Building on the work of Peter Hinst and Geo Siegwart, we develop a pragmatised natural deduction calculus, i.e., a natural deduction calculus that incorporates illocutionary operators at the formal level, and prove its adequacy. In contrast to other linear calculi of natural deduction, derivations in this calculus are sequences of object-language sentences which do not require graphical or other means of commentary in order to keep track of assumptions or to indicate subproofs.
Building on the work of Peter Hinst and Geo Siegwart, we develop a pragmatised natural deduction calculus, i.e. a natural deduction calculus that incorporates illocutionary operators at the formal level, and prove its adequacy. In contrast to other linear calculi of natural deduction, derivations in this calculus are sequences of object-language sentences which do not require graphical or other means of commentary in order to keep track of assumptions or to indicate subproofs. (Translation of our German paper "Ein Redehandlungskalkül. Ein (...) pragmatisierter Kalkül des natürlichen Schließens nebst Metatheorie"; online available at http://philpapers.org/rec/CORERE.). (shrink)
Abstract. The concept of human uniqueness has long played a central role within key interpretations of the hominid fossil record and within numerous theological understandings of the imago Dei. More recently, the status of humans as evolutionarily unique has come under strong criticism owing to the discovery of certain nonhuman hominids who, as language and culture-bearing beings, lived as contemporaries with early anatomically modern humans. Nevertheless, many scholars, including those in the field of religion and science, continue to interpret the (...) remains of these other hominids in light of empirically ungrounded implicit assumptions about human uniqueness, which the author calls “anthropocentrism of the gaps.” This paper argues that “anthropocentrism of the gaps” is philosophically unwarranted and thus should not be assumed by scholars in religion and science when evaluating contemporary findings in paleoanthropology. (shrink)
This paper relates firm size and opportunism by showing that, given certain behavioral dispositions of humans, the size of a profit-maximizing firm can be determined by cognitive aspects underlying firminternal cultural transmission processes. We argue that what firms do better than markets – besides economizing on transaction costs – is to establish a cooperative regime among its employees that keeps in check opportunism. A model depicts the outstanding role of the entrepreneur or business leader in firminternal socialization processes and the (...) evolution of corporate cultures. We show that high opportunismrelated costs are a reason for keeping firms’ size small. (shrink)
Despite a renewed interest in the philosophical prehistory of logical empiricism, several texts by prominent figures such as, e.g., Moritz Schlick and Hans Reichenbach, published in non-standard journals, have escaped the notice of scholars. Here, a hitherto virtually unknown but significant review of Moritz Schlick's influential book Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre [1st ed. 1918] written by Hans Reichenbach in 1919/20 is reprinted together with comments about its background and the later development, relying on and citing from the unpublished correspondence between (...) Schlick and Reichenbach in 1920. Since they later became the leading figures in the so called Vienna and Berlin circles respectively, this episode marks an important stage in the gradual emancipation of scientific philosophy from its (neo)Kantian roots. (shrink)
Sowohl in seiner Habilitationsschrift Das Wesen der Wahrheit nach der modernen Logik (1910) als auch in Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre (1918) setzt Moritz Schhck sich kritisch mit der Phänomenologie Husserls auseinander. Im Zentrum der Kritik steht neben dem Anschauungsbegriff die Hypostasierung der logischen Bedeutungen. Es läßt sich zeigen, daß die Auseinandersetzung mit Husserl eine wesentliche Rolle in der Herausbildung der lingualistischen Bedeutungstheorie Schlicks spielt.
