Search results for 'Moral repair' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jeff Frank (2011). Love and Ruin(S): Robert Frost on Moral Repair. Educational Theory 61 (5):587-600.score: 60.0
    This essay begins where Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue begins: facing a moral world in ruin. MacIntyre argues that this predicament leaves us with a choice: we can follow the path of Friedrich Nietzsche, accepting this moral destruction and attempting to create lives in a rootless, uncertain world, or the path of Aristotle, working to reclaim a world in which close-knit communities sustain human practices that make it possible for us to flourish. Jeff Frank rejects MacIntyre's framework and in (...)
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  2. Margaret Urban Walker (2006). Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrongdoing. Cambridge.score: 60.0
    1. What. Is. Moral. Repair? A woman is at home in an isolated house by the sea. It is night, and she sits on the terrace. When a car turns in toward the house, the woman gets a gun. When she hears her husband's voice, she puts the gun away  ...
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  3. Alisa L. Carse & Lynne Tirrell (2010). Forgiving Grave Wrongs. In Christopher Allers & Marieke Smit (eds.), Forgiveness In Perspective. Rodopi Press.score: 45.0
    We introduce what we call the Emergent Model of forgiving, which is a process-based relational model conceptualizing forgiving as moral and normative repair in the wake of grave wrongs. In cases of grave wrongs, which shatter the victim’s life, the Classical Model of transactional forgiveness falls short of illuminating how genuine forgiveness can be achieved. In a climate of persistent threat and distrust, expressions of remorse, rituals and gestures of apology, and acts of reparation are unable to secure (...)
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  4. Elizabeth A. Cole (2008). Apology, Forgiveness, and Moral Repair. Ethics and International Affairs 22 (4):421-428.score: 45.0
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  5. Elizabeth V. Spelman (2008). Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrongdoingby Margaret Urban Walker. Hypatia 23 (4):228-233.score: 45.0
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  6. Elizabeth V. Spelman (2008). Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrongdoing (Review). Hypatia 23 (4):pp. 228-233.score: 45.0
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  7. Johan Brännmark (2008). Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrongdoing – by Margaret Urban Walker. Theoria 74 (2):169-172.score: 45.0
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  8. Cheshire Calhoun (2007). Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrongdoing Margaret Urban Walker New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, Xii + 250 Pp., $70.00, $27.99 Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 46 (04):819-.score: 45.0
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  9. C. Bennett (2009). Review: Margaret Urban Walker: Moral Repair. [REVIEW] Mind 118 (469):215-220.score: 45.0
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  10. Cheshire Calhoun (2007). Moral Repair. Dialogue 46 (4):819-823.score: 45.0
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  11. Cheshire Calhoun (2007). Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrongdoing. Dialogue 46 (4):819-823.score: 45.0
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  12. Lynne Tirrell (2013). Apologizing for Atrocity: Rwanda and Recognition. In Alice MacLachlan & C. Allen Speight (eds.), Justice, Responsibility, and Reconciliation in the Wake of Conflict. Springer.score: 45.0
    Apology is a necessary component of moral repair of damage done by wrongs against the person. Analyzing the role of apology in the aftermath of atrocity, with a focus on the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda, 1994, this article emphasizes the role of recognition failures in grave moral wrongs, the importance of speech acts that offer recognition, and building mutuality through recognition as a route to reconciliation. Understanding the US role in the international failure to stop (...)
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  13. Brad Wilburn (2007). Review of Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrongdoing. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (5).score: 45.0
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  14. Alexander Lucie-Smith (2012). Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrongdoing. By Margaret Urban Walker. Pp. Xii, 250, Cambridge University Press, 2006, $30.20. [REVIEW] Heythrop Journal 53 (5):845-845.score: 45.0
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  15. Anca Gheaus (2008). Review of" Moral Repair. Reconstructing Moral Relations After Wrongdoing". [REVIEW] Essays in Philosophy 9 (2):10.score: 45.0
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  16. Mark J. Bliton & Richard M. Zaner (2001). Over the Cutting Edge: How Ethics Consultation Illuminates the Moral Complexity of Open-Uterine Fetal Repair of Spina Bifida and Patients' Decision Making. Journal of Clinical Ethics 12 (4):346.score: 36.0
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  17. Howard Mcgary (2010). Reconciliation and Reparations. Metaphilosophy 41 (4):546-562.score: 30.0
    Abstract: This article provides an account of the meaning of reparations and presents a brief explanation as to why African Americans believe they are entitled to reparations from the United States government. It then goes on to explain why reparations are necessary to address the distrust that is thought to exist between many African Americans and their government. Finally, it rejects the belief that reparations require reconciliation.
