Search results for 'Naive Realism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Matthew Kennedy (2011). Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety. Noûs 45 (1):77-102.score: 240.0
    Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one's perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge (...)
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  2. M. D. Conduct (2011). Naïve Realism and Extreme Disjunctivism. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):201-221.score: 240.0
    Disjunctivism about sensory experience is frequently put forward in defence of a particular conception of perception and perceptual experience known as naïve realism. In this paper I present an argument against naïve realism that proceeds through a rejection of disjunctivism. If the naïve realist must also be a disjunctivist about the phenomenal nature of experience, then naïve realism should be abandoned.
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  3. M. D. Conduct (2008). Naïve Realism, Adverbialism and Perceptual Error. Acta Analytica 23 (2):147-159.score: 240.0
    My paper has three parts. First I will outline the act/object theory of perceptual experience and its commitments to (a) a relational view of experience and (b) a view of phenomenal character according to which it is constituted by the character of the objects of experience. I present the traditional adverbial response to this, in which experience is not to be understood as a relation to some object, but as a way of sensing. In the second part I argue that (...)
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  4. Michael Sollberger (2008). Naïve Realism and the Problem of Causation. Disputatio 3 (25):1-19.score: 240.0
    In the present paper, I shall argue that disjunctively construed naïve realism about the nature of perceptual experiences succumbs to the empirically inspired causal argument. The causal argument highlights as a first step that local action necessitates the presence of a type-identical common kind of mental state shared by all perceptual experiences. In a second step, it sets out that the property of being a veridical perception cannot be a mental property. It results that the mental nature of perceptions (...)
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  5. Michael Sollberger (2012). Causation in Perception: A Challenge to Naïve Realism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):581-595.score: 240.0
    Defending a form of naïve realism about visual experiences is quite popular these days. Those naïve realists who I will be concerned with in this paper make a central claim about the subjective aspects of perceptual experiences. They argue that how it is with the perceiver subjectively when she sees worldly objects is literally determined by those objects. This way of thinking leads them to endorse a form of disjunctivism, according to which the fundamental psychological nature of seeings and (...)
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  6. Heather Logue (2011). The Skeptic and the Naïve Realist. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):268-288.score: 210.0
  7. Hilary Putnam (2013). The Revival of Naïve Realism. Rivista di Filosofia 104 (3):505-522.score: 210.0
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  8. David M. Armstrong (1959). Mr Arthadeva and Naive Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (May):67-70.score: 210.0
  9. B. M. Arthadeva (1959). Naive Realism and Illusions of Refraction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (August):118-137.score: 210.0
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  10. B. M. Arthadeva (1959). Naive Realism and Illusions: The Elliptical Penny. Philosophy 34 (October):323-330.score: 210.0
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  11. Harvey S. Smallman & Maia B. Cook (2011). Naïve Realism: Folk Fallacies in the Design and Use of Visual Displays. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (3):579-608.score: 192.0
    Often implicit in visual display design and development is a gold standard of photorealism. By approximating direct perception, photorealism appeals to users and designers by being both attractive and apparently effortless. The vexing result from numerous performance evaluations, though, is that increasing realism often impairs performance. Smallman and St. John (2005) labeled misplaced faith in realistic information display Naïve Realism and theorized it resulted from a triplet of folk fallacies about perception. Here, we illustrate issues associated with the (...)
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  12. Heather Logue (forthcoming). Experiential Content and Naive Realism: A Reconciliation. In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? OUP.score: 180.0
    In the first section of this paper, after briefly arguing for the assumption that experiential content is propositional, I’ll distinguish three interpretations of the claim that experience has content (the Mild, Medium, and Spicy Content Views). In the second section, I’ll flesh out Naïve Realism in greater detail, and I’ll reconstruct what I take to be the main argument for its incompatibility with the Content Views. The third section will be devoted to evaluation of existing arguments for the Mild (...)
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  13. Matthew Kennedy (2010). Naive Realism and Experiential Evidence. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):77-109.score: 180.0
    I describe a naive realist conception of perceptual knowledge, which faces a challenge from the idea that normal perceivers and brains-in-vats have equally justified perceptual beliefs. I defend the naive realist position from Nicholas Silins's recent version of this challenge. I argue that Silins's main objection fails, and that the naive realist understanding of perceptual knowledge can be reconciled with the idea that brains-in-vats have justified perceptual beliefs.
