Search results for 'Moral desert' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Howard Simmons (2010). Moral Desert: A Critique. University Press of America.score: 240.0
    This book argues that moral desert should be excluded as a consideration in normative and applied ethics, as it is likely that no-one ever morally deserves anything for their actions and, if they do, it is in most cases impossible to know what. I also explain how moral deliberation in relation to punishment, distributive justice and personal morality can proceed without appeals to moral desert.
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  2. Adrian Bardon (2000). From Nozick to Welfare Rights: Self‐Ownership, Property, and Moral Desert. Critical Review 14 (4):481-501.score: 180.0
    Abstract The Kantian moral foundations of Nozickian libertarianism suggest that the claim that self?ownership grounds only negative rights to property should be rejected. The moral foundations of Nozick's libertarianism better support basing property rights on moral desert. It is neither incoherent nor implausible to say that need can be a basis for desert. By implication, the libertarian contention that persons ought to be respected as persons living self?shaping lives is inconsistent with the libertarian refusal to (...)
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  3. Richard L. Lippke (2003). Desert, Harm Reduction, and Moral Education: The Case for a Tortfeasor Penalty. Res Publica 9 (2):127-147.score: 174.0
    Those found liable for negligently injuring others are required to compensate them, but current practices permit most tort feasors to spread the costs of their liability burdens through the purchase of insurance. Those found guilty of criminal offences, however, are not allowed to shift the burdens of their sentences onto others. Yet the reasons for not allowing criminal offenders to shift such burdens – harm reduction, retribution, and moral education – also appear to retain some force in relation to (...)
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  4. Dana Kay Nelkin (2014). Moral Responsibility, Conversation, and Desert: Comments on Michael McKenna's Conversation and Responsibility. Philosophical Studies 171 (1):63-72.score: 170.0
    In this paper, I engage with several of the intriguing theses Michael McKenna puts forward in his Conversation and Responsibility. For example, I examine McKenna’s claim that the fact that an agent is morally responsible for an action and the fact that an agent is appropriately held responsible explain each other. I go on to argue that despite the importance of the ability to hold people responsible, an agent’s being morally responsible for an action is explanatorily fundamental, and in this (...)
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  5. N.-H. Hsieh (2000). Moral Desert, Fairness and Legitimate Expectations in the Market. Journal of Political Philosophy 8 (1):91–114.score: 150.0
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  6. Michael Harbour (2012). Ignorance of the Law and Moral Desert. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):209-215.score: 150.0
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  7. Darian DeBolt (2012). Comments on Michael Harbour's “Ignorance of the Law and Moral Desert”. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):87-90.score: 150.0
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  8. Fred Feldman (1997). Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.score: 126.0
    Fred Feldman is an important philosopher, who has made a substantial contribution to utilitarian moral philosophy. This collection of ten previously published essays plus a new introductory essay reveal the striking originality and unity of his views. Feldman's version of utilitarianism differs from traditional forms in that it evaluates behaviour by appeal to the values of accessible worlds. These worlds are in turn evaluated in terms of the amounts of pleasure they contain, but the conception of pleasure involved is (...)
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  9. Richard Arneson (2007). The Smart Theory of Moral Responsibility and Desert. In Serena Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and Justice. Clarendon Press.score: 126.0
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  10. Brian Rosebury (1995). Moral Responsibility and "Moral Luck&Quot;. Philosophical Review 104 (4):499-524.score: 120.0
    This paper argues that "moral luck," understood as a susceptibility of moral desert to lucky or unlucky outcomes, does not exist. The argument turns on the claim that epistemic inquiry is an indissoluble part of moral responsibility, and that judgment on the moral decision making of others should and can adjust for this fact; test cases which aim to isolate moral dilemmas from epistemic consideration misrepresent our moral experience. If the phenomena believed by (...)
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  11. David W. Concepcion (2002). Moral Luck, Control, and the Bases of Desert. Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (4):455-461.score: 120.0
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  12. L. W. Sumner (1998). Fred Feldman, Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy:Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy. Ethics 109 (1):176-179.score: 120.0
  13. Tea Logar (2013). Rawls's Rejection of Preinstitutional Desert. Acta Analytica 28 (4):483-494.score: 120.0
    For many, the idea that people should be rewarded in proportion to what they deserve is the very essence of distributive justice. However, while the notion of moral desert is otherwise widely accepted, Rawls rejects it entirely in his A Theory of Justice. Many authors have argued that Rawls’s claims about desert have serious and unappealing consequences for his conception of justice as fairness, and also that they deny the possibility of autonomous choice to the very agents (...)
