32 found
Sort by:
Disambiguations:
Naomi Eilan [16]Naomi M. Eilan [16]
See also:
Profile: Naomi Eilan (University of Warwick)
  1. Naomi M. Eilan, On the Reality of Color.
    The Quest for Reality, contains, amongst much else, a sustained and deeply illuminating investigation of the thesis Barry Stroud labels ’subjectivism’ about colours. The grounds he relentlessly amasses for rejecting the thesis are, in my view, compelling. There is a sense, indeed, in which I think they are more compelling than he says he himself finds them. For as I understand his arguments, they contain the materials for delivering a positive answer to the question: are objects really coloured? As Stroud (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Naomi M. Eilan, Self-Location, Consciousness, and Attention.
    ‘Like the shadow of one’s own head, [the referent of one’s ‘I’ thoughts] will not wait to be jumped on. And yet it is never very far ahead; indeed, sometimes it does not seem to be ahead of the pursuer at all. It evades capture by lodging itself in the very inside of the muscles of the pursuer. It is too near even to be within arm’s reach.’(C of M 177-89).
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Naomi Eilan (2014). Intelligible Realism About Consciousness: A Response to Nagel's Paradox. Ratio 27 (1):32-52.
    Is the location of consciousness in the objectively represented world intelligible? The paper examines the grounds for Nagel's negative answer, which can be presented as a response to the following paradox. (1) We are realists about consciousness. (2) Realism about a domain of reference requires commitment to the possibility of an objective, perspective-free conception of it. (3) The phenomenal character of an experience can only be captured by means of perspectival concepts. According to Nagel, we can have either realism about (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Naomi Eilan (2013). A Relational Response to Newman's Objection to Russell's Causal Theory of Perception. Theoria 80 (2).
    The causal theory of perception (CTP) has come under a great deal of critical scrutiny from philosophers of mind interested in the nature of perception. M. H. Newman's set-theoretic objection to Russell's structuralist version of the CTP, in his 1928 paper “Mr Russell's Causal Theory of Perception” has not, to my knowledge, figured in these discussions. In this paper I aim to show that it should: Newman's objection can be generalized to yield a particularly powerful and incisive challenge to all (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Naomi Eilan (2013). On the Paradox of Gestalt Switches: Wittgenstein's Response to Kohler. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 2 (3).
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Naomi Eilan (2011). Experiential Objectivity. In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
    To be a 'commonsense realist' is to hold that perceptual experience is (in general) an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects, and a source of direct knowledge of what such objects are like. Over the past few centuries this view has faced formidable challenges from epistemology, metaphysics, and, more recently, cognitive science. However, in recent years there has been renewed interest in it, due to new work on perceptual consciousness, objectivity, and causal understanding. This volume collects nineteen original essays by leading (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.) (2011). Perception, Causation, and Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
    Perceptual experience, that paradigm of subjectivity, constitutes our most immediate and fundamental access to the objective world. At least, this would seem to be so if commonsense realism is correct — if perceptual experience is (in general) an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects, and a source of direct knowledge of what such objects are like. Commonsense realism raises many questions. First, can we be more precise about its commitments? Does it entail any particular conception of the nature of perceptual experience (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Naomi Eilan (2007). Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and Communication. In Thomas Baldwin (ed.), Reading Merleau-Ponty: On Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge.
  9. Naomi M. Eilan (2006). On the Role of Perceptual Consciousness in Explaining the Goals and Mechanisms of Vision: A Convergence on Attention? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):67-88.
    The strong sensorimotor account of perception gives self-induced movements two constitutive roles in explaining visual consciousness. The first says that self-induced movements are vehicles of visual awareness, and for this reason consciousness ‘does not happen in the brain only’. The second says that the phenomenal nature of visual experiences is consists in the action-directing content of vision. In response I suggest, first, that the sense in which visual awareness is active should be explained by appeal to the role of attention (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Naomi M. Eilan (2005). Joint Attention, Communication, and Mind. In N. Elian, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press. 1.