Die im Wiener Kreis dominierenden konträren Derücer Otto Neurath und Moritz Schlick werden jeweüs mit einem historisch-genetischen Profil persönlich, wissenschaftlich-phüosophisch und politisch charakterisiert. Dabei wüd trotz verschiedener Differenzen — als Extrempositionen im pluralistisch-heterogenen Wiener Kreis — die gemeinsame Müiimalplattform eüier "wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung" und das Bekenntnis zu einer als neuartig verstandenen Forschergemeinschaft transparent. Erst vor diesem Hintergrund sind die beiden Denker- und Persönlichkeitsphysiognomien in einen adäquaten Kontext gestellt: während bei Neurath eine konsistente Entwicklung von den Modellen einer "wissenschaftlichen Philosophie", "Einheitswissenschaft" (...) bis zur "Enzyklopädie" im Zusammenhang mit einem Sozialreformerischen Programm und funktionaler Antimetaphysik zu erkennen ist, wird bei Schlick der Dualismus von Philosophie und Wissenschaft neben einem politischen Liberalismus beibehalten. Auf allgemeinster Ebene kollidieren"phüosophiefreier" RELATIVISMUS und "philosophischer" ABSOLUTISMUS. (shrink)
In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden diejenigen Aspekte der Philosophie von Moritz Schlick behandelt, die eng mit der Entwicklung der modernen Naturwissenschaft, Logik und Mathematik verknüpft sind. Es wird gezeigt, in welchem großen Ausmaß Schlick zur Entstehung einer modernen empirischen Phüosophie beigetragen hat. Folgende Problemkreise werden ausführlich behandelt: Raum und Zeit, besonders die Kritik am synthetisch^priorischen Charakter der Geometrie. Das Verhältnis von Erleben und Erkennen und die darauf aufbauende Metaphysikkritik; das Außenwelt- und das Kausalitätsproblem; das psychophysische Problem und schließlich das (...) Problem der Fundierung der Erkenntnis. (shrink)
Schlicks philosophie is der bedeutendste Versuch, der je unternommen worden ist, über die Zersplitterung der philosophischen Systeme hinwegzukommen, zu einer Aufassung, die keiner Richtung angehört und doch für alle Richtungen bindend ist. Man hat bisher das Augenmerk fast immer den Antworten zugewandt, welche auf philosophische Fragen gegeben worden sind. Um diese Antworten, um ihre Wichtigkeit oder Falschheit, Ihre Begründung oder Widerlegung drehte sich bisher der Streit. Die neue Auffassung unterscheidet sich von den bisherigen darin, dass sie zunächst von den Antworten (...) ganz absieht und die Natur der Fragestellung selbst genau untersucht. Diese Einsicht führt zu einer vollkommen neue Lösung der philosophischen Fragen, freilich in einem anderen Sinne als man erwattet hatte. Man hatte nämlich Antworten erwartet, welche die gestellte Frage -- ob zum Beispiel die Aussenwelt wirklich existiert, ob der menschliche Wille frei ist.. -- in bejahendem oder in verneinendem Sinn entscheiden sollten. Statt dessen führt die tiefer dringende Analyse zu der Einsicht, dass die Form dieser Frage überhaupt auf einem Missverständnis beruht und erlöst uns, indem sie uns den Sinn unserer Worte und ihre Verknüpfungen so klar macht, dass wir von dem Zwang des Fragens befreit werden. Es ist eine Hinwendung zu einer objektiven, undogmatischen Philosophie, die keinen Gegner haben kann, weil sie nichts behauptet. In diesem Geiste philosophieren heisst gar nichts anderes, als mit Klarheit und Bewusstsein denken. Durch diese Methode wird die Situation der Philosophie von Grund auf geändert. Es zeigt sich vor allem, dass die sogenannten unlösbaren Probleme Scheinfragen sind. Ihre Unlösbarkeit war ja unsere eigene Schuld: denn wir haben die Worte in unzulässiger Weise zu einer Frage zusammengestellt und damit den Sinnbereich der Sprache verlassen. Jede Frage, die sinnvoll gestellt worden kann, ist auch im Prinzip einer Antwort fähig. Schlick war aber nicht nur der strenge, unerbittliche Denker; innerlich vielleicht noch näher standen ihm die grossen Lebensprobleme. Diese Geisteshaltung ist nur der Ausfluss von Schlicks Persönlichkeit. Ihr war auch ein dichterischer Zug zu eigen, der sogar in seinem Stil manchmal anklingt. Diesen Zug muss man sich wohl vor Augen halten, wenn man Schlick verstehen will. (shrink)
Für die Rekonstruktion der Begriffsbüdung ergeben sich folgende Schwerpunkte: a. Die Erlebnisebene, die irüialtlich nur dem Einzelsubjekt zugänglich ist, muß so bestimmt werden, daß sie über ihre strukturellen Eigenschaften Grundlage eines intersubjektiven Begriffsbüdungsprozesses werden kann. b. Es ist ein Verfahren anzugeben, mit dessen Hilfe der Zusammenhang zwischen Begriffen, der Grundlage ihrer Rückführbarke it ist, aufgedeckt, werden kann. Die zentrale Rolle zur Lösung beider Probleme kommt der Konstruktion des (objektiven) Raum-Zeitschemes zu.
Incorporating the complete, corrected text of The Corded Shell, Kivy brings his earlier arguments up to date in light of recent work in the field, and discusses ...
To what extent is imagination dependent on embodied experience? In attempting to answer such questions I consider the experiences of those who have to come to terms with altered neurological function, namely those with spinal cord injury at the neck. These people have each lost all sensation and movement below the neck. How might these new ways of living affect their imagination?
