Search results for 'Modularity' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Against Emotional Modularity (2008). Ronald de Sousa. In Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.), The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press. 29.score: 60.0
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  2. Johan De Smedt (2009). Cognitive Modularity in the Light of the Language Faculty. Logique Et Analyse 208:373-387.score: 24.0
    Ever since Chomsky, language has become the paradigmatic example of an innate capacity. Infants of only a few months old are aware of the phonetic structure of their mother tongue, such as stress-patterns and phonemes. They can already discriminate words from non-words and acquire a feel for the grammatical structure months before they voice their first word. Language reliably develops not only in the face of poor linguistic input, but even without it. In recent years, several scholars have extended this (...)
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  3. Claudia Lorena García (2007). Cognitive Modularity, Biological Modularity and Evolvability. Biological Theory: Integrating Development, Evolution and Cognition (KLI) 2 (1):62-73.score: 24.0
    There is an argument that has recently been deployed in favor of thinking that the mind is mostly (or even exclusively) composed of cognitive modules; an argument that draws from some ideas and concepts of evolutionary and of developmental biology. In a nutshell, the argument concludes that a mind that is massively composed of cognitive mechanisms that are cognitively modular (henceforth, c-modular) is more evolvable than a mind that is not c-modular (or that is scarcely c-modular), since a cognitive mechanism (...)
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  4. Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (2007). Introduction: Modularity and the Nature of Emotions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (5S).score: 24.0
    In this introduction, we give a brief overview of the main concepts of modularity that have been offered in recent literature. After this, we turn to a summary of the papers collected in this volume. Our primary aim is to explain how the modularity of emotion question relates to traditional debates in emotion theory.
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  5. Peter Carruthers (2003). Moderately Massive Modularity. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Mind and Persons. Cambridge University Press. 67-89.score: 24.0
    This paper will sketch a model of the human mind according to which the mind’s structure is massively, but by no means wholly, modular. Modularity views in general will be motivated, elucidated, and defended, before the thesis of moderately massive modularity is explained and elaborated.
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  6. John M. Collins (2005). On the Input Problem for Massive Modularity. Minds and Machines 15 (1):1-22.score: 24.0
    Jerry Fodor argues that the massive modularity thesis – the claim that (human) cognition is wholly served by domain specific, autonomous computational devices, i.e., modules – is a priori incoherent, self-defeating. The thesis suffers from what Fodor dubs the input problem: the function of a given module (proprietarily understood) in a wholly modular system presupposes non-modular processes. It will be argued that massive modularity suffers from no such a priori problem. Fodor, however, also offers what he describes as (...)
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  7. Eric Dietrich & Chris Fields (1996). Role of the Frame Problem in Fodor's Modularity Thesis. In Ken Ford & Zenon Pylyshyn (eds.), The Robot's Dilemma Revisited.score: 24.0
    It is shown that the Fodor's interpretation of the frame problem is the central indication that his version of the Modularity Thesis is incompatible with computationalism. Since computationalism is far more plausible than this thesis, the latter should be rejected.
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  8. Martin Davies (1989). Connectionism, Modularity and Tacit Knowledge. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (December):541-55.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I define tacit knowledge as a kind of causal-explanatory structure, mirroring the derivational structure in the theory that is tacitly known. On this definition, tacit knowledge does not have to be explicitly represented. I then take the notion of a modular theory, and project the idea of modularity to several different levels of description: in particular, to the processing level and the neurophysiological level. The fundamental description of a connectionist network lies at a level between the (...)
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  9. S. Okasha (2003). Fodor on Cognition, Modularity, and Adaptationism. Philosophy of Science 70 (1):68-88.score: 24.0
    This paper critically examines Jerry Fodor's latest attacks on evolutionary psychology. Contra Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, Fodor argues (i) there is no reason to think that human cognition is a Darwinian adaptation in the first place, and (ii) there is no valid inference from adaptationism about the mind to massive modularity. However, Fodor maintains (iii) that there is a valid inference in the converse direction, from modularity to adaptationism, but (iv) that the language module is an exception (...)
