Search results for 'Moral Contextualism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Daan Evers (2014). Moral Contextualism and the Problem of Triviality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):285-297.
    Moral contextualism is the view that claims like ‘A ought to X’ are implicitly relative to some (contextually variable) standard. This leads to a problem: what are fundamental moral claims like ‘You ought to maximize happiness’ relative to? If this claim is relative to a utilitarian standard, then its truth conditions are trivial: ‘Relative to utilitarianism, you ought to maximize happiness’. But it certainly doesn’t seem trivial that you ought to maximize happiness (utilitarianism is a highly controversial (...)
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  2.  17
    Jan Van Der Stoep (2004). Towards a Sociological Turn in Contextualist Moral Philosophy. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (2):133-146.
    Contextualist moral philosophers criticise hands-off liberal theories of justice for abstracting from the cultural context in which people make choices. Will Kymlicka and Joseph Carens, for example, demonstrate that these theories are disadvantageous to cultural minorities who want to pursue their own way of life. I argue that Pierre Bourdieu's critique of moral reason radicalises contextualist moral philosophy by giving it a sociological turn. In Bourdieu's view it is not enough to provide marginalised groups or subgroups with (...)
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  3. Berit Brogaard (2008). Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):385 - 409.
    Moral relativism provides a compelling explanation of linguistic data involving ordinary moral expressions like 'right' and 'wrong'. But it is a very radical view. Because relativism relativizes sentence truth to contexts of assessment it forces us to revise standard linguistic theory. If, however, no competing theory explains all of the evidence, perhaps it is time for a paradigm shift. However, I argue that a version of moral contextualism can account for the same data as relativism without (...)
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  4.  60
    Lars Binderup (2008). Brogaard's Moral Contextualism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):410–415.
    Brogaard's non-indexical version of moral contextualism has two related problems. It is unable to account for the function of truth-governed assertoric moral discourse, since it leaves two (semantically clearheaded) disputants without any incentive to resolve seemingly contradictory moral claims. The moral contextualist could explain why people do feel such an incentive by ascribing false beliefs about the semantic workings of their own language. But, secondly, this leaves Brogaard's moral contextualism looking weaker than a (...)
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  5.  15
    Martin Montminy (2007). Moral Contextualism and the Norms for Moral Conduct. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):1 - 13.
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  6.  55
    James Dreier (2002). Critical Study: Timmons, Mark; Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Moral Contextualism. [REVIEW] Noûs 36 (1):152–168.
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  7. Mark Timmons (2002). Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Moral Contextualism. Noûs 36 (1):152-168.
     
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  8.  25
    Friderik Klampfer (2005). Contextualism and Moral Justification. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):569-582.
    In his insightful and stimulating book Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism, Mark Timmons presents a strong case for embracing contextualism as a vibrant alternative to the two rival accounts that used to dominate moral epistemology in the past, foundationalism and coherentism. His sophisticated version of contextualist moral epistemology (CME) comprises of several intriguing and mind-boggling theses: (i) moral beliefs that lack Justification altogether can nevertheless be held in an epistemically responsible way; (ii) (...)
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  9.  8
    Friderik Klampfer (2005). Contextualism and Moral Justification: A Discussion of Mark Timmons, Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):569-582.
    In his insightful and stimulating book Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism, Mark Timmons presents a strong case for embracing contextualism as a vibrant alternative to the two rival accounts that used to dominate moral epistemology in the past, foundationalism and coherentism. His sophisticated version of contextualist moral epistemology comprises of several intriguing and mind-boggling theses: moral beliefs that lack Justification altogether can nevertheless be held in an epistemically responsible way; such unjustified beliefs (...)
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  10. Mark Timmons (1996). Outline of a Contextualist Moral Epistemology. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.), Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Oxford University Press
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  11. Berit Brogaard (2003). Epistemological Contextualism and the Problem of Moral Luck. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):351–370.
    We have a strong intuition that a person’s moral standing should not be affected by luck, but the fact is that we do blame a morally unfortunate person more than her fortunate counterpart. This is the problem of moral luck. I argue that the problem arises because account is not taken of the fact that the extension of the term ‘blame’ is contextually determined. Loosely speaking, the more likely an act is to have an undesirable consequence, the more (...)
