Search results for 'Moral Knowledge' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  11
    Reflective Knowledge & Apt Belief (2009). Transforming Conflict Through Insight, Kenneth R. Melchin and Cheryl A. Picard. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008, Xii+ 149 Pp., $45.00,£ 28.00. Love and Objectivity in Virtue Ethics: Aristotle, Lonergan, and Nussbaum on Emotions and Moral Insight, Robert J. Fitterer. Toronto: University Of. [REVIEW] Inquiry 52 (2):215.
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  2.  51
    Paulina Sliwa (2015). Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3).
    To have moral worth an action not only needs to conform to the correct normative theory ; it also needs to be motivated in the right way. I argue that morally worthy actions are motivated by the rightness of the action; they are motivated by an agent's concern for doing what's right and her knowledge that her action is morally right. Call this the Rightness Condition. On the Rightness Condition moral motivation involves both a conative and a (...)
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  3.  99
    Elizabeth Tropman (2012). Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge? Theoria 78 (1):26-46.
    This article raises a problem for Cornell varieties of moral realism. According to Cornell moral realists, we can know about moral facts just as we do the empirical facts of the natural sciences. If this is so, it would remove any special mystery that is supposed to attach to our knowledge of objective moral facts. After clarifying the ways in which moral knowledge is to be similar to scientific knowledge, I claim that (...)
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  4. Manuel Vargas & Shaun Nichols (2007). Psychopaths and Moral Knowledge. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):157-162.
    Neil Levy (2007) argues that empirical data shows that psychopaths lack the moral knowledge required for moral responsibility. His account is intriguing, and it offers a promising way to think about the significance of psychopaths for work on moral responsibility. In what follows we focus on three lines of concern connected to Levy's account: his interpretation of the data, the scope of exculpation, and the significance of biological explanations for anti-social behavior.
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  5. Elizabeth Tropman (2011). Non-Inferential Moral Knowledge. Acta Analytica 26 (4):355-366.
    In a series of recent papers, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed a novel argument against moral intuitionism. I suggest a defense on behalf of the intuitionist against Sinnott-Armstrong’s objections. Rather than focus on the main premises of his argument, I instead examine the way in which Sinnott-Armstrong construes the intuitionistic position. I claim that Sinnott-Armstrong’s understanding of intuitionism is mistaken. In particular, I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong mischaracterizes non-inferentiality as it figures in intuitionism. To the extent that Sinnott-Armstrong’s account of intuitionism (...)
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  6.  62
    Elizabeth Tropman (2012). Self-Evidence and A Priori Moral Knowledge. Disputatio 4 (33).
    According to rationalists about moral knowledge, some moral truths are knowable a priori. Rationalists often defend their position by claiming that some moral propositions are self-evidently true. Copp 2007 has recently challenged this rationalist strategy. Copp argues that even if some moral propositions are self-evident, this is not enough to secure rationalism about moral knowledge, since it turns out that such self-evident propositions are only knowable a posteriori. This paper considers the merits of (...)
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  7. Thomas W. Smythe & Thomas G. Evans (2007). Intuition as a Basic Source of Moral Knowledge. Philosophia 35 (2):233-247.
    The idea that intuition plays a basic role in moral knowledge and moral philosophy probably began in the eighteenth century. British philosophers such as Anthony Shaftsbury, Francis Hutcheson, Thomas Reid, and later David Hume talk about a “moral sense” that they place in John Locke’s theory of knowledge in terms of Lockean reflexive perceptions, while Richard Price seeks a faculty by which we obtain our ideas of right and wrong. In the twentieth century intuitionism in (...)
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  8.  28
    Elizabeth Tropman (2014). Why Cornell Moral Realism Cannot Provide an Adequate Account of Moral Knowledge. Theoria 80 (2):184-190.
    According to Cornell moral realists, we can know about moral facts in much the same way that we do the empirical facts of the natural sciences. In “Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge?” (2012), I argue that this positive comparison to scientific knowledge hurts, rather than helps, the moral realist position. Joseph Long has recently defended Cornell moral realism against my concerns. In this article, I respond to Long's arguments (...)
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  9.  7
    Darlei Dall'agnol (2010). On "Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology". Principia 4 (2):317-322.
