Search results for 'Minds' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Mimetic Minds (2006). Mimetic Minds: Meaning Formation. In A. Loula, R. Gudwin & J. Queiroz (eds.), Artificial Cognition Systems. Idea Group Publishers. 327.score: 80.0
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  2. Robot Minds (2009). Consciousness in Human and Robot Minds. In Susan Schneider (ed.), Science Fiction and Philosophy: From Time Travel to Superintelligence. Wiley-Blackwell. 186.score: 80.0
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  3. Brains Minds (2005). Unifying Approaches to the Unity of Consciousness Minds, Brains and Machines Susan Stuart. In. In L. Magnani & R. Dossena (eds.), Computing, Philosophy and Cognition. 4--259.score: 80.0
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  4. Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.) (2005). Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.score: 21.0
    Sometime around their first birthday most infants begin to engage in relatively sustained bouts of attending together with their caretakers to objects in their environment. By the age of 18 months, on most accounts, they are engaging in full-blown episodes of joint attention. As developmental psychologists (usually) use the term, for such joint attention to be in play, it is not sufficient that the infant and the adult are in fact attending to the same object, nor that the one’s attention (...)
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  5. Stevan Harnad (1991). Other Bodies, Other Minds: A Machine Incarnation of an Old Philosophical Problem. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 1 (1):43-54.score: 21.0
    Explaining the mind by building machines with minds runs into the other-minds problem: How can we tell whether any body other than our own has a mind when the only way to know is by being the other body? In practice we all use some form of Turing Test: If it can do everything a body with a mind can do such that we can't tell them apart, we have no basis for doubting it has a mind. But (...)
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  6. Johannes Roessler (2005). Joint Attention and the Problem of Other Minds. In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.score: 21.0
    The question of what it means to be aware of others as subjects of mental states is often construed as the question of how we are epistemically justified in attributing mental states to others. The dominant answer to this latter question is that we are so justified in virtue of grasping the role of mental states in explaining observed behaviour. This chapter challenges this picture and formulates an alternative by reflecting on the interpretation of early joint attention interactions. It argues (...)
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  7. Stephen R. L. Clark (2003). Non-Personal Minds. In Minds and Persons: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement: 53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 185-209.score: 21.0
    Persons are creatures with a range of personal capacities. Most known to us are also people, though nothing in observation or biological theory demands that all and only people are persons, nor even that persons, any more than people, constitute a natural kind. My aim is to consider what non-personal minds are like. Darwin's Earthworms are sensitive, passionate and, in their degree, intelligent. They may even construct maps, embedded in the world they perceive around them, so as to be (...)
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  8. Anita Avramides (2001). Other Minds. Routledge.score: 19.0
    How do I know whether there are any minds beside my own? This problem of other minds in philosophy raises questions which are at the heart of all philosophical investigations--how it is that we know, what is in the mind, and whether we can be certain about any of our beliefs. In this book, Anita Avramides begins with a historical overview of the problem from the Ancient Skeptics to Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, Reid, and Wittgenstein. The second part (...)
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  9. Bill Brewer (2002). Emotion and Other Minds. In Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals. Brookfield: Ashgate.score: 19.0
    What is the relation between emotional experience and its behavioural expression? As very preliminary clarification, I mean by ‘emotional experience’ such things as the subjective feeling of being afraid of something, or of being angry at someone. On the side of behavioural expression, I focus on such things as cowering in fear, or shaking a fist or thumping the table in anger. Very crudely, this is behaviour intermediate between the bodily changes which just happen in emotional arousal, such as sweating (...)
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  10. Daniel D. Hutto (2002). The World is Not Enough: Shared Emotions and Other Minds. In Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals. Brookfield: Ashgate.score: 19.0
    This chapter argues that the conceptual problem of other minds cannot be properly addressed as long as we subscribe to an individualistic model of how we stand in relation to our own experiences and the behaviour of others. For it is commitment to this picture that sponsors the strong first/third person divide that lies at the heart of the two false accounts of experiential concept learning sketched above. This is the true source of the problem. To deal successfully with (...)