    This chapter argues that a central division among accounts of joint attention, both in philosophy and developmental psychology, turns on how they address two questions: What, if any, is the connection between the capacity to engage in joint attention triangles and the capacity to grasp the idea of objective truth? How do we explain the kind of openness or sharing of minds that occurs in joint attention? The chapter explores the connections between answers to both questions, and argues that theories (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.) (2005). Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Sometime around their first birthday most infants begin to engage in relatively sustained bouts of attending together with their caretakers to objects in their environment. By the age of 18 months, on most accounts, they are engaging in full-blown episodes of joint attention. As developmental psychologists (usually) use the term, for such joint attention to be in play, it is not sufficient that the infant and the adult are in fact attending to the same object, nor that the one’s attention (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Naomi M. Eilan (2003). The Explanatory Role of Consciousness in Action. In Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.), Voluntary Action: Brains, Minds, and Sociality. Oxford University Press. 188-201.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Naomi M. Eilan & Johannes Roessler (2003). Agency and Self-Awareness: Mechanisms and Epistemology. In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  14. Naomi Eilan & Johannes Roessler (2003). Introduction. In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Clarendon Press.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.) (2003). Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press.
    In recent years there has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions, and indeed to demonstrate that free will is an illusion. The essays in this volume subject the assumptions that motivate such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny. The book will be compulsory reading for psychologists and philosophers working on action explanation, and for anyone interested in the relation between the brain sciences and consciousness.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Naomi Eilan (2001). Consciousness, Acquaintance and Demonstrative Thought. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):433–440.
  17. Naomi Eilan (2001). Meaning, Truth, and the Self: Commentary on Campbell and Parnas and Sass. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):121-132.
  18. Naomi Eilan (2000). On Understanding Schizophrenia. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self. Amsterdam: J Benjamins. 97--113.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Naomi M. Eilan (2000). Primitive Consciousness and the 'Hard Problem'. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):28-39.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Naomi Eilan (1998). Philosophy of Mind. The Philosophers' Magazine 2 (2):50-51.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Naomi M. Eilan (1998). Perceptual Intentionality, Attention and Consciousness. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press. 181-202.
    of presence cannot be explained by appeal to the notion of non-representational of experience. world see John Campbell, 'The Role of Physical Objects in Thinking', in Representation: Problems Perceptual Intentionality, and.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Naomi M. Eilan (1997). Objectivity and the Perspective of Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):235-250.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.) (1995). The Body and the Self. MIT Press.
  24. Naomi Eilan (1995). The First Person Perspective. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:51 - 66.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Naomi M. Eilan (1995). Consciousness and the Self. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Mit Press. 291--310.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Naomi M. Eilan & Anthony J. Marcel (1995). Self-Consciousness and the Body: An Interdisciplinary Introduction. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. Mit Press.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Naomi M. Eilan (1993). Molyneux's Question and the Idea of an External World. In Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Naomi M. Eilan (ed.) (1993). Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  29. Naomi M. Eilan (1993). The Imagery Debate. Philosophical Books 34 (3):137-142.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Naomi M. Eilan, R. McCarthy & M. W. Brewer (eds.) (1993). Problems in the Philosophy and Psychology of Spatial Representation. Blackwell.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Naomi Eilan, Rosaleen A. McCarthy & Bill Brewer (eds.) (1993). Spatial Representation: Problems in Philosophy and Psychology. Blackwell.
    Spatial Representation presents original, specially written essays by leading psychologists and philosophers on a fascinating set of topics at the intersection of these two disciplines. They address such questions as these: Do the extraordinary navigational abilities of birds mean that these birds have the same kind of grip on the idea of a spatial world as we do? Is there a difference between the way sighted and blind subjects represent the world 'out there'? Does the study of brain-injured subjects, such (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Naomi Eilan (1992). The A Priori and the Empirical in Theories of Emotion: Smedslund's “Conceptual Analysis” of Emotion. Cognition and Emotion 6 (6):457-466.