Search results for 'Moral desert' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Howard Simmons (2010). Moral Desert: A Critique. University Press of America.
    This book argues that moral desert should be excluded as a consideration in normative and applied ethics, as it is likely that no-one ever morally deserves anything for their actions and, if they do, it is in most cases impossible to know what. I also explain how moral deliberation in relation to punishment, distributive justice and personal morality can proceed without appeals to moral desert.
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  2.  43
    Adrian Bardon (2000). From Nozick to Welfare Rights: Self‐Ownership, Property, and Moral Desert. Critical Review 14 (4):481-501.
    Abstract The Kantian moral foundations of Nozickian libertarianism suggest that the claim that self?ownership grounds only negative rights to property should be rejected. The moral foundations of Nozick's libertarianism better support basing property rights on moral desert. It is neither incoherent nor implausible to say that need can be a basis for desert. By implication, the libertarian contention that persons ought to be respected as persons living self?shaping lives is inconsistent with the libertarian refusal to (...)
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  3.  54
    David W. Concepcion (2002). Moral Luck, Control, and the Bases of Desert. Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):455-461.
    If we want to see justice done with regard to responsibility, then we must either (i) allow that people are never morally responsible, (iia) show that luck is not ubiquitous or at least that (iib) ubiquitous luck is not moral, or (iii) show that ascriptions of responsibility can retain justice despite the omnipresence of luck. This paper defends (iii); ascriptions of responsibility can be just even though luck is ubiquitous.
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  4.  17
    Richard L. Lippke (2003). Desert, Harm Reduction, and Moral Education: The Case for a Tortfeasor Penalty. Res Publica 9 (2):127-147.
    Those found liable for negligently injuring others are required to compensate them, but current practices permit most tort feasors to spread the costs of their liability burdens through the purchase of insurance. Those found guilty of criminal offences, however, are not allowed to shift the burdens of their sentences onto others. Yet the reasons for not allowing criminal offenders to shift such burdens – harm reduction, retribution, and moral education – also appear to retain some force in relation to (...)
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  5.  17
    Dana Kay Nelkin (2014). Moral Responsibility, Conversation, and Desert: Comments on Michael McKenna's Conversation and Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 171 (1):63-72.
    In this paper, I engage with several of the intriguing theses Michael McKenna puts forward in his Conversation and Responsibility. For example, I examine McKenna’s claim that the fact that an agent is morally responsible for an action and the fact that an agent is appropriately held responsible explain each other. I go on to argue that despite the importance of the ability to hold people responsible, an agent’s being morally responsible for an action is explanatorily fundamental, and in this (...)
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  6.  16
    Michael McKenna (forthcoming). Manipulation Arguments, Basic Desert, and Moral Responsibility: Assessing Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-15.
    In this paper I critically assess Derk Pereboom’s book, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life. In it, I resist Pereboom’s manipulation argument for incompatibilism and his indictment of desert-based accounts of moral responsibility.
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  7.  10
    Audrey L. Anton (2015). Moral Responsibility and Desert of Praise and Blame. Lexington Books.
    Through critical examination of three main contemporary approaches to describing moral responsibility, this book illustrates why philosophers must take into account the relationship between retrospective moral responsibility and desert of praise or blame. The author advances the moral attitude account, whereby desert of praise and blame depends on the agent’s moral attitudes in response to moral reasons, and retrospective moral responsibility results from expressions of those attitudes in overt behavior.
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  8.  18
    Darian DeBolt (2012). Comments on Michael Harbour's “Ignorance of the Law and Moral Desert”. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):87-90.
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  9.  22
    N.-H. Hsieh (2000). Moral Desert, Fairness and Legitimate Expectations in the Market. Journal of Political Philosophy 8 (1):91–114.
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  10.  20
    Michael Harbour (2012). Ignorance of the Law and Moral Desert. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):209-215.
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  11. Fred Feldman (1997). Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
    Fred Feldman is an important philosopher, who has made a substantial contribution to utilitarian moral philosophy. This collection of ten previously published essays plus a new introductory essay reveal the striking originality and unity of his views. Feldman's version of utilitarianism differs from traditional forms in that it evaluates behaviour by appeal to the values of accessible worlds. These worlds are in turn evaluated in terms of the amounts of pleasure they contain, but the conception of pleasure involved is (...)