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  11. Søren Overgaard (2006). The Problem of Other Minds: Wittgenstein's Phenomenological Perspective. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):53-73.score: 18.0
    This paper discusses Wittgenstein's take on the problem of other minds. In opposition to certain widespread views that I collect under the heading of the “No Problem Interpretation,” I argue that Wittgenstein does address some problem of other minds. However, Wittgenstein's problem is not the traditional epistemological problem of other minds; rather, it is more reminiscent of the issue of intersubjectivity as it emerges in the writings of phenomenologists such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger. This is one (...)
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  12. Anil Gomes (2011). McDowell's Disjunctivism and Other Minds. Inquiry 54 (3):277-292.score: 18.0
    John McDowell’s original motivation of disjunctivism occurs in the context of a problem regarding other minds. Recent commentators have insisted that McDowell’s disjunctivism should be classed as an epistemological disjunctivism about epistemic warrant, and distinguished from the perceptual disjunctivism of Hinton, Snowdon and others. In this paper I investigate the relation between the problem of other minds and disjunctivism, and raise some questions for this interpretation of McDowell.
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  13. Anil Gomes (2011). Is There a Problem of Other Minds? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):353-373.score: 18.0
    Scepticism is sometimes expressed about whether there is any interesting problem of other minds. In this paper I set out a version of the conceptual problem of other minds which turns on the way in which mental occurrences are presented to the subject and situate it in relation to debates about our knowledge of other people's mental lives. The result is a distinctive problem in the philosophy of mind concerning our relation to other people.
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  14. Edoardo Zamuner (2004). “Treating the Sceptic with Genuine Expression of Feeling. Wittgenstein’s Later Remarks on the Psychology of Other Minds”. In A. Roser & R. Raatzsch (eds.), Jahrbuch der Deutschen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft. Peter Lang Verlag.score: 18.0
    This paper is concerned with the issue of authenticity in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology. In the manuscripts published as Letzte Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie – Das Innere und das Äußere, the German term Echtheit is mostly translated as ‘genuineness’. In these manuscripts, Wittgenstein frequently uses the term as referring to a feature of the expression of feeling and emotion: -/- […] I want to say that there is an original genuine expression of pain; that the expression of pain (...)
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  15. Anil Gomes (2009). Other Minds and Perceived Identity. Dialectica 63 (2):219-230.score: 18.0
    Quassim Cassam has recently defended a perceptual model of knowledge of other minds: one on which we can see and thereby know that another thinks and feels. In the course of defending this model, he addresses issues about our ability to think about other minds. I argue that his solution to this 'conceptual problem' does not work. A solution to the conceptual problem is necessary if we wish to explain knowledge of other minds.
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  16. Hugh S. Chandler, How Many Minds?score: 18.0
    In Analysis, Vol. 45, June 1984, George Rea published a paper attacking my claim that there could be ‘indeterminate minds'. This paper is a reply to his attack. I claim, again, that such ‘minds’ are possible – entities such that it is indeterminate whether or not these entities are people with minds. -/- .
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  17. Mark R. Addis (1999). Wittgenstein: Making Sense of Other Minds. Ashgate.score: 18.0
    The difficulties about other minds are deep and of central philosophical importance. This text explores attempts to apply Wittgenstein's concept of criteria in explaining how we can know other minds and their properties. It is shown that the use of criteria for this purpose is misguided.
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  18. Fred Dretske (1973). Perception and Other Minds. Noûs 7 (March):34-44.score: 18.0
    We ordinarily speak of being able to see that there are people on the bus, Students in the class, And children playing in the street. If human beings are understood to be conscious entities, Then one of our ways of knowing that there are other conscious entities in the world besides ourselves is by seeing that there are. We also speak of seeing that he is angry, She is depressed, And so on. It is argued that this is, Indeed, One (...)
