Search results for 'Naive Realism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  52
    Anil Gomes (forthcoming). Naïve Realism in Kantian Phrase. Mind.
    Early twentieth-century philosophers of perception presented their naïve realist views of perceptual experience in anti-Kantian terms. For they took naïve realism about perceptual experience to be incompatible with Kant’s claims about the way the understanding is necessarily involved in perceptual consciousness. This essay seeks to situate a naïve realist account of visual experience within a recognisably Kantian framework by arguing that a naïve realist account of visual experience is compatible with the claim that the understanding is necessarily involved in (...)
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  2. James Genone (2016). Recent Work on Naive Realism. American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1).
    Naïve realism, often overlooked among philosophical theories of perception, has in recent years attracted a surge of interest. Broadly speaking, the central commitment of naïve realism is that mind-independent objects are essential to the fundamental analysis of perceptual experience. Since the claims of naïve realism concern the essential metaphysical structure of conscious perception, its truth or falsity is of central importance to a wide range of topics, including the explanation of semantic reference and representational content, the nature (...)
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  3.  74
    Boyd Millar (2015). Naïve Realism and Illusion. Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2:607-625.
    It is well-known that naïve realism has difficulty accommodating perceptual error. Recent discussion of the issue has focused on whether the naïve realist can accommodate hallucination by adopting disjunctivism. However, illusions are more difficult for the naïve realist to explain precisely because the disjunctivist solution is not available. I discuss what I take to be the two most plausible accounts of illusion available to the naïve realist. The first claims that illusions are cases in which you are prevented from (...)
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  4.  65
    Erhan Demircioglu (2016). Naïve Realism and Phenomenological Directness: Reply to Millar. Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1897-1910.
    In this paper, I respond to Millar’s recent criticism of naïve realism. Millar provides several arguments for the thesis that there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view to naïve realism. I intend to show that Millar’s arguments are not convincing.
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  5.  53
    Keith Allen (2015). Colour Physicalism, Naïve Realism, and the Argument From Structure. Minds and Machines 25 (2):193-212.
    Colours appear to instantiate a number of structural properties: for instance, they stand in distinctive relations of similarity and difference, and admit of a fundamental distinction into unique and binary. Accounting for these structural properties is often taken to present a serious problem for physicalist theories of colour. This paper argues that a prominent attempt by Byrne and Hilbert to account for the structural properties of the colours, consistent with the claim that colours are types of surface spectral reflectance, is (...)
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  6. Matthew Kennedy (2011). Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety. Noûs 45 (1):77-102.
    Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one's perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge (...)
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  7. Michael Sollberger (2008). Naïve Realism and the Problem of Causation. Disputatio 3 (25):1-19.
    In the present paper, I shall argue that disjunctively construed naïve realism about the nature of perceptual experiences succumbs to the empirically inspired causal argument. The causal argument highlights as a first step that local action necessitates the presence of a type-identical common kind of mental state shared by all perceptual experiences. In a second step, it sets out that the property of being a veridical perception cannot be a mental property. It results that the mental nature of perceptions (...)
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  8. M. D. Conduct (2011). Naïve Realism and Extreme Disjunctivism. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):201-221.
    Disjunctivism about sensory experience is frequently put forward in defence of a particular conception of perception and perceptual experience known as naïve realism. In this paper I present an argument against naïve realism that proceeds through a rejection of disjunctivism. If the naïve realist must also be a disjunctivist about the phenomenal nature of experience, then naïve realism should be abandoned.
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  9.  71
    Michael Sollberger (2012). Causation in Perception: A Challenge to Naïve Realism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):581-595.
    Defending a form of naïve realism about visual experiences is quite popular these days. Those naïve realists who I will be concerned with in this paper make a central claim about the subjective aspects of perceptual experiences. They argue that how it is with the perceiver subjectively when she sees worldly objects is literally determined by those objects. This way of thinking leads them to endorse a form of disjunctivism, according to which the fundamental psychological nature of seeings and (...)
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  10. M. D. Conduct (2008). Naïve Realism, Adverbialism and Perceptual Error. Acta Analytica 23 (2):147-159.
