1. Myrto I. Mylopoulos (forthcoming). Agentive Awareness is Not Sensory Awareness. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    In this paper, I argue that the conscious awareness one has of oneself as acting, i.e., agentive awareness, is not a type of sensory awareness. After providing some set up in Sect. 1, I move on in Sect. 2 to sketch a profile of sensory agentive experiences (SAEs) as representational states with sensory qualities by which we come to be aware of ourselves as performing actions. In Sect. 3, I critique two leading arguments in favor of positing such sensory experiences: (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Myrto I. Mylopoulos & David Pereplyotchik (2013). Is There Any Evidence for Forward Modeling in Language Production? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):368-369.
    The neurocognitive evidence that Pickering & Garrod (P&G) cite in favor of positing forward models in speech production is not compelling. The data to which they appeal either cannot be explained by forward models, or can be explained by a more parsimonious model.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Myrto I. Mylopoulos (2011). Why Reject a Sensory Imagery Theory of Control Consciousness? Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):268-272.
    Mandik (2010) defends a motor theory of control consciousness according to which nonsensory states, like motor commands, directly contribute to the awareness we have of ourselves as being in control of our actions. Along the way, he argues that his theory is to be preferred over Prinz’s (2007) sensory imagery theory, which denies that nonsensory states play any direct role in the generation of control consciousness. I argue that Mandik’s criticisms of Prinz’s theory fall short, but that nonetheless there are (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation