Search results for 'Moral contractarianism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Julia Tanner (2013). Contractarianism and Secondary Direct Moral Standing for Marginal Humans and Animals. Res Publica 19 (2):1-16.score: 72.0
    It is commonly thought that neo-Hobbesian contractarianism cannot yield direct moral standing for marginal humans and animals. However, it has been argued that marginal humans and animals can have a form of direct moral standing under neo-Hobbesian contractarianism: secondary moral standing. I will argue that, even if such standing is direct, this account is unsatisfactory because it is counterintuitive and fragile.
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  2. Jean Hampton (2007). The Intrinsic Worth of Persons: Contractarianism in Moral and Political Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.score: 54.0
    Contractarianism in some form has been at the center of recent debates in moral and political philosophy. Jean Hampton was one of the most gifted philosophers involved in these debates and provided both important criticisms of prominent contractarian theories plus powerful defenses and applications of the core ideas of contractarianism. In these essays, she brought her distinctive approach, animated by concern for the intrinsic worth of persons, to bear on topics such as guilt, punishment, self-respect, family relations, (...)
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  3. Samuel Freeman (2006). Moral Contractarianism as a Foundation for Interpersonal Morality. In James Lawrence Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Blackwell Pub.. 6--57.score: 48.0
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  4. Edwin Etieyibo (2013). Bargaining and Agreement in Gauthier's Moral Contractarianism. South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):221-233.score: 45.0
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  5. Alejandro Rosas (2004). Mind Reading, Deception and the Evolution of Kantian Moral Agents. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 34 (2):127–139.score: 42.0
    Classical evolutionary explanations of social behavior classify behaviors from their effects, not from their underlying mechanisms. Here lies a potential objection against the view that morality can be explained by such models, e.g. Trivers’reciprocal altruism. However, evolutionary theory reveals a growing interest in the evolution of psychological mechanisms and factors them in as selective forces. This opens up perspectives for evolutionary approaches to problems that have traditionally worried moral philosophers. Once the ability to mind-read is factored-in among the relevant (...)
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  6. Why the international market for pharmaceuticals fails & What to Do About It : A. Comparison of Two Alternative Approaches to Global Ethics (2008). Reflecting the Impact of Ethical Theory : Contractarianism, Ethics, and Economics. Christoph Luetge / Civilising the Barbarians? : On the Apparent Necessity of Moral Surpluses; Soeren Buttkereit and Ingo Pies / Social Dilemmas and the Social Contract; Peter Koslowski / Ethical Economy as the Economy of Ethics and as the Ethics of the Market Economy; Ingo Pies and Stefan Hielscher. In Jesús Conill Sancho, Christoph Luetge & Tatjana Schó̈nwälder-Kuntze (eds.), Corporate Citizenship, Contractarianism and Ethical Theory: On Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics. Ashgate Pub. Company.score: 39.0
  7. Matt Matravers (2008). Review of Jean Hampton, The Intrinsic Worth of Persons: Contractarianism in Moral and Political Philosophy. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (9).score: 36.0
  8. Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach (2008). Book Reviews:The Intrinsic Worth of Persons: Contractarianism in Moral and Political Philosophy. [REVIEW] Ethics 119 (1):180-184.score: 36.0
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  9. Andrew I. Cohen (2007). Contractarianism, Other-Regarding Attitudes, and the Moral Standing of Nonhuman Animals. Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2):188–201.score: 36.0
  10. David Boonin-Vail (1993). Contractarianism Gone Wild: Carruthers and the Moral Status of Animals. Between the Species 10 (1):8.score: 36.0
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  11. Jon Mahoney (2009). Jean Hampton, The Intrinsic Worth of Persons: Contractarianism in Moral and Political Philosophy Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 28 (2):120-122.score: 36.0
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  12. Carole Pateman (2009). The Intrinsic Worth of Persons: Contractarianism in Moral and Political Philosophy. By Jean Hampton. Edited by Daniel Farnham. Hypatia 24 (1):188-191.score: 36.0
  13. Rex Martin, David Gauthier & Peter Vallentyne (1993). Moral Dealing: Contract, Ethics, and Reason.Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement. Philosophical Quarterly 43 (172):373.score: 36.0
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  14. Jesús Conill Sancho, Christoph Luetge & Tatjana Schó̈nwälder-Kuntze (eds.) (2008). Corporate Citizenship, Contractarianism and Ethical Theory: On Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics. Ashgate Pub. Company.score: 36.0
    This study provides a representation of the broad spectrum of theoretical work on topics related to business ethics, with a particular focus on corporate citizenship. It considers relations of business and society alongside social responsibility and moves on to examine the historical and systemic foundations of business ethics, focusing on the concepts of social and ethical responsibilities. The contributors explore established theories and concepts and their impact on moral behaviour. Together, the contributions offer varied philosophical theories in approaches to (...)
