Search results for 'Narrow' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. David J. Chalmers (2003). The Nature of Narrow Content. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):46-66.score: 18.0
    A content of a subject's mental state is narrow when it is determined by the subject's intrinsic properties: that is, when any possible intrinsic duplicate of the subject has a corresponding mental state with the same content. A content of a subject's mental state is..
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  2. Murat Aydede (1997). Has Fodor Really Changed His Mind on Narrow Content? Mind and Language 12 (3-4):422-58.score: 18.0
    In his latest book, The Elm and the Expert (1994), Fodor notoriously rejects the notion of narrow content as superfluous. He envisions a scientific intentional psychology that adverts only to broad content properties in its explanations. I argue that Fodor's change in view is only apparent and that his previous position (1985-1991) is extensionally equivalent to his "new" position (1994). I show that, despite what he says narrow content is for in his (1994), Fodor himself has previously never (...)
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  3. Ping Tian (2009). Narrow Memory and Wide Knowledge: An Argument for the Compatibility of Externalism and Self-Knowledge. [REVIEW] Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):604-615.score: 18.0
    The development of the semantic externalism in the 1970s was followed by a debate on the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. Boghossian’s memory argument is one of the most important arguments against the compatibilist view. However, some compatibilists attack Boghossian’s argument by pointing out that his understanding of memory is internalistic. Ludlow and others developed the externalist view of memory to defend the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. However, the externalist view of memory undermines the epistemic status of memory since (...)
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  4. Michael G. Titelbaum (forthcoming). How to Derive a Narrow-Scope Requirement From Wide-Scope Requirements. Philosophical Studies:1-8.score: 18.0
    I argue that given standard deontic logic, wide-scope rational requirements entail narrow-scope rational requirements. In particular, the widely-embraced Enkratic Principle entails that if a particular combination of attitudes is rationally forbidden, it is also rationally forbidden to believe that that combination of attitudes is required.
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  5. Frank Jackson (2003). Representation and Narrow Belief. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):99-112.score: 15.0
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  6. Frances Egan (1999). In Defence of Narrow Mindedness. Mind and Language 14 (2):177-94.score: 15.0
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  7. Tian Ping (2009). Narrow Memory and Wide Knowledge: An Argument for the Compatibility of Externalism and Self-Knowledge. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (4):604-615.score: 15.0
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  8. John Broome (2007). Wide or Narrow Scope? Mind 116 (462):359-370.score: 12.0
    This paper is a response to ‘Why Be Rational?’ by Niko Kolodny. Kolodny argues that we have no reason to satisfy the requirements of rationality. His argument assumes that these requirements have a logically narrow scope. To see what the question of scope turns on, this comment provides a semantics for ‘requirement’. It shows that requirements of rationality have a wide scope, at least under one sense of ‘requirement’. Consequently Kolodny's conclusion cannot be derived.
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  9. Uriah Kriegel (2008). Real Narrow Content. Mind and Language 23 (3):304–328.score: 12.0
    The purpose of the present paper is to develop and defend an account of narrow content that would neutralize the commonplace charge that narrow content.
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  10. Guy Axtell (2010). Agency Ascriptions in Ethics and Epistemology: Or, Navigating Intersections, Narrow and Broad. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):73-94.score: 12.0
    Abstract: In this article, the logic and functions of character-trait ascriptions in ethics and epistemology is compared, and two major problems, the "generality problem" for virtue epistemologies and the "global trait problem" for virtue ethics, are shown to be far more similar in structure than is commonly acknowledged. I suggest a way to put the generality problem to work by making full and explicit use of a sliding scale--a "narrow-broad spectrum of trait ascription"-- and by accounting for the various (...)
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  11. Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1993). Some Content is Narrow. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.score: 12.0
    ONE way t0 defend narrow content is to produce a sentence 0f the form ‘S believes that P’, and show that this sentence is true 0f S if and 0nly if it is true 0f any duplicate from the skin in, any doppclgangcr, of S. N0toriously, this is hard to d0. Twin Earth examples are pervasivc.1 Another way to defend narrow content; is t0 show that Only 2. narrow notion can play thc causal explanatory r01c we require (...)