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  18. Elizabeth Peter & Joan Liaschenko (2013). Moral Distress Reexamined: A Feminist Interpretation of Nurses' Identities, Relationships, and Responsibilites. [REVIEW] Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 10 (3):337-345.score: 27.0
    Moral distress has been written about extensively in nursing and other fields. Often, however, it has not been used with much theoretical depth. This paper focuses on theorizing moral distress using feminist ethics, particularly the work of Margaret Urban Walker and Hilde Lindemann. Incorporating empirical findings, we argue that moral distress is the response to constraints experienced by nurses to their moral identities, responsibilities, and relationships. We recommend that health professionals get assistance in accounting for and (...)
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  19. Alice MacLachlan (2008). Forgiveness and Moral Solidarity. In Stephen Bloch-Shulman & David White (eds.), Forgiveness: Probing the Boundaries. Inter-Disciplinary Press.score: 24.0
    The categorical denial of third-party forgiveness represents an overly individualistic approach to moral repair. Such an approach fails to acknowledge the important roles played by witnesses, bystanders, beneficiaries, and others who stand in solidarity to the primary victim and perpetrator. In this paper, I argue that the prerogative to forgive or withhold forgiveness is not universal, but neither is it restricted to victims alone. Not only can we make moral sense of some third-party acts and utterances of (...)
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  20. Uri D. Leibowitz (2014). Explaining Moral Knowledge. Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (1):35-56.score: 21.0
    In this paper I assess the viability of a particularist explanation of moral knowledge. First, I consider two arguments by Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge that purport to show that a generalist, principle-based explanation of practical wisdom—understood as the ability to acquire moral knowledge in a wide range of situations—is superior to a particularist, non-principle-based account. I contend that both arguments are unsuccessful. Then, I propose a particularist-friendly explanation of knowledge of particular moral facts. I argue that (...)
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  21. Nafsika Athanassoulis (2005). Common-Sense Virtue Ethics and Moral Luck. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):265 - 276.score: 21.0
    Moral luck poses a problem for out conception of responsibility because it highlights a tension between morality and lack of control. Michael Slote’s common-sense virtue ethics claims to avoid this problem. However there are a number of objections to this claim. Firstly, it is not clear that Slote fully appreciates the problem posed by moral luck. Secondly, Slote’s move from the moral to the ethical is problematic. Thirdly it is not clear why we should want to abandon (...)
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  22. Jeanette Kennett & Cordelia Fine (2009). Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):77–96.score: 21.0
    The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we (...)
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  23. Vivienne Brown (2006). Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):265-288.score: 21.0
    Is choice necessary for moral responsibility? And does choice imply alternative possibilities of some significant sort? This paper will relate these questions to the argument initiated by Harry Frankfurt that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's extension of that argument in terms of guidance control in a causally determined world. I argue that attending to Frankfurt's core conceptual distinction between the circumstances that make an action unavoidable and those (...)
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  24. Daniel Jacobson (2005). Seeing by Feeling: Virtues, Skills, and Moral Perception. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (4):387 - 409.score: 21.0
    Champions of virtue ethics frequently appeal to moral perception: the notion that virtuous people can “see” what to do. According to a traditional account of virtue, the cultivation of proper feeling through imitation and habituation issues in a sensitivity to reasons to act. Thus, we learn to see what to do by coming to feel the demands of courage, kindness, and the like. But virtue ethics also claims superiority over other theories that adopt a perceptual moral epistemology, such (...)
