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Nancy J. Nersessian [45]Nancy J. Nersessian [1]
  1. Gordon Belot, Mark J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld, Joseph B. Kadane, Miles MacLeod, Nancy J. Nersessian, Hylarie Kochiras, Bryan W. Roberts, Elay Shech & Richard Healey (2013). 1. Bayesian Orgulity Bayesian Orgulity (Pp. 483-503). Philosophy of Science 80 (4).
     
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  2. Michael H. G. Hoffmann, Jan C. Schmidt & Nancy J. Nersessian (2013). Erratum To: Philosophy of and as Interdisciplinarity. [REVIEW] Synthese 190 (11):1975-1975.
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  3. Michael Hg Hoffmann, Jan C. Schmidt & Nancy J. Nersessian (2013). Philosophy of and as Interdisciplinarity. Synthese 190 (11):1857-1864.
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  4. Miles MacLeod & Nancy J. Nersessian (2013). Building Simulations From the Ground Up: Modeling and Theory in Systems Biology. Philosophy of Science 80 (4):533-556.
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  5. Miles MacLeod & Nancy J. Nersessian (2013). Coupling Simulation and Experiment: The Bimodal Strategy in Integrative Systems Biology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (4):572-584.
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  6. Miles MacLeod & Nancy J. Nersessian (2013). The Creative Industry of Integrative Systems Biology. Mind and Society 12 (1):35-48.
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  7. Lisa M. Osbeck & Nancy J. Nersessian (2013). Beyond Motivation and Metaphor:'Scientific Passions' and Anthropomorphism. In. In Vassilios Karakostas & Dennis Dieks (eds.), Epsa11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. Springer. 455--466.
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  8. Lisa M. Osbeck & Nancy J. Nersessian (2013). Situating Distributed Cognition. Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):1-16.
    We historically and conceptually situate distributed cognition by drawing attention to important similarities in assumptions and methods with those of American ?functional psychology? as it emerged in contrast and complement to controlled laboratory study of the structural components and primitive ?elements? of consciousness. Functional psychology foregrounded the adaptive features of cognitive processes in environments, and adopted as a unit of analysis the overall situation of organism and environment. A methodological implication of this emphasis was, to the extent possible, the study (...)
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  9. Lisa M. Osbeck & Nancy J. Nersessian (2011). Affective Problem Solving: Emotion in Research Practice. Mind and Society 10 (1):57-78.
  10. Nancy J. Nersessian (2010). Mental Modeling in Conceptual Change. International Journal on Humanistic Ideology 1:11-48.
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  11. Nancy J. Nersessian (2010). The Topics: Knowledge and Cognitive Science. International Journal on Humanistic Ideology 3 (1).
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  12. Lisa M. Osbeck & Nancy J. Nersessian (2010). Forms of Positioning in Interdisciplinary Science Practice and Their Epistemic Effects. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 40 (2):136-161.
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  13. Nancy J. Nersessian (2009). How Do Engineering Scientists Think? Model‐Based Simulation in Biomedical Engineering Research Laboratories. Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (4):730-757.
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  14. Sanjay Chandrasekharan & Nancy J. Nersessian (2007). Counterfactuals in Science and Engineering. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):454-455.
    The notion of mutation is applicable to the generation of novel designs and solutions in engineering and science. This suggests that engineers and scientists have to work against the biases identified in counterfactual thinking. Therefore, imagination appears a lot less rational than claimed in the target article.
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  15. Nancy J. Nersessian (2007). Thought Experimenting as Mental Modeling. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):125-161.
    The paper argues that the practice of thought experintenting enables scientists to follow through the implications of a way of representing nature by simulating an exemplary or representative situation that is feasible within that representation. What distinguishes thought experimenting from logical argument and other forms of propositional reasoning is that reasoning by means of a thought experiment involves constructing and simulating a mental model of a representative situation. Although thought experimenting is a creative part of scientific practice, it is a (...)
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  16. Nancy J. Nersessian, Dunja Jutronic, Ksenija Puskaric, Nenad Miscevic, Andreas K. A. Georgiou & James Robert Brown (2007). James Robert Brown: Thought Experiments and Platonism. Part Two. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (20):125-268.
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  17. Nancy J. Nersessian (2006). Model-Based Reasoning in Distributed Cognitive Systems. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):699-709.
    This paper examines the nature of model-based reasoning in the interplay between theory and experiment in the context of biomedical engineering research laboratories, where problem solving involves using physical models. These "model systems" are sites of experimentation where in vitro models are used to screen, control, and simulate specific aspects of in vivo phenomena. As with all models, simulation devices are idealized representations, but they are also systems themselves, possessing engineering constraints. Drawing on research in contemporary cognitive science that construes (...)
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  18. Lisa M. Osbeck & Nancy J. Nersessian (2006). The Distribution of Representation. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 36 (2):141–160.
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  19. Jim Davies, Nancy J. Nersessian & Ashok K. Goel (2005). Visual Models in Analogical Problem Solving. Foundations of Science 10 (1):133-152.
    Visual analogy is believed to be important in human problem solving. Yet, there are few computational models of visual analogy. In this paper, we present a preliminary computational model of visual analogy in problem solving. The model is instantiated in a computer program, called Galatea, which uses a language for representing and transferring visual information called Privlan. We describe how the computational model can account for a small slice of a cognitive-historical analysis of Maxwell’s reasoning about electromagnetism.
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  20. Lorenzo Magnani & Nancy J. Nersessian (2005). Preface. Foundations of Science 10 (1):1-4.
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  21. Nancy J. Nersessian (2005). Abstraction Via Generic Modeling in Concept Formation in Science. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 86 (1):117-144.
    Cases where analogy has played a significant role in the formation of a new scientific concept are well-documented. Yet, how is it that genuinely new representations can be constructed from existing representations? It is argued that the process of ‘generic modeling’ enables abstraction of features common to both the domain of the source of the analogy and of the target phenomena. The analysis focuses on James Clerk Maxwell's construction of the electromagnetic field concept. The mathematical representation Maxwell constructed turned out (...)
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  22. Lorenzo Magnani & Nancy J. Nersessian (2004). Preface. Foundations of Science 9 (3):213-218.
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  23. Lorenzo Magnani & Nancy J. Nersessian (2002). Preface. Mind and Society 3 (1):3-7.
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  24. Nancy J. Nersessian (2002). The Cognitive Basis of Model-Based Reasoning in Science. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Stich & Michael Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. Cambridge University Press. 133--153.
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  25. Lorenzo Magnani & Nancy J. Nersessian (2001). Preface. Mind and Society 2 (2):29-32.
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  26. Nancy J. Nersessian (2001). Concept Formation and Commensurability. In. In Paul Hoyningen-Huene & Howard Sankey (eds.), Incommensurability and Related Matters. Kluwer. 275--301.
  27. Hanne Andersen & Nancy J. Nersessian (2000). Nomic Concepts, Frames, and Conceptual Change. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):241.
  28. Lorenzo Magnani, Nancy J. Nersessian & Paul Thagard (2000). Prefacr. Foundations of Science 5 (2):121-127.
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  29. Nancy J. Nersessian (1999). Model-Based Reasoning in Conceptual Change. In. In L. Magnani, N. J. Nersessian & P. Thagard (eds.), Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery. Kluwer/Plenum. 5--22.
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  30. Todd W. Griffith, Nancy J. Nersessian & Ashok K. Goel (1996). The Role of Generic Models in Conceptual Change. In. In Garrison W. Cottrell (ed.), Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Lawrence Erlbaum. 312--317.
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  31. Nancy J. Nersessian (1996). Child's Play. Philosophy of Science 63 (4):542-546.
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  32. Nancy J. Nersessian (1995). Constructive Modeling in Creating Scientific Understanding. Science and Education 4:203-226.
     
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  33. Nancy J. Nersessian (1995). Should Physicists Preach What They Practice? Science and Education 4 (3):203-226.
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  34. Nancy J. Nersessian (1992). In the Theoretician's Laboratory: Thought Experimenting as Mental Modeling. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:291 - 301.
    Thought experiments have played a prominent role in numerous cases of conceptual change in science. I propose that research in cognitive psychology into the role of mental modeling in narrative comprehension can illuminate how and why thought experiments work. In thought experimenting a scientist constructs and manipulates a mental simulation of the experimental situation. During this process, she makes use of inferencing mechanisms, existing representations, and general world knowledge to make realistic transformations from one possible physical state to the next. (...)
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  35. Nancy J. Nersessian (1991). The Method to "Meaning": A Reply to Leplin. Philosophy of Science 58 (4):678-686.
