Search results for 'Motor Processes*' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  1
    Mark Wexler, Stephen M. Kosslyn & Alain Berthoz (1998). Motor Processes in Mental Rotation. Cognition 68 (1):77-94.
    Much indirect evidence supports the hypothesis that transformations of mental images are at least in part guided by motor processes, even in the case of images of abstract objects rather than of body parts. For example, rotation may be guided by processes that also prime one to see results of a specific motor action. We directly test the hypothesis by means of a dual-task paradigm in which subjects perform the Cooper-Shepard mental rotation task while executing an unseen (...) rotation in a given direction and at a previously learned speed. Four results support the inference that mental rotation relies on motor processes. First, motor rotation that is compatible with mental rotation results in faster times and fewer errors in the imagery task than when the two rotations are incompatible. Second, the angle through which subjects rotate their mental images, and the angle through which they rotate a joystick handle are correlated, but only if the directions of the two rotations are compatible. Third, motor rotation modifies the classical inverted V-shaped mental rotation response time function, favoring the direction of the motor rotation; indeed, in some cases motor rotation even shifts the location of the minimum of this curve in the direction of the motor rotation. Fourth, the preceding effect is sensitive not only to the direction of the motor rotation, but also to the motor speed. A change in the speed of motor rotation can correspondingly slow down or speed up the mental rotation. (shrink)
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  2.  7
    R. MasteRs, J. Poolton & J. Maxwell (2008). Stable Implicit Motor Processes Despite Aerobic Locomotor Fatigue. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):335-338.
    Implicit processes almost certainly preceded explicit processes in our evolutionary history, so they are likely to be more resistant to disruption according to the principles of evolutionary biology [Reber, A. S. . The cognitive unconscious: An evolutionary perspective. Consciousness and Cognition, 1, 93–133.]. Previous work . Knowledge, nerves and know-how: The role of explicit versus implicit knowledge in the breakdown of a complex motor skill under pressure. British Journal of Psychology, 83, 343–358.]) has shown that implicitly learned motor (...)
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  3.  2
    William A. MacKay (1997). Synchronized Neuronal Oscillations and Their Role in Motor Processes. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1 (5):176-183.
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  4.  10
    Charles H. Judd (1909). Motor Processes and Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (4):85-91.
  5.  13
    J. Mark Baldwin (1909). Motor Processes and Mental Unity. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (7):182-185.
  6.  7
    J. Mark Baldwin (1909). Motor Processes and Mental Unity. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (7):182-185.
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  7. Sonia Kandel & Cyril Perret (2015). How Does the Interaction Between Spelling and Motor Processes Build Up During Writing Acquisition? Cognition 136:325-336.
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  8. Isabel Lindner, Cécile Schain & Gerald Echterhoff (2016). Other-Self Confusions in Action Memory: The Role of Motor Processes. Cognition 149:67-76.
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  9.  7
    Rich S. W. Masters, Jon P. Maxwell & Frank F. Eves (2009). Marginally Perceptible Outcome Feedback, Motor Learning and Implicit Processes. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (3):639-645.
    Participants struck 500 golf balls to a concealed target. Outcome feedback was presented at the subjective or objective threshold of awareness of each participant or at a supraliminal threshold. Participants who received fully perceptible feedback learned to strike the ball onto the target, as did participants who received feedback that was only marginally perceptible . Participants who received feedback that was not perceptible showed no learning. Upon transfer to a condition in which the target was unconcealed, performance increased in both (...)
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  10.  1
    Kent L. Norman (1974). Dynamic Processes in Stimulus Integration Theory: Effects of Feedback on Averaging of Motor Movements. Journal of Experimental Psychology 102 (3):399.
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  11.  3
    Michael Briese, Behrooz Esmaeili & David B. Sattelle (2005). Is Spinal Muscular Atrophy the Result of Defects in Motor Neuron Processes? Bioessays 27 (9):946-957.
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  12. Robert M. Kohl & Sebastiano A. Fisicaro (1996). Response Intention and Imagery Processes: Locus, Interaction, and Contribution to Motor Learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (4):760.
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  13.  1
    Margaret Floy Washburn (1917). Movement and Mental Imagery: Outlines of a Motor Theory of the Complexer Mental Processes. Philosophical Review 26 (1):92-95.
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  14.  35
    Helen Johnson & Patrick Haggard (2005). Motor Awareness Without Perceptual Awareness. Neuropsychologia. Special Issue 43 (2):227-237.
