Search results for 'Murat Ersan' (try it on Scholar)

110 found
Sort by:
  1. Erkan Tin, Varol Akman & Murat Ersan (1995). Towards Situation-Oriented Programming Languages. Philosophical Explorations.score: 240.0
    Recently, there have been some attempts towards developing programming languages based on situation theory. These languages employ situation-theoretic constructs with varying degrees of divergence from the ontology of the theory. In this paper, we review three of these programming languages.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Murat Ersan & Varol Akman (1995). Situated Modeling of Epistemic Puzzles. Philosophical Explorations.score: 240.0
    Situation theory is a mathematical theory of meaning introduced by Jon Barwise and John Perry. It has evoked great theoretical interest and motivated the framework of a few `computational' systems. PROSIT is the pioneering work in this direction. Unfortunately, there is a lack of real-life applications on these systems and this study is a preliminary attempt to remedy this deficiency. Here, we solve a group of epistemic puzzles using the constructs provided by PROSIT.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Daniel Murat (2002). L'Ruvre des Ouvriers. Lettre de Pauline Jaricot (Décembre 1848). Clio 15:190-197.score: 30.0
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. [deleted]Dwyer Dominic, Harrison Ben, Yucel Murat, Pantelis Christos, Allen Nicholas & Fornito Alex (2013). Brain Network Correlates of Adolescent Interference Control. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.score: 30.0
  5. L. Murat (2005). The Invention of the Neuter. Diogenes 52 (4):61-72.score: 30.0
    The third sex, which for a long period of history meant the androgyne and the homosexual, took on a new sense around 1900, when it was applied to emancipated women, who were featured by novelists and analysed by psychiatrists. Assimilated with lesbians, 'desexualized' by their modern way of life, they were labelled 'neuter', worker bees in a hive-state where 'female–male' markers were tending to disappear. Neither men in sex, nor women in gender (at least according to traditional assumptions), they constituted (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Laure Murat (2004). L'invention du neutre. Diogène 208 (4):72.score: 30.0
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Mirosław Murat (1999). Tożsamość- jednostka- osoba. Colloquia Communia 69 (2):160-163.score: 30.0
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. David Bain (2010). Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study, Edited by Murat Aydede. [REVIEW] Mind 119 (474):451-456.score: 18.0
    Review of Murat Aydede's edited collection, *Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study".
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Aude Fauvel (2013). Laure Murat, La Loi du genre. Une Histoire culturelle du « troisième sexe ». Clio 1:254-257.score: 15.0
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Josefine Raasch (2011). Murat and Nevin and the Divided Past. Agora 46 (1):33.score: 15.0
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Cássio Dos Santos Tomaim & Valquiria Rodrigues Reis Tomaim (2014). O Estranhamento Como Matriz Estética Em Brava Gente Brasileira, de Lúcia Murat -Doi: 10.4025/Dialogos.V17i3.811. Dialogos 17 (3).score: 15.0
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Robert D'Amico (2005). Sensations and Methodology. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.score: 6.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Shaun Gallagher & Morten Overgaard (2005). Introspections Without Introspeculations. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.score: 6.0
  14. Bernadine Barnes (forthcoming). The Chronicle of Le Murate. The European Legacy:1-2.score: 5.0
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere (2005). Concepts, Introspection, and Phenomenal Consciousness: An Information-Theoretical Approach. Noûs 39 (2):197-255.score: 3.0
    This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic struc-ture that closely (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Murat Aydede (2009). Is Feeling Pain the Perception of Something? Journal of Philosophy 106 (10):531-567.score: 3.0
    According to the increasingly popular perceptual/representational accounts of pain (and other bodily sensations such as itches, tickles, orgasms, etc.), feeling pain in a body region is perceiving a non-mental property or some objective condition of that region, typically equated with some sort of (actual or potential) tissue damage. In what follows I argue that given a natural understanding of what sensory perception requires and how it is integrated with (dedicated) conceptual systems, these accounts are mistaken. I will also examine the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Peter Fazekas & Zoltán Jakab, Sensory Representation and Cognitive Architecture: An Alternative to Phenomenal Concepts.score: 3.0
    We present a cognitive-physicalist account of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that phenomenal concepts do not differ from other types of concepts. When explaining the peculiarities of conscious experience, the right place to look at is sensory/ perceptual representations and their interaction with general conceptual structures. We utilize Jerry Fodor’s psycho- semantic theory to formulate our view. We compare and contrast our view with that of Murat Aydede and Güven Güzeldere, who, using Dretskean psychosemantic theory, arrived at a solution different (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Murat Aydede, Are Phenomenal Zombies Really Conceivable?score: 3.0