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  10. Brian J. Scholl & Alan M. Leslie (1999). Modularity, Development and "Theory of Mind". Mind and Language 14 (1):131-153.score: 24.0
    Psychologists and philosophers have recently been exploring whether the mechanisms which underlie the acquisition of ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) are best charac- terized as cognitive modules or as developing theories. In this paper, we attempt to clarify what a modular account of ToM entails, and why it is an attractive type of explanation. Intuitions and arguments in this debate often turn on the role of _develop-_ _ment_: traditional research on ToM focuses on various developmental sequences, whereas cognitive modules are thought (...)
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  11. Benny Shanon (1988). Remarks on the Modularity of Mind. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (September):331-52.score: 24.0
    the concept of modularity of cognitive processes is introduced and a picture of mind is proposed according to which the peripheral input systems are modular whereas the central processes are not. The present paper examines this view from both a methodological and a substaintive perspective. Methodologically, a contrast between considerations of principle and of fact is made and implications for the nature of cognitive theory are discussed. Substantively, constraints on information flow are examined as they appear in various aspects (...)
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  12. Owen Flanagan & Robert Anthony Williams (2010). What Does the Modularity of Morals Have to Do With Ethics? Four Moral Sprouts Plus or Minus a Few. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):430-453.score: 24.0
    Flanagan (1991) was the first contemporary philosopher to suggest that a modularity of morals hypothesis (MMH) was worth consideration by cognitive science. There is now a serious empirically informed proposal that moral competence is best explained in terms of moral modules-evolutionarily ancient, fast-acting, automatic reactions to particular sociomoral experiences (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). MMH fleshes out an idea nascent in Aristotle, Mencius, and Darwin. We discuss the evidence for MMH, specifically an ancient version, “Mencian Moral Modularity,” which claims (...)
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  13. Robert A. Wilson (2008). What Computers (Still, Still) Can't Do: Jerry Fodor on Computation and Modularity. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind.score: 24.0
    Fodor's thinking on modularity has been influential throughout a range of the areas studying cognition, chiefly as a prod for positive work on modularity and domain-specificity. In The Mind Doesn't Work That Way, Fodor has developed the dark message of The Modularity of Mind regarding the limits to modularity and computational analyses. This paper offers a critical assessment of Fodor's scepticism with an eye to highlighting some broader issues in play, including the nature of computation and (...)
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  14. Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet (eds.) (2008). The Modularity of Emotions. University of Calgary Press.score: 24.0
    Can emotions be rational or are they necessarily irrational? Are emotions universally shared states? Or are they socio-cultural constructions? Are emotions perceptions of some kind? Since the publication of Jerry Fodor’s The Modularity of Mind (1983), a new question about the philosophy of emotions has emerged: are emotions modular? A positive answer to this question would mean, minimally, that emotions are cognitive capacities that can be explained in terms of mental components that are functionally dissociable from other parts of (...)
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  15. H. Clark Barrett (2005). Enzymatic Computation and Cognitive Modularity. Mind and Language 20 (3):259-87.score: 24.0
    Currently, there is widespread skepticism that higher cognitive processes, given their apparent flexibility and globality, could be carried out by specialized computational devices, or modules. This skepticism is largely due to Fodor’s influential definition of modularity. From the rather flexible catalogue of possible modular features that Fodor originally proposed has emerged a widely held notion of modules as rigid, informationally encapsulated devices that accept highly local inputs and whose opera- tions are insensitive to context. It is a mistake, however, (...)
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  16. Emmanuel Chemla, Vincent Homer & Daniel Rothschild (2011). Modularity and Intuitions in Formal Semantics: The Case of Polarity Items. Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (6):537-570.score: 24.0
    Linguists often sharply distinguish the different modules that support linguistics competence, e.g., syntax, semantics, pragmatics. However, recent work has identified phenomena in syntax (polarity sensitivity) and pragmatics (implicatures), which seem to rely on semantic properties (monotonicity). We propose to investigate these phenomena and their connections as a window into the modularity of our linguistic knowledge. We conducted a series of experiments to gather the relevant syntactic, semantic and pragmatic judgments within a single paradigm. The comparison between these quantitative data (...)