     
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  15. Blanca Rodríguez López (2005). Homo Economicus e Individuo Liberal: una derivación de la moral a partir del interés propio. Logos: Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica 38 (1):87-115.score: 36.0
    Apoyándose en la Teoría de la Elección Racional y en el contractualismo, Gauthier intenta derivar la moralidad como una restricción en la maximización de la utilidad justificada por la razón a partir de una situación y unos agentes moralmente neutrales. El mantenimiento de los acuerdos satisfactorios sería racionalmente justificable incluso en ausencia de restricciones externas. En este artículo analizamos la argumentación ofrecida por Gauthier en apoyo de su contractualismo moral y defendemos que, en determinadas situaciones, los acuerdos cuyo cumplimiento (...)
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  16. J. Mahoney (2008). Jean Hampton, The Intrinsic Worth of Persons: Contractarianism in Moral and Political Philosophy. Philosophy in Review 28 (2):120.score: 36.0
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  17. Pedro Francés-Gómez (2003). Some Difficulties in Sacconi's View About Corporate Ethics. Journal of Business Ethics 42 (2):165 - 180.score: 31.0
    Lorenzo Sacconi's The Social Contract of the Firm (Berlin, Springer, 2000) is a major contribution to the normative theory of the firm. It contains a full-fledged contractarian explanation of the role of Corporate Codes of Ethics. Sacconi proposes a game-theoretical model of the normative structure of the firm, including explicit and implicit contracts binding the members of the organisation, and the so-called constitutional contract: the hypothetical agreement that sets the basic co-operative structure in which the organisation consists. While Sacconi's theory (...)
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  18. Fritz Allhoff (2009). The Evolution of the Moral Sentiments and the Metaphysics of Morals. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):97 - 114.score: 30.0
    So-called evolutionary error theorists, such as Michael Ruse and Richard Joyce, have argued that naturalistic accounts of the moral sentiments lead us to adopt an error theory approach to morality. Roughly, the argument is that an appreciation of the etiology of those sentiments undermines any reason to think that they track moral truth and, furthermore, undermines any reason to think that moral truth actually exists. I argue that this approach offers us a false dichotomy between error theory (...)
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  19. Georgia Testa (2003). Gauthier and the Capacity for Morality. Res Publica 9 (3):223-242.score: 30.0
    In Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier tries to provide a justification of morality from morally neutral premises within the constraints of an instrumental conception of reason. But his reliance on this narrow conception of reason creates problems, for it suggests that moral motivation is self-interested. However, Gauthier holds that to act morally is to act for the sake of morality and others, not oneself. An individual who so acts has what he calls an affective capacity for morality. He attempts (...)
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  20. Nicholas Southwood (2010). Contractualism and the Foundations of Morality. Oxford University Press.score: 27.0
    Contractualism has a venerable history and considerable appeal. Yet as an account of the foundations or ultimate grounds of morality it has been thought by many philosophers to be subject to fatal objections. This book argues otherwise. It begins by detailing and diagnosing the shortcomings of the main existing models of contractualism, “Hobbesian” contractualism (or contractarianism) and “Kantian” contractualism. It then proposes a novel, "deliberative" model, based on an interpersonal, deliberative conception of practical reason. It argues that the deliberative (...)
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  21. Robert Bass (2000). Pure Contractarianism: Promise, Problems, Prospects. Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (2-3):319-332.score: 27.0
    Several different positions are classified as contractarian. Though there are variations among them, they all include the assumption that practical or action-guiding principles, among which are principles of moral justification and of political legitimacy, somehow have their basis in consent. A contractarian may or may not believe that there are other practical principles that are based on or justified by something besides consent. If he believes there are any others, there will be delicate issues to address as to whether (...)
