Search results for 'Moorean argument' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Richard Rowland (2013). Moral Error Theory and the Argument From Epistemic Reasons. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1):1-24.score: 76.0
    In this paper I defend what I call the argument from epistemic reasons against the moral error theory. I argue that the moral error theory entails that there are no epistemic reasons for belief and that this is bad news for the moral error theory since, if there are no epistemic reasons for belief, no one knows anything. If no one knows anything, then no one knows that there is thought when they are thinking, and no one knows that (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Tristram McPherson (2009). Moorean Arguments and Moral Revisionism. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.score: 72.0
    G. E. Moore famously argued against skepticism and idealism by appealing to their inconsistency with alleged certainties, like the existence of his own hands. Recently, some philosophers have offered analogous arguments against revisionary views about ethics such as metaethical error theory. These arguments appeal to the inconsistency of error theory with seemingly obvious moral claims like “it is wrong to torture an innocent child just for fun.” It might seem that such ‘Moorean’ arguments in ethics will stand or fall (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Rodrigo Laera (2012). Escepticismo y Desacuerdo. Principia 16 (1):81-97.score: 60.0
    Within the framework of the epistemological debate on disagreement, this paper aims to examine the sceptical thesis that holds that, if it is impossible to rationally choose among two excluding positions, the only sensible or rational thing to do is to suspend judgement. The idea that ordinary life does not constitute the source of scepticism is presented, which rules out real disagreement between epistemic pairs as its foundation. Sceptical scenes differ ontologically from everyday scenes, without such ontological difference entailing an (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Thomas Kelly (2011). Following the Argument Where It Leads. Philosophical Studies 154 (1):105-124.score: 54.0
    Throughout the history of western philosophy, the Socratic injunction to ‘follow the argument where it leads’ has exerted a powerful attraction. But what is it, exactly, to follow the argument where it leads? I explore this intellectual ideal and offer a modest proposal as to how we should understand it. On my proposal, following the argument where it leaves involves a kind of modalized reasonableness. I then consider the relationship between the ideal and common sense or ‘ (...)’ responses to revisionary philosophical theorizing. (shrink)
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Markos Valaris, Dogmatism and Moorean Reasoning.score: 42.0
    According to dogmatism, one may know a proposition by inferring it from a set of evidence even if one has no independent grounds for rejecting a skeptical hypothesis compatible with one’s evidence but incompatible with one’s conclusion. Despite its intuitive attractions, many philosophers have argued that dogmatism goes wrong because they have thought that it licenses Moorean reasoning — i.e., reasoning in which one uses the conclusion of an inference as a premise in an argument against a skeptical (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Thomas Kelly (2005). Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win? Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):179 - 209.score: 42.0
    A Moorean fact, in the words of the late David Lewis, is ‘one of those things that we know better than we know the premises of any philosophical argument to the contrary’. Lewis opens his seminal paper ‘Elusive Knowledge’ with the following declaration.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Duncan Pritchard (2007). How to Be a Neo-Moorean. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 68--99.score: 42.0
    Much of the recent debate regarding scepticism has focussed on a certain template sceptical argument and a rather restricted set of proposals concerning how one might deal with that argument. Throughout this debate the ‘Moorean’ response to scepticism is often cited as a paradigm example of how one should not respond to the sceptical argument, so conceived. As I argue in this paper, however, there are ways of resurrecting the Moorean response to the sceptic. In (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Francesco Orsi (2013). What's Wrong with Moorean Buck-Passing? Philosophical Studies 164 (3):727-746.score: 42.0
    In this paper I discuss and try to remove some major stumbling blocks for a Moorean buck-passing account of reasons in terms of value (MBP): There is a pro tanto reason to favour X if and only if X is intrinsically good, or X is instrumentally good, or favouring X is intrinsically good, or favouring X is instrumentally good. I suggest that MBP can embrace and explain the buck-passing intuition behind the far more popular buck-passing account of value, and (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Charles R. Pigden (2012). Identifying Goodness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):93 - 109.score: 36.0
    The paper reconstructs Moore's Open Question Argument (OQA) and discusses its rise and fall. There are three basic objections to the OQA: Geach's point, that Moore presupposes that ?good? is a predicative adjective (whereas it is in fact attributive); Lewy's point, that it leads straight to the Paradox of Analysis; and Durrant's point that even if 'good' is not synonymous with any naturalistic predicate, goodness might be synthetically identical with a naturalistic property. As against Geach, I argue that 'good' (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Susanna Rinard (2013). Why Philosophy Can Overturn Common Sense. In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 4. Oxford University Press.score: 36.0
    In part one I present a positive argument for the claim that philosophical argument can rationally overturn common sense. It is widely agreed that science can overturn common sense. But every scientific argument, I argue, relies on philosophical assumptions. If the scientific argument succeeds, then its philosophical assumptions must be more worthy of belief than the common sense proposition under attack. But this means there could be a philosophical argument against common sense, each of whose (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Guy Axtell (2008). Virtue-Theoretic Responses to Skepticism. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.score: 36.0
    This chapter focuses on the responses that proponents of virtue epistemology (VE) make to radical skepticism and particularly to two related forms of it, Pyrrhonian skepticism and the “underdetermination-based” argument, both of which have been receiving widening attention in recent debate. Section 1 of the chapter briefly articulates these two skeptical arguments and their interrelationship, while section 2 explains the close connection between a virtue-theoretic and a neo-Moorean response to them. In sections 3 and 4 I advance arguments (...)
