The aim of this book is to show why we should hold 'unlearning' to be a crucial ‘capability’ _in_ and _for_ education at this point in our history. The author argues that it enables to pose and take seriously the problem of ‘governmentality’: How are we governed — individually and collectively? Do we wish to be governed in this or that way, to this or that extent, so much, so little, or so badly, under these or those conditions? Or do (...) we wish instead to be self-governed and thereby practice our freedom and be more autonomous, relatively speaking? As such, it puts in question in a radical way the twin pillars of the so-called ‘contemporary consensus’ — ‘representative democracy’ and ‘capitalism’ — and makes it possible to take a critical measure of their limits, insufficiencies, and irremediable deficits. (shrink)

The nature of the process of meaning-making in science has been one of the central problems in the philosophy of science of the 20th century. Yet, in spite of strenuous efforts by many able philosophers and historians of science over the past three decades or so, our understanding of this process continues to be unsatisfactory and fragmented at best. The need for an adequate account has been particularly exacerbated by the "infamous" and often misinterpreted problem of incommensurability , and its (...) alleged consequence, the incomparability of scientific theories--which presumably threatens the rationality, objectivity, and progress of science. ;In this project, I argue that a new and revised cluster theory can be articulated, which meets the objections typically raised against traditional theories of meaning and theories of reference . Such a theory is not only based on more plausible assumptions and principles, but, in addition, it satisfies the main adequacy requirements formulated by proponents of a "cognitive-historical approach" . I am thus concerned not just with refuting "the entering wedge" of the argument against a defense of cluster theory, but with offering a relatively developed theory, sufficiently fleshed out to permit appreciation of its distinctiveness and evaluation of its merits. ;I argue that the new cluster theory provides not only an adequate account of the process of meaning-making in science, but also a nuanced and context-sensitive one, which exhibits the fine-structure of the history of science. It is thus capable of accounting for the different kinds and degrees of meaning and reference changes in science. Furthermore, when applied in a case-study of the "chemical revolution," it accounts for that which has escaped change without discontinuity, or even, as result of a broader framework of continuous conceptual change. The new cluster theory constitutes a proposal showing how the comparability of scientific theories is possible, how we have in fact been comparing them all along, despite "local incommensurabilities" of various kinds and degrees. Such a theory offers new insights into the developments of the chemical revolution in particular, but also into the structure and process of scientific revolutions in general. In short, it gives us a new framework for understanding the rationality, objectivity, and progress of science. (shrink)

Il capitolo riguarda un commento su Maxwell, N. Global philosophy: What philosophy ought to be? Exeter, UK: Imprint-Academic, Societas – Essays in Political & Cultural Criticism..

In the past few decades, ‘postmodern philosophers’ have leveled severe and sustained criticisms against “the Tradition.” They have radically put in question and undermined our traditional conceptions of Philosophy, its tasks and goals, claims and pretensions, methods and methodologies, its public image and selfimage.In short, everything that Philosophers once held dear, and that some still hold dear today, moved as they are by a quest for Certainty and nostalgia for the Absolute. As a result, many have come to view these (...) radical, postmodern criticisms as having brought on the “End of Philosophy.” If this is so, what is to be done? Where do we go from here? What are our real options? What is there left for Philosophers to do, if anything, that is worthwhile and meaningful? Do we simply accept ‘the postmodernists’ verdict,’ and simply take up whatever they have proposed to replace Philosophy? Or do we boldly and imaginatively consider an alternative? In my essay, I sketch out a 10-points proposal for a ‘philosophy’ –after the end of Philosophy—which, I contend, can only be a new kind of CriticalTheory. (shrink)

This paper examines critically the current state of affairs in philosophy of science. It focuses on the well-Known puzzle about the relationship between the normative prescriptive methodology of science and positive descriptive history of science. This puzzle has dogged philosophers of science for over a generation and is still controversial. My conclusion is that there is really no escape from it. The best way to characterize it is as follows: "philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of (...) science without philosophy of science is blind.". (shrink)