Search results for 'Multiple Realizability' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Holger Lyre (2009). The “Multirealization” of Multiple Realizability. In A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction - Abstraction - Analysis. Ontos. 79.score: 240.0
    Multiple Realizability (MR) must still be regarded as one of the principal arguments against type reductionist accounts of higher-order properties and their special laws. Against this I argue that there is no unique MR but rather a multitude of MR categories. In a slogan: MR is itself “multi-realized”. If this is true then we cannot expect one unique reductionist strategy against MR as an anti-reductionist argument. The main task is rather to develop a taxonomy of the wide variety (...)
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  2. David Barrett (2013). Multiple Realizability, Identity Theory, and the Gradual Reorganization Principle. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (2):325-346.score: 240.0
    In the literature on multiple realizability and the identity theory, cases of neural plasticity have enjoyed a very limited role. The present article attempts to remedy this small influence by arguing that clinical and experimental evidence of quite extensive neural reorganization offers compelling support for the claim that psychological kinds are multiply realized in neurological kinds, thus undermining the identity theory. In particular, cases are presented where subjects with no measurable psychological deficits also have vast, though gradually received, (...)
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  3. Ronald P. Endicott (2005). Multiple Realizability. In D. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition. Thomson Gale, Macmillan Reference.score: 240.0
    Multiple realizability has been at the heart of debates about whether the mind reduces to the brain, or whether the items of a special science reduce to the items of a physical science. I analyze the two central notions implied by the concept of multiple realizability: "multiplicity," otherwise known as property variability, and "realizability." Beginning with the latter, I distinguish three broad conceptual traditions. The Mathematical Tradition equates realization with a form of mapping between objects. (...)
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  4. Colin Klein (2013). Multiple Realizability and the Semantic View of Theories. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):683-695.score: 240.0
    Multiply realizable properties are those whose realizers are physically diverse. It is often argued that theories which contain them are ipso facto irreducible. These arguments assume that physical explanations are restricted to the most specific descriptions possible of physical entities. This assumption is descriptively false, and philosophically unmotivated. I argue that it is a holdover from the late positivist axiomatic view of theories. A semantic view of theories, by contrast, correctly allows scientific explanations to be couched in the most perspicuous, (...)
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  5. Ricardo Restrepo (2012). Multiple Realizability and Novel Causal Powers. Abstracta 6 (2):216-230.score: 240.0
    Framed within the dialectic of the causal exclusion argument (Kim 2005), this paper does two things. One, it clarifies some properties of multiple realizability based on its true origin (Turing 1950). And two, it challenges a form of argument Noordhof (1997), Clarke (1999), and Whittle (2007) employ to support the idea that the mental has causal powers not had by its physical realization base (Novel). The paper challenges Novel with ideas derived from multiple realizability, among others.
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  6. Sungsu Kim (2002). Testing Multiple Realizability: A Discussion of Bechtel and Mundale. Philosophy of Science 69 (4):606-610.score: 228.0
    Bechtel and Mundale (1999) argue that multiple realizability is not plausible. They point out that neuroscientists assume that psychological traits are realized similarly in homologous brain structures and contend that a biological aspect of the brain that is relevant to neuropsychological state individuation provides evidence against multiple realizability. I argue that Bechtel and Mundale adduce the wrong sort of evidence against multiple realizability. Homologous traits do not provide relevant evidence. It is homoplasious traits of (...)
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  7. William Ramsey (2006). Multiple Realizability Intuitions and the Functionalist Conception of the Mind. Metaphilosophy 37 (1):53-73.score: 210.0
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  8. G. Witmer (2003). Multiple Realizability and Psychological Laws: Evaluating Kim's Challenge. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. 59.score: 210.0
  9. W. Jaworksi (2002). Multiple-Realizability, Explanation, and the Disjunctive Move. Philosophical Studies 108 (3):298-308.score: 210.0
     
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  10. Sven Walter (2006). Multiple Realizability and Reduction: A Defense of the Disjunctive Move. Metaphysica 7 (1):43-65.score: 198.0
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  11. John Bickle (1992). Multiple Realizability and Psychophysical Reduction. Behavior and Philosophy 20 (1):47-58.score: 192.0
    The argument from multiple realizability is that, because quite diverse physical systems are capable of giving rise to identical psychological phenomena, mental states cannot be reduced to physical states. This influential argument depends upon a theory of reduction that has been defunct in the philosophy of science for at least fifteen years. Better theories are now available.
