This article explores twelve short narrative films created by women and trans people living with disabilities and embodied differences. Produced through Project Re•Vision, these micro documentaries uncover the cultures and temporalities of bodies of difference by foregrounding themes of multiple histories: body, disability, maternal, medical, and/or scientific histories; and divergent futurities: contradictory, surprising, unpredictable, opaque, and/or generative futures. We engage with Alison Kafer's call to theorize disability futurity by wrestling with the ways in which “the future” is normatively deployed in (...) the service of able-bodiedness and able-mindedness, a deployment used to render bodies of difference as sites of “no future”. By re-storying embodied difference, the storytellers illuminate ongoing processes of remaking their bodily selves in ways that respond to the past and provide possibilities for different futures; these orientations may be configured as “dis-topias” based not on progress, but on new pathways for living, uncovered not through evoking the familiar imaginaries of curing, eliminating, or overcoming disability, but through incorporating experiences of embodied difference into time. These temporalities gesture toward new kinds of futures, giving us glimpses of ways of cripping time, of cripping ways of being/becoming in time, and of radically re-presencing disability in futurity. (shrink)

The claim that theoretical foundations are historically contingent does not draw the same intensity of fire as it did one or especially two decades ago. The aftermath of debates on the political boundaries created by foundations allows for a deeper exploration of the foundations of feminist theory. This article re-examines the (anti)-Hegelian foundations of the feminist standpoint put forward by Nancy Hartsock and argues that the Hegelian subject of the early Phenomenology of Spirit resists gender codification in its experience of (...) ongoing rediscovery and fallibility in knowing. The subject against which the feminist self was constituted does not fit the masculinity thought to be natural. Hegel’s master-slave dialectic and phenomenological subject reveal contradictions that cannot be resolved by an opposing feminist standpoint, and may provide resources that resist the rigid gender categories upon which the standpoint depends. Key Words: abstract masculinity • feminist standpoint • feminist theory • foundations • Nancy Hartsock • Hegel • master-slave dialectic • subjectivity. (shrink)

Recent feminist criticism suggests that Hegel’s account of Antigone in the Phenomenology of Spirit is antithetical to feminism on two key counts: first, Hegel does not develop an authentic political representation of women’s agency and participation in the community, and second, he does not provide a model for a genuinely ethical order especially where relations between men and women are concerned. Patricia Jagentowicz Mills and Luce Irigaray are two feminist thinkers who have expressed these positions. They both take issue with (...) Hegel’s interpretation of Antigone’s actions, although each for different reasons. Mills argues that Hegel misrepresents the experience of women in the Greek community, symbolized by Antigone, as not self-conscious, unreflective, and incapable of enduring ethical conflict. The main reason for this mistaken identity, according to Mills, stems from Hegel’s beliefs that human law and man are ethically superior to divine law and woman, and that the former can legitimately rule over, indeed dominate, the latter. Irigaray asserts that the phallogocentric power of the masculine in Hegel’s text almost completely eliminates the possibility of an authentic feminine individual and action. According to this view, an autonomous feminine understanding of purpose and action is rendered impossible by the feminine’s very masculinization at the outset. At issue here is whether Antigone can indeed be understood as an ethical actor when she acts on behalf of the family and/or whether she can be understood as an ethical actor who represents the community. The conclusions drawn from these interpretations have been that, for Hegel, women are not genuine political actors, on the one hand, because their association with the family disqualifies them as such, and on the other hand, because their actions are constituted by consciousness which is masculine, and also instrumentalized for the masculine. (shrink)

