that becomes most apparent when (...)
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  40. Philippe Rochat (2009). Social-Affective Origins of Mindreading and Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):160-161.score: 12.0
    The engineer's look at how the mind works omits a central piece of the puzzle. It ignores the dynamic of motivations and the social context in which mindreading and metacognition evolved and developed in the first place. Mindreading and metacognition derive from a primacy of affective mindreading and meta-affectivity (e.g., secondary emotions such as shame or pride), both co-emerging in early development.
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  41. Adam Green, Mapping Others: Representation and Mindreading.score: 12.0
    Thinking about the representational qualities of maps and models allows one to offer a new perspective on the nature of mindreading. The recent critiques of our dominant paradigms for mindreading, theory theory and simulation theory by enactivists such as Daniel Hutto reveal a flaw in the standard options for thinking about how we think about others. Views that rely on theorizing or simulation to account for the way in which we understand others often appear to over-intellectualize social interaction. (...)
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  42. Robert W. Lurz (2011). Mindreading Animals: The Debate Over What Animals Know About Other Minds. A Bradford Book.score: 12.0
    But do animals know that other creatures have minds? And how would we know if they do? In "Mindreading Animals," Robert Lurz offers a fresh approach to the hotly debated question of mental-state attribution in nonhuman animals.
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  43. James M. Dow (forthcoming). Mindreading, Mindsharing, and the Evolution of Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Topics.score: 12.0
    Philosophers and psychologists have traditionally understood folk psychology to emerge in one of two ways: either first through the origin of the function of self-consciousness or first through the origin of the function of mindreading. The aim of this paper is to provide reasons to doubt that those options exhaust the possibilities. In particular, I will argue that in the discussion about whether self-consciousness or mindreading evolved first, we have lost sight of a viable third option. I will (...)
     
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  44. Sanjida O'Connell (1998). Mindreading: An Investigation Into How We Learn to Love and Lie. Doubleday.score: 12.0
    "I know what you're thinking," we say, but how do we know what others are thinking or feeling? Because evolution has granted us what has come to be known as "Theory of Mind," the ability not only to be self-aware but aware of others' consciousness. Theory of Mind develops slowly-and in some cases, such as autism, develops little or not at all. Theory of Mind allows us to interact socially, to care about others, to manage our behavior in groups, to (...)
     
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  45. Jennifer Nagel (2013). Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):179-199.score: 9.0
    Do epistemic intuitions tell us anything about knowledge? Stich has argued that we respond to cases according to our contingent cultural programming, and not in a manner that tends to reveal anything significant about knowledge itself. I’ve argued that a cross-culturally universal capacity for mindreading produces the intuitive sense that the subject of a case has or lacks knowledge. This paper responds to Stich’s charge that mindreading is cross-culturally varied in a way that will strip epistemic intuitions of (...)
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  46. Stephen Stich (2013). Do Different Groups Have Different Epistemic Intuitions? A Reply to Jennifer Nagel1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):151-178.score: 9.0
    Intuitions play an important role in contemporary epistemology. Over the last decade, however, experimental philosophers have published a number of studies suggesting that epistemic intuitions may vary in ways that challenge the widespread reliance on intuitions in epistemology. In a recent paper, Jennifer Nagel offers a pair of arguments aimed at showing that epistemic intuitions do not, in fact, vary in problematic ways. One of these arguments relies on a number of claims defended by appeal to the psychological literature on (...)
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  47. Simon Fitzpatrick (2009). The Primate Mindreading Controversy : A Case Study in Simplicity and Methodology in Animal Psychology. In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press. 224--246.score: 9.0
  48. Amy Kind (2013). The Heterogeneity of the Imagination. Erkenntnis 78 (1):141-159.score: 9.0
    Imagination has been assigned an important explanatory role in a multitude of philosophical contexts. This paper examines four such contexts: mindreading, pretense, our engagement with fiction, and modal epistemology. Close attention to each of these contexts suggests that the mental activity of imagining is considerably more heterogeneous than previously realized. In short, no single mental activity can do all the explanatory work that has been assigned to imagining.
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  49. Shannon Spaulding (forthcoming). Imagination Through Knowledge. In Amy Kind & Peter Kung (eds.), Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford University Press.score: 9.0
    Imagination seems to play an epistemic role in philosophical and scientific thought experiments, mindreading, and ordinary practical deliberations. That is, imagination seems to generate new knowledge of contingent facts. However, it also seems that imagination is limited to revealing merely possible ways the world might be. The conjunction of these claims is what I call the puzzle of knowledge through imagination. In this paper, I aim to resolve this puzzle. I argue that imagination has an epistemic role to play, (...)
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  50. Robert M. Gordon (2008). Beyond Mindreading. Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):219 – 222.score: 9.0
    I argue that there is no conflict between the simulation theory, once it is freed from certain constraints carried over from theory theory, and Gallagher's view that our primary and pervasive way of engaging with others rests on 'direct', non-mentalizing perception of the 'meanings' of others' facial expressions, gestures, and intentional actions.
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