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Profile: Nathan Salmon (University of California at Santa Barbara, City University of New York)
  1.  59
    Nathan U. Salmon (2005). Reference and Essence. Prometheus Books.
  2.  65
    Nathan U. Salmon (1986). Frege's Puzzle. Ridgeview.
  3. Nathan Salmon (1998). Nonexistence. Noûs 32 (3):277-319.
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  4.  69
    Nathan Salmon (2006). A Theory of Bondage. Philosophical Review 115 (4):415-448.
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  5. Nathan Salmon (2002). Demonstrating and Necessity. Philosophical Review 111 (4):497-537.
  6. Nathan Salmon (1989). The Logic of What Might Have Been. Philosophical Review 98 (1):3-34.
  7.  54
    Nathan U. Salmon (2005). Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning. Oxford University Press.
    Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning brings together Nathan Salmon's influential papers on topics in the metaphysics of existence, non-existence, and fiction; modality and its logic; strict identity, including personal identity; numbers and numerical quantifiers; the philosophical significance of Godel's Incompleteness theorems; and semantic content and designation. Including a previously unpublished essay and a helpful new introduction to orient the reader, the volume offers rich and varied sustenance for philosophers and logicians.
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  8. Nathan Salmon (2012). Recurrence. Philosophical Studies 159 (3):407-441.
    Standard compositionality is the doctrine that the semantic content of a compound expression is a function of the semantic contents of the contentful component expressions. In 1954 Hilary Putnam proposed that standard compositionality be replaced by a stricter version according to which even sentences that are synonymously isomorphic (in the sense of Alonzo Church) are not strictly synonymous unless they have the same logical form. On Putnam’s proposal, the semantic content of a compound expression is a function of: (i) the (...)
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  9. Nathan Salmon (1989). Illogical Belief. Philosophical Perspectives 3:243-285.
  10. Nathan Salmon (1987). Existence. Philosophical Perspectives 1:49-108.
  11. Nathan Salmon (2005). Are General Terms Rigid? Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (1):117 - 134.
    On Kripke’s intended definition, a term designates an object x rigidly if the term designates x with respect to every possible world in which x exists and does not designate anything else with respect to worlds in which x does not exist. Kripke evidently holds in Naming and Necessity, hereafter N&N (pp. 117–144, passim, and especially at 134, 139–140), that certain general terms – including natural-kind terms like ‘‘water’’ and ‘‘tiger’’, phenomenon terms like ‘‘heat’’ and ‘‘hot’’, and color terms like (...)
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  12. Nathan U. Salmon & Scott Soames (eds.) (1988). Propositions and Attitudes. Oxford University Press.
    The concept of a proposition is important in several areas of philosophy and central to the philosophy of language. This collection of readings investigates many different philosophical issues concerning the nature of propositions and the ways they have been regarded through the years. Reflecting both the history of the topic and the range of contemporary views, the book includes articles from Bertrand Russell, Gottlob Frege, the Russell-Frege Correspondence, Alonzo Church, David Kaplan, John Perry, Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, Mark Richard, Scott (...)
     
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  13.  59
    Nathan Salmon (2010). Lambda in Sentences with Designators. Journal of Philosophy 107 (9):445-468.
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  14. William G. Lycan, Penelope Maddy, Gideon Rosen & Nathan Salmon (2001). Externalism, Naturalism, Nominalism, and Mathematics. Philosophical Perspectives 15:17-117.
     