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  14. Heather Logue (2012). Why Naive Realism? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):211-237.score: 180.0
    Much of the discussion of Naive Realism about veridical experience has focused on a consequence of adopting it—namely, disjunctivism about perceptual experience. However, the motivations for being a Naive Realist in the first place have received relatively little attention in the literature. In this paper, I will elaborate and defend the claim that Naive Realism provides the best account of the phenomenal character of veridical experience.
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  15. Martin Daumer, Detlef Dürr, Sheldon Goldstein & Nino Zanghì (1996). Naive Realism About Operators. Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):379 - 397.score: 180.0
    A source of much difficulty and confusion in the interpretation of quantum mechanics is a naive realism about operators. By this we refer to various ways of taking too seriously the notion of operator-as-observable, and in particular to the all too casual talk about measuring operators that occurs when the subject is quantum mechanics. Without a specification of what should be meant by measuring a quantum observable, such an expression can have no clear meaning. A definite specification is (...)
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  16. Kenneth R. Westphal (2000). Hegel's Internal Critique of Naïve Realism. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:173-229.score: 180.0
    This article reconstructs Hegel’s chapter “Sense Certainty” (Phenomenology of Spirit, chap. 1) in detail in its historical and philosophical context. Hegel’s chapter develops a sound internal critique of naive realism that shows that sensation is necessary but not sufficient for knowledge of sensed particulars. Cognitive reference to particulars also requires using a priori conceptions of space, spaces, time, times, self, and individuation. Several standard objections to and misinterpretations of Hegel’s chapter are rebutted. Hegel’s protosemantics is shown to accord (...)
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  17. Michael Bradie (1976). Ayer and Russell on Naive Realism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1976:175 - 181.score: 180.0
    In this article Ayer's criticisms of Russell's defense of scientific realism and his criticisms of Russell's rejection of naive realism are discussed. It is argued that Ayer's criticisms either lack force or depend for their validity on the assumption of existence of a clear cut distinction between conventional and factual issues, an assumption which is question begging with respect to his discussion of Russell.
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  18. Eric Marcus, Defending Naïve Realism About Mental Properties.score: 180.0
    _metaphysically transparent_: we do not arrive at a better understanding of the realm of facts that make such talk true or false when we abandon ordinary mental concepts in favor of naturalistic concepts—or, for that matter, in favor of supernaturalistic concepts, although _super_naturalism will not be my concern here. Rather, it is ordinary mental concepts themselves that provide the best framework for understanding the metaphysics of mind. In this essay, I will be concerned just with naïve realism about mental (...)
     
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  19. Craig French (2014). Naive Realist Perspectives on Seeing Blurrily. Ratio 27 (4):393-413.score: 180.0
    Naive realists hold that experience is to be understood in terms of an intimate perceptual relation between a subject and aspects of the world, relative to a certain standpoint. Those aspects of the world themselves shape the contours of consciousness. But blurriness is an aspect of some of our experiences that does not seem to come from the world. I argue that this constitutes a significant challenge to some forms of naive realism. But I also argue that (...)
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  20. B. M. Arthadeva (1961). Naive Realism and the Problem of Color-Seeing in Dim Light. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21 (June):467-478.score: 162.0
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  21. Matthew Nudds (2009). Recent Work in Perception: Naïve Realism and its Opponents. Analysis 69 (2):334-346.score: 150.0
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  22. Heather Logue (2010). Getting Acquainted with Naïve Realism: Critical Notice of Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. Philosophical Books 51 (1):22-38.score: 150.0
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  23. John Campbell (2008). Sensorimotor Knowledge and Naïve Realism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):666-673.score: 150.0
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  24. Anil Gomes (2014). Kant on Perception: Naive Realism, Non-Conceptualism, and the B-Deduction. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):1-19.score: 150.0
    According to non-conceptualist interpretations, Kant held that the application of concepts is not necessary for perceptual experience. Some have motivated non-conceptualism by noting the affinities between Kant's account of perception and contemporary relational theories of perception. In this paper I argue (i) that non-conceptualism cannot provide an account of the Transcendental Deduction and thus ought to be rejected; and (ii) that this has no bearing on the issue of whether Kant endorsed a relational account of perceptual experience.
