Search results for 'Multiple Personality' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. George Graham (1999). Fuzzy Fault Lines: Selves in Multiple Personality Disorder. Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):159-174.score: 240.0
    This paper outlines a multidimensional conception of Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) that differs from the 'orthodox' conception in terms of the content of its commitment to the reality of the self. Unlike the orthodox conception it recognizes that selves are fuzzy entities. By appreciating the possibility that selves are fuzzy entities, it is possible to rebut a form of fictionalism about the self which appeals to clinical data from MPD. Realism about self can be preserved in the face (...)
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  2. Logi Gunnarsson (2010). Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality. Routledge.score: 240.0
    Introduction -- Am I alone in my body? -- Multiple personality -- Personal identity -- Diachronic identity -- What am I fundamentally? -- Empirical discernability and fission -- My body -- The various senses of personal identity -- Multiple personality and individuation -- Morton Prince's seminal case study the dissociation of a personality -- Philosophical theories of multiple personality -- The coexistence thesis -- Sharing my body -- A criterion of individuation -- (...) personality in therapeutic and biographic discourses -- Multiple personality in literary discourses. (shrink)
     
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  3. Andrew Apter (1991). The Problem of Who: Multiple Personality, Personal Identity, and the Double Brain. Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):219-48.score: 210.0
  4. Stephen E. Braude (1995). First-Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind. Rowman & Littlefield.score: 210.0
    INTRODUCTION Back in the good old days of philosophy — say, around 400 BC, philosophers played a rather prominent role in the community at large. ...
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  5. Margaret A. Boden (1994). Multiple Personality and Computational Models. Philosophy 37:103-114.score: 210.0
  6. Mark T. Brown (2001). Multiple Personality and Personal Identity. Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):435 – 447.score: 184.0
    If personal identity consists in non-branching psychological continuity, then the sharp breaks in psychological connectedness characteristic of Multiple Personality Disorder implicitly commit psychological continuity theories to a metaphysically extravagant reification of alters. Animalist theories of personal identity avoid the reification of alternate personalities by interpreting multiple personality as a failure to integrate alternative autobiographical memory schemata. In the normal case, autobiographical memory cross-classifies a human life, and in so doing provides access to a variety of interpretative (...)
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  7. Steve Matthews (1998). Personal Identity, Multiple Personality Disorder, and Moral Personhood. Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):67-88.score: 184.0
    Marya Schechtman argues that psychological continuity accounts of personal identity, as represented by Derek Parfit's account, fail to escape the circularity objection. She claims that Parfit's deployment of quasi-memory (and other quasi-psychological) states to escape circularity implicitly commit us to an implausible view of human psychology. Schechtman suggests that what is lacking here is a coherence condition, and that this is something essential in any account of personal identity. In response to this I argue first that circularity may be escaped (...)
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  8. Daniel Kolak (1993). Finding Our Selves: Identification, Identity, and Multiple Personality. Philosophical Psychology 6 (4):363-86.score: 184.0
    Many of the differences between empirical/psychological and conceptual/philosophical approaches to the mind can be resolved using a more precise language that is sensitive to both. Distinguishing identification from identity and identification as from identification with, and then defining the experiential concept of the per sonat, provides a walking bridge. Applying the new terminology to increasing degrees of dissociation, from non-pathological cases to multiple personality, shows how our psychologies can profit from philosophical analysis while our philosophies can revise themselves (...)
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  9. James R. Mensch, Multiple Personality Disorder: A Phenomenological/Postmodern Account.score: 180.0
    A striking feature of post-modernism is its distrust of the subject. If the modern period, beginning with Descartes, sought in the subject a source of certainty, an Archimedian point from which all else could be derived, post- modernism has taken the opposite tack. Rather than taking the self as a foundation, it has seen it as founded, as dependent on the accidents which situate consciousness in the world. The same holds for the unity of the subject. Modernity, in its search (...)
     
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  10. Stephen E. Braude, Mediumship and Multiple Personality.score: 180.0
    mainstream academicians. Perhaps the major common area of interest was that of dissociation — in particular, the study of hypnosis and multiple personality, The founders of the S.P.R. believed, along with many others, that dissociative phenomena promised insights into the nature of the mind generally, including..
