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Profile: Nathan Ballantyne (Fordham University)
  1. Nathan Ballantyne (2014). Does Luck Have a Place in Epistemology? Synthese 191 (7):1391-1407.
    Some epistemologists hold that exploration and elaboration of the nature of luck will allow us to better understand knowledge. I argue this is a mistake.
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  2. Nathan Ballantyne (2013). Counterfactual Philosophers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):368-387.
    I argue that reflection on philosophers who could have been working among us but aren’t can lead us to give up our philosophical beliefs.
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  3. Nathan Ballantyne (2013). Knockdown Arguments. Erkenntnis:1-19.
    David Lewis and Peter van Inwagen have claimed that there are no “knockdown” arguments in philosophy. Their claim appears to be at odds with common philosophical practice: philosophers often write as though their conclusions are established or proven and that the considerations offered for these conclusions are decisive. In this paper, I examine some questions raised by Lewis’s and van Inwagen’s contention. What are knockdown arguments? Are there any in philosophy? If not, why not? These questions concern the nature of (...)
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  4. Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans (2013). Schaffer's Demon. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):552-559.
    Jonathan Schaffer (2010) has summoned a new sort of demon – which he calls the debasing demon – that apparently threatens all of our purported knowledge. We show that any debasing skeptical argument must attack the justification condition and can do so only if a plausible thesis about justification is false.
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  5. Nathan Ballantyne & Joshua C. Thurow (2013). Moral Intuitionism Defeated? American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):411-422.
    Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed and progressively refined an argument against moral intuitionism—the view on which some moral beliefs enjoy non-inferential justification. He has stated his argument in a few different forms, but the basic idea is straightforward. To start with, Sinnott-Armstrong highlights facts relevant to the truth of moral beliefs: such beliefs are sometimes biased, influenced by various irrelevant factors, and often subject to disagreement. Given these facts, Sinnott-Armstrong infers that many moral beliefs are false. What then shall we think (...)
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  6. Nathan Ballantyne (2012). Acquaintance and Assurance. Philosophical Studies 161 (3):421-431.
    I criticize Richard Fumerton’s fallibilist acquaintance theory of noninferential justification.
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  7. Nathan Ballantyne (2012). Luck and Interests. Synthese 185 (3):319-334.
    Recent work on the nature of luck widely endorses the thesis that an event is good or bad luck for an individual only if it is significant for that individual. In this paper, I explore this thesis, showing that it raises questions about interests, well-being, and the philosophical uses of luck. In Sect. 1, I examine several accounts of significance, due to Pritchard (2005), Coffman (2007), and Rescher (1995). Then in Sect. 2 I consider what some theorists want to ‘do’ (...)
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  8. Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman (2012). Conciliationism and Uniqueness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):657-670.
    Two theses are central to recent work on the epistemology of disagreement: Conciliationism:?In a revealed peer disagreement over P, each thinker should give at least some weight to her peer's attitude. Uniqueness:?For any given proposition and total body of evidence, the evidence fully justifies exactly one level of confidence in the proposition. 1This paper is the product of full and equal collaboration between its authors. Does Conciliationism commit one to Uniqueness? Thomas Kelly 2010 has argued that it does. After some (...)
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  9. Nathan Ballantyne (2011). Anti-Luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment, and True Belief. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):485-503.
  10. Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman (2011). Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (18).
    Two theses figure centrally in work on the epistemology of disagreement: Equal Weight (‘EW’) and Uniqueness (‘U’). According to EW, you should give precisely as much weight to the attitude of a disagreeing epistemic peer as you give to your own attitude. U has it that, for any given proposition and total body of evidence, some doxastic attitude is the one the evidence makes rational (justifies) toward that proposition. Although EW has received considerable discussion, the case for U has not (...)
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  11. Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans (2010). Sosa's Dream. Philosophical Studies 148 (2):249 - 252.
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  12. Peter King & Nathan Ballantyne (2009). Augustine on Testimony. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 195-214.
  13. Ian Evans, Don Fallis, Peter Gross, Terry Horgan, Jenann Ismael, John Pollock, Paul D. Thorn, Jacob N. Caton, Adam Arico, Daniel Sanderman, Orlin Vakerelov, Nathan Ballantyne, Matthew S. Bedke, Brian Fiala & Martin Fricke (2007). An Objectivist Argument for Thirdism. Analysis 68.
    Bayesians take “definite” or “single-case” probabilities to be basic. Definite probabilities attach to closed formulas or propositions. We write them here using small caps: PROB(P) and PROB(P/Q). Most objective probability theories begin instead with “indefinite” or “general” probabilities (sometimes called “statistical probabilities”). Indefinite probabilities attach to open formulas or propositions. We write indefinite probabilities using lower case “prob” and free variables: prob(Bx/Ax). The indefinite probability of an A being a B is not about any particular A, but rather about the (...)
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