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  22. Janice Richardson (2007). On Not Making Ourselves the Prey of Others: Jean Hampton's Feminist Contractarianism. [REVIEW] Feminist Legal Studies 15 (1):33-55.score: 27.0
    This article assesses Jean Hampton’s feminist contractarianism by considering the way in which she draws together the contradictory positions of Hobbes and Kant to produce a test for exploitation in personal relationships. The ways in which this work fits with her other analysis of retribution, gratitude and self-worth are examined. Hampton’s work is evaluated in the context of Carole Pateman’s argument that moral theories distract from the political analysis of who has a voice in relationships. Hampton’s work presumes (...)
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  23. Kenneth R. Westphal (forthcoming). ‘Constructivism, Contractarianism and Basic Obligations: Kant and Gauthier’. In J.-C. Merle (ed.), Reading Kant’s Doctrine of Right.score: 27.0
    Gauthier’s contractarianism begins with an idea of a rational deliberator but ‘finds no basis for postulating a moral need for the justification of one’s actions to others. The role of agreement is to address each person’s demand that the constraints of society be justified to him, not a concern that he justify himself to his fellows’ (Gauther 1997, 134–5). He contrasts his view with Scanlon’s contractualism, according to which agreement with others is the core of morality and each (...)
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  24. Daniel Beck (2014). Between Relativism and Imperialism: Navigating Moral Diversity in Cross‐Cultural Bioethics. Developing World Bioethics 14 (2).score: 27.0
    The need for explicit theoretical reflection on cross-cultural bioethics continues to grow as the spread of communication technologies and increased human migration has made interactions between medical professionals and patients from different cultural backgrounds much more common. I claim that this need presents us with the following dilemma. On the one hand, we do not want to operate according to an imperialist ethical framework that denies and silences the legitimacy of cultural values other than our own. On the other hand, (...)
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  25. Daniel Loewe (2010). Obligaciones Hacia Generaciones Futuras: El Caso Contractual. Veritas 55 (1).score: 27.0
    Neste texto, investiga-se a extensão diacrônica da comuni- dade moral no âmbito de teorias contratualistas. Para isso, examinam-se críticas à possibilidade lógica de sustentar obrigações em relação a gerações futuras e se abordam modelos argumentativos contratualistas de justificação dessas obrigações que se baseiam no interesse próprio e na imparcialidade. De acordo com essa pesquisa, a melhor defesa dessas obrigações se pode articular recorrendo a esse último tipo de contratualismo.
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  26. Uri D. Leibowitz (2014). Explaining Moral Knowledge. Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (1):35-56.score: 21.0
    In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge. First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport to show that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—understood as the ability to acquire moral knowledge in a wide range of situations—is superior to a particularist, non-principle-based account. I contend that both arguments are unsuccessful. Then, I propose a particularist-friendly explanation of knowledge of particular moral facts. I argue that (...)
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  27. Nafsika Athanassoulis (2005). Common-Sense Virtue Ethics and Moral Luck. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):265 - 276.score: 21.0
    Moral luck poses a problem for out conception of responsibility because it highlights a tension between morality and lack of control. Michael Slote’s common-sense virtue ethics claims to avoid this problem. However there are a number of objections to this claim. Firstly, it is not clear that Slote fully appreciates the problem posed by moral luck. Secondly, Slote’s move from the moral to the ethical is problematic. Thirdly it is not clear why we should want to abandon (...)
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  28. Jeanette Kennett & Cordelia Fine (2009). Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):77–96.score: 21.0
    The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we (...)
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  29. Vivienne Brown (2006). Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):265-288.score: 21.0
    Is choice necessary for moral responsibility? And does choice imply alternative possibilities of some significant sort? This paper will relate these questions to the argument initiated by Harry Frankfurt that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's extension of that argument in terms of guidance control in a causally determined world. I argue that attending to Frankfurt's core conceptual distinction between the circumstances that make an action unavoidable and those (...)
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  30. Daniel Jacobson (2005). Seeing by Feeling: Virtues, Skills, and Moral Perception. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):387 - 409.score: 21.0
    Champions of virtue ethics frequently appeal to moral perception: the notion that virtuous people can “see” what to do. According to a traditional account of virtue, the cultivation of proper feeling through imitation and habituation issues in a sensitivity to reasons to act. Thus, we learn to see what to do by coming to feel the demands of courage, kindness, and the like. But virtue ethics also claims superiority over other theories that adopt a perceptual moral epistemology, such (...)
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  31. Antti Kauppinen (forthcoming). Intuition and Belief in Moral Motivation. In Gunnar Björnsson (ed.), Moral Internalism.score: 21.0
    It seems to many that moral opinions must make a difference to what we’re motivated to do, at least in suitable conditions. For others, it seems that it is possible to have genuine moral opinions that make no motivational difference. Both sides – internalists and externalists about moral motivation – can tell persuasive stories of actual and hypothetical cases. My proposal for a kind of reconciliation is to distinguish between two kinds of psychological states with moral (...)
