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Profile: Naomi Eilan (University of Warwick)
  1. Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.) (1995). The Body and the Self. MIT Press.
  2.  34
    Naomi M. Eilan & Johannes Roessler (2003). Agency and Self-Awareness: Mechanisms and Epistemology. In Johannes Roessler (ed.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press
  3. Naomi M. Eilan (ed.) (1993). Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
     
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  4.  51
    Naomi M. Eilan (1998). Perceptual Intentionality, Attention and Consciousness. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. New York: Cambridge University Press 181-202.
    of presence cannot be explained by appeal to the notion of non-representational of experience. world see John Campbell, 'The Role of Physical Objects in Thinking', in Representation: Problems Perceptual Intentionality, and.
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  5. Naomi M. Eilan (1997). Objectivity and the Perspective of Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):235-250.
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  6.  86
    Naomi M. Eilan (1995). Consciousness and the Self. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press 291--310.
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  7.  3
    Naomi M. Eilan & Anthony J. Marcel (1995). Self-Consciousness and the Body: An Interdisciplinary Introduction. In Jose Luis Bermudez, Anthony J. Marcel & Naomi M. Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press
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  8.  77
    Naomi M. Eilan (2006). On the Role of Perceptual Consciousness in Explaining the Goals and Mechanisms of Vision: A Convergence on Attention? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):67-88.
    The strong sensorimotor account of perception gives self-induced movements two constitutive roles in explaining visual consciousness. The first says that self-induced movements are vehicles of visual awareness, and for this reason consciousness ‘does not happen in the brain only’. The second says that the phenomenal nature of visual experiences is consists in the action-directing content of vision. In response I suggest, first, that the sense in which visual awareness is active should be explained by appeal to the role of attention (...)
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  9.  74
    Naomi M. Eilan (2005). Joint Attention, Communication, and Mind. In N. Elian, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press 1.
    This chapter argues that a central division among accounts of joint attention, both in philosophy and developmental psychology, turns on how they address two questions: What, if any, is the connection between the capacity to engage in joint attention triangles and the capacity to grasp the idea of objective truth? How do we explain the kind of openness or sharing of minds that occurs in joint attention? The chapter explores the connections between answers to both questions, and argues that theories (...)
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  10.  65
    Naomi M. Eilan, On the Reality of Color.
    The Quest for Reality, contains, amongst much else, a sustained and deeply illuminating investigation of the thesis Barry Stroud labels ’subjectivism’ about colours. The grounds he relentlessly amasses for rejecting the thesis are, in my view, compelling. There is a sense, indeed, in which I think they are more compelling than he says he himself finds them. For as I understand his arguments, they contain the materials for delivering a positive answer to the question: are objects really coloured? As Stroud (...)
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  11.  58
    Naomi M. Eilan (2000). Primitive Consciousness and the 'Hard Problem'. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):28-39.
    [opening paragraph]: If we think intuitively and non-professionally about the evolution of consciousness, the following is a compelling thought. What the emergence of consciousness made possible, uniquely in the natural world, was the capacity for representing the world, and, hence, for acquiring knowledge about it. This is the kind of thought that surfaces when, for example, we make explicit what lies behind wondering whether a frog, as compared to a dog, say, is conscious. The thought that it might not be (...)
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  12. Naomi M. Eilan, R. McCarthy & M. W. Brewer (eds.) (1993). Problems in the Philosophy and Psychology of Spatial Representation. Blackwell.
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  13. Naomi M. Eilan, Self-Location, Consciousness, and Attention.
    ‘Like the shadow of one’s own head, [the referent of one’s ‘I’ thoughts] will not wait to be jumped on. And yet it is never very far ahead; indeed, sometimes it does not seem to be ahead of the pursuer at all. It evades capture by lodging itself in the very inside of the muscles of the pursuer. It is too near even to be within arm’s reach.’(C of M 177-89).
     
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  14. Naomi M. Eilan (1993). Molyneux's Question and the Idea of an External World. In Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell
     
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  15.  3
    Naomi M. Eilan (1993). The Imagery Debate. Philosophical Books 34 (3):137-142.
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  16. Naomi M. Eilan (2003). The Explanatory Role of Consciousness in Action. In Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.), Voluntary Action: Brains, Minds, and Sociality. Oxford University Press 188-201.