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  11. Randall R. Lyle (1998). Toward a Hermeneutics of Memory and Multiple Personality. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 5 (2/3):39-43.score: 180.0
    Barnhardt, in “Dissociation: An Evolutionary Interpretation,” makes a case for understanding multiple personality as a “natural”phenomenon resulting from human biological evolution. He also argues that the reason that “multiple personalities” are not encountered more frequently is a result of a social construction encouraging “single” personalities. He concludes that it is from the interaction between the two that ethics derive. In this response I offer an alternative hermeneutic, using memory as the interpretive key, and by introducing Ricoeur’s work (...)
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  12. Grant Gillett (1991). Multiple Personality and Irrationality. Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):103-118.score: 180.0
    Abstract The phenomenology of Multiple Personality (MP) syndrome is used to derive an Aristotelian explanation of the failure to achieve rational integration of mental content. An MP subject is best understood as having failed to master the techniques of integrating conative and cognitive aspects of her mental life. This suggests that in irrationality the subject may lack similar skills basic to the proper articulation and use of mental content in belief formation and control of action. The view that (...)
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  13. Stephen E. Braude (1996). Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 3 (1):37-54.score: 162.0
  14. Grant R. Gillett (1997). A Discursive Account of Multiple Personality Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 4 (3):213-22.score: 162.0
  15. Stephen E. Braude (1996). Multiple Personality Disorder and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (1):37-54.score: 162.0
  16. John P. Lizza (1993). Multiple Personality and Personal Identity Revisited. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (2):263-274.score: 154.0
  17. Nicholas Humphrey & Daniel C. Dennett (1989). Speaking for Our Selves: An Assessment of Multiple Personality Disorder. .score: 150.0
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  18. Ian Hacking (1995). Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory. Princeton University Press.score: 150.0
    Here the distinguished philosopher Ian Hacking uses the MPD epidemic and its links with the contemporary concept of child abuse to scrutinize today's moral...
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  19. J. O. Beahrs (1983). Co-Consciousness: A Common Denominator in Hypnosis, Multiple Personality, and Normalcy. American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis 26:100-13.score: 150.0
  20. Christopher Buford (2011). Review of Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality – Logi Gunnarsson. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):418-420.score: 150.0
  21. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Stephen Behnke (2000). Responsibility in Cases of Multiple Personality Disorder. Noûs 34 (s14):301-323.score: 150.0
  22. George Graham (1996). Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory. Ian Hacking. [REVIEW] Ethics 106 (4):845-.score: 150.0
  23. Peter Barham (1995). Review Symposium on Ian Hacking : Ian Hacking, Rewriting the Soul. Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, £19.95, Pp. Ix + 336. [REVIEW] History of the Human Sciences 8 (4):107-113.score: 150.0
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  24. David C. Thomasma (2000). Moral and Metaphysical Reflections on Multiple Personality Disorder. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 21 (3):235-260.score: 150.0
  25. John P. Lizza (2010). Review of Logi Gunnarsson, Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (3).score: 150.0
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  26. Lynn Stephens (1997). Book Review:Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory Ian Hacking. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 64 (1):185-.score: 150.0
  27. Stephen R. L. Clark (1996). Commentary on "Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility&Quot. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (1):55-57.score: 150.0
  28. P. Henninger (1992). Conditional Handedness: Handedness Changes in Multiple Personality Disordered Subject Reflect Shift in Hemispheric Dominance. Consciousness and Cognition 1 (3):265-287.score: 150.0
  29. George Graham & G. Lynn Stephens (1995). Book Review:First Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind. Stephen F. Braude. [REVIEW] Ethics 105 (3):655-.score: 150.0
  30. Mary Jo Nissen, James L. Ross, Daniel B. Willingham, Thomas B. Mackenzie & Daniel L. Schacter (1994). Evaluating Amnesia in Multiple Personality Disorder. In R. M. Klein & B. K. Doane (eds.), Psychological concepts and dissociative disorders. Erlbaum Associates.score: 150.0
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  31. Stephen E. Braude (1997). Commentary on" A Discursive Account of Multiple Personality Disorder". Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 4 (3):223-226.score: 150.0
  32. Daniel W. Shuman (1996). Commentary on "Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility&Quot;. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (1):59-60.score: 150.0