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  32. Mark Silcox (2006). Virtue Epistemology and Moral Luck. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2):179--192.score: 21.0
    Thomas Nagel has proposed that the existence of moral luck mandates a general attitude of skepticism in ethics. One popular way of arguing against Nagel’s claim is to insist that the phenomenon of moral luck itself is an illusion , in the sense that situations in which it seems to occur may be plausibly re-described so as to show that agents need not be held responsible for the unlucky outcomes of their actions. Here I argue that this strategy (...)
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  33. Christopher Grau (2010). Moral Status, Speciesism, and Liao’s Genetic Account. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (3):387-96.score: 21.0
    This paper offers several criticisms of the account of rightholding laid out in S. Matthew Liao’s recent paper “The Basis of Human Moral Status.” I argue that Liao’s account both does too much and too little: it grants rightholder status to those who may not deserve it, and it does not provide grounds for offering such status to those who arguably do deserve it. Given these troubling aspects of his approach, I encourage Liao to abandon his “physical basis of (...)
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  34. Hanno Sauer (2012). Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.score: 21.0
    Philosophical and empirical moral psychologists claim that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgment. The aim of this paper is to assess the evidence in favor of both claims and to show how a moderate rationalist position about moral judgment can be defended nonetheless. The experimental evidence for both the necessity- and the sufficiency-thesis concerning the connection between emotional reactions and moral judgment is presented. I argue that a rationalist about moral judgment can (...)
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  35. Jonathan Smith (2010). On Sinnott-Armstrong's Case Against Moral Intuitionism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):75 - 88.score: 21.0
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued against moral intuitionism, according to which some of our moral beliefs are justified without needing to be inferred from any other beliefs. He claims that any prima facie justification some non-inferred moral beliefs might have enjoyed is removed because many of our moral beliefs are formed in circumstances where either (1) we are partial, (2) others disagree with us and there is no reason to prefer our moral judgement to theirs, (3) (...)
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  36. Mark Rowlands (1997). Contractarianism and Animal Rights. Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (3):235–247.score: 21.0
    It is widely accepted, by both friends and foes of animal rights, that contractarianism is the moral theory least likely to justify the assigning of direct moral status to non-human animals. These are not, it is generally supposed, rational agents, and contractarian approaches can grant direct moral status only to such agents. I shall argue that this widely accepted view is false. At least some forms of contractarianism, when properly understood, do, in fact, entail that (...)
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  37. Andrew Sneddon (2005). Moral Responsibility: The Difference of Strawson, and the Difference It Should Make. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):239-264.score: 21.0
    P.F. Strawson’s work on moral responsibility is well-known. However, an important implication of the landmark “Freedom and Resentment” has gone unnoticed. Specifically, a natural development of Strawson’s position is that we should understand being morally responsible as having externalistically construed pragmatic criteria, not individualistically construed psychological ones. This runs counter to the contemporary ways of studying moral responsibility. I show the deficiencies of such contemporary work in relation to Strawson by critically examining the positions of John Martin Fischer (...)
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  38. Wayne Christensen & John Sutton (2012). Reflections on Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning Toward an Integrated, Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Cognition. In Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. Psychology Press. 327-347.score: 21.0
    B eginning with the problem of integrating diverse disciplinary perspectives on moral cognition, we argue that the various disciplines have an interest in developing a common conceptual framework for moral cognition research. We discuss issues arising in the other chapters in this volume that might serve as focal points for future investigation and as the basis for the eventual development of such a framework. These include the role of theory in binding together diverse phenomena and the role of (...)
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  39. Anders Schinkel (2009). The Problem of Moral Luck: An Argument Against its Epistemic Reduction. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):267 - 277.score: 21.0
    Whom I call ‘epistemic reductionists’ in this article are critics of the notion of ‘moral luck’ that maintain that all supposed cases of moral luck are illusory; they are in fact cases of what I describe as a special form of epistemic luck, the only difference lying in what we get to know about someone, rather than in what (s)he deserves in terms of praise or blame. I argue that epistemic reductionists are mistaken. They implausibly separate judgements of (...)
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  40. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2007). Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):279 - 295.score: 21.0
    According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition, and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model has (...)