    My paper has three parts. First I will outline the act/object theory of perceptual experience and its commitments to (a) a relational view of experience and (b) a view of phenomenal character according to which it is constituted by the character of the objects of experience. I present the traditional adverbial response to this, in which experience is not to be understood as a relation to some object, but as a way of sensing. In the second part I argue that (...)
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  11.  31
    B. M. Arthadeva (1959). Naive Realism and Illusions: The Elliptical Penny. Philosophy 34 (October):323-330.
    How can naïve realism defend itself in face of the illusion of the penny which looks elliptical when it is seen obliquely? Of late many philosophers have tried to deny that a penny looks elliptical when viewed obliquely: they have claimed that it still looks round. It may be true to say this of a small object like a penny, but it cannot be denied that the surfaces of objects in general do look different in shape when viewed from (...)
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  12. Heather Logue (2011). The Skeptic and the Naïve Realist. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):268-288.
  13. Hilary Putnam (2013). The Revival of Naïve Realism. Rivista di Filosofia 104 (3):505-522.
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  14.  74
    B. M. Arthadeva (1959). Naive Realism and Illusions of Refraction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (August):118-137.
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  15.  69
    David M. Armstrong (1959). Mr Arthadeva and Naive Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (May):67-70.
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  16.  27
    Harvey S. Smallman & Maia B. Cook (2011). Naïve Realism: Folk Fallacies in the Design and Use of Visual Displays. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (3):579-608.
    Often implicit in visual display design and development is a gold standard of photorealism. By approximating direct perception, photorealism appeals to users and designers by being both attractive and apparently effortless. The vexing result from numerous performance evaluations, though, is that increasing realism often impairs performance. Smallman and St. John (2005) labeled misplaced faith in realistic information display Naïve Realism and theorized it resulted from a triplet of folk fallacies about perception. Here, we illustrate issues associated with the (...)
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  17. Heather Logue (2012). Why Naive Realism? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):211-237.
    Much of the discussion of Naive Realism about veridical experience has focused on a consequence of adopting it—namely, disjunctivism about perceptual experience. However, the motivations for being a Naive Realist in the first place have received relatively little attention in the literature. In this paper, I will elaborate and defend the claim that Naive Realism provides the best account of the phenomenal character of veridical experience.
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  18.  12
    Jonathan Brink Morgan (forthcoming). Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Overlap. Philosophical Studies:1-11.
    Many arguments against naïve realism are arguments against its corollary: disjunctivism. But there is a simpler argument—due to Mehta —that targets naïve realism directly. In broad strokes, the argument is the following. There are certain experiences that are, allegedly, in no way phenomenally similar. Nevertheless, naïve realism predicts that they are phenomenally similar. Hence, naïve realism is false. Mehta and Ganson successfully defend this argument from an objection raised by French and Gomes :451–460, 2016). However, all (...)
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  19. Heather Logue (forthcoming). Experiential Content and Naive Realism: A Reconciliation. In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? OUP
    In the first section of this paper, after briefly arguing for the assumption that experiential content is propositional, I’ll distinguish three interpretations of the claim that experience has content (the Mild, Medium, and Spicy Content Views). In the second section, I’ll flesh out Naïve Realism in greater detail, and I’ll reconstruct what I take to be the main argument for its incompatibility with the Content Views. The third section will be devoted to evaluation of existing arguments for the Mild (...)
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  20. Matthew Nudds (2009). Recent Work in Perception: Naïve Realism and its Opponents. Analysis 69 (2):334-346.
    Suppose that you are looking at a vase of flowers on the table in front of you. You can visually attend to the vase and to the flowers, noticing their different features: their colour, their shape and the way they are arranged. In attending to the vase, the flowers and their features, you are attending to mind-independent objects and features. Suppose, now, that you introspectively reflect on the visual experience you have when looking at the vase of flowers. In doing (...)
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  21.  26
    Craig French (2014). Naive Realist Perspectives on Seeing Blurrily. Ratio 27 (4):393-413.
    Naive realists hold that experience is to be understood in terms of an intimate perceptual relation between a subject and aspects of the world, relative to a certain standpoint. Those aspects of the world themselves shape the contours of consciousness. But blurriness is an aspect of some of our experiences that does not seem to come from the world. I argue that this constitutes a significant challenge to some forms of naive realism. But I also argue that (...)
