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Nomy Arpaly [42]N. Arpaly [1]
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Profile: Nomy Arpaly (Brown University)
  1. Nomy Arpaly (2003). Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency. Oxford University Press.
    Nomy Arpaly rejects the model of rationality used by most ethicists and action theorists. Both observation and psychology indicate that people act rationally without deliberation, and act irrationally with deliberation. By questioning the notion that our own minds are comprehensible to us--and therefore questioning much of the current work of action theorists and ethicists--Arpaly attempts to develop a more realistic conception of moral agency.
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  2.  45
    Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder (2014). In Praise of Desire. OUP.
    Joining the debate over the roles of reason and appetite in the moral mind, In Praise of Desire takes the side of appetite. Acting for moral reasons, acting in a praiseworthy manner, and acting out of virtue are simply acting out of intrinsic desires for the right or the good.
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  3.  6
    Nomy Arpaly (2006). Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will. Princeton University Press.
    Perhaps everything we think, feel, and do is determined, and humans--like stones or clouds--are slaves to the laws of nature. Would that be a terrible state? Philosophers who take the incompatibilist position think so, arguing that a deterministic world would be one without moral responsibility and perhaps without true love, meaningful art, and real rationality. But compatibilists and semicompatibilists argue that determinism need not worry us. As long as our actions stem, in an appropriate way, from us, or respond in (...)
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  4. N. Arpaly & T. Schroeder (2012). Deliberation and Acting for Reasons. Philosophical Review 121 (2):209-239.
    Theoretical and practical deliberation are voluntary activities, and like all voluntary activities, they are performed for reasons. To hold that all voluntary activities are performed for reasons in virtue of their relations to past, present, or even merely possible acts of deliberation thus leads to infinite regresses and related problems. As a consequence, there must be processes that are nondeliberative and nonvoluntary but that nonetheless allow us to think and act for reasons, and these processes must be the ones that (...)
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  5. Nomy Arpaly (2000). On Acting Rationally Against One's Best Judgment. Ethics 110 (3):488-513.
    I argue that akrasia is not always significantly irrational. To be more precise, I argue that an agent is sometimes more rational for being akratic then she would have been for being enkratic or strong-willed.
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  6. Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder (1999). Praise, Blame and the Whole Self. Philosophical Studies 93 (2):161-188.
    What is that makes an act subject to either praise or blame? The question has often been taken to depend entirely on the free will debate for an answer, since it is widely agreed that an agent’s act is subject to praise or blame only if it was freely willed, but moral theory, action theory, and moral psychology are at least equally relevant to it. In the last quarter-century, following the lead of Harry Frankfurt’s (1971) seminal article “Freedom (...)
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  7.  73
    Nomy Arpaly (2015). Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, by Levy, Neil. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):829-831.
  8. Nomy Arpaly (2002). Moral Worth. Journal of Philosophy 99 (5):223-245.
    I argue that a right action has moral worth if and only if it is done for the right reasons - that is, for its right-making features. The reasons the agent acts on have to be identical to the reasons for which the action is right. I argue that Kantians are wrong in thinking that a right action has moral worth iff it is done because the agent thinks it is right, giving examples of morally worthy actions that are done (...)
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  9.  71
    Nomy Arpaly (2014). Duty, Desire and the Good Person: Towards a Non‐Aristotelian Account of Virtue. Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):59-74.
    This paper presents an account of the virtuous person, which I take to be the same as the good person. I argue that goodness in a person is based on her desires. Contra Aristotelians, I argue that one does not need wisdom to be good. There can be a perfectly good person with mental retardation or autism. Contra Kantians, I argue that the sense of duty - which does exist! - is compatible with a desire-based moral psychology.
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  10.  73
    Nomy Arpaly & John Doris (2005). Review: Comments on "Lack of Character" by John Doris. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):643-647.
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  11. Nomy Arpaly (2002). Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency. Oxford University Press Usa.
    Both observation and psychology indicate that people act rationally without deliberation, and act irrationally with deliberation. By questioning the notion that our own minds are comprehensible to us--and therefore questioning much of the current work of action theorists and ethicists--Arpaly attempts to develop a more realistic conception of moral agency.
     
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  12. Nomy Arpaly (2005). How It is Not "Just Like Diabetes": Mental Disorders and the Moral Psychologist. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):282–298.
    Many psychiatrists tell their clients that any mental disorder is ‘‘a disease, just like diabetes’’. This slogan appears to suggest that mental states and behavior that are classified ‘‘mental disorders’’ are somehow radically different from other mental states and behaviors—both when it comes to simply understanding people and when it comes to moral assessments of mental states and of actions. After all, mental illness is just like diabetes, while other human conditions are not. That sounds like a huge difference. I (...)
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  13.  50
    Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder (2014). Précis of In Praise of Desire. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):490-495.
  14. Nomy Arpaly (2004). Unprincipled Virtue. Journal of Ethics 8 (2):201-204.
    Nomy Arpaly rejects the model of rationality used by most ethicists and action theorists. Both observation and psychology indicate that people act rationally without deliberation, and act irrationally with deliberation. By questioning the notion that our own minds are comprehensible to us--and therefore questioning much of the current work of action theorists and ethicists--Arpaly attempts to develop a more realistic conception of moral agency.
     
