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Profile: Monima Chadha (Monash University)
  1. Monima Chadha (forthcoming). Time-Series of Ephemeral Impressions: The Abhidharma-Buddhist View of Conscious Experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
    In the absence of continuing selves or persons, Buddhist philosophers are under pressure to provide a systematic account of phenomenological and other features of conscious experience. Any such Buddhist account of experience, however, faces further problems because of another cardinal tenet of Buddhist revisionary metaphysics: the doctrine of impermanence, which during the Abhidharma period is transformed into the doctrine of momentariness. Setting aside the problems that plague the Buddhist Abhidharma theory of experience because of lack of persons, I shall focus (...)
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  2. Monima Chadha (2015). A Buddhist Epistemological Framework for Mindfulness Meditation. Asian Philosophy 25 (1):65-80.
    One of the major aims of this article is to provide the theoretical account of mindfulness provided by the systematic Abhidharma epistemology of conscious states. I do not claim to present the one true version of mindfulness, because there is not one version of it in Buddhism; in addition to the Abhidharma model, there is, for example, the nondual Mahāmudrā tradition. A better understanding of a Buddhist philosophical framework will not only help situate meditation practice in its originating tradition, but (...)
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  3. Monima Chadha (2015). Meditation and Unity of Consciousness: A Perspective From Buddhist Epistemology. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):111-127.
    The paper argues that empirical work on Buddhist meditation has an impact on Buddhist epistemology, in particular their account of unity of consciousness. I explain the Buddhist account of unity of consciousness and show how it relates to contemporary philosophical accounts of unity of consciousness. The contemporary accounts of unity of consciousness are closely integrated with the discussion of neural correlates of consciousness. The conclusion of the paper suggests a new direction in the search for neural correlates of state consciousness (...)
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  4. Monima Chadha (2014). A Buddhist Explanation of Episodic Memory: From Self to Mind. Asian Philosophy 24 (1):14-27.
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  5. Monima Chadha, On Knowing Universals: The Nyaya Way.
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  6. Monima Chadha (2013). The Self in Early Nyāya: A Minimal Conclusion. Asian Philosophy 23 (1):24-42.
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  7. Monima Chadha, Purushottama Bilimoria & John Bigelow (2013). J. J. C Smart (1920-2012): Remembering Jack. [REVIEW] Sophia 52 (1):1-5.
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  8. Monima Chadha, The Epistemic Illusion of First-Person Authority.
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  9. Monima Chadha (2011). Self-Awareness: Eliminating the Myth of the “Invisible Subject”. Philosophy East and West 61 (3):453-467.
    In the sixth century a.d., in a debate with the Buddhists about the nature of Self, the well-known Naiyāyika Uddyotakara declared that there is no need prove that the Self or what is referred to by the pronoun “I” exists, for on that score there cannot be any significant disagreement.1 It is only this or that specific metaphysical nature of the self that is the subject of controversy. To limit the scope of the debate at issue here, we employ the (...)
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  10. Robert Hanna & Monima Chadha (2011). Non-Conceptualism and the Problem of Perceptual Self-Knowledge. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):184-223.
    In this paper we (i) identify the notion of ‘essentially non-conceptual content’ by critically analyzing the recent and contemporary debate about non-conceptual content, (ii) work out the basics of broadly Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content in relation to a corresponding theory of conceptual content, and then (iii) demonstrate one effective application of the Kantian theory of essentially non-conceptual content by using this theory to provide a ‘minimalist’ solution to the problem of perceptual self-knowledge which is raised by Strong Externalism.
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  11. Monima Chadha (2010). Perceptual Experience and Concepts in Classical Indian Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  12. Monima Chadha (2009). Contents of Experience. Sophia 48 (3):237-251.
    In this paper I aim to situate the Naiyayika theory of perception in contemporary philosophy of mind. Following the ancients, I suggest we reconsider the taxonomy and the assumed interactions between kinds of perceptual content. This reclassification will lead us to reconsider some aspects of the Cartesian conception of mind that continue to influence the work of contemporary theorists. I focus attention on different accounts of sensory perception favoured by ancient Indian Naiyayika philosophers and Descartes as a starting point for (...)
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  13. Monima Chadha (2009). An Independent, Empirical Route to Nonconceptual Content. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):439-448.
    The overall goal of this paper is to offer an independent, empirical route to characterize the content on nonconceptual content. I pursue a recent move by Pylyshyn, a leading cognitive scientist and philosopher of mental representation, who focuses on empirical considerations in favor of nonconceptual representations. Pylyshyn proposes a minimalist view of nonconceptual representations. I offer empirical reasons that force us to go beyond minimalist account and reinstate empirically defensible richer nonconceptual representations into a theory of content.
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  14. Monima Chadha (2007). No Speech, Never Mind! Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):641 – 657.
    In a series of classic papers, Donald Davidson put forward an ingenious argument to challenge the ascription of minds to nonlinguistic animals. Davidson's conclusions have been mercilessly demolished in the literature by cognitive ethologists, but none of them have directly addressed Davidson's argument. First, this paper is an attempt to elucidate and evaluate Davidson's central argument for denying minds to nonlinguistic animals. Davidson's central argument puts forth a challenge to those of us who want to attribute minds to nonlinguistic animals. (...)
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  15. Monima Chadha & Nick Trakakis (2007). Karma and the Problem of Evil: A Response to Kaufman. Philosophy East and West 57 (4):533-556.
    The doctrine of karma, as elaborated in the Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain religious traditions, offers a powerful explanatory account of the human predicament, and in particular of seemingly undeserved human suffering. Whitley R. P. Kaufman is right to point out that on some points, such as the suffering of children, the occurrence of natural disasters, and the possibility of universal salvation, the karma theory appears, initially at least, much more satisfactory than the attempts made to solve the perennial problem of (...)
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  16. Monima Chadha (2006). Yet Another Attempt to Salvage Pristine Perceptions! Philosophy East and West 56 (2):333-342.
  17. Monima Chadha (2004). Perceiving Particulars-as-Such is Incoherent--A Reply to Mark Siderits. Philosophy East and West 54 (3):382-389.
  18. Monima Chadha (2004). Perceiving Particulars-as-Such Is Incoherent: A Reply to Mark Siderits. Philosophy East and West 54 (3):382-389.
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  19. Monima Chadha, Anita Avramides: Other Minds.
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  20. Monima Chadha, Other Minds.
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  21. Monima Chadha, Thinking Beings.
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  22. Monima Chadha (2001). Perceptual Cognition: A Nyaya-Kantian Approach. Philosophy East and West 51 (2):197-209.
    It is commonly believed that the given consists of particulars cognized as such in perceptual experiences. Against this belief it is argued that perceptual cognition must be restricted to universal features. A Nyāya-Kantian argument is presented to reveal the incoherence in the very idea of a conception-free awareness of particulars. For the Naiyāyika philosophers and Kant, conceptualization is a necessary ingredient of perceptual experience, since perceptual cognition requires the possibility of recognition. From this it follows that perceptual cognition must be (...)
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  23. A. K. Raina, B. N. Patnaik & Monima Chadha (eds.) (2000). Science and Tradition. Inter-University Centre for Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Advanced Study.
     
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