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  14. Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in the Competition Between Deontological and Empirical Desert.score: 120.0
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  15. Robert L. Frazier (2000). Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert: Essays in Moral Philosophy Fred Feldman New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, Ix + 220 Pp., US$54.95, US$17.95 Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 39 (03):626-.score: 120.0
  16. Nadine Elzein (2013). Basic Desert, Conceptual Revision, and Moral Justification. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):1-14.score: 120.0
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  17. Andrew Mason, Meritocracy, Desert and the Moral Force of Intuitions.score: 120.0
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  18. Tamler Sommers (forthcoming). Partial Desert. In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.score: 108.0
    Theories of moral desert focus only on the personal culpability of the agent to determine the amount of blame and punishment the agent deserves. I defend an alternative account of desert, one that does not focus only facts about offenders and their offenses. In this revised framework, personal culpability can do no more than set upper and lower limits for deserved blame and punishment. For more precise judgments within that spectrum, additional factors must be considered, factors that (...)
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  19. Daniel Haas (2013). Merit, Fit, and Basic Desert. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):226-239.score: 108.0
    Basic desert is central to the dispute between compatibilists and incompatibilists over the four-case manipulation argument. I argue that there are two distinct ways of understanding the desert salient to moral responsibility; moral desert can be understood as a claim about fitting responses to an agent or as a claim about the merit of the agent. Failing to recognize this distinction has contributed to a stalemate between both sides. I suggest that recognizing these distinct approaches (...)
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  20. Seth Shabo (2012). Compatibilism and Moral Claimancy: An Intermediate Path to Appropriate Blame. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):158-186.score: 102.0
    In this paper, I explore a new approach to the problem of determinism and moral responsibility. This approach involves asking when someone has a compelling claim to exemption against other members of the moral community. I argue that it is sometimes fair to reject such claims, even when the agent doesn’t deserve, in the sense of basic desert, to be blamed for her conduct. In particular, when an agent’s conduct reveals that her commitment to comply with the (...)
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  21. Zac Cogley (2013). Basic Desert of Reactive Emotions. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):165-177.score: 102.0
    In this paper, I explore the idea that someone can deserve resentment or other reactive emotions for what she does by attention to three psychological functions of such emotions – appraisal, communication, and sanction – that I argue ground claims of their desert. I argue that attention to these functions helps to elucidate the moral aims of reactive emotions and to distinguish the distinct claims of desert, as opposed to other moral considerations.
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  22. Matt King (2012). Moral Responsibility and Merit. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2).score: 102.0
    In the contemporary moral responsibility debate, most theorists seem to be giving accounts of responsibility in the ‘desert-entailing sense’. Despite this agreement, little has been said about the notion of desert that is supposedly entailed. In this paper I propose an understanding of desert sufficient to help explain why the blameworthy and praiseworthy deserve blame and praise, respectively. I do so by drawing upon what might seem an unusual resource. I appeal to so-called Fitting-Attitude accounts of (...)
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  23. Matt King (2014). Two Faces of Desert. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):401-424.score: 102.0
    There are two broadly competing pictures of moral responsibility. On the view I favor, to be responsible for some action is to be related to it in such a way that licenses attributing certain properties to the agent, properties like blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. Responsibility is attributability. A different view understands being responsible in terms of our practices of holding each other responsible. Responsibility is accountability, which “involves a social setting in which we demand (require) certain conduct from one another (...)
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  24. Friderik Klampfer (2014). Consequentializing Moral Responsibility. Croatian Journal of Philosophy (40):121-150.score: 102.0
    In the paper, I try to cast some doubt on traditional attempts to define, or explicate, moral responsibility in terms of deserved praise and blame. Desert-based accounts of moral responsibility, though no doubt more faithful to our ordinary notion of moral responsibility, tend to run into trouble in the face of challenges posed by a deterministic picture of the world on the one hand and the impact of moral luck on human action on the other. (...)