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  25. Antti Kauppinen (forthcoming). Intuition and Belief in Moral Motivation. In Gunnar Björnsson (ed.), Moral Internalism.score: 21.0
    It seems to many that moral opinions must make a difference to what we’re motivated to do, at least in suitable conditions. For others, it seems that it is possible to have genuine moral opinions that make no motivational difference. Both sides – internalists and externalists about moral motivation – can tell persuasive stories of actual and hypothetical cases. My proposal for a kind of reconciliation is to distinguish between two kinds of psychological states with moral (...)
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  26. Mark Silcox (2006). Virtue Epistemology and Moral Luck. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2):179--192.score: 21.0
    Thomas Nagel has proposed that the existence of moral luck mandates a general attitude of skepticism in ethics. One popular way of arguing against Nagel’s claim is to insist that the phenomenon of moral luck itself is an illusion , in the sense that situations in which it seems to occur may be plausibly re-described so as to show that agents need not be held responsible for the unlucky outcomes of their actions. Here I argue that this strategy (...)
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  27. Christopher Grau (2010). Moral Status, Speciesism, and Liao’s Genetic Account. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (3):387-96.score: 21.0
    This paper offers several criticisms of the account of rightholding laid out in S. Matthew Liao’s recent paper “The Basis of Human Moral Status.” I argue that Liao’s account both does too much and too little: it grants rightholder status to those who may not deserve it, and it does not provide grounds for offering such status to those who arguably do deserve it. Given these troubling aspects of his approach, I encourage Liao to abandon his “physical basis of (...)
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  28. Hanno Sauer (2012). Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.score: 21.0
    Philosophical and empirical moral psychologists claim that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgment. The aim of this paper is to assess the evidence in favor of both claims and to show how a moderate rationalist position about moral judgment can be defended nonetheless. The experimental evidence for both the necessity- and the sufficiency-thesis concerning the connection between emotional reactions and moral judgment is presented. I argue that a rationalist about moral judgment can (...)
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  29. Jonathan Smith (2010). On Sinnott-Armstrong's Case Against Moral Intuitionism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):75 - 88.score: 21.0
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued against moral intuitionism, according to which some of our moral beliefs are justified without needing to be inferred from any other beliefs. He claims that any prima facie justification some non-inferred moral beliefs might have enjoyed is removed because many of our moral beliefs are formed in circumstances where either (1) we are partial, (2) others disagree with us and there is no reason to prefer our moral judgement to theirs, (3) (...)
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  30. Andrew Sneddon (2005). Moral Responsibility: The Difference of Strawson, and the Difference It Should Make. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):239-264.score: 21.0
    P.F. Strawson’s work on moral responsibility is well-known. However, an important implication of the landmark “Freedom and Resentment” has gone unnoticed. Specifically, a natural development of Strawson’s position is that we should understand being morally responsible as having externalistically construed pragmatic criteria, not individualistically construed psychological ones. This runs counter to the contemporary ways of studying moral responsibility. I show the deficiencies of such contemporary work in relation to Strawson by critically examining the positions of John Martin Fischer (...)
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  31. Anders Schinkel (2009). The Problem of Moral Luck: An Argument Against its Epistemic Reduction. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):267 - 277.score: 21.0
    Whom I call ‘epistemic reductionists’ in this article are critics of the notion of ‘moral luck’ that maintain that all supposed cases of moral luck are illusory; they are in fact cases of what I describe as a special form of epistemic luck, the only difference lying in what we get to know about someone, rather than in what (s)he deserves in terms of praise or blame. I argue that epistemic reductionists are mistaken. They implausibly separate judgements of (...)
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  32. Wayne Christensen & John Sutton (2012). Reflections on Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning Toward an Integrated, Multidisciplinary Approach to Moral Cognition. In Robyn Langdon & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Emotions, Imagination, and Moral Reasoning. Psychology Press. 327-347.score: 21.0
    B eginning with the problem of integrating diverse disciplinary perspectives on moral cognition, we argue that the various disciplines have an interest in developing a common conceptual framework for moral cognition research. We discuss issues arising in the other chapters in this volume that might serve as focal points for future investigation and as the basis for the eventual development of such a framework. These include the role of theory in binding together diverse phenomena and the role of (...)