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  12. Simone Gozzano (2009). Multiple Realizability and Mind-Body Identity. In Marcelo Suarez, Miklos Redei & Mauro Dorato (eds.), Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the a European Philosophy of Science Association. Kluwer.score: 180.0
    In this paper it is argued that the multiple realizability argument and Kripke's argument are based on schemas of identifications rather than identification. In fact, "heat = molecular motion" includes a term "molecular motion" that does not capture a natural kind, nor has a unique referent. If properly framed, this schema suits also for the type identity theory of mind. Some consequences of this point are evaluated.
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  13. William P. Bechtel & Jennifer Mundale (1999). Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and Neural States. Philosophy of Science 66 (2):175-207.score: 180.0
    The claim of the multiple realizability of mental states by brain states has been a major feature of the dominant philosophy of mind of the late 20th century. The claim is usually motivated by evidence that mental states are multiply realized, both within humans and between humans and other species. We challenge this contention by focusing on how neuroscientists differentiate brain areas. The fact that they rely centrally on psychological measures in mapping the brain and do so in (...)
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  14. Elliott Sober (1999). The Multiple Realizability Argument Against Reductionism. Philosophy of Science 66 (4):542-564.score: 180.0
    Reductionism is often understood to include two theses: (1) every singular occurrence that the special sciences can explain also can be explained by physics; (2) every law in a higher-level science can be explained by physics. These claims are widely supposed to have been refuted by the multiple realizability argument, formulated by Putnam (1967, 1975) and Fodor (1968, 1975). The present paper criticizes the argument and identifies a reductionistic thesis that follows from one of the argument's premises.
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  15. Eric Funkhouser (2007). Multiple Realizability. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):303–315.score: 180.0
    b>: This article explains the concept of multiple realizability and its role in the philosophy of mind. In particular, I consider what is required for the multiple realizability of psychological kinds, the relevance of multiple realizability to the reducibility and autonomy of psychology, as well as further refinements of the concept that would prove helpful.
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  16. Jennifer Mundale & William P. Bechtel, Multiple Realizability Revisited.score: 180.0
    The claim of the multiple realizability of mental states by brain states has been a major feature of the dominant philosophy of mind of the late 20th century. The claim is usually motivated by evidence that mental states are multiply realized, both within humans and between humans and other species. We challenge this contention by focusing on how neuroscientists differentiate brain areas. The fact that they rely centrally on psychological measures in mapping the brain and do so in (...)
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  17. Eric Funkhouser (2007). A Liberal Conception of Multiple Realizability. Philosophical Studies 132 (3):467-494.score: 180.0
    While the concept of multiple realizability is widely used, it is seldom rigorously characterized. This paper defends a liberal conception of multiple realizability as sameness of type through _any_ differences in the (lower-level) conditions that give rise to instances of that type. This kind of “sameness through difference” is contrasted with another type of asymmetric dependency relation between properties, multiple _specification_. This liberal conception is then defended from objections, and it is augmented by a concept (...)
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  18. Jonathan Schaffer (2013). Metaphysical Semantics Meets Multiple Realizability. Analysis 73 (4):736-751.score: 180.0
    Metaphysical semantics is supposed to connect the nonfundamental to the fundamental in a distinctively “linguistic” way, explaining how nonfundamental truths can be grounded in fundamental facts , and so inducing a radically eliminative vision of the nonfundamental as mere talk. I wonder how the story goes when a single nonfundamental truth can be grounded in many different fundamental facts. For instance, the truth that Moore has hands can presumably be grounded in many different distributions of fields, arrangements of particles, vibrations (...)
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  19. RW Batterman (2000). Multiple Realizability and Universality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (1):115-145.score: 180.0
    This paper concerns what Jerry Fodor calls a 'metaphysical mystery': How can there by macroregularities that are realized by wildly heterogeneous lower level mechanisms? But the answer to this question is not as mysterious as many, including Jaegwon Kim, Ned Block, and Jerry Fodor might think. The multiple realizability of the properties of the special sciences such as psychology is best understood as a kind of universality, where 'universality' is used in the technical sense one finds in the (...)
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  20. William Jaworski (2002). Multiple-Realizability, Explanation and the Disjunctive Move. Philosophical Studies 108 (3):289 - 308.score: 180.0
    The multiple-realizability argument has been the mainstay ofanti-reductionist consensus in philosophy of mind for the past thirty years. Reductionist opposition to it has sometimes taken the form of the Disjunctive Move: If mental types are multiply-realizable, they are not coextensive with physical types; they might nevertheless be coextensive with disjunctionsof physical types, and those disjunctions could still underwrite psychophysical reduction. Among anti-reductionists, confidence is high that the Disjunctive Move fails; arguments to this effect, however, often leave something to (...)