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  12.  95
    Richard Arneson (2007). The Smart Theory of Moral Responsibility and Desert. In Serena Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and Justice. Clarendon Press
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  13. Fred Feldman (2012). Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
    Fred Feldman is an important philosopher, who has made a substantial contribution to utilitarian moral philosophy. This collection of ten previously published essays plus a new introductory essay reveal the striking originality and unity of his views. Feldman's version of utilitarianism differs from traditional forms in that it evaluates behaviour by appeal to the values of accessible worlds. These worlds are in turn evaluated in terms of the amounts of pleasure they contain, but the conception of pleasure involved is (...)
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  14. Brian Rosebury (1995). Moral Responsibility and "Moral Luck". Philosophical Review 104 (4):499-524.
    This paper argues that "moral luck", understood as a susceptibility of moral desert to lucky or unlucky outcomes, does not exist. The argument turns on the claim that epistemic inquiry is an indissoluble part of moral responsibility, and that judgment on the moral decision making of others should and can adjust for this fact; test cases which aim to isolate moral dilemmas from epistemic consideration misrepresent our moral experience. If the phenomena believed by (...)
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  15.  26
    Tea Logar (2013). Rawls's Rejection of Preinstitutional Desert. Acta Analytica 28 (4):483-494.
    For many, the idea that people should be rewarded in proportion to what they deserve is the very essence of distributive justice. However, while the notion of moral desert is otherwise widely accepted, Rawls rejects it entirely in his A Theory of Justice. Many authors have argued that Rawls’s claims about desert have serious and unappealing consequences for his conception of justice as fairness, and also that they deny the possibility of autonomous choice to the very agents (...)
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  16.  27
    L. W. Sumner (1998). Fred Feldman, Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy:Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy. Ethics 109 (1):176-179.
  17.  7
    Andrew Mason, Meritocracy, Desert and the Moral Force of Intuitions.
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  18.  11
    Nadine Elzein (2013). Basic Desert, Conceptual Revision, and Moral Justification. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):1-14.
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  19.  19
    Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in the Competition Between Deontological and Empirical Desert.
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  20.  14
    Robert L. Frazier (2000). Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy Fred Feldman New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, Ix + 220 Pp., US$54.95, US$17.95 Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 39 (03):626-.
  21.  1
    Michael R. Turner (2014). Retrieving the Moral Significance of Deserving for Protestant Ethics: Calvin’s Commentaries on Personal Desert in Economic Exchange. Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 34 (2):123-140.
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  22. Christopher S. Hill (1985). Desert and The Moral Arbitrariness of The Natural Lottery. Philosophical Forum 16 (3):207.
     
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  23. Tamler Sommers (forthcoming). Partial Desert. In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press
    Theories of moral desert focus only on the personal culpability of the agent to determine the amount of blame and punishment the agent deserves. I defend an alternative account of desert, one that does not focus only facts about offenders and their offenses. In this revised framework, personal culpability can do no more than set upper and lower limits for deserved blame and punishment. For more precise judgments within that spectrum, additional factors must be considered, factors that (...)
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  24.  20
    Brian Rosebury (2011). Moore's Moral Facts and the Gap in the Retributive Theory. Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (3):361-376.
    The purely retributive moral justification of punishment has a gap at its centre. It fails to explain why the offender should not be protected from punishment by the intuitively powerful moral idea that afflicting another person (other than to avoid a greater harm) is always wrong. Attempts to close the gap have taken several different forms, and only one is discussed in this paper. This is the attempt to push aside the ‘protecting’ intuition, using some more powerful intuition (...)
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  25.  19
    Daniel Haas (2013). Merit, Fit, and Basic Desert. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):226-239.
    Basic desert is central to the dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists over the four-case manipulation argument. I argue that there are two distinct ways of understanding the desert salient to moral responsibility; moral desert can be understood as a claim about fitting responses to an agent or as a claim about the merit of the agent. Failing to recognize this distinction has contributed to a stalemate between both sides. I suggest that recognizing these distinct approaches (...)