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  12. Jerome C. Wakefield (2002). Broad Versus Narrow Content in the Explanation of Action: Fodor on Frege Cases. Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):119-33.score: 12.0
    A major obstacle to formulating a broad-content intentional psychology is the occurrence of ''Frege cases'' - cases in which a person apparently believes or desires Fa but not Fb and acts accordingly, even though "a" and "b" have the same broad content. Frege cases seem to demand narrow-content distinctions to explain actions by the contents of beliefs and desires. Jerry Fodor ( The elm and the expert: Mentalese and its semantics , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994) argues that an (...)
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  13. Curtis Brown, Narrow Mental Content. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 12.0
    Narrow mental content is a kind of mental content that does not depend on an individual's environment. Narrow content contrasts with “broad” or “wide” content, which depends on features of the individual's environment as well as on features of the individual. It is controversial whether there is any such thing as narrow content. Assuming that there is, it is also controversial what sort of content it is, what its relation to ordinary or “broad” content is, and how (...)
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  14. Joe Lau, Three Motivations for Narrow Content.score: 12.0
    In everyday life, we typically explain what people do by attributing mental states such as beliefs and desires. Such mental states belong to a class of mental states that are _intentional_, mental states that have content. Hoping that Johnny will win, and believing that Johnny will win are of course rather different mental states that can lead to very different behaviour. But they are similar in that they both have the same content : what is being hoped for and believed (...)
     
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  15. David J. Buller (1992). "Narrow"-Mindedness Breeds Inaction. Behavior and Philosophy 20 (1):59-70.score: 12.0
    Discussion of Fodor's doctrine of 'methodological solipsism' and Stich's principle of autonomy' has been concerned to show that these principles are incompatible with psychological theories which appeal to states with content (e.g. beliefs and desires). Concern with these issues, and the subsequent attempt to develop a notion of 'narrow' content which is solipsistic or autonomous, has, I believe, obscured a more fundamental issue: No theory which satisfies these principles would ever be able to explain behavior under descriptions which are (...)
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  16. Pat A. Manfredi (1993). Two Routes to Narrow Content: Both Dead Ends. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):3-22.score: 12.0
    If psychology requires a taxonomy that categorizes mental states according to their causal powers, the common sense method of individuating mental states (a taxonomy by intentional content) is unacceptable because mental states can have different intentional content, but identical causal powers. This difference threatens both the vindication of belief/desire psychology and the viability of scientific theories whose posits include intentional states. To resolve this conflict, Fodor has proposed that for scientific purposes mental states should be classified by their narrow (...)
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  17. Ken Safir, Coconstrual and Narrow Syntax.score: 12.0
    This essay explores the place of coconstrual relations, such as antecedent-anaphor relations, in a theory of grammar informed by minimalist architecture. It has been argued that the logical space created by minimalist theorizing should favor an account of coconstrual derived from the tree-building operations of narrow syntax (Agree, feature theory, Merge and its subcase, Remerge), dispensing with rules or conditions that evaluate constructed trees. On such an account, it is argued, the explanatory power of narrow syntax is enhanced (...)
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  18. Kam-Yuen Cheng (2002). Narrow Content and Historical Accounts: Can Fodor Live Without Them? Journal of Philosophical Research 27:101-113.score: 12.0
    Fodor’s Informational Semantics states that the content of a representation depends on the counterfactual relation between the representation and the represented. However, his theory suffers from the psychological explanation problem and the indeterminacy problem raised by twin cases. In response to these problems, Fodor has introduced narrow content and a mixed theory of content that combines a historical account with the counterfactual account. In The Elm and the Expert, he drops both of them for the reason that twin cases (...)
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  19. Alberto Voltolini (1997). Holistic Narrow Content? Il Cannocchiale 2:197-209.score: 12.0
    In the course of his philosophical development, Jerry Fodor has indicated two sorts of non-broad (i.e., non-truthconditional) content of mental representations, namely content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized (de dicto content: DDC) and narrow content (NC) qua mapping function from contexts (of thought) to broad contents. According to the former conceptualization, mental state tokens which are truth-conditionally identical may be such that they cannot both truthfully ascribed to one and the same subject at the same time, for they (...)