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  33. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2007). Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):279 - 295.score: 21.0
    According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition, and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model has (...)
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  34. Daan Evers (2014). Moral Contextualism and the Problem of Triviality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):285-297.score: 21.0
    Moral contextualism is the view that claims like ‘A ought to X’ are implicitly relative to some (contextually variable) standard. This leads to a problem: what are fundamental moral claims like ‘You ought to maximize happiness’ relative to? If this claim is relative to a utilitarian standard, then its truth conditions are trivial: ‘Relative to utilitarianism, you ought to maximize happiness’. But it certainly doesn’t seem trivial that you ought to maximize happiness (utilitarianism is a highly controversial position). (...)
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  35. Andrea Viggiano (2008). Ethical Naturalism and Moral Twin Earth. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (2):213 - 224.score: 21.0
    In order to rebut G. E. Moore’s open question argument, ethical naturalists adopt a theory of direct reference for our moral terms. T. Horgan and M. Timmons have argued that this theory cannot be applied to moral terms, on the ground that it clashes with competent speakers’ linguistic intuitions. While Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment shows that our linguistic intuitions confirm the theory of direct reference, as applied to ‘water’, Horgan and Timmons devise a parallel thought experiment about (...)
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  36. Maike Albertzart (2013). Principle-Based Moral Judgement. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):339-354.score: 21.0
    It is widely acknowledged that moral principles are not sufficient to guide moral thought and action: they need to be supplemented by a capacity for judgement. However, why can we not rely on this capacity for moral judgement alone? Why do moral principles need to be supplemented, but are not supplanted, by judgement? So-called moral particularists argue that we can, and should, make moral decisions on a case-by-case basis without any principles. According to particularists, (...)
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  37. Don Loeb (2007). The Argument From Moral Experience. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):469 - 484.score: 21.0
    It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory (according to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories (...)
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  38. Richard Joyce (2009). Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):53 - 75.score: 21.0
    Different versions of moral projectivism are delineated: minimal, metaphysical, nihilistic, and noncognitivist. Minimal projectivism (the focus of this paper) is the conjunction of two subtheses: (1) that we experience morality as an objective aspect of the world and (2) that this experience has its origin in an affective attitude (e.g., an emotion) rather than in perceptual faculties. Both are empirical claims and must be tested as such. This paper does not offer ideas on any specific test procedures, but rather (...)
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  39. Lorraine Besser-Jones (2012). The Role of Practical Reason in an Empirically Informed Moral Theory. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):203-220.score: 21.0
    Empirical research paints a dismal portrayal of the role of reason in morality. It suggests that reason plays no substantive role in how we make moral judgments or are motivated to act on them. This paper explores how it is that an empirically oriented philosopher, committed to methodological naturalism, ought to respond to the skeptical challenge presented by this research. While many think taking this challenge seriously requires revising, sometimes dramatically, how we think about moral agency, this paper (...)
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  40. Russ Shafer-Landau (2007). Moral and Theological Realism: The Explanatory Argument. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (3):311-329.score: 21.0
    There are striking parallels, largely unexplored in the literature, between skeptical arguments against theism and against moral realism. After sketching four arguments meant to do this double duty, I restrict my attention to an explanatory argument that claims that we have most reason to deny the existence of moral facts (and so, by extrapolation, theistic ones), because such putative facts have no causal-explanatory power. I reject the proposed parity, and offer reasons to think that the potential vulnerabilities of (...)
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  41. Leonard Kahn (2011). Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):131-142.score: 21.0
    In this paper, I present and defend a novel version of the Reactive Attitude account of moral blameworthiness. In Section 1, I introduce the Reactive Attitude account and outline Allan Gibbard's version of it. In Section 2, I present the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, which has been at the heart of much recent discussion about the nature of value, and explain why a reformulation of it causes serious problems for versions of the Reactive Attitude account such as Gibbard's. (...)