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  22.  25
    Matthew Conduct (2012). Naïve Realism Without Disjunctivism About Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):727-736.
    I argue that the possibility of non-perceptual experience need not compel a naïve realist to adopt a disjunctive conception of experience. Instead, they can maintain that the nature of perceptual and hallucinatory experience is the same, while still claiming that perceptual experience is presentational of the objects of perception. On such a view the difference between perceptual and non-perceptual experience will lie in the nature of the objects that are so presented. I will defend a view according to which in (...)
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  23. Matthew Kennedy (2010). Naive Realism and Experiential Evidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):77-109.
    I describe a naive realist conception of perceptual knowledge, which faces a challenge from the idea that normal perceivers and brains-in-vats have equally justified perceptual beliefs. I defend the naive realist position from Nicholas Silins's recent version of this challenge. I argue that Silins's main objection fails, and that the naive realist understanding of perceptual knowledge can be reconciled with the idea that brains-in-vats have justified perceptual beliefs.
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  24.  62
    Martin Daumer, Detlef Dürr, Sheldon Goldstein & Nino Zanghì (1996). Naive Realism About Operators. Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):379 - 397.
    A source of much difficulty and confusion in the interpretation of quantum mechanics is a naive realism about operators. By this we refer to various ways of taking too seriously the notion of operator-as-observable, and in particular to the all too casual talk about measuring operators that occurs when the subject is quantum mechanics. Without a specification of what should be meant by measuring a quantum observable, such an expression can have no clear meaning. A definite specification is (...)
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  25.  40
    Kenneth R. Westphal (2000). Hegel's Internal Critique of Naïve Realism. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:173-229.
    This article reconstructs Hegel’s chapter “Sense Certainty” (Phenomenology of Spirit, chap. 1) in detail in its historical and philosophical context. Hegel’s chapter develops a sound internal critique of naive realism that shows that sensation is necessary but not sufficient for knowledge of sensed particulars. Cognitive reference to particulars also requires using a priori conceptions of space, spaces, time, times, self, and individuation. Several standard objections to and misinterpretations of Hegel’s chapter are rebutted. Hegel’s protosemantics is shown to accord (...)
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  26.  9
    Evandro Agazzi (1989). Naive Realism And Naive Antirealism. Dialectica 43 (1‐2):83-98.
    SummaryScientific realism is here made equivalent to the referentiality of scientific language. A clear distinction of meaning and reference is advocated and certain ‘symptoms' of referentiality in scientific language are stressed. It is then shown that contemporary scholars stressing the contextual determination of meaning, the meaning variance and theory‐ladenness of all terms in scientific theories, often fail to recognize that an independent ‘stable’ core of the meaning still exists. This allows for theory comparison and is witness that science investigates (...)
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  27.  5
    M. D. Conduct (2008). Naïve Realism, Adverbialism and Perceptual Error. Acta Analytica 23 (2):147-159.
    My paper has three parts. First I will outline the act/object theory of perceptual experience and its commitments to a relational view of experience and a view of phenomenal character according to which it is constituted by the character of the objects of experience. I present the traditional adverbial response to this, in which experience is not to be understood as a relation to some object, but as a way of sensing. In the second part I argue that acceptance of (...)
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  28.  1
    Mazviita Chirimuuta (2015). Colour Physicalism, Naïve Realism, and the Argument From Structure. Minds and Machines 25 (2):193-212.
    Colours appear to instantiate a number of structural properties: for instance, they stand in distinctive relations of similarity and difference, and admit of a fundamental distinction into unique and binary. Accounting for these structural properties is often taken to present a serious problem for physicalist theories of colour. This paper argues that a prominent attempt by Byrne and Hilbert to account for the structural properties of the colours, consistent with the claim that colours are types of surface spectral reflectance, is (...)
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  29.  8
    Michael Bradie (1976). Ayer and Russell on Naive Realism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1976:175 - 181.