     
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  20. Eric Mandelbaum (2011). What is the Narrow Content of Fence (and Other Definitionally and Interpretationally Primitive Concepts)? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):138-138.score: 12.0
    It's unclear what narrow content is interpersonally shared for concepts that don't originate from core cognition yet are still definitionally and interpretationally primitive. A primary concern is that for these concepts, one cannot draw a principled distinction between inferences that are content determining and those that aren't. The lack of a principled distinction imperils an account of interpersonally shared concepts.
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  21. Dennis Skocz (2004). The Narrow Road to The Deep North. Environmental Philosophy 1 (2):75-83.score: 12.0
    The paper offers a reading of “The Narrow Road to the Deep North” and related writings by the famous Japanese haiku poet of the 17 century, Basho. Employing the Heideggerian distinction between earth and world, the interpretation of Basho suggests that prose narrative, represented by Basho’s travelogue or account of his journey by foot through Japan, inserts nature (earth) within the scope of everyday human concerns (world). The reading suggests that it is in the poetic interludes, the haiku pieces (...)
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  22. Stephen Binns & Bjørn Kjos-Hanssen (2009). Finding Paths Through Narrow and Wide Trees. Journal of Symbolic Logic 74 (1):349-360.score: 12.0
    We consider two axioms of second-order arithmetic. These axioms assert, in two different ways, that infinite but narrow binary trees always have infinite paths. We show that both axioms are strictly weaker than Weak König's Lemma, and incomparable in strength to the dual statement (WWKL) that wide binary trees have paths.
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  23. Alberto Voltolini (1997). Is Narrow Content the Same as Content of Mental State Types Opaquely Taxonomized? In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy, Miscellanea. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.score: 12.0
    Jerry Fodor now holds (1990) that the content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized (de dicto content: DDC) is determined by the 'orthographical' syntax + the computational/functional role of such states. Mental states whose tokens are both orthographically and truth-conditionally identical may be different with regard to the computational/functional role played by their respective representational cores. This make them tantamount to different contentful states, i.e. states with different DDCs, insofar as they are opaquely taxonomized. Indeed they cannot both be truthfully (...)
     
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  24. Amy Coplan (2011). Will the Real Empathy Please Stand Up? A Case for a Narrow Conceptualization. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):40-65.score: 10.0
    A longstanding problem with the study of empathy is the lack of a clear and agreed upon definition. A trend in the recent literature is to respond to this problem by advancing a broad and all-encompassing view of empathy that applies to myriad processes ranging from mimicry and imitation to high-level perspective taking. I argue that this response takes us in the wrong direction and that what we need in order to better understand empathy is a narrower conceptualization, not a (...)
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  25. David Rose & David Danks (2013). In Defense of a Broad Conception of Experimental Philosophy. Metaphilosophy 44 (4):512-532.score: 9.0
    Experimental philosophy is often presented as a new movement that avoids many of the difficulties that face traditional philosophy. This article distinguishes two views of experimental philosophy: a narrow view in which philosophers conduct empirical investigations of intuitions, and a broad view which says that experimental philosophy is just the colocation in the same body of (i) philosophical naturalism and (ii) the actual practice of cognitive science. These two positions are rarely clearly distinguished in the literature about experimental philosophy, (...)
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  26. Robyn Carston (2008). Linguistic Communication and the Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction. Synthese 165 (3):321 - 345.score: 9.0
    Most people working on linguistic meaning or communication assume that semantics and pragmatics are distinct domains, yet there is still little consensus on how the distinction is to be drawn. The position defended in this paper is that the semantics/pragmatics distinction holds between (context-invariant) encoded linguistic meaning and speaker meaning. Two other ‘minimalist’ positions on semantics are explored and found wanting: Kent Bach’s view that there is a narrow semantic notion of context which is responsible for providing semantic values (...)
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  27. Daan Evers (2011). Two Objections to Wide-Scoping. Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (13):251-255.score: 9.0
    Wide-scopers argue that the detachment of intuitively false ‘ought’ claims from hypothetical imperatives is blocked because ‘ought’ takes wide, as opposed to narrow, scope. I present two arguments against this view. The first questions the premise that natural language conditionals are true just in case the antecedent is false. The second shows that intuitively false ‘ought’s can still be detached even WITH wide-scope readings. This weakens the motivation for wide-scoping.