    In his article, "Is Essentialism Unscientific?" (1988), Jarrett Leplin claims that I do not have sufficient grounds for rejecting the customary "philosophical method of discovery" that allows for the direct transfer of theories developed in the philosophy of language to science. While admitting that all attempts at transfer thus far have failed, he still maintains that method is sound. I argue that the wholesale failure of these attempts is reason enough to suspect the method and to try to devise one (...)
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  36. Nancy J. Nersessian (1991). The Method to Meaning-a Reply to Leplin-Discussion. In Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper & J. D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science. Mit Press. 58--4.
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  37. Nancy J. Nersessian (1990). Barriers and Models: Comments on Margolis and Giere. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:441 - 444.
    Giere's assessment is that the cognitive sciences, especially cognitive psychology, have much to offer the philosophy of science as it attempts to develop theories of the growth, development, and change of scientific knowledge as human activities. Margolis produces a model of scientific change by drawing from recent work in the cognitive sciences and attempts to show how this model explains salient cases of conceptual change. While agreeing with Giere's assessment, I argue that Margolis provides the wrong model both for scientific (...)
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  38. Nancy J. Nersessian (1989). Conceptual Change in Science and in Science Education. Synthese 80 (1):163 - 183.
    There is substantial evidence that traditional instructional methods have not been successful in helping students to restructure their commonsense conceptions and learn the conceptual structures of scientific theories. This paper argues that the nature of the changes and the kinds of reasoning required in a major conceptual restructuring of a representation of a domain are fundamentally the same in the discovery and in the learning processes. Understanding conceptual change as it occurs in science and in learning science will require the (...)
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  39. Nancy J. Nersessian (1988). Reasoning From Imagery and Analogy in Scientific Concept Formation. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:41 - 47.
    Concept formation in science is a reasoned process, commensurate with ordinary problem-solving processes. An account of how analogical reasoning and reasoning from imagistic representations generate new scientific concepts is presented. The account derives from case studies of concept formation in science and from computational theories of analogical problem solving in cognitive science. Concept formation by analogy is seen to be a process of increasing abstraction from existing conceptual structures.
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  40. Nancy J. Nersessian (1987). Book Review:From Maxwell to Microphysics: Aspects of Electromagnetic Theory in the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century Jed Z. Buchwald. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 54 (3):489-.
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  41. Nancy J. Nersessian (1987). A Cognitive-Historical Approach to Meaning in Scientific Theories. In , The Process of Science: Contemporary Philosophical Approaches to Understanding Scientific Practice. Distributors for the United States and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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  42. Nancy J. Nersessian (ed.) (1987). The Process of Science: Contemporary Philosophical Approaches to Understanding Scientific Practice. Distributors for the United States and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    ' this volume will make a significant contribution to a more adequate understanding of the 'nature of scientific knowledge and inquiry' ' ISIS Vol.79,No.1,1988.
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  43. Nancy J. Nersessian (1984). Aether/Or: The Creation of Scientific Concepts. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 15 (3):175-212.
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  44. Nancy J. Nersessian (1984). Faraday to Einstein: Constructing Meaning in Scientific Theories. Distributors for the United States and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    PARTI The Philosophical Situation: A Critical Appraisal We must begin with the mistake and find out the truth in it. That is, we must uncover the source of ...
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  45. Nancy J. Nersessian (1982). Why is 'Incommensurability' a Problem? Acta Biotheoretica 31 (4).
    The origins of the ‘incommensurability problem’ and its central aspect, the ‘meaning variance thesis’ are traced to the successive collapse of several distinctions maintained by the standard empiricist account of meaning in scientific theories. The crucial distinction is that between a conceptual structure and a theory. The ‘thesis’ and the ‘problem’ follow from critiques of this distinction by Duhem, Quine and Feyerabend. It is maintained that, rather than revealing the ‘problem’, the arguments leading to it simply show the inadequacy of (...)
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  46. Nancy J. Nersessian (1979). The Roots of Epistemological 'Anarchy'. Inquiry 22 (1-4):423 – 440.
    The claims of the epistemological 'anarchists' have their roots in the orthodox tradition as well as in the Popperian. In particular they follow from the work of Quine. Meaning variance and incommensurability follow directly from the holistic conception of meaning in his 'network' view. Quine's efforts to evade this conclusion fail. His attempt to develop a theory-neutral notion of observation sentence is shown (1) to be inconsistent with his previous claims since it involves the tacit acceptance of the 'dogma of (...)
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