How are we individually and as a society to handle new and emerging technologies? This challenging question underlies much of the bioethical debates of modern times. To address this question we need suitable conceptions of the new technology and ways of identifying its proper management and regulation. To establish conceptions and to find ways to handle emerging technologies we tend to use analogies extensively. The aim of this article is to investigate the role that analogies play or may play in (...) the processes of understanding and managing new technology. More precisely we aim to unveil the role of analogies as analytical devices in exploring the "being" of the new technology as well the normative function of analogies in conceptualizing the characteristics and applications of new technology. Umbilical cord blood biobanking will be used as a case to investigate these roles and functions. (shrink)
Geron recently announced that it had begun enrolling patients in the world's first-in-human clinical trial involving cells derived from human embryonic stem cells (hESCs). This trial raises important questions regarding the future of hESC-based therapies, especially in spinal cord injury (SCI) patients. We address some safety and efficacy concerns with this research, as well as the ethics of fair subject selection. We consider other populations that might be better for this research: chronic complete SCI patients for a safety trial, subacute (...) incomplete SCI patients for an efficacy trial, and perhaps primary progressive multiple sclerosis (MS) patients for a combined safety and efficacy trial. (shrink)
In early 2009, President Obama overturned the ban on federal funding for research involving the derivation of human embryonic stem cells (hESC). The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) also approved Geron’s first-in-human hESC trial for spinal cord injury (SCI) patients. We anticipate an increase in both research in the United States to derive hESC and applications to the FDA for approval of clinical trials involving transplantation of hESCs. An increase of such clinical trials will require a concomitant increase in the (...) number of preceding preclinical assays. We examine important issues concerning the use of animals in SCI stem cell research that require a reevaluation of the moral permissibility of studies such as Geron’s. (shrink)
Over the past decade, umbilical cord blood (UCB) has routinely been used as a source of haematopoietic stem cells for allogeneic stem cell transplants in the treatment of a range of malignant and non-malignant conditions affecting children and adults. UCB banks are a necessary part of the UCB transplant program, but their establishment has raised a number of important scientific, ethical and political issues. This paper examines the scientific and clinical evidence that has provided the basis for the establishment of (...) UCB banks. We also discuss the major ethical issues that UCB banks raise, including ownership of cord blood, processes for obtaining consent for its collection and storage, and confidentiality. Finally, we review other concerns about commercial non-altruistic banking, including concerns about social justice, equity of access and equity of care. (shrink)
Though there has been an array of methods to evaluate the extent of sarcoidosis, it is generally difficult to detect central nervous system involvement. Recently it has become accepted that 18F-FDG PET is more sensitive than gallium scintigraphy in finding sarcoid lesions, however its usefulness and limitations for detecting sarcoidosis in the central nervous system, especially in the spinal cord, has rarely been investigated. Two patients with pathologically confirmed sarcoidosis manifested spinal symptoms. We conducted 18F-FDG PET along with conventional imagings (...) before and after treatment. Abnormal FDG uptakes which could not be detected by gallium scintigraphy were shown in the spinal cords in both patients. These abnormal uptakes were diminished in accordance with clinical improvement after treatment. Our findings suggest that 18F-FDG PET is effective in detecting and tracking the activity of spinal sarcoidosis. (shrink)
The thought that there is a way to reconcile empiricism with a realist stance towards scientific theories, avoiding instrumentalism and without fearing that this will lead straight to metaphysics, seems very promising. This paper aims to articulate this thought. It consists of two parts. The first (sections 2 and 3) will articulate how empiricism can go for scientific realism without metaphysical anxiety. It will draw on the work of Moritz Schlick, Hans Reichenbach and Herbert Feigl to develop an indispensability (...) argument for the adoption of the realist framework. This argument, unlike current realist arguments, has a pragmatic ring to it: there is no ultimate argument for the adoption of the realist framework. The guiding thought here is that fundamental ontic questions are not dealt with in the same way in which questions about the reality of ordinary entities (be they stones or electrons) are dealt with—the ontic framework must already be in place before questions about the reality of specific entities are raised. The second part (sections 4 and 5) will articulate reasons for avoiding instrumentalism. Most space is given in offering reasons to refrain from adopting P. Kyle Stanford’s (2006) neo-instrumentalism—a very sophisticated version of instrumentalism that seems to work within the realist framework and promises empiricists a way to avoid scientific realism. Scientific realism is alive and well because of Ti(a)na: there is (almost) no alternative. However, in section 6, it will be argued that there is room for rapprochement between contextualist instrumentalism and scientific realism. The paper is accompanied by an appendix in which Reichenbach’s argument for scientific realism is presented and discussed. (shrink)
