Online research in philosophy

Sudoku puzzles, which are popular worldwide, require individuals to infer the missing digits in a 9 9 array according to the general rule that every digit from 1 to 9 must occur once in each row, in each column, and in each of the 3-by-3 boxes in the array. We present a theory of how individuals solve these puzzles. It postulates that they rely solely on pure deductions, and that they spontaneously acquire various deductive tactics, which differ in their difficulty (...) depending on their “relational complexity”, i.e., the number of constraints on which they depend. A major strategic shift is necessary to acquire tactics for more difficult puzzles: solvers have to keep track of possible digits in a cell. We report three experiments corroborating this theory. We also discuss their implications for theories of reasoning that downplay the role of deduction in everyday reasoning. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Robert Brandom argues for a "pragmatic phenomenalist account" of knowledge. On this account, we should understand our notion of justification in accordance will a Sellarsian social practice model, and there is nothing more to the phenomenon of knowledge than the proprieties of takings-as-knowing. I agree with these two claims. But Brandom's proposal is so sketchy that it is unclear how it can deal will a number of much-discussed problems in contemporary epistemology. The main purpose of this article is to (...) develop and defend a pragmatic phenomenalist account of knowledge by resolving those problems. I argue, in particular, that thisaccount can accommodate both the lesson of the Gettier problem and the lesson of reliabilism simultaneously.RÉSUMÉ: Robert Brandom soutient une «théorie pragmatique et phénomenaliste» de la connaissance. Selon cette théorie, nous devons comprendre notre notion de justification d'après un modèle sellarsien de la pratique sociale, et il n'y a rien d'autre dans phénomène de connaissance que la pertinence de «prendre-pour-connaître». Je suis tout à fait d'accord avec ces deux opinions. Mais la thèse de Brandom est si sommaire qu'il n'est pas évident de savoir comment elle peut trailer les nombreux problèmes discutés en épistémologie contemporaine. Le but principal de cet article est de développer et défendre une théorie pragmatique et phénomenaliste de la connaissance en résolvant ces problèmes. Je soutiens, en particulier, que cette théorie peut s'accorder en même temps à lerçon du problème de Gettier et au «fiabilisme». (shrink)

Sudoku puzzles, which are popular worldwide, require individuals to infer the missing digits in a 9 9 array according to the general rule that every digit from 1 to 9 must occur once in each row, in each column, and in each of the 3-by-3 boxes in the array. We present a theory of how individuals solve these puzzles. It postulates that they rely solely on pure deductions, and that they spontaneously acquire various deductive tactics, which differ in their difficulty (...) depending on their “relational complexity”, i.e., the number of constraints on which they depend. A major strategic shift is necessary to acquire tactics for more difficult puzzles: solvers have to keep track of possible digits in a cell. We report three experiments corroborating this theory. We also discuss their implications for theories of reasoning that downplay the role of deduction in everyday reasoning. (shrink)

In June 1998 Hans Primas turned 70 y ears old. Although he himself is not fond of jubilees and although he lik es to play the decimal system of numb ers do wn as contingent, this is nev ertheless a suitable o ccasion to re ect on the professional work of one of the rare distinguished contemp orary scientists who attach equal imp ortance to exp erimen tal and theoretical and conceptual lines of researc h. Hans Primas' in terests ha (...) ve covered an enormous range: metho ds and instruments for n uclear magnetic resonance, theoretical c hemistry , C - and W -algebraic formulations of quantum mechanics, the measurement problem and its various implications, holism and realism in quantum theory , theory reduction, the w ork and p ersonality of Wolfgang Pauli, as well as Jungian psychology . In man y of these elds he provided imp ortan t and original fo o d for though t, in some cases going far b eyond the ev eryda y business in the scientic world. As is the case with other scien tists who are conceptually innov ativ e, Hans Primas is read more than he is quoted. His in uence is due to his writings. Even with the current ood of publications, he still p erforms the miracle of ha ving scientists eagerly a waiting his next publication. His external life, by wa y of contrast, is not very sp ectacular. With the exception of a brief p erio d as a guest professor at Washington Univ ersity at St. Louis, he has never b een a wa y from Zuric h for an y length of time. He has nev er b een a warded an y prizes, nev er organized a congress, nev er done any organizational work in a scientic so ciety . He delib erately distanced himself from the hustle and bustle of national and in ternational scien tic business. (shrink)

The radical nub of Byrne & Russon's argument is that passive priming effects can produce much of the evidence of higher-order cognition in nonhuman primates. In support of their position we review evidence of similar behavioral priming effects n humans. However, that evidence further suggests that even program-level imitative behavior can be produced through priming.

Spinoza semble adopter une position pleinement nominaliste lorsqu'il discue des notions universelles dans l'Ethique, mais on y trouve aussi plusieurs arguments où, semble-t-il, des universaux sont présupposés. La solution avancé par plusieurs commentateurs, y compris Haserot, est que le système spinoziste est d'inspiration platoniste, et qu'il faut réinterpréter les passages d'apparence nominaliste pour les accorder avec le platonisme ou l'essentialisme. J'argumente qu'un tel procédé n'est justifié ni par le texte ni par la structure du système de Spinoza. L'interprétation du spinozisme (...) que je propose le place dans le cadre logique du nominalisme contemporain, à l'instar du système de Nelson Goodman, par exemple. (shrink)