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Michael J. Shaffer (2012). Moorean Sentences and the Norm of Assertion. Logos and Episteme 3:653-658.score: 36.0
    In this paper Timothy Williamson’s argument that the knowledge norm of assertion is the best explanation of the unassertability of Morrean sentences is challenged and an alternative account of the norm of assertion is defended.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. José Zalabardo (2012). Wright on Moore. In Crispin Wright & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press.score: 30.0
    To the sceptic's contention that I don't know that I have hands because I don't know that there is an external world, the Moorean replies that I know that there is an external world because I know that I have hands. Crispin Wright has argued that the Moorean move is illegitimate, and has tried to block it by limiting the applicability of the principle of the transmission of knowledge by inference—the principle that recognising the validity of an inference (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (2012). Reasoning, Normativity, and Experimental Philosophy. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):151 - 163.score: 26.0
    The development of modern science, as everybody knows, has come largely through naturalizing domains of inquiry that were historically parts of philosophy. Theories based on mere speculation about matters empirical, such as Aristotle‟s view about teleology in nature, were replaced with law-based, predictive explanatory theories that invoked empirical data as supporting evidence. Although philosophers have, by and large, applauded such developments, inquiry into normative domains presents a different set of problems, and there is no consensus about whether such an inquiry (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Nicholas Silins (2008). Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic. In Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 2. OUP.score: 24.0
    My focus will be on two questions about Moore’s justification to believe the premises and the conclusion of the argument above. At stake is what makes it possible for our experiences to justify our beliefs, and what makes it possible for us to be justified in disbelieving skeptical..
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Matthew A. Benton (2011). Two More for the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Analysis 71 (4):684-687.score: 24.0
    The Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA) has received added support recently from data on prompting assertion (Turri 2010) and from a refinement suggesting that assertions ought to express knowledge (Turri 2011). This paper adds another argument from parenthetical positioning, and then argues that KAA’s unified explanation of some of the earliest data (from Moorean conjunctions) adduced in its favor recommends KAA over its rivals.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Stephen Finlay & Terence Cuneo (2008). Teaching & Learning Guide For: Moral Realism and Moral Nonnaturalism. Philosophy Compass 3 (3):570-572.score: 24.0
    Metaethics is a perennially popular subject, but one that can be challenging to study and teach. As it consists in an array of questions about ethics, it is really a mix of (at least) applied metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and mind. The seminal texts therefore arise out of, and often assume competence with, a variety of different literatures. It can be taught thematically, but this sample syllabus offers a dialectical approach, focused on metaphysical debate over moral realism, which spans (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. John Greco (2007). External World Skepticism. Philosophy Compass 2 (4):625–649.score: 24.0
    Recent literature in epistemology has focused on the following argument for skepticism (SA): I know that I have two hands only if I know that I am not a handless brain in a vat. But I don't know I am not a handless brain in a vat. Therefore, I don't know that I have two hands. Part I of this article reviews two responses to skepticism that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s: sensitivity theories and attributor contextualism. Part II (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay, Semantic Naturalism and the New Naturalistic Fallacy.score: 24.0
    More than a century ago, G. E. Moore famously offered an extended inference to reject what are in effect two substantially different types of ethical naturalism. Although some naturalistic doctrines targeted by that inference make semantic claims that, if true, would entail certain metaphysical claims, it is also possible that those semantic doctrines could be false and the metaphysical ones true at the same time. For if semantic naturalism is true, then moral terms and sentences are reducible, by an analysis (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Meghan Sullivan (2012). The Minimal A-Theory. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):149-174.score: 24.0