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  42. Thaddeus Metz (2012). An African Theory of Moral Status: A Relational Alternative to Individualism and Holism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (3):387-402.score: 21.0
    The dominant conceptions of moral status in the English-speaking literature are either holist or individualist, neither of which accounts well for widespread judgments that: animals and humans both have moral status that is of the same kind but different in degree; even a severely mentally incapacitated human being has a greater moral status than an animal with identical internal properties; and a newborn infant has a greater moral status than a mid-to-late stage foetus. Holists accord no (...)
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  43. Jurriaan De Haan (2001). The Definition of Moral Dilemmas: A Logical Problem. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):267-284.score: 21.0
    This paper concerns one of the undecided disputes of modern moral philosophy: the possibility of moral dilemmas. Whereas proponents of the possibility of moral dilemmas often appeal to moral experience, many opponents refer to ethical theory and deontic logic. My aim in this paper is to clarify some of the tension between moral experience and ethical theory with respect to moral dilemmas. In Part One I try to show that a number of logical arguments (...)
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  44. David P. Hunt (2000). Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action. Philosophical Studies 97 (2):195-227.score: 21.0
    The principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), making the ability to do otherwise a necessary condition for moral responsibility, is supposed by Harry Frankfurt, John Fischer, and others to succumb to a peculiar kind of counterexample. The paper reviews the main problems with the counterexample that have surfaced over the years, and shows how most can be addressed within the terms of the current debate. But one problem seems ineliminable: because Frankfurt''s example relies on a counterfactual intervener to preclude alternatives (...)
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  45. Peter Schulte (2012). The Difference Between Moral and Rational “Oughts”: An Expressivist Account. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (2):159-174.score: 21.0
    Morality and rationality are both normative: the moral claim “you ought to help others” is a genuine normative judgment, as well as the rational maxim “you ought to brush your teeth twice a day”. But it seems that there is a crucial difference these two judgments. In the first part of this paper, I argue that this difference is to be understood as a difference between two kinds of normativity: demanding and recommending normativity. But the crucial task is, of (...)
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  46. Alfred R. Mele (2009). Moral Responsibility and History Revisited. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):463 - 475.score: 21.0
    Compatibilists about determinism and moral responsibility disagree with one another about the bearing of agents’ histories on whether or not they are morally responsible for some of their actions. Some stories about manipulated agents prompt such disagreements. In this article, I call attention to some of the main features of my own “history-sensitive” compatibilist proposal about moral responsibility, and I argue that arguments advanced by Michael McKenna and Manuel Vargas leave that proposal unscathed.
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  47. Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2009). What Does the Frame Problem Tell Us About Moral Normativity? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):25 - 51.score: 21.0
    Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem; it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals concerning human cognition, and we argue that these morals (...)
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  48. Philip Nickel (2001). Moral Testimony and its Authority. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):253-266.score: 21.0
    A person sometimes forms moral beliefs by relying on another person''s moral testimony. In this paper I advance a cognitivist normative account of this phenomenon. I argue that for a person''s actions to be morally good, they must be based on a recognition of the moral reasons bearing on action. Morality requires people to act from an understanding of moral claims, and consequently to have an understanding of moral claims relevant to action. A person sometimes (...)
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  49. Michael J. Zimmerman (2006). On the Fulfillment of Moral Obligation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (5):577 - 597.score: 21.0
    This paper considers three general views about the nature of moral obligation and three particular answers (with which these views are typically associated) concerning the following question: if on Monday you lend me a book that I promise to return to you by Friday, what precisely is my obligation to you and what constitutes its fulfillment? The example is borrowed from W.D. Ross, who in The Right and the Good proposed what he called the Objective View of obligation, (...)
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  50. Matt King & Peter Carruthers (2012). Moral Responsibility and Consciousness. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):200-228.score: 21.0
    Our aim in this paper is to raise a question about the relationship between theories of responsibility, on the one hand, and a commitment to conscious attitudes, on the other. Our question has rarely been raised previously. Among those who believe in the reality of human freedom, compatibilists have traditionally devoted their energies to providing an account that can avoid any commitment to the falsity of determinism while successfully accommodating a range of intuitive examples. Libertarians, in contrast, have aimed to (...)
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