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  21. Sven Walter (2002). Need Multiple Realizability Deter the Identity-Theorist? Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):51-75.score: 180.0
    I will discuss two possible options how a defender of the type identity-theory with respect to mental properties can avoid the conclusion of Putnam's Multiple Realizability Argument. I begin by offering a rigorous formulation of Putnam's argument, which has been lacking so far in the literature (section 2). This rigorous formulation shows that there are basically two possible options for avoiding the argument's conclusion. Contrary to current mainstream, I reject the first option?Kim's 'local reductionism'?as untenable (section 3). I (...)
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  22. Mark Bauer (2013). Multiple Realizability, Constraints, and Identity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):446-464.score: 180.0
    Shapiro has suggested that the empirical plausibility of the multiple realizability of human-like minds is dubious, because a contrary thesis, the Mental Constraint Thesis, enjoys positive empirical evidence. The Mental Constraint Thesis states that, given the actual physical laws, there is only one way to realize a human-like mind. I will suggest, however, that the Mental Constraint Thesis is not a contrary to the empirical multiple realizability thesis relevant to psychological reduction or autonomy and, as a (...)
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  23. John Bickle (1995). Connectionism, Reduction, and Multiple Realizability. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):29-39.score: 180.0
    I sketch a theory of cognitive representation from recent "connectionist" cognitive science. I then argue that (i) this theory is reducible to neuroscientific theories, yet (ii) its kinds are multiply realized at a neurobiological level. This argument demonstrates that multiple realizability alone is no barrier to the reducibility of psychological theories. I conclude that the multiple realizability argument, the most influential argument against psychophysical reductionism, should be abandoned.
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  24. Ronald P. Endicott (forthcoming). Multiple Realizability. In Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan Press.score: 180.0
    Multiple realizability is a key issue in debates over the nature of mind and reduction in the sciences. The subject consists of two parts:.
     
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  25. Robert Francescotti (1997). What Multiple Realizability Does Not Show. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (1):13-28.score: 180.0
    It is widely held that psychological theories cannot be reduced to those of the natural sciences. Perhaps the most common reason for rejecting psycho-physical reduction is the belief that mental properties are multiply realizable--i.e., that events of different physical types might realize the same mental property. While the multiple realizability argument has had its share of criticism, its major flaw has been overlooked. I aim to show the real reason why the argument fails and why multiple (...) is compatible with even the strongest varieties of reduction. (shrink)
     
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  26. John Heil (1999). Multiple Realizability. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (3):189-208.score: 154.0
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  27. Michael P. Lynch (2004). Truth and Multiple Realizability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.score: 152.0
    Pluralism about truth is the view that there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. When taken to imply that there is more than one concept and property of truth, this position faces a number of troubling objections. I argue that we can overcome these objections, and yet retain pluralism's key insight, by taking truth to be a multiply realizable property of propositions.
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  28. Ellen Clarke (2013). The Multiple Realizability of Biological Individuals. Journal of Philosophy (8).score: 150.0
    Biological theory demands a clear organism concept, but at present biologists cannot agree on one. They know that counting particular units, and not counting others, allows them to generate explanatory and predictive descriptions of evolutionary processes. Yet they lack a unified theory telling them which units to count. In this paper, I offer a novel account of biological individuality, which reconciles conflicting definitions of ‘organism’ by interpreting them as describing alternative realisers of a common functional role, and then defines individual (...)
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  29. Carl Gillett (2003). The Metaphysics of Realization, Multiple Realizability, and the Special Sciences. Journal of Philosophy 100 (11):591-603.score: 150.0
  30. Andrew R. Bailey, Multiple Realizability, Qualia, and Natural Kinds.score: 150.0
    Are qualia natural kinds? In order to give this question slightly more focus, and to show why it might be an interesting question, let me begin by saying a little about what I take qualia to be, and what natural kinds. For the purposes of this paper, I shall be assuming a fairly full-blooded kind of phenomenal realism about qualia: qualia, thus, include the qualitative painfulness of pain (rather than merely the functional specification of pain states), the qualitative redness in (...)
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  31. John Bickle, Multiple Realizability. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 150.0
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  32. Mehdi Nasrin (2000). Multiple Realizability: Also a Difficulty for Functionalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):25-34.score: 150.0
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  33. John Bolender (1995). Is Multiple Realizability Compatible with Antireductionism? Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):129-42.score: 150.0
    Jaegwon Kim attempts to pose a dilemma for anyone who would deny mind/body reductionism, namely that one must either advocate the wholesale reduction of psychology to physical science or the sundering of psychology into distinct fields each one of which is reducible to physical science. Supposedly, the denial of mind/body reduction is not an option. My aim is to show that this is not a genuine dilemma, and that antireductionism is an option, if one recognizes that natural-kind individuation is not (...)