  33. Ian Hacking (1992). Multiple Personality Disorder and its Hosts. History of the Human Sciences 5 (2):3-31.score: 150.0
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  34. Stanley Krippner (1987). Cross‐Cultural Approaches to Multiple Personality Disorder: Practices in Brazilian Spiritism. Ethos 15 (3):273-295.score: 150.0
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  35. Stanley Krippner (1995). Trance and Possession in Bali: A Window on Western Multiple Personality, Possession Disorder, and Suicide. Anthropology of Consciousness 6 (1):39-40.score: 150.0
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  36. D. G. Benner & C. Stephen Evans (1984). Unity and Multiplicity in Hypnosis, Commissurotomy, and Multiple Personality Disorder. Journal of Mind and Behavior 5:423-431.score: 150.0
  37. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen (1994). Who's Who? Introducing Multiple Personality. In Joan Copjec (ed.), Supposing the Subject. Verso. 45--63.score: 150.0
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  38. Erika Bourguignon (1989). Multiple Personality, Possession Trance, and the Psychic Unity of Mankind. Ethos 17 (3):371-384.score: 150.0
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  39. Stephen Clark (1993). First Person Plural: Multiple Personality and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Books 34 (2):109-112.score: 150.0
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  40. Grant R. Gillett (1986). Multiple Personality and the Concept of a Person. New Ideas in Psychology 4:173-84.score: 150.0
     
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  41. Frank W. Putnam (1992). Multiple Personality Disorder; a Window Into the Organization of Consciousness. In B. Rubik (ed.), The Interrelationship Between Mind and Matter. Center for Frontier Sciences Temple University.score: 150.0
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  42. E. Taylor (2005). Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory. By Ian Hacking. The European Legacy 10 (5):550.score: 150.0
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  43. Roland Wulbert (1976). Conventions of Theorizing and of Multiple Personality. Theory and Society 3 (2):199-222.score: 150.0
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  44. Paul T. Costa & Robert R. McCrae (1987). On the Need for Longitudinal Evidence and Multiple Measures in Behavioral-Genetic Studies of Adult Personality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (1):22.score: 120.0
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  45. Stephen E. Braude (2003). Counting Persons and Living with Alters: Comments on Matthews. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 10 (2):153-156.score: 100.0
    KEYWORDS: dissociation; multiple personality, person, responsibility.
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  46. Jeanette Kennett & Steve Matthews (2003). Delusion, Dissociation and Identity. Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):31-49.score: 90.0
    The condition known as Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) or Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) is metaphysically strange. Can there really be several distinct persons operating in a single body? Our view is that DID sufferers are single persons with a severe mental disorder. In this paper we compare the phenomenology of dissociation between personality states in DID with certain delusional disorders. We argue both that the burden of proof must lie with those who defend the metaphysically extravagant (...) Persons view and that there is little theoretical motivation to yield to that view in light of the fact that the core symptoms of DID bear remarkable similarity to the symptoms of these other disorders where no such extravagance is ever seriously entertained. (shrink)
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  47. Timothy J. Bayne (2002). Moral Status and the Treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder. Journal Of Medicine And Philosophy 27 (1):87-105.score: 90.0
    Many contemporary bioethicists claim that the possession of certain psychological properties is sufficient for having full moral status. I will call this thepsychological approach to full moral status. In this paper, I argue that there is a significant tension between the psychological approach and a widely held model of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID, formerly Multiple Personality Disorder). According to this model, the individual personalities or alters that belong to someone with DID possess those properties that proponents of the (...)
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  48. Valerie Gray Hardcastle & Owen J. Flanagan (1999). Multiplex Vs. Multiple Selves: Distinguishing Dissociative Disorders. The Monist 82 (4):645-657.score: 90.0
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  49. Kathleen V. Wilkes (1981). Multiple Personalty and Personal Identity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (4):331-48.score: 72.0
  50. Jennifer Radden (2004). Identity: Personal Identity, Characterization Identity, and Mental Disorder. In , The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 133--46.score: 70.0
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