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  19. John R. Lucas (1961). Minds, Machines and Godel. Philosophy 36 (April-July):112-127.score: 18.0
    Goedel's theorem states that in any consistent system which is strong enough to produce simple arithmetic there are formulae which cannot be proved-in-the-system, but which we can see to be true. Essentially, we consider the formula which says, in effect, "This formula is unprovable-in-the-system". If this formula were provable-in-the-system, we should have a contradiction: for if it were provablein-the-system, then it would not be unprovable-in-the-system, so that "This formula is unprovable-in-the-system" would be false: equally, if it were provable-in-the-system, then it (...)
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  20. Arindam Chakrabarti (2011). Troubles with a Second Self: The Problem of Other Minds in 11th Century Indian and 20th Century Western Philosophy. ARGUMENT 1 (1):23-35.score: 18.0
    In contemporary Western analytic philosophy, the classic analogical argument explaining our knowledge of other minds has been rejected. But at least three alternative positive theories of our knowledge of the second person have been formulated: the theory-theory, the simulation theory and the theory of direct empathy. After sketching out the problems faced by these accounts of the ego’s access to the contents of the mind of a “second ego”, this paper tries to recreate one argument given by Abhinavagupta (Shaiva (...)
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  21. Jack Reynolds (2010). Problems of Other Minds: Solutions and Dissolutions in Analytic and Continental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 5 (4):326-335.score: 18.0
    While there is a great diversity of treatments of other minds and inter-subjectivity within both analytic and continental philosophy, this article specifies some of the core structural differences between these treatments. Although there is no canonical account of the problem of other minds that can be baldly stated and that is exhaustive of both traditions, the problem(s) of other minds can be loosely defined in family resemblances terms. It seems to have: (1) an epistemological dimension (How do (...)
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  22. Melissa Frankel (2009). Something-We-Know-Not-What, Something-We-Know-Not-Why: Berkeley, Meaning and Minds. Philosophia 37 (3):381-402.score: 18.0
    It is sometimes suggested that Berkeley adheres to an empirical criterion of meaning, on which a term is meaningful just in case it signifies an idea (i.e., an immediate object of perceptual experience). This criterion is thought to underlie his rejection of the term ‘matter’ as meaningless. As is well known, Berkeley thinks that it is impossible to perceive matter. If one cannot perceive matter, then, per Berkeley, one can have no idea of it; if one can have no idea (...)
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  23. Joel Smith (2011). Strawson on Other Minds. In Joel Smith & Peter Sullivan (eds.), Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. OUP.score: 18.0
    I critically discuss Strawson's transcendental argument against other minds scepticism, and look at the prospects for a naturalised version of it.
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  24. Theodore W. Budlong (1975). Analogy, Induction and Other Minds. Analysis 35 (January):111-112.score: 18.0
    Alvin plantinga and michael slote, Following ayer, Have attempted to formulate the argument from analogy for the existence of other minds as an enumerative induction. Their way of avoiding the 'generalizing from a single case' objection is shown to be fallacious.
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  25. Radu J. Bogdan (2003). Minding Minds: Evolving a Reflexive Mind by Interpreting Others. MIT Press.score: 18.0
    In this book, Radu Bogdan proposes that humans think reflexively because they interpret each other's minds in social contexts of cooperation, communication, ...
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  26. Katsunori Miyahara (2011). Neo-Pragmatic Intentionality and Enactive Perception: A Compromise Between Extended and Enactive Minds. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):499-519.score: 18.0
    The general idea of enactive perception is that actual and potential embodied activities determine perceptual experience. Some extended mind theorists, such as Andy Clark, refute this claim despite their general emphasis on the importance of the body. I propose a compromise to this opposition. The extended mind thesis is allegedly a consequence of our commonsense understanding of the mind. Furthermore, extended mind theorists assume the existence of non-human minds. I explore the precise nature of the commonsense understanding of the (...)