    I argue that if we have a rich enough description of perceptual experiences from an information-theoretic viewpoint, it becomes surprisingly difficult (to put it mildly) to positively conceive philosophical zombies (as complete physical/functional duplicates that lack phenomenal consciousness). Hence, it is at best an open question whether zombies are positively conceivable. My argument requires paying close attention to the direct relation between phenomenology and information.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere (2000). Consciousness, Intentionality, and Intelligence: Some Foundational Issues for Artificial Intelligence. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 12 (3):263-277.score: 3.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Murat Aydede, The Language of Thought Hypothesis. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 3.0
  21. Murat Aydede (ed.) (2005). Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. MIT Press.score: 3.0
  22. Murat Aydede, Language of Thought Hypothesis: State of the Art.score: 3.0
    The Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH) is an empirical thesis about thought and thinking. For their explication, it postulates a physically realized system of representations that have a combinatorial syntax (and semantics) such that operations on representations are causally sensitive only to the syntactic properties of representations. According to LOTH, thought is, roughly, the tokening of a representation that has a syntactic (constituent) structure with an appropriate semantics. Thinking thus consists in syntactic operations defined over representations. Most of the arguments (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Murat Aydede (1995). Connectionism and the Language of Thought. CSLI Technical Report.score: 3.0
    Fodor and Pylyshyn's (F&P) critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought'' (LOT). Some connectionists declined to meet the challenge on the basis that the alleged regularities are somehow spurious. Some, like Smolensky, however, took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that are supposed to be non-classical.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Murat Aydede (2003). Is Introspection Inferential? In Brie Gertler (ed.), Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. Ashgate.score: 3.0
    I introduce the Displaced Perception Model of Introspection developed by Dretske which treats introspection of phenomenal states as inferential and criticize it.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Murat Aydede (2001). Naturalism, Introspection, and Direct Realism About Pain. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):29-73.score: 3.0
    This paper examines pain states (and other intransitive bodily sensations) from the perspective of the problems they pose for pure informational/representational approaches to naturalizing qualia. I start with a comprehensive critical and quasi-historical discussion of so-called Perceptual Theories of Pain (e.g., Armstrong, Pitcher), as these were the natural predecessors of the more modern direct realist views. I describe the theoretical backdrop (indirect realism, sense-data theories) against which the perceptual theories were developed. The conclusion drawn is that pure representationalism about pain (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Murat Aydede (1998). Fodor on Concepts and Frege Puzzles. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):289-294.score: 3.0
    ABSTRACT. Fodor characterizes concepts as consisting of two dimensions: one is content, which is purely denotational/broad, the other the Mentalese vehicle bearing that content, which Fodor calls the Mode of Presentation (MOP), understood "syntactically." I argue that, so understood, concepts are not interpersonally sharable; so Fodor's own account violates what he calls the Publicity Constraint in his (1998) book. Furthermore, I argue that Fodor's non-semantic, or "syntactic," solution to Frege cases succumbs to the problem of providing interpersonally applicable functional roles (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere (2001). Consciousness, Conceivability Arguments, and Perspectivalism: The Dialectics of the Debate. Communication and Cognition 34 (1-2):99-122.score: 3.0
  28. Murat Aydede (2000). An Analysis of Pleasure Vis-a-Vis Pain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):537-570.score: 3.0
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Murat Aydede (2000). Emotions or Emotional Feelings? (Commentary on Rolls' The Brain and Emotion). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):192-194.score: 3.0
    It turns out that Rolls’s answer to Nagel’s (1974) question, "What is it like to be a bat?" is brusque: there is nothing it is like to be a bat . . . provided that bats don’t have a linguistically structured internal representational system that enables them to think about their first-order thoughts which are also linguistically structured. For phenomenal consciousness, a properly functioning system of higher-order linguistic thought (HOLT) is necessary (Rolls 1998, p. 262). By this criterion, not only (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Murat Aydede (1997). Language of Thought: The Connectionist Contribution. Minds and Machines 7 (1):57-101.score: 3.0
    Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique of connectionism has posed a challenge to connectionists: Adequately explain such nomological regularities as systematicity and productivity without postulating a "language of thought" (LOT). Some connectionists like Smolensky took the challenge very seriously, and attempted to meet it by developing models that were supposed to be non-classical. At the core of these attempts lies the claim that connectionist models can provide a representational system with a combinatorial syntax and processes sensitive to syntactic structure. They are not (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (2001). Are Frege Cases Exceptions to Intentional Generalizations? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-22.score: 3.0
    This piece criticizes Fodor's argument (in The Elm and the Expert, 1994) for the claim that Frege cases should be treated as exceptions to (broad) psychological generalizations rather than as counterexamples.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Murat Aydede & Guven Guzeldere (2002). Some Foundational Problems in the Scientific Study of Pain. Philosophy of Science Supplement 69 (3):265-83.score: 3.0
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Murat Aydede (2005). Computation and Functionalism: Syntactic Theory of Mind Revisited. In G. Irzik & G. Guezeldere (eds.), Turkish Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Springer.score: 3.0
    There is a thesis often aired by some philosophers of psychology that syntax is all we need and there is no need to advert to intentional/semantic properties of symbols for purposes of psychological explanation. Indeed, the worry has been present since the first explicit articulation of so-called Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Even Fodor, who has been the most ardent defender of the Language of Thought Hypoth- esis (LOTH) (which requires the CTM), has raised worries about its apparent consequences. The (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson (2014). Affect: Representationalists' Headache. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):175-198.score: 3.0
    Representationalism is the view that the phenomenal character of experiences is identical to their representational content of a certain sort. This view requires a strong transparency condition on phenomenally conscious experiences. We argue that affective qualities such as experienced pleasantness or unpleasantness are counter-examples to the transparency thesis and thus to the sort of representationalism that implies it.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Murat Aydede (1997). Has Fodor Really Changed His Mind on Narrow Content? Mind and Language 12 (3-4):422-58.score: 3.0
    In his latest book, The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor notoriously rejects the notion of narrow content as superfluous. He envisions a scientific intentional psychology that adverts only to broad content properties in its explanations. I argue that Fodor's change in view is only apparent and that his previous position (1985-1991) is extensionally equivalent to his "new" position (1994). I show that, despite what he says narrow content is for in his (1994), Fodor himself has previously never appealed to (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Güven Güzeldere & Murat Aydede (1997). On the Relation Between Phenomenal and Representational Properties. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):151-153.score: 3.0
    We argue that Block's charge of fallacy remains ungrounded so long as the existence of P-consciousness, as Block construes it, is independently established. This, in turn, depends on establishing the existence of “phenomenal properties” that are essentially not representational, cognitive, or functional. We argue that Block leaves this fundamental thesis unsubstantiated. We conclude by suggesting that phenomenal consciousness can be accounted for in terms of a hybrid set of representational and functional properties.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. John Sutton (2009). Remembering. In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge University Press.score: 3.0
    Philip Robbins and Murat Aydede (eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 217-235.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Murat Aydede, Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.score: 3.0
    I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the Transparency Datum (TD). Pain experiences are consistent with TD. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis (ST) that is entailed by (strong) representationalism about phenomenology. I argue that pain experiences (as well as some other similar experiences) are not transparent in this strong sense. Hence I argue that representationalism is false. Then, I outline a framework about how the introspection (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Murat Aydede (2000). On the Type/Token Relation of Mental Representations. Facta Philosophica 2 (1):23-50.score: 3.0
    According to the Computational/Representational Theory of Thought (CRTT ? Language of Thought Hypothesis, or LOTH), propositional attitudes, such as belief, desire, and the like, are triadic relations among subjects, propositions, and internal mental representations. These representations form a representational _system_ physically realized in the brain of sufficiently sophisticated cognitive organisms. Further, this system of representations has a combinatorial syntax and semantics, but the processes that operate on the representations are causally sensitive only to their syntax, not to their semantics. On (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Murat Aydede, Pain. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 3.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Murat Baç (2004). Can Realists Know That They Know? Acta Analytica 19 (32):65-90.score: 3.0