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  12.  50
    Daan Evers (2016). Jonas Olson's Evidence for Moral Error Theory. Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):403-418.
    Jonas Olson defends a moral error theory in (2014). I will first argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral nonnaturalism in his own opinion. I will then argue that Olson is not justified in believing the error theory as opposed to moral contextualism either (although the latter is not a matter of his own opinion).
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  13.  89
    Elvio Baccarini (2009). Moral Epistemological Coherentism, Contextualism, and Consensualism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1):69-89.
    The discussion regards moral epistemology as the research of a proper methodology in moral thinking. Coherentism is proposed as the appropriate methodology in the individual context of moral thinking (because of the fact that all the alternatives to coherentism, at least understood as a regulatory ideal, are opposed to rationality), while a qualified form of consensualism is proposed as the appropriate methodology in the context of communitarian or public justification of beliefs.
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  14.  67
    Nikola Kompa (2004). Moral Particularism and Epistemic Contextualism: Comments on Lance and Little. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):457 - 467.
    Do we need defeasible generalizations in epistemology, generalizations that are genuinely explanatory yet ineliminably exception-laden? Do we need them to endow our epistemology with a substantial explanatory structure? Mark Lance and Margaret Little argue for the claim that we do. I will argue that we can just as well do without them – at least in epistemology. So in the paper, I am trying to very briefly sketch an alternative contextualist picture. More specifically, the claim will be that although an (...)
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  15. Earl Winkler (1996). Moral Philosophy and Bioethics: Contextualism Versus the Paradigm Theory. In Wayne L. Sumner & Joseph Boyle (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Bioethics. University of Toronto Press 50--78.
     
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  16.  3
    Nikola Kompa (2004). Moral Particularism and Epistemic Contextualism: Comments on Lance and Little. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):457-467.
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  17.  10
    Donald Ipperciel (2003). Dialogue and Decision in a Moral Context. Nursing Philosophy 4 (3):211-221.
    One of the most widely accepted tenets in postmetaphysical normative ethics is the principle of dialogue as a foundational authority. Conceptually, the dialogical model is valuable, in that it allows a binding yet mutable underpinning of moral discourse. However, dialogue has its limits. The main drawback lies in the fact that deliberations can be very lengthy, perhaps even infinite. In other words, deliberation does not always lend itself to action. From the vantage point of applied ethics, in this case, (...)
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  18.  97
    Gunnar Björnsson (forthcoming). Contextualism in Ethics. International Encyclopedia of Ethics.
    In more than one way, context matters in ethics. Most clearly, the moral status of an action might depend on context: though it is typically wrong not to keep a promise, some contexts make it permissible. More radically, proponents of moral particularism (see PARTICULARISM) have argued that a reason for an action in one context is not guaranteed to be even a defeasible reason in every context: whether it counts against an act that it breaks a promise or (...)
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  19. Gunnar Björnsson (2013). Contextualism in Ethics. In Hugh LaFolette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell
    There are various ways in which context matters in ethics. Most clearly, the context in which an action is performed might determine whether the action is morally right: though it is often wrong not to keep a promise, it might be permissible in certain contexts. More radically, proponents of moral particularism (see particularism) have argued that a reason for an action in one context is not guaranteed to be a reason in a different context: whether it is a reason (...)
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  20.  63
    Basil Smith (2001). Mark Timmons, Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism. [REVIEW] Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (2):269-273.
    In Morality Without Foundations, Mark Timmons argues that moral judgments (e.g. “cruelty is wrong”) have what he calls “evaluative assertoric content,” and so, are true or false. However, I argue that, even if correct, this argument renders moral truth or falsity mysterious.
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  21. Alexander A. Guerrero (2007). Don't Know, Don't Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution. Philosophical Studies 136 (1):59-97.
    This paper takes on several distinct but related tasks. First, I present and discuss what I will call the “Ignorance Thesis,” which states that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, whether factual or moral, she is culpable for the act only if she is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts. Second, I offer a counterexample to the Ignorance Thesis, an example that applies most directly to the part I call the “Moral Ignorance Thesis.” Third, I argue (...)