    The control of action has traditionally been described as "automatic". In particular, movement control may occur without conscious awareness, in contrast to normal visual perception. Studies on rapid visuomotor adjustment of reaching movements following a target shift have played a large part in introducing such distinctions. We suggest that previous studies of the relation between motor performance and perceptual awareness have confounded two separate dissociations. These are: (a) the distinction between motoric and perceptual representations, and (b) an orthogonal distinction (...)
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  15. Bill Faw (2003). Pre-Frontal Executive Committee for Perception, Working Memory, Attention, Long-Term Memory, Motor Control, and Thinking: A Tutorial Review. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (1):83-139.
    As an explicit organizing metaphor, memory aid, and conceptual framework, the prefrontal cortex may be viewed as a five-member ‘Executive Committee,’ as the prefrontal-control extensions of five sub-and-posterior-cortical systems: the ‘Perceiver’ is the frontal extension of the ventral perceptual stream which represents the world and self in object coordinates; the ‘Verbalizer’ is the frontal extension of the language stream which represents the world and self in language coordinates; the ‘Motivator’ is the frontal cortical extension of a subcortical extended-amygdala stream which (...)
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  16.  23
    Yves Rossetti (2001). Implicit Perception in Action: Short-Lived Motor Representation of Space. In Peter G. Grossenbacher (ed.), Finding Consciousness in the Brain: A Neurocognitive Approach. Advances in Consciousness Research. John Benjamins 133-181.
  17. Laure Pisella & Yves Rosetti (2000). Interaction Between Conscious Identification and Non-Conscious Sensory-Motor Processing: Temporal Constraints. In Yves Rossetti & Antti Revonsuo (eds.), Beyond Dissociation: Interaction Between Dissociated Implicit and Explicit Processing. John Benjamins
     
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  18.  2
    Abram M. Barch (1959). Replication Report: Work and Rest as Variables in Cyclical Motor Performance. Journal of Experimental Psychology 58 (5):415.
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  19.  1
    Ina McD Bilodeau & Edward A. Bilodeau (1954). Some Effects of Work Loading in a Repetitive Motor Task. Journal of Experimental Psychology 48 (6):455.
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  20. Armin Kibele (2006). Non-Consciously Controlled Decision Making for Fast Motor Reactions in Sports--A Priming Approach for Motor Responses to Non-Consciously Perceived Movement Features. Psychology of Sport and Exercise 7 (6):591-610.
  21.  32
    Flavio T. P. Oliveira & David Goodman (2004). Conscious and Effortful or Effortless and Automatic: A Practice/Performance Paradox in Motor Learning. Perceptual and Motor Skills 99 (1):315-324.
  22.  1
    Irwin P. Levin, John L. Craft & Kent L. Norman (1971). Averaging of Motor Movements: Tests of an Additive Model. Journal of Experimental Psychology 91 (2):287.
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  23.  1
    M. Campbell (1936). The Cognitive Aspects of Motor Performances and Their Bearing on General Motor Ability. Journal of Experimental Psychology 19 (3):323.
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  24.  72
    Sarah-Jayne Blakemore, Daniel M. Wolpert & Christopher D. Frith (2002). Abnormalities in the Awareness of Action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (6):237-242.
  25.  14
    David Moreau (2015). Unreflective Actions? Complex Motor Skill Acquisition to Enhance Spatial Cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2):349-359.
    Cognitive science has recently moved toward action-integrated paradigms to account for some of its most remarkable findings. This novel approach has opened up new venues for the sport sciences. In particular, a large body of literature has investigated the relationship between complex motor practice and cognition, which in the sports domain has mostly concerned the effect of imagery and other forms of mental practice on motor skill acquisition and emotional control. Yet recent evidence indicates that this relationship (...)
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  26. Melvyn A. Goodale, Jonathan S. Cant & Grzegorz Króliczak (2006). Grasping the Past and Present: When Does Visuomotor Priming Occur? In Ögmen, Haluk; Breitmeyer, Bruno G. (2006). The First Half Second: The Microgenesis and Temporal Dynamics of Unconscious and Conscious Visual Processes. (Pp. 51-71). Cambridge, Ma, Us: Mit Press. Xi, 410 Pp.