    Timothy Williamson thinks that every object is a necessary, eternal existent. In defense of his view, Williamson appeals primarily to considerations from modal and tense logic. While I am uncertain about his modal claims, I think there are good metaphysical reasons to believe permanentism: the principle that everything always exists. B-theorists of time and change have long denied that objects change with respect to unqualified existence. But aside from Williamson, nearly all A-theorists defend temporaryism: the principle that there are temporary (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Mitchell S. Green (1999). Moore's Many Paradoxes. Philosophical Papers 28 (2):97-109.score: 24.0
    Over the last two decades J.N. Williams has developed an account of the absurdity of such utterances as Its raining but I dont believe it that is both intuitively plausible and applicable to a wide variety of forms that this so-called Moorean absurdity can take. His approach is also noteworthy for making only minimal appeal to principles of epistemic or doxastic logic in its account of such absurdity. We first show that Williams places undue emphasis upon assertion and belief: (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. John N. Williams (2014). Moore's Paradox in Belief and Desire. Acta Analytica 29 (1):1-23.score: 24.0
    Is there a Moore’s paradox in desire? I give a normative explanation of the epistemic irrationality, and hence absurdity, of Moorean belief that builds on Green and Williams’ normative account of absurdity. This explains why Moorean beliefs are normally irrational and thus absurd, while some Moorean beliefs are absurd without being irrational. Then I defend constructing a Moorean desire as the syntactic counterpart of a Moorean belief and distinguish it from a ‘Frankfurt’ conjunction of desires. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Daniel Halliday (2013). Holism About Value: Some Help for Invariabilists. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1033-1046.score: 24.0
    G.E. Moore’s principle of organic unity holds that the intrinsic value of a whole may differ from the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts. Moore combined this principle with invariabilism about intrinsic value: An item’s intrinsic value depends solely on its bearer’s intrinsic properties, not on which wholes it has membership of. It is often said that invariabilism ought to be rejected in favour of what might be called ‘conditionalism’ about intrinsic value. This paper is an attempt to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Adam Leite (2011). Immediate Warrant, Epistemic Responsibility, and Moorean Dogmatism. In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press.score: 22.0
    Moorean Dogmatist” responses to external world skepticism endorse courses of reasoning that many people find objectionable. This paper seeks to locate this dissatisfaction in considerations about epistemic responsibility. I sketch a theory of immediate warrant and show how it can be combined with plausible “inferential internalist” demands arising from considerations of epistemic responsibility. The resulting view endorses immediate perceptual warrant but forbids the sort of reasoning that “Moorean Dogmatism” would allow. A surprising result is that Dogmatism’s commitment to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Jan Willem Wieland (2012). Regress Argument Reconstruction. Argumentation 26 (4):489-503.score: 19.0
    If an argument can be reconstructed in at least two different ways, then which reconstruction is to be preferred? In this paper I address this problem of argument reconstruction in terms of Ryle’s infinite regress argument against the view that knowledge-how requires knowledge-that. First, I demonstrate that Ryle’s initial statement of the argument does not fix its reconstruction as it admits two, structurally different reconstructions. On the basis of this case and infinite regress arguments generally, I (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. James B. Freeman (2001). Argument Structure and Disciplinary Perspective. Argumentation 15 (4):397-423.score: 19.0
    Many in the informal logic tradition distinguish convergent from linked argument structure. The pragma-dialectical tradition distinguishes multiple from co-ordinatively compound argumentation. Although these two distinctions may appear to coincide, constituting only a terminological difference, we argue that they are distinct, indeed expressing different disciplinary perspectives on argumentation. From a logical point of view, where the primary evaluative issue concerns sufficient strength of support, the unit of analysis is the individual argument, the particular premises put forward to support a (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Douglas Walton (2012). Building a System for Finding Objections to an Argument. Argumentation 26 (3):369-391.score: 19.0
    Abstract This paper addresses the role that argumentation schemes and argument visualization software tools can play in helping to find and counter objections to a given argument one is confronted with. Based on extensive analysis of features of the argumentation in these two examples, a practical four-step method of finding objections to an argument is set out. The study also applies the Carneades Argumentation System to the task of finding objections to an argument, and shows how (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Barbara Warnick (2004). Rehabilitating AI: Argument Loci and the Case for Artificial Intelligence. [REVIEW] Argumentation 18 (2):149-170.score: 19.0