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  22.  75
    Rodrigo Laera (2014). The Narrative of Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Analysis 31:123-149.
    The goal of this paper is to suggest that theoretical thinking with respect to metaphysical determinations or indeterminations is not the appropriate realm for attributing moral responsibility. On the contrary, judgments that attribute moral responsibility (S is responsible for...) depend on the possibility that a rational narrative be built. Agents are capable of forging their future actions, as well as of reflecting upon past actions. With this it will also be shown how we assume control of our behavior (...)
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  23.  96
    Ragnar Francén Olinder (2013). Moral Relativism, Error-Theory, and Ascriptions of Mistakes. Journal of Philosophy 110 (10):564-580.
    Moral error-theorists and relativists agree that there are no absolute moral facts, but disagree whether that makes all moral judgments false. Who is right? This paper examines a type of objection used by moral error-theorists against relativists, and vice versa: objections from implausible ascriptions of mistakes. Relativists (and others) object to error-theory that it implausibly implies that people, in having moral beliefs, are systematically mistaken about what exists. Error-theorists (and others) object to relativism that it (...)
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  24. Jeremy Byrd (2010). Agnosticism About Moral Responsibility. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):411-432.
    Traditionally, incompatibilism has rested on two theses. First, the familiar Principle of Alternative Possibilities says that we cannot be morally responsible for what we do unless we could have done otherwise. Accepting this principle, incompatibilists have then argued that there is no room for such alternative possibilities in a deterministic world. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have argued that incompatibilism about moral responsibility can be defended independently of these traditional theses (Ginet 2005: 604-8; McKenna 2001; Stump 1999: 322-4, (...)
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  25.  34
    Ragnar Francén Olinder (2012). Moral and Metaethical Pluralism: Unity in Variation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):583-601.
    The most basic argument for moral relativism is that different people are (fundamentally) disposed to apply moral terms, such as ‘morally right’ and ‘morally wrong’, and the corresponding concepts, to different (types of) acts. In this paper, I argue that the standard forms of moral relativism fail to account for certain instances of fundamental variation, namely, variation in metaethical intuitions, and I develop a form of relativism—pluralism—that does account for them. I identify two challenges that pluralism faces. (...)
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  26.  35
    Isidora Stojanovic (forthcoming). Relativism. In David Plunkett & Tristram McPherson (eds.), The Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge
    Although relativism may be said to be one of the oldest doctrines in philosophy, dating back to the teachings of Protagoras in the 5th century B.C., when it comes to contemporary philosophy, there is no consensus on what makes a view qualify as "relativist". The problem is particularly accute in metaethics, since most of the views that up to a decade ago were described as “relativist” would be more accurately described as "contextualist" or even “expressivist” in light of the distinctions (...)
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  27.  76
    Ben A. Minteer, Elizabeth A. Corley & Robert E. Manning (2004). Environmental Ethics Beyond Principle? The Case for a Pragmatic Contextualism. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 17 (2):131-156.
    Many nonanthropocentric environmental ethicists subscribe to a ``principle-ist'''' approach to moral argument, whereby specific natural resource and environmental policy judgments are deduced from the prior articulation of a general moral principle. More often than not, this principle is one requiring the promotion of the intrinsic value of nonhuman nature. Yet there are several problems with this method of moral reasoning, including the short-circuiting of reflective inquiry and the disregard of the complex nature of specific environmental problems and (...)
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  28.  60
    Alastair Norcross (2005). Contextualism for Consequentialists. Acta Analytica 20 (2):80-90.
    If, as I have argued elsewhere, consequentialism is not fundamentally concerned with such staples of moral theory as rightness, duty, obligation, moral requirements, goodness (as applied to actions), and harm, what, if anything, does it have to say about such notions? While such notions have no part to play at the deepest level of the theory, they may nonetheless be of practical significance. By way of explanation I provide a linguistic contextualist account of these notions. A contextualist approach (...)
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  29.  31
    Michael Buckley (2012). Justice in Context: Assessing Contextualism as an Approach to Justice. Ethics and Global Politics 5 (2):71-94.