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  41. Daan Evers (2014). Moral Contextualism and the Problem of Triviality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):285-297.score: 21.0
    Moral contextualism is the view that claims like ‘A ought to X’ are implicitly relative to some (contextually variable) standard. This leads to a problem: what are fundamental moral claims like ‘You ought to maximize happiness’ relative to? If this claim is relative to a utilitarian standard, then its truth conditions are trivial: ‘Relative to utilitarianism, you ought to maximize happiness’. But it certainly doesn’t seem trivial that you ought to maximize happiness (utilitarianism is a highly controversial position). (...)
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  42. Andrea Viggiano (2008). Ethical Naturalism and Moral Twin Earth. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (2):213 - 224.score: 21.0
    In order to rebut G. E. Moore’s open question argument, ethical naturalists adopt a theory of direct reference for our moral terms. T. Horgan and M. Timmons have argued that this theory cannot be applied to moral terms, on the ground that it clashes with competent speakers’ linguistic intuitions. While Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment shows that our linguistic intuitions confirm the theory of direct reference, as applied to ‘water’, Horgan and Timmons devise a parallel thought experiment about (...)
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  43. Maike Albertzart (2013). Principle-Based Moral Judgement. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):339-354.score: 21.0
    It is widely acknowledged that moral principles are not sufficient to guide moral thought and action: they need to be supplemented by a capacity for judgement. However, why can we not rely on this capacity for moral judgement alone? Why do moral principles need to be supplemented, but are not supplanted, by judgement? So-called moral particularists argue that we can, and should, make moral decisions on a case-by-case basis without any principles. According to particularists, (...)
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  44. Don Loeb (2007). The Argument From Moral Experience. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):469 - 484.score: 21.0
    It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory (according to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories (...)
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  45. Richard Joyce (2009). Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):53 - 75.score: 21.0
    Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this paper) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (e.g., an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims and must be tested as such. This paper does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather (...)
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  46. Lorraine Besser-Jones (2012). The Role of Practical Reason in an Empirically Informed Moral Theory. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):203-220.score: 21.0
    Empirical research paints a dismal portrayal of the role of reason in morality. It suggests that reason plays no substantive role in how we make moral judgments or are motivated to act on them. This paper explores how it is that an empirically oriented philosopher, committed to methodological naturalism, ought to respond to the skeptical challenge presented by this research. While many think taking this challenge seriously requires revising, sometimes dramatically, how we think about moral agency, this paper (...)
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  47. Russ Shafer-Landau (2007). Moral and Theological Realism: The Explanatory Argument. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):311-329.score: 21.0
    There are striking parallels, largely unexplored in the literature, between skeptical arguments against theism and against moral realism. After sketching four arguments meant to do this double duty, I restrict my attention to an explanatory argument that claims that we have most reason to deny the existence of moral facts (and so, by extrapolation, theistic ones), because such putative facts have no causal-explanatory power. I reject the proposed parity, and offer reasons to think that the potential vulnerabilities of (...)
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  48. Leonard Kahn (2011). Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):131-142.score: 21.0
    In this paper, I present and defend a novel version of the Reactive Attitude account of moral blameworthiness. In Section 1, I introduce the Reactive Attitude account and outline Allan Gibbard's version of it. In Section 2, I present the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, which has been at the heart of much recent discussion about the nature of value, and explain why a reformulation of it causes serious problems for versions of the Reactive Attitude account such as Gibbard's. (...)
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  49. Thaddeus Metz (2012). An African Theory of Moral Status: A Relational Alternative to Individualism and Holism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):387-402.score: 21.0
    The dominant conceptions of moral status in the English-speaking literature are either holist or individualist, neither of which accounts well for widespread judgments that: animals and humans both have moral status that is of the same kind but different in degree; even a severely mentally incapacitated human being has a greater moral status than an animal with identical internal properties; and a newborn infant has a greater moral status than a mid-to-late stage foetus. Holists accord no (...)
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  50. Jurriaan De Haan (2001). The Definition of Moral Dilemmas: A Logical Problem. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):267-284.score: 21.0
    This paper concerns one of the undecided disputes of modern moral philosophy: the possibility of moral dilemmas. Whereas proponents of the possibility of moral dilemmas often appeal to moral experience, many opponents refer to ethical theory and deontic logic. My aim in this paper is to clarify some of the tension between moral experience and ethical theory with respect to moral dilemmas. In Part One I try to show that a number of logical arguments (...)
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