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  17. Marcin Miłkowski (2008). When Weak Modularity is Robust Enough? Análisis Filosófico 28 (1):77-89.score: 24.0
    In this paper, I suggest that the notion of module explicitly defined by Peter Carruthers in The Architecture of The Mind (Carruthers 2006) is not really In use in the book. Instead, a more robust notion seems to be actually in play. The more robust notion, albeit implicitly assumed, seems to be far more useful for making claims about the modularity of mind. Otherwise, the claims would become trivial. This robust notion will be reconstructed and improved upon by putting (...)
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  18. Jerry A. Fodor (1985). Precis of the Modularity of Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):1-42.score: 24.0
    The Modularity of Mind proposes an alternative to the or view of cognitive architecture that has dominated several decades of cognitive science. Whereas interactionism stresses the continuity of perceptual and cognitive processes, modularity theory argues for their distinctness. It is argued, in particular, that the apparent plausibility of New Look theorizing derives from the failure to distinguish between the (correct) claim that perceptual processes are inferential and the (dubious) claim that they are unencapsidated, that is, that they are (...)
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  19. Assaf Weksler, Phenomenal Concepts and Massive Modularity.score: 24.0
    Some philosophers have recently pointed out that phenomenal concepts are transparent, that is, they reveal the nature of their referents. Some of these philosophers have argued that the transparency of phenomenal concepts is incompatible with a posteriori physicalism, and hence the latter view is false. The basic idea is that, if phenomenal concepts are transparent, and physicalism is true, then phenomenal concepts reveal the physical nature of phenomenal properties. But if so, then, apparently, it is possible to a priori derive (...)
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  20. Lelio Camilleri (1992). On Music Perception and Cognition: Modularity, Structure, and Processing. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 2 (4):365-377.score: 24.0
    The paper treats issues concerning the modular modelisation of musical mental processes. Some musical phenomena, like musical illusions, are explained in the framework of modularity and hypotheses are advanced in which the modular model seems very promising for the study of musical perception and cognition. In addition, arguments are proposed to distinguish between levels of abstraction and knowledge in musical cognitive processes.Moreover, some aspects about the theory of musical competence and the theory of musical processing are identified and the (...)
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  21. Theo C. Meyering (1994). Fodor's Modularity: A New Name for an Old Dilemma. Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):39-62.score: 24.0
    This paper critically examines the argument structure of Fodor's theory of modularity. Fodor claims computational autonomy as the essential properly of modular processing. This property has profound consequences, burdening modularity theory with corollaries of rigidity, non-plasticity, nativism, and the old Cartesian dualism of sensing and thinking. However, it is argued that Fodor's argument for computational autonomy is crucially dependent on yet another postulate of Fodor's theory, viz. his thesis of strong modularity, ie. the view that functionally distinct (...)
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  22. Bongrae Seok (2006). Diversity and Unity of Modularity. Cognitive Science 30 (2):347-380.score: 24.0
    Since the publication of Fodor's (1983) The Modularity of Mind, there have been quite a few discussions of cognitive modularity among cognitive scientists. Generally, in those discussions, modularity means a property of specialized cognitive processes or a domain-specific body of information. In actuality, scholars understand modularity in many different ways. Different characterizations of modularity and modules were proposed and discussed, but they created misunderstanding and confusion. In this article, I classified and analyzed different approaches to (...)
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  23. William Marslen-Wilson & Lorraine Komisarjevsky Tyler (1987). Against Modularity. In Modularity In Knowledge Representation And Natural- Language Understanding. Cambridge: Mit Press.score: 24.0
     
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  24. Neil Stillings (1987). Modularity and Naturalism in Theories of Vision. In Modularity In Knowledge Representation. Cambridge: Mit Press.score: 24.0
     
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  25. David J. Buller & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2000). Evolutionary Psychology, Meet Developmental Neurobiology: Against Promiscuous Modularity. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 1 (3):307-25.score: 22.0
    Evolutionary psychologists claim that the mind contains “hundreds or thousands” of “genetically specified” modules, which are evolutionary adaptations for their cognitive functions. We argue that, while the adult human mind/brain typically contains a degree of modularization, its “modules” are neither genetically specified nor evolutionary adaptations. Rather, they result from the brain’s developmental plasticity, which allows environmental task demands a large role in shaping the brain’s information-processing structures. The brain’s developmental plasticity is our fundamental psychological adaptation, and the “modules” that result (...)
