1.  19
    Nathan Berg & Ulrich Hoffrage (2010). Compressed Environments: Unbounded Optimizers Should Sometimes Ignore Information. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 20 (2):259-275.
    Given free information and unlimited processing power, should decision algorithms use as much information as possible? A formal model of the decision-making environment is developed to address this question and provide conditions under which informationally frugal algorithms, without any information or processing costs whatsoever, are optimal. One cause of compression that allows optimal algorithms to rationally ignore information is inverse movement of payoffs and probabilities (e.g., high payoffs occur with low probably and low payoffs occur with high probability). If inversely (...)
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  2.  6
    Marco Monti, Riccardo Boero, Nathan Berg, Gerd Gigerenzer & Laura Martignon (2012). How Do Common Investors Behave? Information Search and Portfolio Choice Among Bank Customers and University Students. Mind and Society 11 (2):203-233.
    Bank customers are not financial experts, and yet they make high-stakes decisions that can substantively affect personal wealth. Sooner or later, every individual has to take relevant investment decisions. Using data collected from financial advisors, bank customers and university students in Italy, this paper aims to reveal new insights about the decision processes of average non-expert investors: their investment goals, the information sets they consider, and the factors that ultimately influence decisions about investment products. Using four portfolio choice tasks based (...)
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  3. Nathan Berg (2014). The Consistency and Ecological Rationality Approaches to Normative Bounded Rationality. Journal of Economic Methodology 21 (4):375-395.
    This paper focuses on tacit versus explicit uses of plural performance metrics as a primary methodological characteristic. This characteristic usefully distinguishes two schools of normative analysis and their approaches to normative interpretations of bounded rationality. Both schools of thought make normative claims about bounded rationality by comparing the performance of decision procedures using more than one performance metric. The consistency school makes tacit reference to performance metrics outside its primary axiomatic framework, but lexicographically promotes internal axiomatic consistency as the primary, (...)
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