    This article examines argument structures and strategies in pro and con argumentation about the possibility of human-level artificial intelligence (AI) in the near term future. It examines renewed controversy about strong AI that originated in a prominent 1999 book and continued at major conferences and in periodicals, media commentary, and Web-based discussions through 2002. It will be argued that the book made use of implicit, anticipatory refutation to reverse prevailing value hierarchies related to AI. Drawing on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Zoltan P. Majdik & William M. Keith (2011). Expertise as Argument: Authority, Democracy, and Problem-Solving. [REVIEW] Argumentation 25 (3):371-384.score: 19.0
    This article addresses the problem of expertise in a democratic political system: the tension between the authority of expertise and the democratic values that guide political life. We argue that for certain problems, expertise needs to be understood as a dialogical process, and we conceptualize an understanding of expertise through and as argument that positions expertise as constituted by and a function of democratic values and practices, rather than in the possession of, acquisition of, or relationship to epistemic materials. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. J. Anthony Blair (1998). The Limits of the Dialogue Model of Argument. Argumentation 12 (2):325-339.score: 19.0
    The paper's thesis is that dialogue is not an adequate model for all types of argument. The position of Walton is taken as the contrary view. The paper provides a set of descriptions of dialogues in which arguments feature in the order of the increasing complexity of the argument presentation at each turn of the dialogue, and argues that when arguments of great complexity are traded, the exchanges between arguers are turns of a dialogue only in an extended (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Larry Wright (2001). Justification, Discovery, Reason & Argument. Argumentation 15 (1):97-104.score: 19.0
    In distinguishing justification from discovery, the logical empiricists hoped to avoid confusing causal matters with normative ones. Exaggerating the virtue of this distinction, however, has disguised from us important features of the concept of a reason as it functions in human practice. Surfacing those features gives some insight into reasoning and argument.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Harvey Siegel (1999). Argument Quality and Cultural Difference. Argumentation 13 (2):183-201.score: 19.0
    Central to argumentation theory is a concern with normativity. Argumentation theorists are concerned, among other things, with explaining why some arguments are good (or at least better than others) in the sense that a given argument provides reasons for embracing its conclusion which are such that a fair- minded appraisal of the argument yields the judgment that the conclusion ought to be accepted -- is worthy of acceptance -- by all who so appraise it.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Eddo Rigotti & Sara Greco Morasso (2010). Comparing the Argumentum Model of Topics to Other Contemporary Approaches to Argument Schemes: The Procedural and Material Components. Argumentation 24 (4):489-512.score: 19.0
    This paper focuses on the inferential configuration of arguments, generally referred to as argument scheme. After outlining our approach, denominated Argumentum Model of Topics (AMT, see Rigotti and Greco Morasso 2006, 2009; Rigotti 2006, 2008, 2009), we compare it to other modern and contemporary approaches, to eventually illustrate some advantages offered by it. In spite of the evident connection with the tradition of topics, emerging also from AMT’s denomination, its involvement in the contemporary dialogue on argument schemes (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Stephen D. O'Leary (1997). Apocalyptic Argument and the Anticipation of Catastrophe: The Prediction of Risk and the Risks of Prediction. [REVIEW] Argumentation 11 (3):293-313.score: 19.0
    This essay proposes to extend the model of apocalyptic argument developedin my recent book Arguing the Apocalypse (O‘Leary, 1994) beyond the study ofreligious discourse, by applying this model to the debate over awell-publicized earthquake prediction that caused a widespread panic in theAmerican midwest in December, 1990. The first section of the essay willsummarize the essential elements of apocalyptic argument as I have earlierdefined them; the second section will apply the model to the case of the NewMadrid, Missouri, earthquake (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Roosmaryn Pilgram (2012). Reasonableness of a Doctor’s Argument by Authority: A Pragma-Dialectical Analysis of the Specific Soundness Conditions. Journal of Argumentation in Context 1 (1):33-50.score: 19.0