    Review of SINNOT-ARMSTRONG, W & TIMMONS, M. (eds) Moral knowledge? New readings in moral epistemology. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
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  10.  45
    Michael Jeffrey Winter (2012). Does Moral Virtue Require Knowledge? A Response to Julia Driver. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):533 - 546.
    A long-standing tenet of virtue theory is that moral virtue and knowledge are connected in some important way. Julia Driver attacks the traditional assumption that virtue requires knowledge. I argue that the examples of virtues of ignorance Driver offers are not compelling and that the idea that knowledge is required for virtue has been taken to be foundational for virtue theory for good reason. I propose that we understand modesty as involving three conditions: 1) having genuine (...)
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  11. Uri D. Leibowitz (2014). Explaining Moral Knowledge. Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (1):35-56.
    In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge. First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport to show that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—understood as the ability to acquire moral knowledge in a wide range of situations—is superior to a particularist, non-principle-based account. I contend that both arguments are unsuccessful. Then, I propose a particularist-friendly explanation of knowledge of particular moral facts. (...)
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  12. Russ Shafer-Landau (2012). Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism, and Moral Knowledge. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (1).
    This paper reconstructs what I take to be the central evolutionary debunking argument that underlies recent critiques of moral realism. The argument claims that given the extent of evolutionary influence on our moral faculties, and assuming the truth of moral realism, it would be a massive coincidence were our moral faculties reliable ones. Given this coincidence, any presumptive warrant enjoyed by our moral beliefs is defeated. So if moral realism is true, then we can (...)
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  13.  22
    Julia Jorati (2014). Leibniz's Twofold Gap Between Moral Knowledge and Motivation. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (4):748-766.
    Moral rationalists and sentimentalists traditionally disagree on at least two counts, namely regarding the source of moral knowledge or moral judgements and regarding the source of moral motivation. I will argue that even though Leibniz's moral epistemology is very much in line with that of mainstream moral rationalists, his account of moral motivation is better characterized as sentimentalist. Just like Hume, Leibniz denies that there is a necessary connection between knowing that something (...)
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  14. Yves René Marie Simon (2002). A Critique of Moral Knowledge. Fordham University Press.
    This long-awaited book is the first English-language edition of.Simon’s first book, Critique de la connaissance morale (1934). Not only does this work clarify the first stages of Simon’s intellectual career, it is also a major contribution to moral philosophy. A Critique of Moral Knowledge addresses fundamental issues. How does moral knowledge differ from other practical knowledge? What is the relationship between the moral sense, moral philosophy, and cognition in action? Is politics (...) philosophy or simply a neutral technique? This elegant translation will be an important contribution to the conversation on philosophy, politics, religion, and ethics. (shrink)
     
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  15. Kevin Brosnan (2011). Do the Evolutionary Origins of Our Moral Beliefs Undermine Moral Knowledge? Biology and Philosophy 26 (1):51-64.
    According to some recent arguments, if our moral beliefs are products of natural selection, then we do not have moral knowledge. In defense of this inference, its proponents argue that natural selection is a process that fails to track moral facts. In this paper, I argue that our having moral knowledge is consistent with, the hypothesis that our moral beliefs are products of natural selection, and the claim that natural selection fails to track (...)
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  16.  41
    Ramin Akbari & Leila Tajik (2012). Second-Language Teachers' Moral Knowledge Base: A Comparison Between Experienced and Less Experienced, Male and Female Practitioners. Journal of Moral Education 41 (1):39-59.
    The second-language teacher education community has become increasingly interested in the moral dimensions of teaching. Herein ELT practitioners? ?moral knowledge base?, as a window into their mental lives, has not received the attention it deserves. The present study was conducted to document likely differences between the frequencies of pedagogical and moral thought units of male and female, experienced and less experienced teachers, and to look deeply into participants? moral thought categories. Forty teachers participated in the (...)
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  17.  20
    Lee Ward (2009). Locke on Punishment, Property and Moral Knowledge. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2):218-244.