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  25. Paul Robinson, Joshua S. Barton & Matthew J. Lister (2014). Empirical Desert, Individual Prevention, and Limiting Retributivism: A Reply. New Criminal Law Review 17 (2):312-375.score: 102.0
    A number of articles and empirical studies over the past decade, most by Paul Robinson and co-authors, have suggested a relationship between the extent of the criminal law's reputation for being just in its distribution of criminal liability and punishment in the eyes of the community – its "moral credibility" – and its ability to gain that community's deference and compliance through a variety of mechanisms that enhance its crime-control effectiveness. This has led to proposals to have criminal liability (...)
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  26. Michael McKenna (2009). Compatibilism & Desert: Critical Comments on Four Views on Free Will. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):3 - 13.score: 90.0
    In this paper I offer from a source compatibilist's perspective a critical discussion of "Four Views on Free Will" by John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. Sharing Fischer's semi-compatibilist view, I propose modifications to his arguments while resisting his coauthors' objections. I argue against Kane that he should give up the requirement that a free and morally responsible agent be able to do otherwise (in relevant cases). I argue against Pereboom that his famed manipulation argument be (...)
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  27. Michael Cholbi (2014). Luck, Blame, and Desert. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):313-332.score: 90.0
    T.M. Scanlon has recently proposed what I term a ‘double attitude’ account of blame, wherein blame is the revision of one’s attitudes in light of another person’s conduct, conduct that we believe reveals that the individual lacks the normative attitudes we judge essential to our relationship with her. Scanlon proposes that this account justifies differences in blame that in turn reflect differences in outcome luck. Here I argue that although the double attitude account can justify blame’s being sensitive to outcome (...)
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  28. Brian Rosebury (2011). Moore's Moral Facts and the Gap in the Retributive Theory. Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (3):361-376.score: 78.0
  29. Benjamin Vilhauer (2013). Persons, Punishment, and Free Will Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):143-163.score: 72.0
    The purpose of this paper is to provide a justification of punishment which can be endorsed by free will skeptics, and which can also be defended against the "using persons as mere means" objection. Free will skeptics must reject retributivism, that is, the view that punishment is just because criminals deserve to suffer based on their actions. Retributivists often claim that theirs is the only justification on which punishment is constrained by desert, and suppose that non-retributive justifications must therefore (...)
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  30. Zac Cogley (2013). The Three-Fold Significance of the Blaming Emotions. In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. 205-224.score: 72.0
    In this paper, I explore the idea that someone can deserve resentment or other reactive emotions for what she does by attention to three psychological functions of such emotions—appraisal, communication, and sanction—that I argue ground claims of their desert. I argue that attention to these functions helps to elucidate the moral aims of reactive emotions and to distinguish the distinct claims of desert, as opposed to other moral considerations.
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  31. Benjamin Vilhauer (2009). Free Will Skepticism and Personhood as a Desert Base. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 489-511.score: 66.0
    In contemporary free will theory, a significant number of philosophers are once again taking seriously the possibility that human beings do not have free will, and are therefore not morally responsible for their actions. Free will theorists commonly assume that giving up the belief that human beings are morally responsible implies giving up all our beliefs about desert. But the consequences of giving up the belief that we are morally responsible are not quite this dramatic. Giving up the belief (...)
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  32. Randolph Clarke (2013). Some Theses on Desert. Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):153-64.score: 66.0
    Consider the idea that suffering of some specific kind is deserved by those who are guilty of moral wrongdoing. Feeling guilty is a prime example. It might be said that it is noninstrumentally good that one who is guilty feel guilty (at the right time and to the right degree), or that feeling guilty (at the right time and to the right degree) is apt or fitting for one who is guilty. Each of these claims constitutes an interesting thesis (...)
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  33. Lene Bomann-Larsen (2009). Revisionism and Desert. Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):1-16.score: 66.0
    Revisionists claim that the retributive intuitions informing our responsibility-attributing practices are unwarranted under determinism, not only because they are false, but because if we are all victims of causal luck , it is unfair to treat one another as if we are deserving of moral and legal sanctions. One (moderate) revisionist strategy recommends a deflationary concept of moral responsibility, and that we justify punishment in consequentialist rather than retributive terms. Another (strong) revisionist strategy recommends that we eliminate all (...)