    Moral and political philosophers are increasingly using empirical data to inform their normative theories. This has sparked renewed interest into questions concerning the relationship between facts and principles. A recent attempt to frame these questions within a broader approach to normative theory comes from David Miller, who has on several occasions defended ‘contextualism’ as the best approach to justice. Miller argues that the context of distribution itself brings one or another political principle into play. This paper examines this (...)
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  30.  33
    Mark Timmons (1998). Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism. Oxford University Press.
    In this book Timmons defends a metaethical view that exploits certain contextualist themes in philosophy of language and epistemology. He advances what he calls assertoric non-descriptivism, a view that employs semantic contextualism in giving an account of moral discourse. This view, which like traditional non-descriptivist views stresses the practical, action-guiding function of moral thought and discourse, also allows that moral sentences, as typically used, make genuine assertions. Timmons then defends a contextualist moral epistemology thus completing (...)
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  31.  13
    Martin T. Adam (2008). Classes of Agent and the Moral Logic of the Pali Canon. Argumentation 22 (1):115-124.
    This paper aims to lay bare the underlying logical structure of early Buddhist moral thinking. It argues that moral vocabulary in the Pali Suttas varies depending on the kind of agent under discussion and that this variance reflects an understanding that the phenomenology of moral experience also differs on the same basis. An attempt is made to spell this out in terms of attachment. The overall picture of Buddhist ethics that emerges is that of an agent-based (...) contextualism. This account does not imply that the prescription for moral conduct differs according to class of agent, but rather that the correct description of moral experience does. Further it implies that the descriptions of the moral experiences of different classes of agent differ phenomenologically, rather than in terms of overt behavioral characteristics. While most of the discussion is centered on the distinction between ordinary persons and disciples in higher training, the paper concludes with a brief exploration of the problematic moral experience of the arahat. (shrink)
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  32. John Greco (2008). What's Wrong with Contextualism? Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):416 - 436.
    This paper addresses two worries that might be raised about contextualism in epistemology and that carry over to its moral analogues: that contextualism robs epistemology (and moral theory) of a proper subject-matter, and that contextualism robs knowledge claims (and moral claims) of their objectivity. Two theses are defended: (1) that these worries are appropriately directed at interestdependent theories in general rather than at contextualism in particular, and (2) that the two worries are over-stated (...)
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  33. Gunnar Björnsson & Stephen Finlay (2010). Metaethical Contextualism Defended. Ethics 121 (1):7-36.
    We defend a contextualist account of deontic judgments as relativized both to (i) information and to (ii) standards or ends, against recent objections that turn on practices of moral disagreement. Kolodny & MacFarlane argue that information-relative contextualism cannot accommodate the connection between deliberation and advice; we suggest in response that they misidentify the basic concerns of deliberating agents. For pragmatic reasons, semantic assessments of normative claims sometimes are evaluations of propositions other than those asserted. Weatherson, Schroeder and others (...)
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  34.  19
    Alan Thomas (2006). Value and Context: The Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    In Value and Context Alan Thomas articulates and defends the view that human beings do possess moral and political knowledge but it is historically and culturally contextual knowledge in ways that, say, mathematical or chemical knowledge is not. In his exposition of "cognitive contextualism" in ethics and politics he makes wide-ranging use of contemporary work in epistemology, moral philosophy, and political theory.
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  35. Thomas W. Pogge (2002). Moral Universalism and Global Economic Justice. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 1 (1):29-58.
    Moral universalism centrally involves the idea that the moral assessment of persons and their conduct, of social rules and states of affairs, must be based on fundamental principles that do not, explicitly or covertly, discriminate arbitrarily against particular persons or groups. This general idea is explicated in terms of three conditions. It is then applied to the discrepancy between our criteria of national and global economic justice. Most citizens of developed countries are unwilling to require of the global (...)
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  36. Daniel Nica (2011). Originile Disputei Etice Dintre Particularism Şi Generalism: Platon Şi Aristotel. Annals of Philosophy. University of Bucharest:51-63.