    Locke's admittedly 'very strange' sounding doctrine of natural executive power, according to which the individual has the right to execute the law of nature, has long been one of the most controversial features of his moral philosophy. In contrast to the many commentators who deny its theoretical innovation and challenge its individualist premises, this study proposes that the philosophical significance of Locke's natural right to punish derives from its critical departure from earlier moral and political theory. It also (...)
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  18.  4
    Sarah Cusworth (2000). Moral Knowledge and the Problems of Psychotherapy. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):25-35.
    The distinction between objective and subjective knowledge has a long philosophical history, but the modem version has ties to Hume's separation of reason and belief. The extraction of reason from mere habits of the mind raises its own problems concerning the possibility of knowledge . These problems are especially acute within the therapeutic context. Indeed, the inclusion of morals in psychotherapy is considered unethical. This arises from the assumption that morality is idiosyncratic and subjective whereas scientific knowledge (...)
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  19. Robert Audi (2010). Moral Perception and Moral Knowledge. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):79-97.
    This paper presents a theory of how perception provides a basis for moral knowledge. To do this, the paper sketches a theory of perception, explores the sense in which moral perception may deserve that name, and explains how certain moral properties may be perceptible. It does not presuppose a causal account of moral properties. If, however, they are not causal, how can we perceive, say, injustice? Can it be observable even if injustice is not a (...)
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  20. Sarah McGrath (2004). Moral Knowledge by Perception. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):209–228.
    On the face of it, some of our knowledge is of moral facts (for example, that this promise should not be broken in these circumstances), and some of it is of non-moral facts (for example, that the kettle has just boiled). But, some argue, there is reason to believe that we do not, after all, know any moral facts. For example, according to J. L. Mackie, if we had moral knowledge (‘‘if we were aware (...)
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  21. Daniel Star (2008). Moral Knowledge, Epistemic Externalism, and Intuitionism. Ratio 21 (3):329-343.
    This paper explores the generally overlooked relevance of an important contemporary debate in mainstream epistemology to philosophers working within ethics on questions concerning moral knowledge. It is argued that this debate, between internalists and externalists about the accessibility of epistemic justification, has the potential to be both significantly influenced by, and have a significant impact upon, the study of moral knowledge. The moral sphere provides a particular type of strong evidence in favour of externalism, and (...)
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  22.  92
    Elizabeth Tropman (2014). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments: Moral Realism, Constructivism, and Explaining Moral Knowledge. Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):126-140.
    One of the alleged advantages of a constructivist theory in metaethics is that the theory avoids the epistemological problems with moral realism while reaping many of realism's benefits. According to evolutionary debunking arguments, the epistemological problem with moral realism is that the evolutionary history of our moral beliefs makes it hard to see how our moral beliefs count as knowledge of moral facts, realistically construed. Certain forms of constructivism are supposed to be immune to (...)
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  23.  4
    Uri D. Leibowitz, Explaining Moral Knowledge.
    In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge. First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport to show that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—understood as the ability to acquire moral knowledge in a wide range of situations—is superior to a particularist, non-principle-based account. I contend that both arguments are unsuccessful. Then, I propose a particularist-friendly explanation of knowledge of particular moral facts. (...)
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  24. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.) (1996). Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    In Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, editors Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons bring together eleven specially commissioned essays by distinguished moral philosophers exploring the nature and possibility of moral knowledge. Each essay represents a major position within the exciting field of moral epistemology in which a proponent of the position presents and defends his or her view and locates it vis-a-vis competing views. The authors include established philosophers such as Peter Railton, (...)
     
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  25.  81
    Michael Huemer (2000). Naturalism and the Problem of Moral Knowledge. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):575-597.
    Ethical naturalists interpret moral knowledge as analogous to scientific knowledge and not dependent on intuition. For their account to succeed, moral truths must explain observable phenomena, and these explanations (i) must be better than any explanations framed in non-moral terms, (ii) must not rely on ad hoc posits about the causal powers of moral properties, and (iii) must not presuppose the existence of an independent means of awareness of moral truths. No moral (...)
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  26.  68
    Nathan L. King (2011). McGrath on Moral Knowledge. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:219-233.