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  26. Irene Appelbaum (1998). Fodor, Modularity, and Speech Perception. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):317-330.score: 22.0
    Fodor argues that speech perception is accomplished by a module. Typically, modular processing is taken to be bottom-up processing. Yet there is ubiquitous empirical evidence that speech perception is influenced by top-down processing. Fodor attempts to resolve this conflict by denying that modular processing must be exclusively bottom-up. It is argued, however, that Fodor's attempt to reconcile top-down and modular processing fails, because: (i) it undermines Fodor's own conception of modular processing; and (ii) it cannot account for the contextually varying (...)
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  27. Louis C. Charland (1995). Feeling and Representing: Computational Theory and the Modularity of Affect. Synthese 105 (3):273-301.score: 22.0
    In this paper I review some leading developments in the empirical theory of affect. I argue that (1) affect is a distinct perceptual representation governed system, and (2) that there are significant modular factors in affect. The paper concludes with the observation thatfeeler (affective perceptual system) may be a natural kind within cognitive science. The main purpose of the paper is to explore some hitherto unappreciated connections between the theory of affect and the computational theory of mind.
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  28. Paul E. Griffiths (1990). Modularity, and the Psychoevolutionary Theory of Emotion. Biology and Philosophy 5 (2):175-196.score: 22.0
    It is unreasonable to assume that our pre-scientific emotion vocabulary embodies all and only those distinctions required for a scientific psychology of emotion. The psychoevolutionary approach to emotion yields an alternative classification of certain emotion phenomena. The new categories are based on a set of evolved adaptive responses, or affect-programs, which are found in all cultures. The triggering of these responses involves a modular system of stimulus appraisal, whose evoluations may conflict with those of higher-level cognitive processes. Whilst the structure (...)
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  29. Peter Carruthers (2006). The Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press.score: 21.0
    Peter Carruthers, a leading philosopher of mind, provides a comprehensive development and defense of one of the guiding assumptions of evolutionary psychology: that the human mind is composed of a large number of semi-independent modules. Written with unusual clarity and directness, and surveying an extensive range of research in cognitive science, it will be essential reading for anyone with an interest in the nature and organization of the mind.
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  30. Dan Sperber (2005). Modularity and Relevance: How Can a Massively Modular Mind Be Flexible and Context-Sensitive. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Content. Oup. 53.score: 21.0
  31. Wayne Wu (2013). Visual Spatial Constancy and Modularity: Does Intention Penetrate Vision? Philosophical Studies 165 (2):647-669.score: 21.0
    Is vision informationally encapsulated from cognition or is it cognitively penetrated? I shall argue that intentions penetrate vision in the experience of visual spatial constancy: the world appears to be spatially stable despite our frequent eye movements. I explicate the nature of this experience and critically examine and extend current neurobiological accounts of spatial constancy, emphasizing the central role of motor signals in computing such constancy. I then provide a stringent condition for failure of informational encapsulation that emphasizes a computational (...)
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  32. Gregory Currie & Kim Sterelny (2000). How to Think About the Modularity of Mind-Reading. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (199):145-160.score: 21.0
  33. Richard Samuels (2005). The Complexity of Cognition: Tractability Arguments for Massive Modularity. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York: Oxford University Press New York. 107.score: 21.0
  34. Peter Carruthers (2002). The Roots of Scientific Reasoning: Infancy, Modularity, and the Art of Tracking. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen P. Stich & Michael Siegal (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Cambridge University Press. 73--95.score: 21.0
    This chapter examines the extent to which there are continuities between the cognitive processes and epistemic practices engaged in by human hunter-gatherers, on the one hand, and those which are distinctive of science, on the other. It deploys anthropological evidence against any form of 'no-continuity' view, drawing especially on the cognitive skills involved in the art of tracking. It also argues against the 'child-as-scientist' accounts put forward by some developmental psychologists, which imply that scientific thinking is present in early infancy (...)