    This paper is a critical investigation about the historical origins of two contemporary approaches in ethics: moral particularism and moral generalism. Moral particularism states that there are no defensible moral principles and that moral thought doesn’t consist in the application of moral principles to cases, but in understanding the morally relevant features of an action, which vary from case to case. In opposition, moral generalism is the traditional claim that moral decisions are (...)
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  37. Mark Timmons (1998). Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism. Oxford University Press Usa.
    Morality Without Foundations investigates fundamental metaethical questions about the meaning, truth, and justification of moral thought and discourse. Mark Timmons maintains that all versions of descriptivism in ethics, particularly certain accounts of moral realism, fail. He argues instead that a correct metaethical theory should embrace some version of non-descriptivism. Timmons defends what he calls "assertoric non-descriptivism" which, unlike traditional non-descriptivist views, holds that moral sentences are typically used to make genuine assertions. In defending this view, he exploits (...)
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  38.  6
    Sofia Jeppsson (2016). Non-Elusive Freedom Contextualism. Philosophia 44 (3):793-808.
    There are powerful arguments for free will scepticism. However, it seems obvious that some of our actions are done of our own free will. It has been argued that we can solve this puzzle by giving ‘free’ a contextualist analysis. In everyday contexts we are often allowed to ignore sceptical arguments, and can truly say that we acted freely. In the more demanding context of philosophy, it is true that we never do anything freely. Our freedom is elusive; it escapes (...)
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  39.  73
    Heather D. Battaly (ed.) (2010). Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Machine generated contents note: Notes on Contributors -- Introduction: Virtue and Vice: Heather Battaly -- 1. Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology: Roger Crisp -- 2. Exemplarist Virtue Theory: Linda Zagzebski -- 3. Right Act, Virtuous Motive: Thomas Hurka -- 4. Agency Ascriptions in Ethics and Epistemology: Or, Navigating Intersections, Narrow and Broad: Guy Axtell -- 5. Virtues, Social Roles, and Contextualism: Sarah Wright -- 6. Virtue, Emotion, and Attention: Michael S. Brady -- 7. Feeling Without Thinking: Lessons from the (...)
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  40.  42
    Isidora Stojanovic (2008). The Scope and the Subtleties of the Contextualism–Literalism–Relativism Debate. Language and Linguistics Compass 2 (6):1171–1188.
    In recent years, a number of new trends have seen light at the intersection of semantics and philosophy of language. They are meant to address puzzles raised by the context-sensitivity of a variety of natural language constructions, such as knowledge ascriptions, belief reports, epistemic modals, indicative conditionals, quantifier phrases, gradable adjectives, temporal constructions, vague predicates, moral predicates, predicates of personal taste. A diversity of labels have consequently emerged, such as 'contextualism', 'indexicalism', 'invariantism', 'literalism', 'minimalism', and 'relativism', variously qualified. (...)
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  41.  24
    William Rehg (1999). Intractable Conflicts and Moral Objectivity: A Dialogical, Problem-Based Approach. Inquiry 42 (2):229 – 257.
    According to the standard version of discourse ethics (e.g. as formulated by Apel, Habermas, and others), the objectivity of moral norms resides in their intersubjective acceptability under idealized conditions of discourse. These accounts have been criticized for not taking sufficient account of contextual particularities and the realities of actual discourse. This essay addresses such objections by proposing a more realistic, contextualist 'principle of real moral discourse' (RMD). RMD is derived from a more comprehensive concept of objectivity that links (...)
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  42.  14
    Tibor R. Machan (1982). Epistemology and Moral Knowledge. Review of Metaphysics 36 (1):23 - 49.
    It is argued that a wrongheaded model of what a theory of knowledge must satisfy has engendered unjustified skepticism about knowledge and moral knowledge in particular. A contextualist conception of knowledge is sketched and defended and it is then argued that in terms of such an idea of what it is to know something the prospects for moral and political knowledge are significantly improved.
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  43.  3
    Reuben E. Stern, Can the Contextualist Win the Free Will Debate?