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  15. Nomy Arpaly (2011). The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 120 (4):607-609.
  16. Nomy Arpaly (2011). Open-Mindedness as a Moral Virtue. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1):75.
    Open-mindedness appears to be a cognitive disposition: an open-minded person is disposed to gain, lose, and revise beliefs in a particular, reasonable way. It is also a moral virtue, for we blame, for example, the man who quickly comes to think a new neighbor untrustworthy because he drives the wrong car or wears the wrong clothes—for his closed-mindedness. How open–mindedness could be a moral virtue is a puzzle, though, because exercises of moral virtues are expressions of moral concern, whereas gaining, (...)
     
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  17.  87
    Nomy Arpaly (2007). Review: Reply to Harman, Stroud and Mason: Nomy Arpaly. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 134 (3):457 - 465.
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  18. Nomy Arpaly (2007). Unprincipled Virtue—Synopsis (of Sorts). Philosophical Studies 134 (3):429 - 431.
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  19.  75
    Nomy Arpaly (2000). Hamlet and the Utilitarians. Philosophical Studies 99 (1):45-57.
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  20. Nomy Arpaly (2004). Review: Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes From Harry Frankfurt. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (452):744-747.
  21.  52
    Timothy Schroeder & Nomy Arpaly (1999). Alienation and Externality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):371-387.
    Harry Frankfurt introduces the concept of externality. Externality is supposed to be a fact about the structure of an agent's will. We argue that the pre-theorethical basis of externality has a lot more to do with feelings of alienation than it does with the will. Once we realize that intuitions about externality are guided by intuitions about feelings of alienation surprising conclusions follow regarding the structure of our will.
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  22.  18
    Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder (2014). Replies to Critics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):509-515.
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  23.  13
    Nomy Arpaly (2004). 8 Which Autonomy? In M. O.’Rourke J. K. Campbell (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. MIT 173.
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  24.  63
    Nomy Arpaly (2002). The Utilitarian's Song. Utilitas 14 (1):1.
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  25.  16
    Joshua Alexander, Mark Alicke, Holly Andersen, Michael Anderson, Kristin Andrews, István Aranyosi, Adam Arico, Nomy Arpaly, Robert Audi & Andrew R. Bailey (2012). Philosophical Psychology Would Like to Thank the Following for Contributing to the Journal as Reviewers This Past Year: Fred Adams Kenneth Aizawa. Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):161-163.
  26.  56
    Nomy Arpaly (2007). Reply to Pippin. Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):303 – 307.
    I argue that in his response to me Robert Pippin misrepresents my view of akrasia (partially because of what looks like his strong disbelief in the existence of akrasia) as well as expresses a false view of the way a generalizing moral theory is supposed to apply to specific cases. The last issue is related to particularism, which I turn to discuss, arguing that one familiar way in which it seems attractive is a misleading one.
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  27.  4
    Nomy Arpaly (2009). 2 Reason Responsiveness in a Deterministic World. In Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will. Princeton University Press 40-85.
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  28.  1
    Nomy Arpaly (2007). Unprincipled Virtue—Synopsis. Philosophical Studies 134 (3):429-431.
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  29.  2
    Nomy Arpaly (2009). 1 Praise and Blame: Toward a New Compatibilism. In Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will. Princeton University Press 9-39.
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  30.  2
    Nomy Arpaly (2009). 4 When Cheap Will Just Won’T Do. In Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will. Princeton University Press 117-138.
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  31.  12
    Nomy Arpaly (2002). Edna Ullman‐Margalit, Ed., Reasoning Practically:Reasoning Practically. Ethics 112 (4):878-880.
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  32.  1
    Nomy Arpaly (2009). 3 Ought Implies Can? An Argument From Epistemology. In Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will. Princeton University Press 86-108.
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  33.  1
    Nomy Arpaly (2009). INTERLUDE. The Science Fiction of Mind Design. In Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will. Princeton University Press 109-116.
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  34. Nomy Arpaly (2009). Acknowledgments. In Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will. Princeton University Press
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  35. Nomy Arpaly (2009). Bibliography. In Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will. Princeton University Press 139-142.
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  36. Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder (forthcoming). Book Forum on In Praise of Desire, Oxford University Press, 2013. Journal of Value Inquiry:1-8.
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  37. Nomy Arpaly (2009). Contents. In Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will. Princeton University Press
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  38. Nomy Arpaly (2009). Introduction. In Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will. Princeton University Press 1-8.
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  39. Nomy Arpaly (2009). Index. In Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will. Princeton University Press 143-148.
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  40. Nomy Arpaly (1998). In Defense of Deep Virtue Ethics. Dissertation, Stanford University
    In this dissertation, I defend two main claims: the moral worth of actions depends on the agent's overall character rather than merely on the agent's concern for morality; and for an action to have moral worth it is not necessary for the agent to perform it out of concern for morality. My defense of both claims greatly relies on intuitions we have about people who do the right thing despite the fact that their moral beliefs, and hence their concern for (...)
     
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  41. Nomy Arpaly (2007). Reply to Harman, Stroud and Mason––Nomy Arpaly. Philosophical Studies 134 (3):457-465.
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  42. Nomy Arpaly (2004). Which Autonomy. In M. O.’Rourke J. K. Campbell (ed.), Freedom and Determinism. MIT 173--188.
     
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  43. Susan Wolf, Stephen Macedo, John Koethe, Robert M. Adams, Nomy Arpaly & Jonathan Haidt (2010). Meaning in Life and Why It Matters. Princeton University Press.
    Most people, including philosophers, tend to classify human motives as falling into one of two categories: the egoistic or the altruistic, the self-interested or the moral. According to Susan Wolf, however, much of what motivates us does not comfortably fit into this scheme. Often we act neither for our own sake nor out of duty or an impersonal concern for the world. Rather, we act out of love for objects that we rightly perceive as worthy of love--and it is these (...)
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