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  34. J. Schwartz (1992). Who's Afraid of Multiple Realizability?: Functionalism, Reductionism, and Connectionism. In J. Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Lawrence Erlbaum.score: 150.0
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  35. Lawrence A. Shapiro, The Metaphysics of Multiple Realizability: It's Like Apples and Oranges.score: 150.0
     
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  36. Louise M. Antony (1999). Multiple Realizability, Projectibility, and the Reality of Mental Properties. Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):1-24.score: 150.0
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  37. Lawrence A. Shapiro, Neural Plasticity and Multiple Realizability.score: 150.0
     
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  38. Ron McClamrock (1994). Kim on Multiple Realizability and Causal Types. Analysis 54 (4):248-252.score: 150.0
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  39. Sergio Balari & Guillermo Lorenzo (forthcoming). Ahistorical Homology and Multiple Realizability. Philosophical Psychology:1-22.score: 150.0
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  40. Mark Bauer (2012). Multiple Realizability as Compatible with the Mental Constraint Thesis. Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (1):119-127.score: 150.0
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  41. Heimir Geirsson (2011). Multiple Realizability, Physical Constraints, and Possibilities. Southwest Philosophy Review 27 (2):53-56.score: 150.0
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  42. Simone Gozzano (2010). Multiple Realizability and Mind-Body Identity. In. In M. Dorato M. Suàrez (ed.), Epsa Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer. 119--127.score: 150.0
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  43. Sven Walter & Markus Eronen (2011). Reduction, Multiple Realizability, and Levels of Reality. In Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.), Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Continuum. 138.score: 150.0
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  44. Sungsu Kim (2009). Multiple Realizations, Diverse Implementations and Antireductionism. Theoria 75 (3):232-244.score: 130.0
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  45. Jacqueline Anne Sullivan (2008). Memory Consolidation, Multiple Realizations, and Modest Reductions. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):501-513.score: 100.0
    This article investigates several consequences of a recent trend in philosophy of mind to shift the relata of realization from mental state–physical state to function‐mechanism. It is shown, by applying both frameworks to the neuroscientific case study of memory consolidation, that, although this shift can be used to avoid the immediate antireductionist consequences of the traditional argument from multiple realizability, what is gained is a far more modest form of reductionism than recent philosophical accounts have intimated and neuroscientists (...)
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  46. Tuomas K. Pernu (2014). Causal Exclusion and Multiple Realizations. Topoi 33 (2):525-530.score: 100.0
    A critical analysis of recent interventionist responses to the causal exclusion problem is presented. It is argued that the response can indeed offer a solution to the problem, but one that is based on renouncing the multiple realizability thesis. The account amounts to the rejection of nonreductive physicalism and would thus be unacceptable to many. It is further shown that if the multiple realizability thesis is brought back in and conjoined with the interventionist notion of causation, (...)
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  47. K. I. M. Sungsu (2009). Multiple Realizations, Diverse Implementations and Antireductionism. Theoria 75 (3):232-244.score: 100.0
    It has been debated what implications multiple realizability has for reductionism. I claim that more explicit attention needs to be paid to the distinction between multiple realizations of kinds and diverse implementations of laws. In this paper, I distinguish two different theses on the relations between multiple realization and diverse implementation: one thesis states that multiple realizations imply diverse implementations and the other states the converse. I claim that although antireductionism might turn out to be (...)
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  48. Thomas W. Polger (2002). Putnam's Intuition. Philosophical Studies 109 (2):143-70.score: 90.0
    Multiple realizability has recently attractedrenewed attention, for example Bickle, 1998;Bechtel and Mundale, 1999; Bechtel and McCauley,1999; Heil, 1999; and Sober, 1999. Many of thesewriters revisit the topic of multiplerealizability in order to show that someversion of a mind-brain identity theory isviable. Although there is much of value inthese recent explorations, they do not addressthe underlying intuitions that have vexedphilosophers of mind since Hilary Putnamintroduced the concern (1967). I argue that thestandard way of construing multiplerealizability is a much stronger (...)
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  49. Ronald P. Endicott (1994). Constructival Plasticity. Philosophical Studies 74 (1):51-75.score: 90.0
    Some scientists and philosophers have claimed that there is a converse to multiple realizability. While a given higher-level property can be realized by different lower-level properties (multiple realizability), a given lower-level property can in turn serve to realize different higher-level properties (this converse I dubbed the unfortunately obscure "constructival plasticity" to emphasize the constructive metaphysics involved when realizing properties generate realized properties in the stated way). I begin by defining multiple realizabilty in a formal way, (...)
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