    Sarah McGrath has recently defended a disagreement-based argument for skepticism about moral knowledge. If sound, the argument shows that our beliefs about controversial moral issues do not amount to knowledge. In this paper, I argue that McGrath fails to establish her skeptical conclusion. I defend two main claims. First, the key premise of McGrath’s argument is inadequately supported. Second, there is good reason to think that this premise is false.
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  27.  71
    Oswald Hanfling (2008). Moral Knowledge and Moral Uncertainty. Philosophical Investigations 31 (2):105–123.
    Applying a broadly Wittgensteinian view of knowledge and its relation to the conditions in which the word “know” is ordinarily used, the paper defends the claim that there can be knowledge in moral matters and rejects the idea that a cross‐culturally homogeneous moral language is a necessary condition for this. However, the fact that moral knowledge is available sometimes does not imply that it is available always. Taking issue in particular with Ronald Dworkin, the (...)
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  28.  7
    Ido Geiger (2015). How Do We Acquire Moral Knowledge? Is Knowing Our Duty Ever Passive? – Two Questions for Martin Sticker. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (5):990-997.
    Martin Sticker's discussion of the common moral agent contains much that I find insightful, true and significant. As a response to his paper, I focus on two important issues that nevertheless separate us: Sticker claims that knowing our duty can be mere passive awareness and that it indeed is passive as awareness of the special status of humanity. I deny that knowing our duty is ever passive. He further claims that the common universalization test is the paradigmatic way active (...)
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  29.  64
    Mark D. Mathewson (2006). John Locke and the Problems of Moral Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):509–526.
    In this paper, I argue that John Locke's account of knowledge coupled with his commitments to moral ideas being voluntary constructions of our own minds and to divine voluntarism (moral rules are given by God according to his will) leads to a seriously flawed view of moral knowledge. After explicating Locke's view of moral knowledge, highlighting the specific problems that seem to arise from it, and suggesting some possible Lockean responses, I conclude that (...)
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  30.  30
    William Tolhurst (1986). Supervenience, Externalism and Moral Knowledge. Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):43-55.
    This article begins with a refutation of a common argument for the view that we have no knowledge of objective moral facts. However, This refutation leaves open the possibility of second-Order moral skepticism, The view that we can never tell whether or not we have objective moral knowledge. Two ways of showing that there is such knowledge are then considered and it is argued that even if one is successful, This need not establish that (...)
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  31.  15
    Benedict Smith (2008). Traditional Moral Knowledge and Experience of the World. Analyse & Kritik 30 (1):139-155.
    MacIntyre shares with others, such as John McDowell, a broad commitment in moral epistemology to the centrality of tradition and both regard forms of enculturation as conditions of moral knowledge. Although MacIntyre is critical of the thought that moral reasons are available only to those whose experience of the world is conceptually articulated, he is sympathetic to the idea that the development of sub jectivity involves the capacity to appreciate external moral demands. This paper critically (...)
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  32.  11
    Stephen L. Payne (2000). Challenges for Research Ethics and Moral Knowledge Construction in the Applied Social Sciences. Journal of Business Ethics 26 (4):307 - 318.
    Certain critical accounts of conventional research practices in business and the social sciences are explored in this essay. These accounts derive from alternative social paradigms and their underlying assumptions about appropriate social inquiry and knowledge construction. Among these alternative social paradigms, metatheories, mindscapes, or worldviews are social constructionist, critical, feminist, and postmodern or poststructural thinking. Individuals with these assumptions and values for knowledge construction are increasingly challenging conventional scholarship in what has been referred to as paradigm debates or (...)
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  33.  43
    Manyul Im (2004). Moral Knowledge and Self Control in Mengzi: Rectitude, Courage, and Qi. Asian Philosophy 14 (1):59 – 77.
    In this paper, I reveal systematic aspects of the moral epistemology of the Warring States Confucian, Mengzi. Mengzi thinks moral knowledge is 'internally' available to humans because it is acquired through normative dictates built into the human heart-mind. Those dictates are capable of motivating and justifying an agent's normative categorizations. Such dictates are linked to Mengzi's conception of human nature as good. I then interpret Mengzi's difficult discussion of courage and qi in Mengzi 2A: 2 as illuminating (...)