  27. Jens Schwarzbach & Dirk Vorberg (2006). Response Priming with and Without Awareness. In Haluk Ögmen & Bruno G. Breitmeyer (eds.), The First Half Second: The Microgenesis and Temporal Dynamics of Unconscious and Conscious Visual Processes. MIT Press 297-314.
     
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  28. Christopher D. Frith, S. J. Blakemore & D. Wolpert (2000). Explaining the Symptoms of Schizophrenia: Abnormalities in the Awareness of Action. Brain Research Reviews 31 (2):357-363.
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  29.  58
    Gottfried Vosgerau & Albert Newen (2007). Thoughts, Motor Actions, and the Self. Mind and Language 22 (1):22–43.
    The comparator-model, originally developed to explain motor action, has recently been invoked to explain several aspects of the self. However, in the first place it may not be used to explain a basic self-world distinction because it presupposes one. Our alternative account is based on specific systematic covariation between action and perception. Secondly, the comparator model cannot explain the feeling of ownership of thoughts. We argue—contra Frith and Campbell—that thoughts are not motor processes and therefore cannot be described (...)
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  30.  94
    Sarah-Jayne Blakemore & Chris Frith (2003). Self-Awareness and Action. Current Opinion in Neurobiology. Special Issue 13 (2):219-224.
  31. Patrick Haggard, P. Catledge, M. Dafydd & David A. Oakley (2004). Anomalous Control: When "Free Will" is Not Conscious. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):646-654.
    The conscious feeling of exercising ‘free-will’ is fundamental to our sense of self. However, in some psychopathological conditions actions may be experienced as involuntary or unwilled. We have used suggestion in hypnosis to create the experience of involuntariness in normal participants. We compared a voluntary finger movement, a passive movement and a voluntary movement suggested by hypnosis to be ‘involuntary.’ Hypnosis itself had no effect on the subjective experience of voluntariness associated with willed movements and passive movements or on time (...)
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  32.  10
    Germund Hesslow (2002). Conscious Thought as Simulation of Behavior and Perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (6):242-247.
  33. Shaun Gallagher (2006). Where's the Action? Epiphenomenalism and the Problem of Free Will. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press 109-124.
    Some philosophers argue that Descartes was wrong when he characterized animals as purely physical automata – robots devoid of consciousness. It seems to them obvious that animals (tigers, lions, and bears, as well as chimps, dogs, and dolphins, and so forth) are conscious. There are other philosophers who argue that it is not beyond the realm of possibilities that robots and other artificial agents may someday be conscious – and it is certainly practical to take the intentional stance toward them (...)
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  34.  44
    G. Knoblich & T. T. J. Kircher (2004). Deceiving Oneself About Being in Control: Conscious Detection of Changes in Visuomotor Coupling. Journal of Experimental Psychology - Human Perception and Performance 30 (4):657-66.
  35.  83
    Bjorn H. Merker (2005). The Liabilities of Mobility: A Selection Pressure for the Transition to Consciousness in Animal Evolution. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (1):89-114.
    The issue of the biological origin of consciousness is linked to that of its function. One source of evidence in this regard is the contrast between the types of information that are and are not included within its compass. Consciousness presents us with a stable arena for our actions—the world—but excludes awareness of the multiple sensory and sensorimotor transformations through which the image of that world is extracted from the confounding influence of self-produced motion of multiple receptor arrays (...)
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  36. Rolf Verleger, Piotr Jaskowski, Aytaç Aydemir, Rob H. J. van der Lubbe & Margriet Groen (2004). Qualitative Differences Between Conscious and Nonconscious Processing? On Inverse Priming Induced by Masked Arrows. Journal of Experimental Psychology 133 (4):494-515.
  37.  11
    Marc Jeannerod (2006). Motor Cognition: What Actions Tell the Self. OUP Oxford.
    Our ability to acknowledge and recognise our own identity - our 'self' - is a characteristic doubtless unique to humans. Where does this feeling come from? How does the combination of neurophysiological processes coupled with our interaction with the outside world construct this coherent identity? We know that our social interactions contribute via the eyes, ears etc. However, our self is not only influenced by our senses. It is also influenced by the actions we perform and those we see others (...)
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  38. D. D. Wickens (1939). A Study of Voluntary and Involuntary Finger Conditioning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 25 (2):127.
  39.  39
    R. P. Behrendt (2003). Hallucinations: Synchronisation of Thalamocortical ? Oscillations Underconstrained by Sensory Input. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):413-451.