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  35. L. J. Bennett (1990). Modularity of Mind Revisited. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (September):429-36.score: 21.0
  36. Philip Cam (1988). Modularity, Rationality, and Higher Cognition. Philosophical Studies 53 (March):279-94.score: 21.0
  37. Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson (2002). Pragmatics, Modularity and Mind-Reading. Mind and Language 17 (1&2):3-23.score: 21.0
    The central problem for pragmatics is that sentence meaning vastly underdetermines speaker’s meaning. The goal of pragmatics is to explain how the gap between sentence meaning and speaker’s meaning is bridged. This paper defends the broadly Gricean view that pragmatic interpretation is ultimately an exercise in mind-reading, involving the inferential attribution of intentions. We argue, however, that the interpretation process does not simply consist in applying general mind-reading abilities to a particular (communicative) domain. Rather, it involves a dedicated comprehension module, (...)
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  38. Mitch Parsell (2005). Context-Sensitive Inference, Modularity, and the Assumption of Formal Processing. Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):45-58.score: 21.0
    Performance on the Wason selection task varies with content. This has been taken to demonstrate that there are different cognitive modules for dealing with different conceptual domains. This implication is only legitimate if our underlying cognitive architecture is formal. A non-formal system can explain content-sensitive inference without appeal to independent inferential modules.
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  39. Erik J. Olsson (1997). Coherence and the Modularity of Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):404-11.score: 21.0
  40. Emmett L. Holman (2003). Sense Experience, Intentionality, and Modularity. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:143-57.score: 21.0
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  41. John A. Bullinaria (2007). Understanding the Emergence of Modularity in Neural Systems. Cognitive Science 31 (4):673-695.score: 21.0
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  42. Annette Karmiloff-Smith (1994). Précis of Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):693.score: 21.0
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  43. Haifeng Du, Marcus W. Feldman, Shuzhuo Li & Xiaoyi Jin (2007). An Algorithm for Detecting Community Structure of Social Networks Based on Prior Knowledge and Modularity. Complexity 12 (3):53-60.score: 21.0
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  44. Lars Kristian Hansen and Shegaw Anagaw Mengiste (2012). IT Project Portfolio Management: Modularity Problems in a Public Organization. Iris 35.score: 21.0
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  45. Robert M. Harnish (1995). Modularity and Speech Acts. Pragmatics and Cognition 3 (1):1-29.score: 21.0
  46. Jay L. Garfield (ed.) (1987). Modularity in Knowledge Representation and Natural-Language Understanding. MIT Press.score: 21.0
  47. Philip Robbins (2013). Modularity and Mental Architecture. WIREs Cognitive Science 4 (6):641-648.score: 21.0
     
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  48. R. M. Singh (2005). Mind, Modularity and Evolution. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1-2):105-131.score: 21.0
     
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  49. Marcus P. Adams (2011). Modularity, Theory of Mind, and Autism Spectrum Disorder. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):763-773.score: 18.0
    The theory of mind (ToM) deficit associated with autism spectrum disorder has been a central topic in the debate about the modularity of the mind. In a series of papers, Philip Gerrans and Valerie Stone argue that positing a ToM module does not best explain the deficits exhibited by individuals with autism (Gerrans 2002; Stone & Gerrans 2006a, 2006b; Gerrans & Stone 2008). In this paper, I first criticize Gerrans and Stone’s (2008) account. Second, I discuss various studies of (...)
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  50. Alan M. Leslie & Brian J. Scholl (1999). Modularity, Development and 'Theory of Mind'. Mind and Language 14 (1):131-153.score: 18.0
    Psychologists and philosophers have recently been exploring whether the mechanisms which underlie the acquisition of ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) are best charac- terized as cognitive modules or as developing theories. In this paper, we attempt to clarify what a modular account of ToM entails, and why it is an attractive type of explanation. Intuitions and arguments in this debate often turn on the role of develop- ment: traditional research on ToM focuses on various developmental sequences, whereas cognitive modules are thought (...)
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