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  34.  27
    Todd A. Salzman (2001). The Basic Goods Theory and Revisionism: A Methodological Comparison on the Use of Reason and Experience as Sources of Moral Knowledge. Heythrop Journal 42 (4):423–450.
    In Roman Catholic moral theology there is an ongoing debate between the proportionalist or revisionist school and the traditionalist school that has developed what is referred to as the ‘New Natural Law Theory’ or ‘Basic Goods Theory’ . The stakes in this debate have been raised with Pope John Paul II's encyclical Veritatis Splendor on fundamental moral theology that condemned ‘proportionalism’ or ‘teleologism’ as an ethical theory while utilizing many of the ideas, concepts, and terminology of the BGT, (...)
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  35.  12
    Tibor R. Machan (1982). Epistemology and Moral Knowledge. Review of Metaphysics 36 (1):23 - 49.
    It is argued that a wrongheaded model of what a theory of knowledge must satisfy has engendered unjustified skepticism about knowledge and moral knowledge in particular. A contextualist conception of knowledge is sketched and defended and it is then argued that in terms of such an idea of what it is to know something the prospects for moral and political knowledge are significantly improved.
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  36.  5
    J. B. Schneewind (1969). Moral Knowledge and Moral Principles. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 3:249-262.
    What is the function of moral principles within the body of moral knowledge? And what must be the nature of moral principles in order for them to carry out this function? A specific set of answers to these questions is widely accepted among moral philosophers – so widely accepted as almost to constitute a sort of orthodoxy. The answers embody a view of the place of principles within the body of morality which crosses the lines (...)
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  37.  14
    Margaret Watkins (2008). Humean Moral Knowledge. Inquiry 51 (6):581 – 602.
    I develop resources from Hume to account for moral knowledge in the qualified sense developed by Bernard Williams, according to which the proper application of thick ethical terms constitutes moral knowledge. By applying to moral discernment the criteria of the good aesthetic critic, as explained in Hume's “ Of the Standard of Taste ”, we can see how Humean moral knowledge might be possible. For each of these criteria, an analogous trait would contribute (...)
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  38.  18
    Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Dycus Miller & Jeffrey Paul (eds.) (2001). Moral Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
    Philosophers since ancient times have pondered how we can know whether moral claims are true or false. The first half of the twentieth century witnessed widespread skepticism concerning the possibility of moral knowledge. Indeed, some argued that moral statements lacked cognitive content altogether, because they were not susceptible to empirical verification. The British philosopher A. J. Ayer contends that 'They are pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come under the category of truth and (...)
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  39. Ellen Frankel Paul, Miller Jr & Jeffrey Paul (eds.) (2010). Moral Knowledge: Volume 18, Part 2. Cambridge University Press.
    Philosophers since ancient times have pondered how we can know whether moral claims are true or false. The first half of the twentieth century witnessed widespread skepticism concerning the possibility of moral knowledge. Indeed, some argued that moral statements lacked cognitive content altogether, because they were not susceptible to empirical verification. The British philosopher A. J. Ayer contends that 'They are pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come under the category of truth and (...)
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  40. Ellen Frankel Paul, Miller Jr & Jeffrey Paul (eds.) (2001). Moral Knowledge: Volume 18, Part 2. Cambridge University Press.
    Philosophers since ancient times have pondered how we can know whether moral claims are true or false. The first half of the twentieth century witnessed widespread skepticism concerning the possibility of moral knowledge. Indeed, some argued that moral statements lacked cognitive content altogether, because they were not susceptible to empirical verification. The British philosopher A. J. Ayer contends that 'They are pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come under the category of truth and (...)
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  41. Ellen Frankel Paul, Miller Jr & Jeffrey Paul (eds.) (2012). Moral Knowledge: Volume 18, Part 2. Cambridge University Press.
    Philosophers since ancient times have pondered how we can know whether moral claims are true or false. The first half of the twentieth century witnessed widespread skepticism concerning the possibility of moral knowledge. Indeed, some argued that moral statements lacked cognitive content altogether, because they were not susceptible to empirical verification. The British philosopher A. J. Ayer contends that 'They are pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come under the category of truth and (...)
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  42. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons (eds.) (1996). Moral Knowledge New Readings. Oxford University Press Usa.
