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Profile: Monica Meijsing (Tilburg University)
  1. Monica Meijsing (2012). Waarneming Tussen Representationalisme En Enactivisme. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 104 (3).
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  2. Monica Meijsing (2011). The Whereabouts of Pictorial Space. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (3-4):3-4.
    This paper deals with the perception of depth in two-dimensional pictures. Two indirect theories of perception, the Mainstream Theory and the Projection Theory, are compared with a direct Adverbial Theory. Apart from seeming to be the philosophical counterpart to present-day empirical theories of perception, the first two theories seem to be tailor-made to deal with this phenomenon, where the perceived space is certainly not out there, on or behind the canvas: they claim that pictorial space is constructed by the brain (...)
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  3. Ton Derksen & Monica Meijsing (2008). The Fabrication of Facts : The Lure of the Incredible Coincidence. In Hendrik Kaptein (ed.), Legal Evidence and Proof: Statistics, Stories, Logic. Ashgate
     
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  4. Monica Meijsing (2007). Steen Olaf Welding, Die Unerkennbarkeit Des Geistes. Phänomenale Erfahrung Und Menschliche Erkenntnis. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (2):407-412.
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  5. Monica Meijsing (2006). Being Ourselves and Knowing Ourselves: An Adverbial Account of Mental Representations. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):605-619.
    This paper takes an evolutionary approach to what we are, namely autopoietic systems with a first person perspective on our surroundings and ourselves. This in contrast with Thomas Metzinger.
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  6. Monica Meijsing (2006). Real People and Virtual Bodies: How Disembodied Can Embodiment Be? [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 16 (4):443-461.
    It is widely accepted that embodiment is crucial for any self-aware agent. What is less obvious is whether the body has to be real, or whether a virtual body will do. In that case the notion of embodiment would be so attenuated as to be almost indistinguishable from disembodiment. In this article I concentrate on the notion of embodiment in human agents. Could we be disembodied, having no real body, as brains-in-a-vat with only a virtual body? Thought experiments alone will (...)
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  7. Monica Meijsing (2006). The Development of the First-Person Perspective. A Gradualist Approach. Manuscrito 29 (2):677-705.
    What are we, most fundamentally? Two topical answers to this question are discussed and rejected and a more evolutionary account is offered. Lynne Baker argues that we are persons: beings with a first-person perspective. Persons form a separate ontological category, with persistence conditions that are different from those of the body. Eric Ol-son, by contrast, claims that we are human organisms. No psychological property is definitive of what we are. Our persistence conditions are those of the human organism. In a (...)
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  8. Fred H. Previc, P. Piolino, M. Hisland, I. Ruffeveille, V. Matuszewski, I. Jambaqué, F. Eustache, Guy Pinku, Joseph Tzelgov & Monica Meijsing (2006). Paolo Bartolomeo, Caroline Decaix, Eric Siéroff. The Phenomenology of Endogenous Orienting. Consciousness and Cognition 15:484.
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  9. Monica Meijsing (2000). Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism by John Sutton. [REVIEW] Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 91:427-428.
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  10. Monica Meijsing (2000). Self-Consciousness and the Body. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (6):34-50.
    Traditionally, what we are conscious of in self-consciousness is something non-corporeal. But anti-Cartesian philosophers argue that the self is as much corporeal as it is mental. Because we have the sense of proprioception, a kind of body awareness, we are immediately aware of ourselves as bodies in physical space. In this debate the case histories of patients who have lost their sense of proprioception are clearly relevant. These patients do retain an awareness of themselves as corporeal beings, although they hardly (...)
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