    What we perceive is the product of an intrinsic process and not part of external physical reality. This notion is consistent with the philosophical position of transcendental idealism but also agrees with physiological findings on the thalamocortical system. -Frequency rhythms of discharge activity from thalamic and cortical neurons are facilitated by cholinergic arousal and resonate in thalamocortical networks, thereby transiently forming assemblies of coherent oscillations under constraints of sensory input and prefrontal attentional mechanisms. Perception and conscious experience may be based (...)
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  40.  66
    Carrie Figdor (2003). Can Mental Representations Be Triggering Causes? Consciousness and Emotion 4 (1):43-61.
    Fred Dretske?s (1988) account of the causal role of intentional mental states was widely criticized for missing the target: he explained why a type of intentional state causes the type of bodily motion it does rather than some other type, when what we wanted was an account of how the intentional properties of these states play a causal role in each singular causal relation with a token bodily motion. I argue that the non-reductive metaphysics that Dretske defends for his account (...)
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  41.  26
    Cristina Becchio & Cesare Bertone (2005). The Ontology of Neglect. Consciousness and Cognition 14 (3):483-494.
    As shown by neuroscientific evidence, neglect may occur without elementary sensorimotor impairments. The deficit is to be found at a higher, more abstract level of representation, which prevents the patient not only from seeing, but from conceiving the contralesional space. By analysing a series of neuropsychological results, in this paper we suggest a crucial role of time for the construction of a world: on this basis, we try to explain how it is possible that half the ontology gets lost. The (...)
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  42.  5
    Sukhvinder S. Obhi (2007). Evidence for Feedback Dependent Conscious Awareness of Action. Brain Research 1161:88-94.
  43.  46
    David A. Oakley & Patrick Haggard (2006). The Timing of Brain Events: Authors' Response to Libet's 'Reply'. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):548-550.
  44.  7
    Christian de Quincey (2000). Conceiving the 'Inconceivable'? Fishing for Consciousness with a Net of Miracles. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):67-81.
    Sometimes, after years of painstaking work, someone presents a startling argument that seems to suddenly snatch the ground right out from under your feet. And it's back to square one. Such a conceptual trapdoor caught me by surprise a few years ago. For decades, I had been convinced it is simply inconceivable that subjectivity -- the interior experience of how consciousness feels -- could possibly emerge from a previously wholly objective world, that mind could evolve from ‘dead’ matter. It seemed (...)
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  45.  22
    Daniel A. Pollen (2006). Brain Stimulation and Conscious Experience: Electrical Stimulation of the Cortical Surface at a Threshold Current Evokes Sustained Neuronal Activity Only After a Prolonged Latency. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):560-565.
    Libet demonstrated that a substantial duration (>0.5-1.0 s) of direct electrical stimulation of the surface of a sensory cortex at a threshold or liminal current is required before a subject can experience a percept. Libet and his co-workers originally proposed that the result could be due either to spatial and temporal facilitation of the underlying neurons or additionally to a prolonged central processing time. However, over the next four decades, Libet chose to attribute the prolonged latency for evoking conscious experience (...)
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  46.  6
    I. C. Young (1933). A Study of Tremor in Normal Subjects. Journal of Experimental Psychology 16 (5):644.
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  47.  19
    Susan Pockett (2006). The Great Subjective Back-Referral Debate: Do Neural Responses Increase During a Train of Stimuli? Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):551-559.
    Evidence is summarised for and against the hypothesis that potentiation or facilitation of neural responses during a train of threshold-level stimuli occurred in the experiments reported by Libet et al. . It is concluded that such potentiation probably did occur. Since the main arguments for the existence of subjective backwards referral take it as given that such potentiation did not occur, it is further concluded that the main arguments for the existence of subjective backwards referral fail.
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  48.  4
    T. W. Cook (1933). Studies in Cross Education: II. Further Experiments in Mirror Tracing the Star-Shaped Maze. Journal of Experimental Psychology 16 (5):679.
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  49.  9
    Elzbieta Szelag, Krystyna Rymarczyk & Ernst Poppel (2001). Conscious Control of Movements: Increase of Temporal Precision in Voluntarily Delayed Actions. Acta Neurobiologiae Experimentalis 61 (3):175-179.
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  50.  6
    Wing K. Ng, Risa N. Thompson, Stuart A. Yablon & Mark Sherer (2001). Conceptual Dilemmas in Evaluating Individuals with Severely Impaired Consciousness. Brain Injury 15 (7):639-643.
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