    Realists typically suppose that nonepistemic truth is an independent condition on propositional knowledge. Few philosophers, however, have seriously questioned the meta-epistemic consequences of combining alethic and epistemic variants of realism. In this paper I aim to show that the truth condition in the customary definition of knowledge presents an important problem for the realist at higher epistemic levels. According to my argument, traditional epistemic-logical analyses of metaknowledge fail because of their extensionalism and certain presuppositions they have about the satisfaction of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Murat Baç (2003). The Ontological Status of Truthmakers: An Alternative to Tractarianism and Metaphysical Anti-Realism. Metaphysica 4 (2):5-28.score: 3.0
    This paper aims to describe and defend a Pluralistic Kantian, as opposed to a Tractarian, version of realism vis-à-vis the ontological basis of truthmaking relations. One underlying assumption of my position is that propositional truth is a robust property and, consequently, is normatively distinct from epistemic justification. Still, it does not follow from this realist contention that truth is generated ontologically, viz., independently of cognitive and intensional contributions of human agents. This point brings my view notably close to H. Putnam’s (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Murat Aydede (1998). Aristotle on Episteme and Nous: The Posterior Analytics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):15-46.score: 3.0
    According to the standard and largely traditional interpretation, Aristotle’s conception of nous, at least as it occurs in the Posterior Analytics, is geared against a certain set of skeptical worries about the possibility of scientific knowledge, and ultimately of the knowledge of Aristotelian first principles. On this view, Aristotle introduces nous as an intuitive faculty that grasps the first principles once and for all as true in such a way that it does not leave any room for the skeptic to (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Murat Aydede (1999). What Makes Perceptual Symbols Perceptual? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):610-611.score: 3.0
    It is argued that three major attempts by Barsalou to specify what makes a perceptual symbol perceptual fail. It is suggested that one way to give such an account is to employ the symbols.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Murat Aydede (2008). Review of Nikola Grahek, Feeling Pain and Being in Pain. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (1).score: 3.0
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Murat Bac & Nurbay Irmak (2011). Knowing Wrongly: An Obvious Oxymoron, or a Threat for the Alleged Universality of Epistemological Analyses? Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):305-321.score: 3.0
    The traditional tripartite and tetrapartite analyses describe the conceptual components of propositional knowledge from a universal epistemic point of view. According to the classical analysis, since truth is a necessary condition of knowledge, it does not make sense to talk about “false knowledge” or “knowing wrongly.” There are nonetheless some natural languages in which speakers ordinarily make statements about a person’s knowing a given subject matter wrongly. In this paper, we first provide a brief analysis of “knowing wrongly” in Turkish. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson (forthcoming). Reasons and Theories of Sensory Affect. In David Bain, Michael Brady & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Nature of Pain.score: 3.0
    [Penultimate draft] Some sensory experiences are pleasant, some unpleasant. This is a truism. But understanding what makes these experiences pleasant and unpleasant is not an easy job. Various difficulties and puzzles arise as soon as we start theorizing. There are various philosophical theories on offer that seem to give different accounts for the positive or negative affective valences of sensory experiences. In this paper, we will look at the current state of art in the philosophy of mind, present the main (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Murat Baç & Renée Elio (2004). Scheme-Based Alethic Realism: Agency, the Environment, and Truthmaking. Minds and Machines 14 (2):173-196.score: 3.0
    This paper presents a position called Scheme-based Alethic Realism, which reconciles a realist position on the nature of truth with a pluralistic Kantian perspective that allows for multiple environments in which truthmaking relationships are established. We argue that truthmaking functions are constrained by a stable phenomenal world and a stable cognitive architecture. This account takes truth as normatively distinct from epistemic justification while relativizing the truth conditions of our statements to what we call Frameworks. The pluralistic aspect allows that these (...)
    Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Murat Baç (2010). Truth as One and Many. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):122 – 125.score: 3.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 110