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  15. Nathan Ucuzoglu Salmon (1979). How Not to Derive Essentialism From the Theory of Reference. Journal of Philosophy 76 (12):703-725.
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  16. Nathan Salmon (2003). Naming, Necessity, and Beyond. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (447):475-492.
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  17.  60
    Nathan Salmon (1991). The Pragmatic Fallacy. Philosophical Studies 63 (1):83--97.
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  18.  76
    Nathan Salmon (2005). On Designating. Mind 114 (456):1069-1133.
    A detailed interpretation is provided of the ‘Gray's Elegy’ passage in Russell's ‘On Denoting’. The passage is suffciently obscure that its principal lessons have been independently rediscovered. Russell attempts to demonstrate that the thesis that definite descriptions are singular terms is untenable. The thesis demands a distinction be drawn between content and designation, but the attempt to form a proposition directly about the content (as by using an appropriate form of quotation) inevitably results in a proposition about the thing designated (...)
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  19.  58
    Nathan Salmon (1995). Being of Two Minds: Belief with Doubt. Noûs 29 (1):1-20.
  20.  70
    Nathan Salmon (2006). The Resilience of Illogical Belief. Noûs 40 (2):369–375.
    Although Professor Schiffer and I have many times disagreed, I share his deep and abiding commitment to argument as a primary philosophical tool. Regretting any communication failure that has occurred, I endeavor here to make clearer my earlier reply in “Illogical Belief” to Schiffer’s alleged problem for my version of Millianism.1 I shall be skeletal, however; the interested reader is encouraged to turn to “Illogical Belief” for detail and elaboration. I have argued that to bear a propositional attitude de re (...)
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  21.  73
    Nathan Salmon (1986). Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):75-120.
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  22.  88
    Nathan Salmon (1996). Trans-World Identification and Stipulation. Philosophical Studies 84 (2-3):203 - 223.
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  23.  88
    Nathan Salmon (2015). Recurrence Again. Philosophical Studies 172 (2):445-457.
    Kit Fine has replied to my criticism of a technical objection he had given to the version of Millianism that I advocate. Fine evidently objects to my use of classical existential instantiation in an object-theoretic rendering of his meta-proof. Fine’s reply appears to involve both an egregious misreading of my criticism and a significant logical error. I argue that my rendering is unimpeachable, that the issue over my use of classical EI is a red herring, and that Fine’s original argument (...)
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  24.  36
    Nathan Salmon (2007). About Aboutness. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 3 (2):59-76.
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  25.  46
    Nathan Salmon (1986). Reflexivity. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (3):401-429.
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  26.  93
    Nathan Salmon (2008). That F. Philosophical Studies 141 (2):263 - 280.
    Jeffrey King's principal objection to the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is analyzed and criticized. King has responded with a modified version of his original argument aimed at establishing the weaker conclusion that the direct-reference theory of demonstratives is either incomplete or incorrect. It is argued that this fallback argument also fails.
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  27.  29
    Nathan Salmon (1987). How to Measure the Standard Metre. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:193 - 217.
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  28. Nathan Salmon (2004). The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly. In Marga Reimer & Anne Bezuidenhout (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond. Oxford University Press 230--260.
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  29. Nathan Salmon (2008). Numbers Versus Nominalists. Analysis 68 (299):177–182.
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  30. Nathan Salmon (1989). Tense and Singular Propositions. In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press 331--392.
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  31.  73
    Nathan Salmon (2013). A Note on Kripke’s Paradox About Time and Thought. Journal of Philosophy 110 (4):213-220.
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  32.  66
    Nathan Salmon (1991). How Not to Become a Millian Heir. Philosophical Studies 62 (2):165 - 177.
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  33.  31
    Nathan Salmon (2006). Terms in Bondage. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):263–274.
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  34.  55
    Nathan Salmon (1984). Impossible Worlds. Analysis 44 (3):114 - 117.
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  35. Nathan Salmon (2012). Generality. Philosophical Studies 161 (3):471-481.
    A distinction is drawn among predicates, open sentences (or open formulas), and general terms, including general-term phrases. Attaching a copula, perhaps together with an article, to a general term yields a predicate. Predicates can also be obtained through lambda-abstraction on an open sentence. The issue of designation and semantic content for each type of general expression is investigated. It is argued that the designatum of a general term is a universal, e.g., a kind, whereas the designatum of a predicate is (...)
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  36.  28
    Nathan Salmon (1993). Relative and Absolute Apriority. Philosophical Studies 69 (1):83 - 100.
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  37.  56
    Nathan Salmon (1989). Symposiums Papers: How to Become a Millian Heir. Noûs 23 (2):211-220.
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  38.  49
    Nathan U. Salmon (1982). Assertion and Incomplete Definite Descriptions. Philosophical Studies 42 (1):37--45.
  39.  32
    Nathan Salmon (1997). Is de Re Belief Reducible to de Dicto? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (sup1):85-110.
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  40. Nathan Salmon (1990). A Millian Heir Rejects the Wages of Sinn. In C. A. Anderson & J. Owens (eds.), Propositional Attitudes: The Role of Content in Logic, Language, and Mind. Csli Publications 215-247.
     
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  41.  62
    Nathan Salmon (1992). Reflections on Reflexivity. Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (1):53 - 63.
  42.  82
    Nathan Salmon (1993). Analyticity and Apriority. Philosophical Perspectives 7:125-133.
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  43. Nathan Salmon (2006). Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning. Philosophical Papers I. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 68 (3):671-672.
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  44.  54
    Nathan Salmon (2002). Identity Facts. Philosophical Topics 30 (1):237-267.
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  45. Nathan Salmon (2005). Two Conceptions of Semantics. In Zoltan Szabo (ed.), Semantics Versus Pragmatics. Oxford University Press 317-328.
     
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  46.  32
    Nathan Salmon (1987). The Fact Thatx=Y. Philosophia 17 (4):517-518.
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  47.  29
    Nathan Salmon (1997). Wholes, Parts, and Numbers. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):1-15.
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  48. Nathan Salmon (1988). How to Measure the Standard of Metre. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:193.
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  49. Nathan Salmon (2010). Three Perspectives on Quantifying In. In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought. OUP Oxford
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  50.  20
    Nathan Salmon (1993). This Side of Paradox. Philosophical Topics 21 (2):187-197.
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