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  26. Zac Cogley (2013). Basic Desert of Reactive Emotions. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):165-177.
    In this paper, I explore the idea that someone can deserve resentment or other reactive emotions for what she does by attention to three psychological functions of such emotions – appraisal, communication, and sanction – that I argue ground claims of their desert. I argue that attention to these functions helps to elucidate the moral aims of reactive emotions and to distinguish the distinct claims of desert, as opposed to other moral considerations.
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  27.  6
    Randolph Clarke (forthcoming). Moral Responsibility, Guilt, and Retributivism. Journal of Ethics:1-17.
    This paper defends a minimal desert thesis, according to which someone who is blameworthy for something deserves to feel guilty, to the right extent, at the right time, because of her culpability. The sentiment or emotion of guilt includes a thought that one is blameworthy for something as well as an unpleasant affect. Feeling guilty is not a matter of inflicting suffering on oneself, and it need not involve any thought that one deserves to suffer. The desert of (...)
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  28. Seth Shabo (2012). Compatibilism and Moral Claimancy: An Intermediate Path to Appropriate Blame. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):158-186.
    In this paper, I explore a new approach to the problem of determinism and moral responsibility. This approach involves asking when someone has a compelling claim to exemption against other members of the moral community. I argue that it is sometimes fair to reject such claims, even when the agent doesn’t deserve, in the sense of basic desert, to be blamed for her conduct. In particular, when an agent’s conduct reveals that her commitment to comply with the (...)
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  29. Matt King (2012). Moral Responsibility and Merit. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2).
    In the contemporary moral responsibility debate, most theorists seem to be giving accounts of responsibility in the ‘desert-entailing sense’. Despite this agreement, little has been said about the notion of desert that is supposedly entailed. In this paper I propose an understanding of desert sufficient to help explain why the blameworthy and praiseworthy deserve blame and praise, respectively. I do so by drawing upon what might seem an unusual resource. I appeal to so-called Fitting-Attitude accounts of (...)
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  30.  47
    Friderik Klampfer (2014). Consequentializing Moral Responsibility. Croatian Journal of Philosophy (40):121-150.
    In the paper, I try to cast some doubt on traditional attempts to define, or explicate, moral responsibility in terms of deserved praise and blame. Desert-based accounts of moral responsibility, though no doubt more faithful to our ordinary notion of moral responsibility, tend to run into trouble in the face of challenges posed by a deterministic picture of the world on the one hand and the impact of moral luck on human action on the other. (...)
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  31.  20
    Manuel R. Vargas (2015). Desert, Responsibility, and Justification: A Reply to Doris, McGeer, and Robinson. Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2659-2678.
    Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility argues that the normative basis of moral responsibility is anchored in the effects of responsibility practices. Further, the capacities required for moral responsibility are socially scaffolded. This article considers criticisms of this account that have been recently raised by John Doris, Victoria McGeer, and Michael Robinson. Robinson argues against Building Better Beings’s rejection of libertarianism about free will, and the account of desert at stake in the theory. considers (...)
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  32.  49
    Matt King (2014). Two Faces of Desert. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):401-424.
    There are two broadly competing pictures of moral responsibility. On the view I favor, to be responsible for some action is to be related to it in such a way that licenses attributing certain properties to the agent, properties like blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. Responsibility is attributability. A different view understands being responsible in terms of our practices of holding each other responsible. Responsibility is accountability, which “involves a social setting in which we demand (require) certain conduct from one another (...)
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  33.  1
    Saul Smilansky (forthcoming). Parfit on Free Will, Desert, and the Fairness of Punishment. Journal of Ethics:1-10.
    In his recent monumental book On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues for a hard determinist view that rejects free will-based moral responsibility and desert. This rejection of desert is necessary for his main aim in the book, the overall reconciliation of normative ethics. In Appendix E of his book, however, Parfit claims that it is possible to mete out fair punishment. Parfit’s position on punishment here seems to be inconsistent with his hard determinism. I argue that Parfit (...)
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  34.  15
    Paul Robinson, Joshua S. Barton & Matthew J. Lister (2014). Empirical Desert, Individual Prevention, and Limiting Retributivism: A Reply. New Criminal Law Review 17 (2):312-375.