    In Moral Knowledge?: New Readings in Moral Epistemology, editors Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons bring together eleven newly written essays by distinguished moral philosophers exploring the nature and possibility of moral knowledge. Each essay represents a major position within the exciting field of moral epistemology in which a proponent of the position presents and defends his or her view and locates it vis-a-vis competing views. The first chapter, written by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, provides a (...)
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  43. Ron Wilburn (2008). Moral Knowledge and Moral Factuality. Ethic@ 7:69-85.
    For naturalistic and non-intuitionistic moral realists, moral knowledge is more problematic than ordinary and scientific factual knowledge. For without special faculties of moral discernment, how could we ever detect moral facts and properties? Physical facts and properties may be accessible to perceptual recognition. But how could moral facts and properties ever be similarly accessible? To address this challenge, we need a meta-ethical account that does two things. First, it must explain how the discernment (...)
     
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  44. Julia Annas (2001). Moral Knowledge as Practical Knowledge. Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):236.
    In the area of moral epistemology, there is an interesting problem facing the person in my area, ancient philosophy, who hopes to write a historical paper which will engage with our current philosophical concerns. Not only are ancient ethical theories very different in structure and concerns from modern ones, but the concerns and emphases of ancient epistemology are very different from those of modern theories of knowledge. Some may think that they are so different that they are useful (...)
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  45.  26
    Gary Slater (2014). A Peircean Response to the Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Knowledge. Zygon 49 (3):593-611.
    The evolutionary debunking argument advanced by Sharon Street, Michael Ruse, and Richard Joyce employs the logic of Paul Griffiths and John Wilkins to contend that humans cannot have knowledge of moral truths, since the evolutionary process that has produced our basic moral intuitions lacks causal connections to those (putative) truths. Yet this argument is self-defeating, because its aim is the categorical, normative claim that we should suspend our moral beliefs in light of the discoveries about their (...)
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  46. Sergio Tenenbaum (2011). Externalism, Motivation, and Moral Knowledge. In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates. Cambridge University Press
    For non-analytic ethical naturalists, externalism about moral motivation is an attractive option: it allows naturalists to embrace a Humean theory of motivation while holding that moral properties are real, natural properties. However, Michael Smith has mounted an important objection to this view. Smith observes that virtuous agents must have non-derivative motivation to pursue specific ends that they believe to be morally right; he then argues that this externalist view ascribes to the virtuous agent only a direct de dicto (...)
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  47.  11
    Pamela Bjorklund (2004). Invisibility, Moral Knowledge and Nursing Work in the Writings of Joan Liaschenko and Patricia Rodney. Nursing Ethics 11 (2):110-121.
    The ethical ‘eye’ of nursing, that is, the particular moral vision and values inherent in nursing work, is constrained by the preoccupations and practices of the superordinate biomedical structure in which nursing as a practice discipline is embedded. The intimate, situated knowledge of particular persons who construct and attach meaning to their health experience in the presence of and with the active participation of the nurse, is the knowledge that provides the evidence for nurses’ ethical decision making. (...)
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  48.  10
    Christopher J. Preston (2009). Moral Knowledge: Real and Grounded in Place. Ethics, Place and Environment 12 (2):175 – 186.
    Recent work in ethics and epistemology argues that physical surroundings have normative force. The ideas of 'grounding knowledge' and 'real ethics' provide an important way to understand sense of place. This paper uses this work to argue that there is a moral structure to material culture, and that the existence of this moral structure makes it necessary for us to pay attention to the epistemic import of the physical environments we create and live in. Since environments are (...)
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  49. Jason Decker & Daniel Groll (2013). The (In)Significance of Moral Disagreement for Moral Knowledge. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8. Oxford
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  50. Amber Riaz (2015). Moral Understanding and Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 172 (1):113-128.
    Moral understanding is a species of knowledge. Understanding why an action is wrong, for example, amounts to knowing why the action is wrong. The claim that moral understanding is immune to luck while moral knowledge is not does not withstand scrutiny; nor does the idea that there is something deep about understanding for there are different degrees of understanding. It is also mistaken to suppose that grasping is a distinct psychological state that accompanies understanding. To (...)
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