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  25. Heather Logue (2012). What Should the Naïve Realist Say About Total Hallucinations? Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):173-199.score: 150.0
  26. Adam Pautz (2013). Do the Benefits of Naïve Realism Outweigh the Costs? Comments on Fish, Perception, Hallucination and Illusion. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):25-36.score: 150.0
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  27. Hiram J. McLendon (1956). Has Russell Proved Naive Realism Self-Contradictory? Journal of Philosophy 53 (9):289-302.score: 150.0
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  28. H. D. Lewis (1938). Naïve Realism and a Passage in the Theaetetus. Mind 47 (187):351-356.score: 150.0
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  29. Matthew Nudds (2013). 12 Naive Realism and Hallucinations. In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. Mit Press. 271.score: 150.0
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  30. M. Arthadeva (1957). Naive Realism and Illusions of Reflection. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):155 – 169.score: 150.0
  31. A. P. Ushenko (1956). A Note on Russell and Naive Realism. Journal of Philosophy 53 (25):819-820.score: 150.0
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  32. Nicla Vassallo (2005). Naive Realism, Scientific Realism, and Contextualism. Rivista di Estetica (3):296-306.score: 150.0
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  33. Matthew Conduct (2012). Naïve Realism Without Disjunctivism About Experience. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):727-736.score: 150.0
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  34. Tassos Lycurgo (2010). Solipsism and Naive Realism in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Princípios 8 (9):68-79.score: 150.0
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  35. Matthew Nudds (2009). Recent Work : Recent Work in Perception: Naïve Realism and its Opponents. Analysis 69 (2):334 - 346.score: 150.0
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  36. Alessandra Tanesini, Naive Realism and Perception as a Guide to Action.score: 150.0
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  37. Thomas W. Leddy (1999). Naïve Realism in Philosophy of Literature. Philosophy Today 43 (1):100-107.score: 150.0
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  38. Evandro Agazzi (1989). Naive Realism And Naive Antirealism. Dialectica 43 (1‐2):83-98.score: 150.0
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  39. M. Arthadeva (1959). Naïve Realism and Illusions of Refraction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):118-137.score: 150.0
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  40. S. Harrison (1989). A New Visualization on the Mind-Brain Problem: Naive Realism Transcended. In J. R. Smythies & John Beloff (eds.), The Case for Dualism. University of Virginia Press. 113--165.score: 150.0
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  41. A. Martinezlois (1992). Feijoo and Gnoseology, From Naive Realism to Perspectivist Phenomenism. Pensamiento 48 (190):231-243.score: 150.0
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  42. Juraj Such (2010). Several Remarks on Naive Realism, Constructivism and Critical (Scientific) Realism. Filozofia 65 (7):664-671.score: 150.0
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  43. Eddy M. Zemach (1991). Perceptual Realism, Naive and Otherwise. In John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.score: 132.0
     
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  44. Daniel Cory (1942). The Transition From Naïve to Critical Realism. Journal of Philosophy 39 (10):261-268.score: 120.0
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  45. Horace B. English (1926). Naïve Psychological Realism Vs. Critical Realism. Journal of Philosophy 23 (25):682-685.score: 120.0
    Psychology does not get rid of its problems by taking experience at its face value, for it is the province of psychology to study problems arising when experience is taken at its face value. Only in actual lived experience is concrete reality to be found in its fullest sense. All reality which is experience includes attributes both spatial and temporal. Objects cannot b7 considered in the first place apart from such attributes. Physical objects are perceived as parts of a total (...)
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  46. David Woodruff Smith (1982). The Realism in Perception. Noûs 16 (March):42-55.score: 96.0
    Initially, Realism is related to perception and its intentionality, And perception is analyzed as a form of acquaintance, Or intuition, A direct cognitive relation to its object. Then several commitments to realism are detailed in the phenomenological content of everyday perception. At issue is internal, As opposed to external, Realism, In a sense defined. The demonstrative content of perception (i see "this object (visually before me)") contains a commitment to a causal relation between the perceptual experience and (...)
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  47. Heather Logue (2013). Good News for the Disjunctivist About (One of) the Bad Cases. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.score: 90.0
    Many philosophers are skeptical about disjunctivism—a theory of perceptual experience which holds roughly that a situation in which I see a banana that is as it appears to me to be (the good case) and one in which I have a hallucination as of a banana (a certain kind of bad case) are mentally completely different. Often this skepticism is rooted in the suspicion that such a view cannot adequately account for the bad case—in particular, (i) that such a view (...)
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  48. Matthew Kennedy (2009). Heirs of Nothing: The Implications of Transparency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.score: 90.0
    Recently representationalists have cited a phenomenon known as the transparency of experience in arguments against the qualia theory. Representationalists take transparency to support their theory and to work against the qualia theory. In this paper I argue that representationalist assessment of the philosophical importance of transparency is incorrect. The true beneficiary of transparency is another theory, naïve realism. Transparency militates against qualia and the representationalist theory of experience. I describe the transparency phenomenon, and I use my description to argue (...)
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