    Argumentation can play an important role in medical consultation. A doctor could, for instance, argue in support of a treatment advice to overcome a patient’s hesitance about it. In this argumentation, the doctor might explicitly present him- or herself as an authority, thereby presenting an argument by authority. Depending on the specific conditions under which the doctor advances such an argument, the doctor’s argument by authority can constitute a sound or a fallacious contribution to the discussion. In (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Leo Groarke (2002). Johnson on the Metaphysics of Argument. Argumentation 16 (3):277-286.score: 19.0
    This paper responds to two aspects of Ralph Johnson's Manifest Rationality (2000). The first is his critique of deductivism. The second is his failure to make room for some species of argument (e.g., visual and kisceral arguments) proposed by recent commentators. In the first case, Johnson holds that argumentation theorists have adopted a notion of argument which is too narrow. In the second, that they have adopted one which is too broad. I discuss the case Johnson makes for (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Jane Macoubrie (2003). Logical Argument Structures in Decision-Making. Argumentation 17 (3):291-313.score: 19.0
    Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's practical reasoning theory has attracted a great deal of interest since its publication in 1969. Their most important assertion, however, that argument is the logical basis for practical decision-making, has been under-utilized, primarily because it was not sufficiently operationalized for research purposes. This essay presents an operationalization of practical reasoning for use in analyzing argument logics that emerge through group interaction. Particular elements of discourse and argument are identified as responding to principles put forward (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Thomas A. Russman (1995). Postmodernism and the Parody of Argument. Argumentation 9 (1):123-135.score: 19.0
    Argument, in any full sense of the word, needs resources and assumptions that postmodernism does not provide. Postmodernism is not a phenomenon that emerged ‘after modernism,’ as it were, to replace it; postmodernism is just an ultimate expression of the nihilistic tendencies of modernism, tendencies which were present from its beginning and have continued to the present. A radical critique of modernism undercuts postmodernism as well and clears the way for a revival of realist foundations for argument and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Richard A. Cherwitz & Thomas J. Darwin (1995). On the Continuing Utility of Argument in a Postmodern World. Argumentation 9 (1):181-202.score: 19.0
    In this essay we contend that traditional theories of argument are consonant with and enrich the project of postmodernity. Reading postmodernity as ‘a rhetoric’ underscores how the process of discursively resolving conflicts is occasionally threatened by politically motivated efforts to misuse the methods of argument; it alerts us to the egregious acts that are and can be performed ‘in the name of,’ but not because of, rationality. Postmodernity is thus an attempt by a new generation of theorists to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. G. Thomas Goodnight (1993). A ?New Rhetoric? For a ?New Dialectic?: Prolegomena to a Responsible Public Argument. [REVIEW] Argumentation 7 (3):329-342.score: 19.0
    This essay offers, as a counterpart to pragma-dialectical argument, a “new rhetoric” produced in the situated discourse of a public forum when a community addresses matters of common urgency and undertakes informed action. Such a rhetoric takes the principles of discourse ethics as its informing dialectic by identifying an interlocutor as one who is obligatedboth to argue effectively,and also to hold open, even reinforce, norms of communicative reason. Implications concerning the study of fallacies and theethos obligations of communicative reasoning (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. André Juthe (2009). Refutation by Parallel Argument. Argumentation 23 (2):133–169.score: 19.0
    This paper discusses the method when an argument is refuted by a parallel argument since the flaw of the parallel argument is clearly displayed. The method is explicated, examined and compared with two other general methods.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Michael Leff (2009). Perelman, Ad Hominem Argument, and Rhetorical Ethos. Argumentation 23 (3):301-311.score: 19.0
    Perelman’s view of the role of persons in argument is one of the most distinctive features of his break with Cartesian assumptions about reasoning. Whereas the rationalist paradigm sought to minimize or eliminate personal considerations by dismissing them as distracting and irrelevant, Perelman insists that argumentation inevitably does and ought to place stress on the specific persons engaged in an argument and that the relationship between speaker and what is spoken is always relevant and important. In taking this (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Marie J. Secor (2003). Reconsidering Contentious Argument: Augustus DeMorgan on Fallacy. [REVIEW] Argumentation 17 (2):131-143.score: 19.0