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  34. Ishtiyaque Haji & Justin Caouette (eds.) (2013). Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.score: 66.0
    Determinism is, roughly, the thesis that facts about the past and the laws of nature entail all truths. A venerable, age-old dilemma concerning responsibility distils to this: if either determinism is true or it is not true, we lack "responsibility-grounding" control. Either determinism is true or it is not true. So, we lack responsibility-grounding control. Deprived of such control, no one is ever morally responsible for anything. A number of the freshly-minted essays in this collection address aspects of this dilemma. (...)
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  35. Peter Vallentyne (2003). Brute Luck Equality and Desert. In Sabrina Olsaretti (ed.), Desert and Justice. Clarendon Press.score: 60.0
    In recent years, interest in desert-based theories of justice has increased, and this seems to represent a challenge to equality-based theories of justice.[i] The best distribution of outcomeadvantage with respect to desert, after all, need not be the most equal distribution of outcomeadvantage. Some individuals may deserve more than others. Outcome egalitarianism is, however, implausible, and so the conflict of outcome desert with outcome equality is of little significance.[ii] Most contemporary versions of egalitarianism are concerned with neutralizing (...)
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  36. Kristján Kristjánsson (2005). A Utilitarian Justification of Desert in Distributive Justice. Journal of Moral Philosophy 2 (2):147-170.score: 60.0
    We cannot conclude from the assumptions that justice is a virtue and desert is an ingredient in justice that desert claims themselves express a virtue. It could be that desert is morally neutral, or even immoral, and that there are other aspects of justice which make it all-in-all virtuous. We need, in other words, an independent moral justification of desert and desert-based emotions. In this paper I take on the challenge of articulating and defending (...)
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  37. Tamler Sommers (2012). Relative Justice: Cultural Diversity, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility. Princeton University Press.score: 60.0
    [Publisher's description:] When can we be morally responsible for our behavior? Is it fair to blame people for actions that are determined by heredity and environment? Can we be responsible for the actions of relatives or members of our community? In this provocative book, Tamler Sommers concludes that there are no objectively correct answers to these questions. Drawing on research in anthropology, psychology, and a host of other disciplines, Sommers argues that cross-cultural variation raises serious problems for theories that propose (...)
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  38. Shelly Kagan (2012). The Geometry of Desert. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
    Moral desert -- Fault forfeits first -- Desert graphs -- Skylines -- Other shapes -- Placing peaks -- The ratio view -- Similar offense -- Graphing comparative desert -- Variation -- Groups -- Desert taken as a whole -- Reservations.
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  39. Wilfried Hinsch (2001). Global Distributive Justice. Metaphilosophy 32 (1-2):58-78.score: 60.0
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  40. Peter Miller (1983). Do Animal Have Interests Worthy of Our Moral Interest? Environmental Ethics 5 (4):319-333.score: 60.0
    The conclusion of animal liberationists that the underlying assumptions of modern egalitarian humanism can be construed to imply an equal moral desert for the higher nonhuman animals has recently been challenged by R. G. Frey on the grounds that linguistic incompetence and lack of self-consciousness on the part of animals preclude them from having desires, beliefs, interests, and rights. AlthoughFrey’s arguments fail, they challenge us to provide alternative accounts of these descriptive and normative categories of human and animal (...)
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  41. Serena Olsaretti (ed.) (2003). Desert and Justice. Oxford University Press.score: 54.0
    Does justice require that individuals get what they deserve? Serena Olsaretti brings together new essays by leading moral and political philosophers examining the relation between desert and justice; they also illuminate the nature of distributive justice, and the relationship between desert and other values, such as equality and responsibility.
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  42. Tamler Sommers (2009). The Two Faces of Revenge: Moral Responsibility and the Culture of Honor. Biology and Philosophy 24 (1):35-50.score: 54.0
    Retributive emotions and behavior are thought to be adaptive for their role in improving social coordination. However, since retaliation is generally not in the short-term interests of the individual, rational self-interest erodes the motivational link between retributive emotions and the accompanying adaptive behavior. I argue that two different sets of norms have emerged to reinforce this link: (1) norms about honor and (2) norms about moral responsibility and desert. I observe that the primary difference between these types of (...)