    A number of articles and empirical studies over the past decade, most by Paul Robinson and co-authors, have suggested a relationship between the extent of the criminal law's reputation for being just in its distribution of criminal liability and punishment in the eyes of the community – its "moral credibility" – and its ability to gain that community's deference and compliance through a variety of mechanisms that enhance its crime-control effectiveness. This has led to proposals to have criminal liability (...)
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  35.  4
    Manuel Vargas (2013). Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Manuel Vargas presents a compelling and state-of-the-art defense of moral responsibility in the face of growing philosophical and scientific skepticism about free will and accountability. He shows how we can justify our responsibility practices, and provides a normatively and naturalistically adequate account of agency, blame, and desert. Winner of the 2015 APA Book Prize.
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  36.  2
    Steven Sverdlik (forthcoming). Giving Wrongdoers What They Deserve. Journal of Ethics:1-15.
    Retributivist approaches to the philosophy of punishment are usually based on certain claims related to moral desert. I focus on one such principle:Censuring Principle : There is a moral reason to censure guilty wrongdoers aversively.Principles like CP are often supported by the construction of examples similar to Kant’s ‘desert island’. These are meant to show that there is a reason for state officials to punish deserving wrongdoers, even if none of the familiar goals of punishment, such (...)
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  37. Gregg Caruso (2015). If Consciousness is Necessary for Moral Responsibility, Then People Are Less Responsible Than We Think. Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7-8):49-60.
  38. Michael McKenna (2009). Compatibilism & Desert: Critical Comments on Four Views on Free Will. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):3 - 13.
    In this paper I offer from a source compatibilist's perspective a critical discussion of "Four Views on Free Will" by John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. Sharing Fischer's semi-compatibilist view, I propose modifications to his arguments while resisting his coauthors' objections. I argue against Kane that he should give up the requirement that a free and morally responsible agent be able to do otherwise (in relevant cases). I argue against Pereboom that his famed manipulation argument be (...)
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  39.  38
    Michael Cholbi (2014). Luck, Blame, and Desert. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):313-332.
    T.M. Scanlon has recently proposed what I term a ‘double attitude’ account of blame, wherein blame is the revision of one’s attitudes in light of another person’s conduct, conduct that we believe reveals that the individual lacks the normative attitudes we judge essential to our relationship with her. Scanlon proposes that this account justifies differences in blame that in turn reflect differences in outcome luck. Here I argue that although the double attitude account can justify blame’s being sensitive to outcome (...)
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  40.  7
    Saul Smilansky (forthcoming). Pereboom on Punishment: Funishment, Innocence, Motivation, and Other Difficulties. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-13.
    In Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, Derk Pereboom proposes an optimistic model of life that follows on the rejection of both libertarian and compatibilist beliefs in free will, moral responsibility, and desert. I criticize his views, focusing on punishment. Pereboom responds to my earlier argument that hard determinism must seek to revise the practice of punishment in the direction of funishment, whereby the incarcerated are very generously compensated for the deprivations of incarceration. I claimed that funishment (...)
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  41.  63
    Benjamin Vilhauer (2013). Persons, Punishment, and Free Will Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):143-163.
    The purpose of this paper is to provide a justification of punishment which can be endorsed by free will skeptics, and which can also be defended against the "using persons as mere means" objection. Free will skeptics must reject retributivism, that is, the view that punishment is just because criminals deserve to suffer based on their actions. Retributivists often claim that theirs is the only justification on which punishment is constrained by desert, and suppose that non-retributive justifications must therefore (...)
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  42.  64
    Zac Cogley (2013). The Three-Fold Significance of the Blaming Emotions. In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press 205-224.
    In this paper, I explore the idea that someone can deserve resentment or other reactive emotions for what she does by attention to three psychological functions of such emotions—appraisal, communication, and sanction—that I argue ground claims of their desert. I argue that attention to these functions helps to elucidate the moral aims of reactive emotions and to distinguish the distinct claims of desert, as opposed to other moral considerations.
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  43.  34
    Marion Godman & Anneli Jefferson (forthcoming). On Blaming and Punishing Psychopaths. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-16.