Recent feminist criticism suggests that Hegel’s account of Antigone in the Phenomenology of Spirit is antithetical to feminism on two key counts: first, Hegel does not develop an authentic political representation of women’s agency and participation in the community, and second, he does not provide a model for a genuinely ethical order especially where relations between men and women are concerned. Patricia Jagentowicz Mills and Luce Irigaray are two feminist thinkers who have expressed these positions. They both take issue with (...) Hegel’s interpretation of Antigone’s actions, although each for different reasons. Mills argues that Hegel misrepresents the experience of women in the Greek community, symbolized by Antigone, as not self-conscious, unreflective, and incapable of enduring ethical conflict. The main reason for this mistaken identity, according to Mills, stems from Hegel’s beliefs that human law and man are ethically superior to divine law and woman, and that the former can legitimately rule over, indeed dominate, the latter. Irigaray asserts that the phallogocentric power of the masculine in Hegel’s text almost completely eliminates the possibility of an authentic feminine individual and action. According to this view, an autonomous feminine understanding of purpose and action is rendered impossible by the feminine’s very masculinization at the outset. At issue here is whether Antigone can indeed be understood as an ethical actor when she acts on behalf of the family and/or whether she can be understood as an ethical actor who represents the community. The conclusions drawn from these interpretations have been that, for Hegel, women are not genuine political actors, on the one hand, because their association with the family disqualifies them as such, and on the other hand, because their actions are constituted by consciousness which is masculine, and also instrumentalized for the masculine. (shrink)

A large number of feminist philosophers and social critics accept that Simone de Beauvoir's conception of transcendence in The Second Sex relies on masculinist ontology. In contrast with feminist interpretations that see Beauvoir claiming the success of masculinist ontology, this article argues that transcendence as masculinist ontology does not succeed in The Second Sex because it requires a relation of domination, something contrary to its own definition of freedom-producing relations. The Second Sex obliquely reveals this failure, but Beauvoir does not (...) ruminate upon it. Instead, Beauvoir turns to imagine freedom-producing gender relations in the future where the body and consciousness are already emancipated from constitutive domination. This is a future that resonates with G. W. F. Hegel's `Stoic Consciousness'. The significance of this finding is that the location of freedom neither resides in the intertwinement of the male body and consciousness previously argued to be the case, for Beauvoir, nor does it reside in the intertwinement of the female body and consciousness. Rather, freedom resides in the intertwinement of male and female bodies and consciousness where domination is already absent, that is, a place outside of history. Thus, the conclusion of The Second Sex can be read as a consolation and an escape from the inescapable limits of the present. (shrink)

This article argues that Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex continues to teach academic feminism why difference feminism holds productive and generative potential for feminists and why equality feminism has been consistently subject to criticism since the second wave of feminism. Using Hegel's master—slave dialectic as a lens to interpret subjectivity in The Second Sex, this text reveals an aspect of equality feminism that relies upon masculine subjectivity, a subjectivity that inherently constitutes otherness. This reliance on masculine subjectivity is anathema (...) to difference feminism because the otherness inherently constituted by such subjectivity simultaneously and paradoxically constitutes women's ongoing subordination. In assuming equality with men by adopting masculine subjectivity, women are not immune to constituting women as other. Difference feminisms, on the other hand, start from where women are as they choose to see themselves socially, economically, racially, sexually. The Second Sex reveals that difference feminisms imagine freedom in order to identify the difference that would empower women, not strictly towards sex equality with a stable referent, but towards emancipatory projects that make a difference for women themselves. The Second Sex portends that such imagined freedom has not been actualized, thus the present remains circumscribed by power that subordinates the difference in question. When read alongside The Second Sex, the tension between equality and difference feminisms can still be read as feminisms that coexist with one another, each with their limitations, each with productive potential and cautionary rejoinders. (shrink)

This paper revisits the dynamic discussion about journalism’s role in representing and amplifying disability arts at the 2019 Cripping the Arts Symposium. Chronicling the dialogue of the “Representation” panel which included artists, arts and culture critics, journalists, and scholars, it reveals how arts and culture coverage contributes to the cultivation of disability, D/deaf, and mad art. Given that the relationship between journalism and disability communities continues to be fractured in Canada, speakers were invited to reflect on journalism and disability arts (...) in relation to their own engagement with media as subjects, authors, and critics of disability arts reviews. The methods for presentation were cripped in multiple ways to provide the fullest access possible. The panel concluded with examples of ableist fault lines in representation practices where the disabled figure is an absent “ghost” in journalistic representation, warnings against journalistic reliance on traditional and objective narratives, and a call for artists to claim and write their own stories. Ultimately, disabled, D/deaf, and mad artists need both control over artistic endeavours and output and influence over representation. This article reconnects journalism and disability communities, ultimately demonstrating that representation is a critical, co-constitutive process that can become more aesthetically and politically oriented toward social justice in its focus on disability, D/deaf, and mad arts. (shrink)