There has been an empiricist tradition in the core of Logical Positivism/Empiricism, starting with Moritz Schlick and ending in Herbert Feigl (via Hans Reichenbach), according to which the world of empiricism need not be a barren place devoid of all the explanatory entities posited by scientific theories. The aim of this paper is to articulate this tradition and to explore ways in which its key elements can find a place in the contemporary debate over scientific realism. It presents a (...) way empiricism can go for scientific realism without metaphysical anxiety, by developing an indispensability argument for the adoption of the realist framework. This argument, unlike current realist arguments, has a pragmatic ring to it: there is no ultimate argument for the adoption of the realist framework. (shrink)
Recently, Yalcin (Epistemic modals. Mind, 116 , 983–1026, 2007) put forward a novel account of epistemic modals. It is based on the observation that sentences of the form ‘ & Might ’ do not embed under ‘suppose’ and ‘if’. Yalcin concludes that such sentences must be contradictory and develops a notion of informational consequence which validates this idea. I will show that informational consequence is inadequate as an account of the logic of epistemic modals: it cannot deal with reasoning from (...) uncertain premises. Finally, I offer an alternative way of explaining the relevant linguistic data. (shrink)
The relation between chance and actuality gives rise to a puzzle. On the one hand, it may be a chancy matter what will actually happen. On the other hand, the standard semantics for ‘actually’ implies that sentences beginning with ‘actually’ are never contingent. To elucidate the puzzle, I defend a kind of objective semantic indeterminacy: in a chancy world, it may be a chancy matter which proposition is expressed by sentences containing ‘actually’. I bring this thesis to bear on certain (...) counter-examples, proposed by Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio, to Lewis' ‘principal principle’. (shrink)
Indexical beliefs pose a special problem for standard theories of Bayesian updating. Sometimes we are uncertain about our location in time and space. How are we to update our beliefs in situations like these? In a stepwise fashion, I develop a constraint on the dynamics of indexical belief. As an application, the suggested constraint is brought to bear on the Sleeping Beauty problem.
In the 19th century, "Psychophysical Parallelism" was the most popular solution of the mind-body problem among physiologists, psychologists and philosophers. (This is not to be mixed up with Leibnizian and other cases of "Cartesian" parallelism.) The fate of this non-Cartesian view, as founded by Gustav Theodor Fechner, is reviewed. It is shown that Feigl's "identity theory" eventually goes back to Alois Riehl who promoted a hybrid version of psychophysical parallelism and Kantian mind-body theory which was taken up by Feigl's teacher (...)Moritz Schlick. (shrink)
A new direction in philosophy Between 1920 and 1940 logical empiricism reset the direction of philosophy of science and much of the rest of Anglo-American philosophy. It began as a relatively organized movement centered on the Vienna Circle, and like-minded philosophers elsewhere, especially in Berlin. As Europe drifted into the Nazi era, several important figures, especially Carnap and Neurath, also found common ground in their liberal politics and radical social agenda. Together, the logical empiricists set out to reform traditional philosophy (...) with a new set of doctrines more firmly grounded in logic and science. Criticism and decline Because of Nazi persecution, most of the European adherents of logical empiricism moved to the United States in the late 1930s. During the 1940s, many of their most cherished tenets became targets of criticism from outsiders as well as from within their own ranks. Philosophers of science in the late 1950s and 1960s rejected logical empiricism and, starting in the 1970s, presented such alternative programs such as scientific realism with evolutionary epistemology. A resurgence of interest During the early 1980s, philosophers and historians of philosophy began to study logical empiricism as an important movement. Unlike their predecessors in the 1960s-for whom the debate over logical empiricism now seems to have been largely motivated by professional politics-these philosopher no longer have to take positions for or against logical empiricism. The result has been a more balanced view of that movement, its achievements, its failures, and its influence. Hard-to-find core writings now available This collection makes available a selection of the most influential and representative writings of the logical empiricists, important contemporary criticisms of their doctrines, their responses, as well as the recent reappraisals. Introductions to each volume examine the articles in historical context and provide importantbackground information that is vital to a full understanding of the issues discussed. They outline prevalent trends, identifying leading figures and summarize their positions and reasoning, as well as those of opposing thinkers. (shrink)