    Current legal practice holds that a diagnosis of psychopathy does not remove criminal responsibility. In contrast, many philosophers and legal experts are increasingly persuaded by evidence from experimental psychology and neuroscience indicating moral and cognitive deficits in psychopaths and have argued that they should be excused from moral responsibility. However, having opposite views concerning psychopaths’ moral responsibility, on the one hand, and criminal responsibility, on the other, seems unfortunate given the assumption that the law should, at least (...)
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  44.  18
    Gregg Caruso (forthcoming). Moral Responsibility and the Strike Back Emotion: Comments on Bruce Waller’s The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility. Syndicate Philosophy 1 (1).
    In The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility (2015), Bruce Waller sets out to explain why the belief in individual moral responsibility is so strong. He begins by pointing out that there is a strange disconnect between the strength of philosophical arguments in support of moral responsibility and the strength of philosophical belief in moral responsibility. While the many arguments in favor of moral responsibility are inventive, subtle, and fascinating, Waller points out that even the most (...)
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  45. Gregg Caruso (2014). (Un)Just Deserts: The Dark Side of Moral Responsibility. Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (1):27-38.
    What would be the consequence of embracing skepticism about free will and/or desert-based moral responsibility? What if we came to disbelieve in moral responsibility? What would this mean for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and the law? What would it do to our standing as human beings? Would it cause nihilism and despair as some maintain? Or perhaps increase anti-social behavior as some recent studies have suggested (Vohs and Schooler 2008; Baumeister, Masicampo, and DeWall 2009)? Or (...)
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  46.  96
    Randolph Clarke (2013). Some Theses on Desert. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):153-64.
    Consider the idea that suffering of some specific kind is deserved by those who are guilty of moral wrongdoing. Feeling guilty is a prime example. It might be said that it is noninstrumentally good that one who is guilty feel guilty (at the right time and to the right degree), or that feeling guilty (at the right time and to the right degree) is apt or fitting for one who is guilty. Each of these claims constitutes an interesting thesis (...)
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  47.  80
    Benjamin Vilhauer (2009). Free Will Skepticism and Personhood as a Desert Base. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 489-511.
    In contemporary free will theory, a significant number of philosophers are once again taking seriously the possibility that human beings do not have free will, and are therefore not morally responsible for their actions. Free will theorists commonly assume that giving up the belief that human beings are morally responsible implies giving up all our beliefs about desert. But the consequences of giving up the belief that we are morally responsible are not quite this dramatic. Giving up the belief (...)
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  48.  15
    Linda Radzik (forthcoming). Desert of What? On Murphy’s Reluctant Retributivism. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-13.
    In Punishment and the Moral Emotions, Jeffrie Murphy rejects his earlier, strong endorsements of retributivism. Questioning both our motivations for embracing retributivism and our views about the basis of desert, he now describes himself as a “reluctant retributivist.” In this essay, I argue that Murphy should reject retributivism altogether. Even if we grant that criminals have negative desert, why should we suppose that it is desert of suffering? I argue that it is possible to defend (...)-based theories of punishment that reject this view of the object of desert. I consider, but reject, expressivist versions of such a theory. (shrink)
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  49.  23
    Lene Bomann-Larsen (2010). Revisionism and Desert. Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):1-16.
    Revisionists claim that the retributive intuitions informing our responsibility-attributing practices are unwarranted under determinism, not only because they are false, but because if we are all victims of causal luck, it is unfair to treat one another as if we are deserving of moral and legal sanctions. One revisionist strategy recommends a deflationary concept of moral responsibility, and that we justify punishment in consequentialist rather than retributive terms. Another revisionist strategy recommends that we eliminate all concepts of guilt, (...)
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  50. Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna & Angela M. Smith (2015). The Nature of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
    What is it to be morally responsible for something? Recent philosophical work reveals considerable disagreement on the question. Indeed, some theorists claim to distinguish several varieties of moral responsibility, with different conditions that must be satisfied if one is to bear responsibility of one or another of these kinds. -/- Debate on this point turns partly on disagreement about the kinds of responses made appropriate when one is blameworthy or praiseworthy. It is generally agreed that these include "reactive attitudes" (...)
     
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