    In this article Ayer's criticisms of Russell's defense of scientific realism and his criticisms of Russell's rejection of naive realism are discussed. It is argued that Ayer's criticisms either lack force or depend for their validity on the assumption of existence of a clear cut distinction between conventional and factual issues, an assumption which is question begging with respect to his discussion of Russell.
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  30. Eric Marcus, Defending Naïve Realism About Mental Properties.
    _metaphysically transparent_: we do not arrive at a better understanding of the realm of facts that make such talk true or false when we abandon ordinary mental concepts in favor of naturalistic concepts—or, for that matter, in favor of supernaturalistic concepts, although _super_naturalism will not be my concern here. Rather, it is ordinary mental concepts themselves that provide the best framework for understanding the metaphysics of mind. In this essay, I will be concerned just with naïve realism about mental (...)
     
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  31. H. A. Logue, Experiential Content and Naive Realism: A Reconciliation.
    This chapter argues that Naïve Realism is compatible with experiential content. First, it distinguishes three interpretations of the claim that experience has content. Second, it elaborates Naïve Realism and reconstructs the main argument for its incompatibility with the Content Views. Third, it suggests that existing arguments for the Mild Content View are sound but unlikely to persuade Naïve Realists, and it develops another argument that is more dialectically effective. Finally, the chapter identifies a flaw in the argument for (...)
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  32.  46
    B. M. Arthadeva (1961). Naive Realism and the Problem of Color-Seeing in Dim Light. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21 (June):467-478.
  33. Anil Gomes (2014). Kant on Perception: Naive Realism, Non-Conceptualism, and the B-Deduction. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):1-19.
    According to non-conceptualist interpretations, Kant held that the application of concepts is not necessary for perceptual experience. Some have motivated non-conceptualism by noting the affinities between Kant's account of perception and contemporary relational theories of perception. In this paper I argue (i) that non-conceptualism cannot provide an account of the Transcendental Deduction and thus ought to be rejected; and (ii) that this has no bearing on the issue of whether Kant endorsed a relational account of perceptual experience.
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  34. Heather Logue (2012). What Should the Naïve Realist Say About Total Hallucinations? Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):173-199.
  35. Heather Logue (2010). Getting Acquainted with Naïve Realism: Critical Notice of Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Philosophical Books 51 (1):22-38.
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  36. John Campbell (2008). Sensorimotor Knowledge and Naïve Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):666-673.
  37.  73
    Adam Pautz (2013). Do the Benefits of Naïve Realism Outweigh the Costs? Comments on Fish, Perception, Hallucination and Illusion. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):25-36.
  38. Hiram J. McLendon (1956). Has Russell Proved Naive Realism Self-Contradictory? Journal of Philosophy 53 (9):289-302.
  39.  41
    John Campbell (2008). Sensorimotor Knowledge and Naïve Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):666 - 673.
  40.  3
    Ingvar Johansson (2014). Triple Disjunctivism, Naive Realism, and Anti-Representationalism. Metaphysica 15 (2).
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  41.  24
    Matthew Nudds (2013). 12 Naive Realism and Hallucinations. In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. MIT Press 271.
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  42.  11
    M. Arthadeva (1959). Naïve Realism and Illusions of Refraction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):118-137.
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  43.  24
    M. Arthadeva (1957). Naive Realism and Illusions of Reflection. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):155 – 169.
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  44.  1
    D. R. Cousin (1955). VIII.—Naïve Realism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55 (1):179-200.
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  45.  10
    Tassos Lycurgo (2010). Solipsism and Naive Realism in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Princípios 8 (9):68-79.
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  46.  12
    A. P. Ushenko (1956). A Note on Russell and Naive Realism. Journal of Philosophy 53 (25):819-820.
  47.  11
    Nicla Vassallo (2005). Naive Realism, Scientific Realism, and Contextualism. Rivista di Estetica (3):296-306.
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  48.  10
    H. D. Lewis (1938). Naïve Realism and a Passage in the Theaetetus. Mind 47 (187):351-356.
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  49.  3
    Thomas W. Leddy (1999). Naïve Realism in Philosophy of Literature. Philosophy Today 43 (1):100-107.
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  50. Keith Allen (2016). A Naive Realist Theory of Colour. Oxford University Press Uk.
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