This paper explores the possibility of supplementing the suppositional view of indicative conditionals with a corresponding view of epistemic modals. The most striking feature of the suppositional view consists in its claim that indicative conditionals are to be evaluated by conditional probabilities. On the basis of a natural link between indicative conditionals and epistemic modals, a corresponding thesis about the probabilities of statements governed by epistemic modals can be derived. The paper proceeds by deriving further consequences of this thesis, in (...) particular, the logic of epistemic modals and their logical interaction with indicative conditionals are studied. (shrink)
Abstract. It is commonplace that economic globalization poses new challenges to legal theory. But instead of responding to these challenges, legal scholars often get caught up in heated yet purely abstract discussions of positivist and legal pluralist conceptions of the law. Meanwhile, economics-based theories such as "Law and Social Norms" have much less difficulty in analysing the newly arising forms of private and hybrid "governance without government" from a functional perspective. While legal theory has much to learn from these approaches, (...) we argue that they fail in one crucial point: They cannot uphold the analytical distinction between law and non-law. The reasons for this shortcoming are theory-immanent in that the economic theories' focus on efficiency and their actor-based perspective are necessarily blind to "law's own rationality." We therefore propose to further develop those functional approaches to the study of global governance by complementing them with elements from Niklas Luhmann's systems theory of law. This will provide us with a conceptual framework for analyzing the workings of global governance regimes without ignoring their potential for "legalisation" and "constitutionalisation." As we will show in three concrete examples (Corporate Social Responsibility, lex mercatoria , and internet regulation) we can thus describe the evolution of new forms of legal regulation beyond the nation-state. This will also allow us to draw some preliminary conclusions on the role of law in the context of globalization and, at the same time, show the direction for further empirical research. (shrink)
Abstract. The aim of this paper is to reconstruct the debate on Begriffstheorie between Ernst Cassirer, the Swe¬dish philosopher Konrad Marc-Wogau, and, virtually, Moritz Schlick. It took place during in the late thirties when Cassirer had immigrated to Sweden. While Cassirer argued for a rich “constitutive” theory of concepts, Marc-Wogau, and, in a different way, Schlick favored “austere” non-con¬sti¬¬tutive theories of concepts. Ironically, however, Cassirer used Schlick’s account as a weapon to counter Marc-Wogau’s criticism of his rich con¬¬sti¬tu¬¬tive theory (...) of concepts. With the help of modern Formal Concept Theory (FCT) it can be shown, however, that Marc-Wogau’s argument is flawed. (shrink)
Rudolf Carnap's 'Principle of Tolerance' was undoubtedly one of the most infl uential precepts in 20th Century philosophy. Introduced in The Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap's Principle suffered from ambiguities which aroused important philosophical questions from Moritz Schlick (in 1935) and Alberto Coffa (1991). Specifi cally, their questions arise from the application of the Principle to the matter of including extra-logical transformation rules (so-called 'physical rules' or 'P-rules') in the defi nition of a language, which Carnap regarded as (...) an important difference between his own conventionalist philosophy of logic and the 'absolutist' conception of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Yet both Schlick and Coffa suggested that applying the Tolerance precept to this matter exceeds the limits of its legitimate deployment. Upon considering their objections, as well as the criticism of Wittgenstein which evoked them, it is argued that the philosophical signifi cance of the Principle of Tolerance requires its strict limitation to matters pertaining to the determination of meaning. (shrink)
The article is an extended comment on Strawson’s neglected paper ‘Maybes and Might Have Beens’, in which he suggests that both statements about what may be the case and statements about what might have been the case can be understood epistemically. We argue that Strawson is right about the first sort of statements but wrong about the second. Finally, we discuss some of Strawson’s claims which are related to positions of Origin Essentialism.
Hans Vaihinger tried to explain how mathematical theories can be useful without being true or even coherent, arguing that mathematicians employ a special kind of fictional or “as if” reasoning that reliably extracts truths from absurdities. Moritz Pasch insisted that Vaihinger was wrong about the incoherence of core mathematical theories, but right about the utility of fictional discourse in mathematics. This essay explores this area of agreement between Pasch and Vaihinger. Pasch’s position raises questions about structuralist interpretations of mathematics.
A possible event always seems to be more probable than an impossible event. Although this constraint, usually alluded to as regularity , is prima facie very attractive, it cannot hold for standard probabilities. Moreover, in a recent paper Timothy Williamson has challenged even the idea that regularity can be integrated into a comparative conception of probability by showing that the standard comparative axioms conflict with certain cases if regularity is assumed. In this note, we suggest that there is a natural (...) weakening of the standard comparative axioms. It is shown that these axioms are consistent both with the regularity condition and with the essential feature of Williamson’s example. (shrink)