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  43. Bradford Skow (2012). A Solution to the Problem of Indeterminate Desert. Mind 121 (481):37-65.score: 54.0
    A desert-sensitive moral theory says that whether people get what they deserve, whether they are treated as they deserve to be treated, plays a role in determining what we ought to do. Some popular forms of consequentialism are desert-sensitive. But where do facts about what people deserve come from? If someone deserves a raise, or a kiss, in virtue of what does he deserve those things? One plausible answer is that what someone deserves depends, at least in (...)
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  44. Carl Knight (2011). Responsibility, Desert, and Justice. In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press.score: 54.0
    This chapter identifies three contrasts between responsibility-sensitive justice and desert-sensitive justice. First, while responsibility may be appraised on prudential or moral grounds, it is argued that desert is necessarily moral. As moral appraisal is much more plausible, responsibility-sensitive justice is only attractive in one of its two formulations. Second, strict responsibility sensitivity does not compensate for all forms of bad brute luck, and forms of responsibility-sensitive justice like luck egalitarianism that provide such compensation do so (...)
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  45. Teun J. Dekker (2009). Choices, Consequences and Desert. Inquiry 52 (2):109 – 126.score: 54.0
    It is a commonly held position in the literature on distributive justice that choices individuals make from an equalized background may lead to inequalities of outcome. This raises the question of how to assign consequences to particular types of behaviour. Theories of justice based on the concept of moral responsibility offer considerable guidance as to how society should be structured, but they rarely address the question of what the consequences of making a particular choice should be. To fill this (...)
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  46. L. A. Garcia (1986). Two Concepts of Desert. Law and Philosophy 5 (2):219 - 235.score: 54.0
    In the first section I briefly consider some stituations in which standard desert-claims would be disputed, with the aim of revealing why and by whom they are asserted or denied. Having attained some understanding of the point of different desert-statements, I propose an accound of their content that entails the thesis that statements of positive desert (deserving something desirable) sharply differ in meaning from statements of negative desert (deserving something undesirable), even when expressed in the same (...)
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  47. Matthew Rendall (2013). Priority and Desert. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):939-951.score: 54.0
    Michael Otsuka, Alex Voorhoeve and Marc Fleurbaey have challenged the priority view in favour of a theory based on competing claims. The present paper shows how their argument can be used to recast the priority view. All desert claims in distributive justice are comparative. The stronger a party’s claims to a given benefit, the greater is the value of her receiving it. Ceteris paribus, the worse-off have stronger claims on welfare, and benefits to them matter more. This can account (...)
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  48. A. T. Nuyen (2008). Moral Luck, Role-Based Ethics and the Punishment of Attempts. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):59-69.score: 54.0
    In most countries, failed criminal attempts are punished less severely than those that succeed. Many philosophers, including myself, have argued that differential punishment can be justified. However, in a recent paper, Hanna raises objections to defenses of differential punishment, claiming that such policy goes against our “desert intuitions” and also cannot be justified on utilitarian grounds. I argue in this paper that Hanna’s desert-based and utilitarian objections can be undermined. Further, they are valid only within moral theories (...)
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  49. Manuel Vargas (2013). Building Better Beings: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.score: 54.0
    Part I: Building blocks. 1. Folk convictions -- 2. Doubts about libertarianism -- 3. Nihilism and revisionism -- 4. Building a better theory -- Part II. A theory of moral responsibility. 5. The primacy of reasons -- 6. Justifying the practice -- 7. Responsible agency -- 8. Blame and desert -- 9. History and manipulation --10. Some conclusions.
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  50. Michael H. Shapiro (2005). The Identity of Identity: Moral and Legal Aspects of Technological Self-Transformation. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):308-373.score: 54.0
    Technologies are being developed for significantly altering the traits of existing persons (or fetuses or embryos) and of future persons via germ line modification. The availability of such technologies may affect our philosophical, legal, and everyday understandings of several important concepts, including that of personal identity. I consider whether the idea of personal identity requires reconstruction, revision or abandonment in the face of such possibilities of technological intervention into the nature and form of an individual's attributes. This requires an account (...)
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