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  28. Jerry A. Fodor (1991). A Modal Argument for Narrow Content. Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26.score: 9.0
  29. Frank Jackson (2003). Narrow Content and Representation--Or Twin Earth Revisited. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 77 (2):55-70.score: 9.0
    Intentional states represent. Belief represents how we take things to be; desire represents how we would like things to be; and so on. To represent is to make a division among possibilities; it is to divide the possibilities into those that are consistent with how things are being represented to be and those that are not. I will call the possibilities consistent with how some intentional state represents things to be, its content. There is no suggestion that this is the (...)
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  30. Karen Neander, The Narrow and the Normative.score: 9.0
  31. Kent Bach (1996). Content: Wide Vs. Narrow. In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.score: 9.0
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  32. Rob Lovering (2009). On What God Would Do. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (2):87 - 104.score: 9.0
    Many debates in the philosophy of religion, particularly arguments for and against the existence of God, depend on a claim or set of claims about what God—qua sovereign, omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being— would do , either directly or indirectly, in particular cases or in general. Accordingly, before these debates can be resolved we must first settle the more fundamental issue of whether we can know, or at least have justified belief about, what God would do. In this paper, (...)
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  33. Andrew Reisner (2009). Unifying the Requirements of Rationality. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):243-260.score: 9.0
    This paper looks at the question of what form the requirements of practical rationality take. One common view is that the requirements of rationality are wide-scope, and another is that they are narrow-scope. I argue that the resolution to the question of wide-scope versus narrow-scope depends to a significant degree on what one expects a theory of rationality to do. In examining these expectations, I consider whether there might be a way to unify requirements of both forms into (...)
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  34. Sam Shpall (2013). Wide and Narrow Scope. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):717-736.score: 9.0
    In this paper I present an original and relatively conciliatory solution to one of the central contemporary debates in the theory of rationality, the debate about the proper formulation of rational requirements. I begin by offering my own version of the “symmetry problem” for wide scope rational requirements, and I show how this problem necessitates the introduction of a normative concept other than the traditional notions of reason and requirement. I then sketch a theory of rational commitment , showing how (...)
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  35. L. L. E. Bolt (2007). True to Oneself? Broad and Narrow Ideas on Authenticity in the Enhancement Debate. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (4):285-300.score: 9.0
    Our knowledge of the human brain and the influence of pharmacological substances on human mental functioning is expanding. This creates new possibilities to enhance personality and character traits. Psychopharmacological enhancers, as well as other enhancement technologies, raise moral questions concerning the boundary between clinical therapy and enhancement, risks and safety, coercion and justice. Other moral questions include the meaning and value of identity and authenticity, the role of happiness for a good life, or the perceived threats to humanity. Identity and (...)
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  36. Daniel Dohrn (2011). Are There a Posteriori Conceptual Necessities? Philosophical Studies 155 (2):181-197.score: 9.0
    I critically assess Stephen Yablo’s claim that cassinis are ovals is an a posteriori conceptual necessity. One does not know it simply by mastering the relevant concepts but by substantial empirical scrutiny. Yablo represents narrow content by would have turned out -conditionals. An epistemic reading of such conditionals does not bear Yablo’s claim. Two metaphysically laden readings are considered. In one reading, Yablo’s conditionals test under what circumstances concepts remain the same while their extensions diverge. As an alternative, I (...)
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  37. Wolfram Hinzen (2013). Narrow Syntax and the Language of Thought. Philosophical Psychology 26 (1):1-23.score: 9.0
    A traditional view maintains that thought, while expressed in language, is non-linguistic in nature and occurs in non-linguistic beings as well. I assess this view against current theories of the evolutionary design of human grammar. I argue that even if some forms of human thought are shared with non-human animals, a residue remains that characterizes a unique way in which human thought is organized as a system. I explore the hypothesis that the cause of this difference is a grammatical way (...)