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  27. Matheson Russell & Jack Reynolds (2011). Transcendental Arguments About Other Minds and Intersubjectivity. Philosophy Compass 6 (5):300-11.score: 18.0
    This article describes some of the main arguments for the existence of other minds, and intersubjectivity more generally, that depend upon a transcendental justification. This means that our focus will be largely on ‘continental’ philosophy, not only because of the abiding interest in this tradition in thematising intersubjectivity, but also because transcendental reasoning is close to ubiquitous in continental philosophy. Neither point holds for analytic philosophy. As such, this essay will introduce some of the important contributions of Edmund Husserl, (...)
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  28. George N. Schlesinger (1974). Induction and Other Minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (May):3-21.score: 18.0
    Plantinga's attempts generally to undermine inductive-Analogical arguments for the other minds are criticized, And an attempt is made to present a sound analogical argument for other minds that can withstand plantinga's and other sceptical criticisms. It is then argued that a similar demonstration of the reasonableness of believing in objects when we are not observing them is also possible.
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  29. Sam C. Coval (1959). Exceptives and Other Minds. Analysis 19 (June):138-142.score: 18.0
    The article addresses the sceptics who claim there is only one mind. the author contends that the statement 'there is only one mind' is not solipsistic and does not account for a plurality of minds. (staff).
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  30. Carl B. Sachs (2012). Resisting the Disenchantment of Nature: McDowell and the Question of Animal Minds. Inquiry 55 (2):131-147.score: 18.0
    Abstract McDowell's contributions to epistemology and philosophy of mind turn centrally on his defense of the Aristotelian concept of a ?rational animal?. I argue here that a clarification of how McDowell uses this concept can make more explicit his distance from Davidson regarding the nature of the minds of non-rational animals. Close examination of his responses to Davidson and to Dennett shows that McDowell is implicitly committed to avoiding the following ?false trichotomy?: that animals are not bearers of semantic (...)
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  31. William E. S. McNeill (forthcoming). Inferentialism and Our Knowledge of Others' Minds. Philosophical Studies.score: 18.0
    Our knowledge of each others’ mental features is sometimes epistemically basic or non-inferential. The alternative to this claim is Inferentialism, the view that such knowledge is always epistemically inferential. Here, I argue that Inferentialism is not plausible. My argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation. Given the nature of the task involved in recognizing what mental features others have on particular occasions, and our capacity to perform that task, we should not expect always to find good (...)
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  32. Thomas W. Smythe (1989). Disembodied Minds and Personal Identity. Philosophy Research Archives 14:415-423.score: 18.0
    Discussion of the human soul has bulked large in the literature of philosophy and religion. I defend the possibility of disembodied Cartesian minds by examining the criticisms of three philosophers who argue that there are serious difficulties about any attempt to account for the identity of such Cartesian minds through time. I argue that their criticisms of the possibility of disembodied minds are damaging but not fatal. I hold that the central issue behind their criticisms of Cartesian (...)
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  33. Anik Waldow (2009). David Hume and the Problem of Other Minds. Continuum.score: 18.0
    Other minds and their place in the Hume-literature -- A modern approach -- Scepticism versus naturalism -- The vulgar and the philosopher -- Relative ideas -- Concepts of the real -- Intuition and common sense -- Epistemic responsibility -- Degeneration of reason -- Just philosophy -- Conceiving minds -- Abstraction -- Argument from analogy -- Sympathy -- Limitations -- Generality -- Hume's concept of mind -- The world and the other -- Habit and intersubjective responsiveness -- Belief and (...)
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  34. Massimo Warglien & Peter Gärdenfors (2013). Semantics, Conceptual Spaces, and the Meeting of Minds. Synthese 190 (12):2165-2193.score: 18.0
    We present an account of semantics that is not construed as a mapping of language to the world but rather as a mapping between individual meaning spaces. The meanings of linguistic entities are established via a “meeting of minds.” The concepts in the minds of communicating individuals are modeled as convex regions in conceptual spaces. We outline a mathematical framework, based on fixpoints in continuous mappings between conceptual spaces, that can be used to model such a semantics. If (...)