    This essay examines Augustus DeMorgan's chapter on fallacy in his Formal Logic (1847) in order to show how DeMorgan's treatment represents an expansion and advance upon Aristotle. It is important that Aristotle clearly distinguishes among dialectical, didactic, demonstrative, and contentious types of argument, based upon the acceptability of premises and the aims of participants. Appropriating Aristotle's list of fallacies, DeMorgan discusses examples that reveal how the charge and countercharge of fallacy function in contentious argument, which is more widespread (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Christopher W. Tindale (2002). A Concept Divided: Ralph Johnson's Definition of Argument. [REVIEW] Argumentation 16 (3):299-309.score: 19.0
    Ralph Johnson's Manifest Rationality (2000) is a major contribution to the field of informal logic, but the concept of argument that is central to its project suffers from a tension between the components that comprise it. This paper explores and addresses that tension by examining the implications of each of five aspects of the definition of ‘argument’.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn (2007). Evaluating the Meta-Slope: Is There a Slippery Slope Argument Against Slippery Slope Arguments? [REVIEW] Argumentation 21 (4):349-359.score: 19.0
    Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) have often been viewed as inherently weak arguments, to be classified together with traditional fallacies of reasoning and argumentation such as circular arguments and arguments from ignorance. Over the last two decades several philosophers have taken a kinder view, often providing historical examples of the kind of gradual change on which slippery slope arguments rely. Against this background, Enoch (2001, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 21(4), 629–647) presented a novel argument against SSA use that itself (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. James W. Hikins (1995). The Given of Achievement and the Reluctance to Assent: Argument and Inquiry in the Post-Postmodern World. [REVIEW] Argumentation 9 (1):137-162.score: 19.0
    Changes in the social, political, and intellectual climate worldwide portend radical changes in how humans view themselves and their world. This essay argues that the twenty-first century will usher in apost-postmodern age. The new epoch will be one in which argument practices more closely resemble their modernist forbears. The ‘given of achievement’ will overcome the postmodern ‘reluctance to assent.’ Argument will be practiced against the backdrop of realist philosophical frameworks and will be viewed as contributing to the accretion (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Manfred Kraus (2007). From Figure to Argument: Contrarium in Roman Rhetoric. [REVIEW] Argumentation 21 (1):3-19.score: 19.0
    In Roman rhetoric, contrarium was variably considered either a figure of speech or an argument. The paper examines the logical pattern of this type of argument, which according to Cicero is based on a third Stoic indemonstrable syllogism: $$ \neg ({\hbox{p}} \wedge {\hbox{q}});<$> <$>{\hbox{p}} \to \neg {\hbox{q}}{\hbox{.}} $$ The persuasiveness of this type of argument, however, vitally depends on the validity of the alleged ‹incompatibility’ forming its major premiss. Yet this appears to be the argument’s weak (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Don S. Levi (1994). Begging What is at Issue in the Argument. Argumentation 8 (3):265-282.score: 19.0
    This paper objects to treating begging the question as circular reasoning. It argues that what is at issue in the argument is not to be confused with the claim or position that the arguer is adopting, and that logicians from Aristotle on give the wrong definition and have difficulty making sense of the fallacy because they try to define it in terms of how an argument is defined by logical theory - as a sequence consisting of premises followed (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Marco Rühl (1999). The Revelation Argument. A 'Communicational Fallacy'. Argumentation 13 (1):73-96.score: 19.0
    In this paper it is argued that much can be gained for the analysis and evaluation of arguing when fallacies are not, or not only, conceived of as flawed premise–conclusion complexes but rather as argumentative moves which distort harmfully an interaction aiming at resolving communication problems argumentatively. Starting from Normative Pragmatics and the pragma-dialectical concept of fallacy, a case study is presented to illustrate a fallacy which is termed the 'revelation argument' because it is characterized by an interactor's revealing (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. R. G. Scofield (2006). The Economic, Political, Strategic, and Rhetorical Uses of Simple Constructive Dilemma in Legal Argument. Argumentation 20 (1):1-14.score: 19.0
    The author argues that simple constructive dilemma is a valuable argument form for reasoning under relative conditions of uncertainty. When applied to legal argument this value of simple constructive dilemma is shown in its political, strategic, rhetorical, and especially economic, uses by lawyers and judges. After considering some examples of the use of the form by trial lawyers, the author gives examples of the more interesting use of the form by appellate courts. Research into the use of simple (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000