    This thesis explores the merits and limits of John Hawthorne’s contextualist analysis of free will. First, I argue that contextualism does better at capturing the ordinary understanding of ‘free will’ than competing views because it best accounts for the way in which our willingness to attribute free will ordinarily varies with context. Then I consider whether this is enough to conclude that the contextualist has won the free will debate. I argue that this would be hasty, because the contextualist, (...)
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  44.  4
    Rebecca Kingston (2008). Locke, Waldron and the Moral Status of 'Crooks'. European Journal of Political Theory 7 (2):203-221.
    This article provides an assessment of Jeremy Waldron's arguments (in God, Locke and Equality and his subsequent 'Response to Critics') that Locke provides us with a compelling version of liberal equality. A close examination of the case of the criminally convicted in The Second Treatise shows how Locke's commitment to the principle of equality is compromised. This is revealed in part through recourse to contextualist considerations. This leads to the suggestion that Waldron's principled rejection of contextualist approaches to the history (...)
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  45. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.) (1996). Moral Knowledge New Readings. Oxford University Press Usa.
    In Moral Knowledge?: New Readings in Moral Epistemology, editors Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons bring together eleven newly written essays by distinguished moral philosophers exploring the nature and possibility of moral knowledge. Each essay represents a major position within the exciting field of moral epistemology in which a proponent of the position presents and defends his or her view and locates it vis-a-vis competing views. The first chapter, written by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, provides a framework for (...)
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  46. Isidora Stojanovic, The Scope and the Subtleties of the Contextualism/Literalism/Relativism Debate.
    In recent years, a number of new trends have seen light at the intersection of semantics and philosophy of language. They are meant to address puzzles raised by the context-sensitivity of a variety of natural language constructions, such as knowledge ascriptions, belief reports, epistemic modals, indicative conditionals, quantifier phrases, gradable adjectives, temporal constructions, vague predicates, moral predicates, predicates of personal taste, etc. A diversity of labels have consequently emerged, such as 'contextualism', 'indexicalism', 'invariantism', 'literalism', 'minimalism', 'relativism', variously qualified. (...)
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  47. Mark Timmons (1999). Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism. OUP Usa.
    Morality Without Foundations investigates fundamental metaethical questions about the meaning, truth, and justification of moral thought and discourse. Mark Timmons maintains that all versions of descriptivism in ethics, particularly certain accounts of moral realism, fail. He argues instead that a correct metaethical theory should embrace some version of non-descriptivism. Timmons defends what he calls "assertoric non-descriptivism" which, unlike traditional non-descriptivist views, holds that moral sentences are typically used to make genuine assertions. In defending this view, he exploits (...)
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  48. Justin Khoo & Joshua Knobe (2016). Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics. Noûs 50 (2).
    When speakers utter conflicting moral sentences, it seems clear that they disagree. It has often been suggested that the fact that the speakers disagree gives us evidence for a claim about the semantics of the sentences they are uttering. Specifically, it has been suggested that the existence of the disagreement gives us reason to infer that there must be an incompatibility between the contents of these sentences. This inference then plays a key role in a now-standard argument against certain (...)
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  49.  34
    Gunnar Björnsson (forthcoming). The Significance of Ethical Disagreement for Theories of Ethical Thought and Talk. In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge
    This chapter has two sections, each focusing on a distinct way in which ethical disagreement and variations in ethical judgment matter for theories of ethical thought and talk. In the first section, we look at how the variation poses problems for both cognitivist and non-cognitivist ways of specifying the nature of ethical judgments. In the second, we look at how disagreement phenomena have been taken to undermine cognitivist accounts, but also at how the seeming variation in cognitive and non-cognitive contents (...)
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  50. Pekka Väyrynen (2011). Thick Concepts and Variability. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (1):1-17.
    Some philosophers hold that so-called "thick" terms and concepts in ethics (such as 'cruel,' 'selfish,' 'courageous,' and 'generous') are contextually variable with respect to the valence (positive or negative) of the evaluations that they may be used to convey. Some of these philosophers use this variability claim to argue that thick terms and concepts are not inherently evaluative in meaning; rather their use conveys evaluations as a broadly pragmatic matter. I argue that one sort of putative examples of contextual variability (...)
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