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  35. Melville Stratton (1974). On Time and Other Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (December):211-222.score: 18.0
    THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS TO ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THE\nPROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS. THE METHOD USED INVOLVES\nINTRODUCING THREE NEW TERMS, EACH OF WHICH IN SOME WAYS\nRESEMBLES IN MEANING, AND IN SOME WAYS DIFFERS FROM IN\nMEANING, THE ORDINARY TERM "EXISTS." WHEN THE PROBLEM OF\nOTHER MINDS IS RESTATED WITH THESE NEW TERMS, THERE IS A\nPRONOUNCED INCREASE IN THE COMPLEXITY OF THE DISCUSSION,\nBUT THERE IS ALSO A PRONOUNCED DECREASE IN THE VAGUENESS OF\nTHE DISCUSSION. A COMPLETE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF (...)
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  36. Michael H. de Armey (1982). William James and the Problem of Other Minds. Southern Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):325-336.score: 18.0
    William james's views on the other minds problem are a serious lacuna in jamesian scholarship. this essay systematically collects together and examines his encounter with this problem. james consistently held to a teleological criterion for mindedness, which appeals to certain eidetic features which living things manifest. the essay also examines the implications of this view for james's ethical theory, especially his 'privacy defense' of democracy.
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  37. Maria Antonietta Perna (2008). An Answer to the Problem of Other Minds. Phaenex 3 (1):1-31.score: 18.0
    The present paper sets out to counter the claim put forward by British philosopher of mind, Robert Kirk, according to which Sartre's notion of consciousness as for-itself, while offering some valuable insights regarding human existence, nonetheless fails to engage with the problem of how to establish the existence of such conscious beings on philosophical grounds. To the extent that it succeeds in meeting the challenge raised by Kirk's comment, the reading of Being and Nothingness offered here could be considered as (...)
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  38. Bryan Benham (2009). Analogies and Other Minds. Informal Logic 29 (2):198-214.score: 18.0
    The argument by analogy for other minds is customarily rejected as a weak inference because the argument is based on a single instance. The current paper argues that this objection fundamentally misunderstands the inferential structure of analogies and so misrepresents the role analogy plays in the justifycation of belief in other minds. Arguments by be uniquely suited to draw inferences from single instances. This defense does not remove all difficulties faced by the argument by analogy for other (...). (shrink)
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  39. S. Harnad (2000). Minds, Machines and Turing. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 9 (4):425-445.score: 18.0
    Turing's celebrated 1950 paper proposes a very generalmethodological criterion for modelling mental function: total functionalequivalence and indistinguishability. His criterion gives rise to ahierarchy of Turing Tests, from subtotal (toy) fragments of ourfunctions (t1), to total symbolic (pen-pal) function (T2 – the standardTuring Test), to total external sensorimotor (robotic) function (T3), tototal internal microfunction (T4), to total indistinguishability inevery empirically discernible respect (T5). This is areverse-engineering hierarchy of (decreasing) empiricalunderdetermination of the theory by the data. Level t1 is clearly toounderdetermined, T2 (...)
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  40. Joe Ullian (1957). Karalis and Other Minds. Review of Metaphysics 10 (March):525-528.score: 18.0
    In his paper "knowledge of other minds" ("review of metaphysics", Volume ix, June, 1956, Pages 565-568), Nicholas karalis attempts to demonstrate that numerically identical acts of thought can occur in different minds. The cogency of his arguments is questioned. It is contended that some of them rest on a confusion between what is known and what is true.
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  41. Harrison B. Hall (1976). Criteria, Perception and Other Minds. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (June):257-274.score: 18.0
    The paper uses thompson clark's theory of the relation of perceptual parts and wholes to illuminate certain aspects of our knowledge of other minds. The thesis is that the traditional problem can be usefully broken down into two parts--One of which calls for a better understanding of the logic of perceptual concepts; the other, For a closer look at what happens when we try to take the epistemological skeptic seriously.
