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Profile: Miriam Schoenfield (University of Texas at Austin)
  1. Miriam Schoenfield (2015). The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences. Noûs 49 (3):n/a-n/a.
    It has been claimed that, in response to certain kinds of evidence, agents ought to adopt imprecise credences: doxastic states that are represented by sets of credence functions rather than single ones. In this paper I argue that, given some plausible constraints on accuracy measures, accuracy-centered epistemologists must reject the requirement to adopt imprecise credences. I then show that even the claim that imprecise credences are permitted is problematic for accuracy-centered epistemology. It follows that if imprecise credal states are permitted (...)
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  2. Miriam Schoenfield (2014). A Dilemma for Calibrationism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1).
    The aim of this paper is to describe a problem for calibrationism: a view about higher order evidence according to which one's credences should be calibrated to one's expected degree of reliability. Calibrationism is attractive, in part, because it explains our intuitive judgments, and provides a strong motivation for certain theories about higher order evidence and peer disagreement. However, I will argue that calibrationism faces a dilemma: There are two versions of the view one might adopt. The first version, I (...)
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  3. Miriam Schoenfield (2014). Decision Making in the Face of Parity. Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):263-277.
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  4. Miriam Schoenfield (2013). Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief. Noûs 47 (1):193-218.
    In this paper, I begin by defending permissivism: the claim that, sometimes, there is more than one way to rationally respond to a given body of evidence. Then I argue that, if we accept permissivism, certain worries that arise as a result of learning that our beliefs were caused by the communities we grew up in, the schools we went to, or other irrelevant influences dissipate. The basic strategy is as follows: First, I try to pinpoint what makes irrelevant influences (...)
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  5. Miriam Schoenfield (2012). Chilling Out on Epistemic Rationality. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.
    A defense of imprecise credences (and other imprecise doxastic attitudes).
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