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  38. Frederick R. Adams, David Drebushenko, Gary Fuller & Robert A. Stecker (1990). Narrow Content: Fodor's Folly. Mind and Language 5 (3):213-29.score: 9.0
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  39. Chen Bo (2012). A Descriptivist Refutation of Kripke's Modal Argument and of Soames's Defence. Theoria 78 (3):225-260.score: 9.0
    This article systematically challenges Kripke's modal argument and Soames's defence of this argument by arguing that, just like descriptions, names can take narrow or wide scopes over modalities, and that there is a big difference between the wide scope reading and the narrow scope reading of a modal sentence with a name. Its final conclusions are that all of Kripke's and Soames's arguments are untenable due to some fallacies or mistakes; names are not “rigid designators”; if there were (...)
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  40. Georges Rey (1998). A Narrow Representationalist Account of Qualitative Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):435-58.score: 9.0
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  41. David J. Buller (1997). Individualism and Evolutionary Psychology (Or: In Defense of "Narrow" Functions). Philosophy of Science 64 (1):74-95.score: 9.0
    Millikan and Wilson argue, for different reasons, that the essential reference to the environment in adaptationist explanations of behavior makes (psychological) individualism inconsistent with evolutionary psychology. I show that their arguments are based on misinterpretations of the role of reference to the environment in such explanations. By exploring these misinterpretations, I develop an account of explanation in evolutionary psychology that is fully consistent with individualism. This does not, however, constitute a full-fledged defense of individualism, since evolutionary psychology is only one (...)
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  42. François Recanati (1994). How Narrow is Narrow Content? Dialectica 48 (3-4):209-29.score: 9.0
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  43. Gabriel Segal (2000). A Slim Book About Narrow Content. MIT Press.score: 9.0
    The book, written in a clear, engaging style, contains four chapters.
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  44. Marc A. Cohen (2010). The Narrow Application of Rawls in Business Ethics: A Political Conception of Both Stakeholder Theory and the Morality of Markets. Journal of Business Ethics 97 (4):563-579.score: 9.0
    This paper argues that Rawls’ principles of justice provide a normative foundation for stakeholder theory. The principles articulate (at an abstract level) citizens’ rights; these rights create interests across all aspects of society, including in the space of economic activity; and therefore, stakeholders – as citizens – have legitimate interests in the space of economic activity. This approach to stakeholder theory suggests a political interpretation of Boatright’s Moral Market approach, one that emphasizes the rights/place of citizens. And this approach to (...)
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  45. Gabriel Segal (2009). Keep Making Sense. Synthese 170 (2):275 - 287.score: 9.0
    In a number works Jerry Fodor has defended a reductive, causal and referential theory of cognitive content. I argue against this, defending a quasi-Fregean notion of cognitive content, and arguing also that the cognitive content of non-singular concepts is narrow, rather than wide.
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  46. Boudewijn de Bruin (2009). On the Narrow Epistemology of Game Theoretic Agents. In Ondrej Majer, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen & Tero Tulenheimo (eds.), Games: Unifying Logic, Language, and Philosophy. Springer.score: 9.0
    I argue that game theoretic explanations of human actions make implausible epistemological assumptions. A logical analysis of game theoretic explanations shows that they do not conform to the belief-desire framework of action explanation. Epistemic characterization theorems (specifying sufficient conditions for game theoretic solution concepts to obtain) are argued to be the canonical way to make game theory conform to that framework. The belief formation practices implicit in epistemic characterization theorems, however, disregard all information about players except what can be found (...)
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  47. Bernard Molyneux (2007). Primeness, Internalism and Explanatory Generality. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):255 - 277.score: 9.0
    Williamson (2000) [Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press] argues that attempts to substitute narrow mental states or narrow/environmental composites for broad and factive mental states will result in poorer explanations of behavior. I resist Williamson.
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  48. B. Jack Copeland (2000). Narrow Versus Wide Mechanism: Including a Re-Examination of Turing's Views on the Mind-Machine Issue. Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):5-33.score: 9.0
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  49. Pierre Jacob (1990). Externalism Revisited: Is There Such a Thing as Narrow Content? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 60 (November):143-176.score: 9.0
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  50. Curtis Brown (1993). Belief States and Narrow Content. Mind and Language 8 (3):343-67.score: 9.0
    The first thesis is that beliefs play a role in explaining behavior. This is reasonably uncontroversial, though it has been controverted. Why did I raise my arm? Because I wanted to emphasize a point, and believed that I could do so by raising my arm. The belief that I could emphasize a point by raising my arm is central to the most natural explanation of my action.
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