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  42. Hanna Pickard (2003). Emotions and the Problem of Other Minds. In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Philosophy and the Emotions. Cambridge University Press. 87-103.score: 18.0
    The problem of other minds is a collection of problems centering upon the extent to which our belief in other minds or other's minds can be justified. Swedish psychologist, Gunnar Borg has developed a principle called "the range principle" which helps fill out our "knowledge" of other minds. Borg developed this principle partly in response to the skeptical challenge of Harvard psychophysicist S S Stevens. Stevens claimed that the intersubjective comparison of experience was scientifically impossible. Borg (...)
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  43. G. Thomas Goodnight (2013). The Virtues of Reason and the Problem of Other Minds: Reflections on Argumentation in a New Century. Informal Logic 33 (4):510-530.score: 18.0
    From early modernity, philosophers have engaged in skeptical discussions concerning knowledge of the existence, state, and standing of other minds. The analogical move from self to other unfolds as controversy. This paper reposes the problem as an argumentation predicament and examines analogy as an opening to the study of rhetorical cognition. Rhetorical cognition is identified as a productive process coming to terms with an other through testing sustainable risk. The paper explains how self-sustaining risk is theorized by Aristotle’s virtue (...)
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  44. Kai Spiekermann & Robert E. Goodin (2012). Courts of Many Minds. British Journal of Political Science 42:555-571.score: 18.0
    In 'A Constitution of Many Minds' Cass Sunstein argues that the three major approaches to constitutional interpretation – Traditionalism, Populism and Cosmopolitanism – all rely on some variation of a ‘many-minds’ argument. Here we assess each of these claims through the lens of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. In regard to the first two approaches we explore the implications of sequential influence among courts (past and foreign, respectively). In regard to the Populist approach, we consider the influence of opinion (...)
     
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  45. Bradley Monton & Sanford Goldberg (2006). The Problem of the Many Minds. Minds and Machines 16 (4):463-470.score: 17.0
    It is argued that, given certain reasonable premises, an infinite number of qualitatively identical but numerically distinct minds exist per functioning brain. The three main premises are (1) mental properties supervene on brain properties; (2) the universe is composed of particles with nonzero extension; and (3) each particle is composed of continuum many point-sized bits of particle-stuff, and these points of particlestuff persist through time.
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  46. Dale Jacquette (1996). Lloyd on Intrinsic Natural Representation in Simple Mechanical Minds. Minds and Machines 6 (1):47-60.score: 17.0
    In Simple Minds, Dan Lloyd presents a reductive account of naturally representing machines. The theory entails that a system represents an event by virtue of potentially misrepresenting it whenever the machine satisfies a multiple information channel, convergence, and uptake condition. I argue that Lloyd's conditions are insufficient for systems intrinsically naturally to misrepresent, and hence insufficient for them intrinsically naturally to represent. The appearance of potential misrepresentation in such machines is achieved only by reference to the extrinsic design or (...)
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  47. Robert W. Lurz (ed.) (2009). The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press.score: 17.0
    This volume is a collection of fourteen new essays by leading philosophers on issues concerning the nature, existence, and our knowledge of animal minds.
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  48. Sean Allen-Hermanson (2008). Insects and the Problem of Simple Minds: Are Bees Natural Zombies? Journal of Philosophy 105 (8): 389-415.score: 16.0
    This paper explores the idea that many “simple minded” invertebrates are “natural zombies” in that they utilize their senses in intelligent ways, but without phenomenal awareness. The discussion considers how “first-order” representationalist theories of consciousness meet the explanatory challenge posed by blindsight. It would be an advantage of first-order representationalism, over higher-order versions, if it does not rule out consciousness in most non-human animals. However, it is argued that a first-order representationalism which adequately accounts for blindsight also implies that most (...)
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  49. Kristin Andrews (2000). Our Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):12-24.score: 16.0
    Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a `theory of mind', and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett's theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make the distinction all (...)
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