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  1. Nathan Stemmer (2007). Hume's Solution of the Goodman Paradox and the Reliability Riddle (Mill's Problem). Philosophical Studies 132 (2):137 - 159.
    Many solutions of the Goodman paradox have been proposed but so far no agreement has been reached about which is the correct solution. However, I will not contribute here to the discussion with a new solution. Rather, I will argue that a solution has been in front of us for more than two hundred years because a careful reading of Hume’s account of inductive inferences shows that, contrary to Goodman’s opinion, it embodies a correct solution of the paradox. Moreover, the (...)
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  2. Nathan Stemmer (2007). On Universals: An Extensionalist Alternative to Quine's Resemblance Theory. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 38 (1):75 - 90.
    The notion of similarity plays a central role in Quine’s theory of Universals and it is with the help of this notion that Quine intends to define the concept of kind which also plays a central role in the theory. But as Quine has admitted, his attempts to define kinds in terms of similarities were unsuccessful and it is mainly because of this shortcoming that Quine’s theory has been ignored by several philosophers (see, e.g., Armstrong, D. M. (1978a). Nominalism and (...)
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  3. Nathan Stemmer (2007). Quine's Eliminativism and the Crystal Spheres. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 38 (2):315 - 327.
    Quine’s eliminativist theory has largely been ignored by the philosophical community. This is highly regrettable because Quine’s theory is probably close to correct. Now, the probable correctness of Quine’s theory has an important consequence since, according to the theory, there are no mental entities (events, states, phenomena, properties, etc.) nor do such entities play any role in a scientific account of the relevant phenomena. But the hundreds or probably thousands of publications that deal with issues such as mental causation, the (...)
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  4. Nathan Stemmer (2004). On Hetherington's Solution of the Goodman Paradox. Philosophy 79 (4):617-623.
    The Goodman paradox presents us with the problem of selecting the hypotheses that are confirmed by their positive instances. In a recent paper, Stephen Hetherington proposes a criterion that enables us to specify the hypotheses that are subjectively confirmed by these instances. But there is also an objective aspect to be considered here because, as a matter of fact, the hypotheses selected by the criterion have often been highly reliable even if they were based on the observation of only a (...)
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  5. Nathan Stemmer (2004). The Goodman Paradox: Three Different Problems and a Naturalistic Solution to Two of Them. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 35 (2):351 - 370.
    It is now more than 50 years that the Goodman paradox has been discussed, and many different solutions have been proposed. But so far no agreement has been reached about which is the correct solution to the paradox. In this paper, I present the naturalistic solutions to the paradox that were proposed in Quine (1969, 1974), Quine and Ullian (1970/1978), and Stemmer (1971). At the same time, I introduce a number of modifications and improvements that are needed for overcoming shortcomings (...)
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  6. Nathan Stemmer (2003). Covert Behavior and Mental Terms: A Reply to Moore. Behavior and Philosophy 31:165 - 171.
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  7. Nathan Stemmer (2001). The Mind-Body Problem and Quine's Repudiation Theory. Behavior and Philosophy 29:187-202.
    Most scholars who presently deal with the Mind-Body problem consider themselves monist materialists. Nevertheless, many of them also assume that there exist (in some sense of existence) mental entities. But since these two positions do not harmonize quite well, the literature is full of discussions about how to reconcile the positions. In this paper, I will defend a materialist theory that avoids all these problems by completely rejecting the existence of mental entities. This is Quine's repudiation theory. According to the (...)
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  8. Nathan Stemmer (1996). Review: A Naturalist Account of Language Acquisition. [REVIEW] Behavior and Philosophy 24 (2):195 - 196.
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  9. Nathan Stemmer (1995). A Behaviorist Account to Theory and Simulation Theories of Folk Psychology. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (1):29-41.
  10. Nathan Stemmer (1993). Behavioral Materialism, the Success of Folk Psychology, and the First-Person Case. Behavior and Philosophy 20 (21):1-14.
  11. Nathan Stemmer (1989). Empiricist Versus Prototype Theories of Language Acquisition. Mind and Language 4 (3):201-221.
  12. Nathan Stemmer (1989). Physicalism and the Argument From Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (March):84-91.
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  13. Nathan Stemmer (1988). Hume's Two Assumptions. Dialectica 42 (2):93-104.
    One usually speaks of Hume's problem of induction in the singular, as if Hume had called our attention to only one problem which affects the justification of inductive inferences. But Hume shows that this justification depends on two assumptions which are not logically valid. In most studies about the justification of inductive inferences, Hume's approach to base the justification on two assumptions has not been discussed. This seems to have been a mistake, however. Not only do these assumptions play different (...)
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  14. Nathan Stemmer (1987). The Hempel and Goodman Paradoxes: A Reply to Adler. Behaviorism 15 (2):165-166.
  15. Nathan Stemmer (1987). The Hypothesis of Other Minds: Is It the Best Explanation? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 51 (January):109-121.
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  16. Lynn Stephens, Norman Malcolm, D. M. Armstrong, Jonathan E. Adler, Nathan Stemmer & Steven C. Hayes (1987). Reviews and Replies. Behaviorism 15:77.
     
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  17. Nathan Stemmer (1984). Empiricist Versus Mentalist Theories of Language Acquisition. Semiotica 49 (1-2).
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  18. Nathan Stemmer (1983). The Roots of Knowledge. St. Martin's Press.
     
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  19. Nathan Stemmer (1982). A Solution to the Lottery Paradox. Synthese 51 (3):339 - 353.
  20. Nathan Stemmer (1981). Generalization Classes as Alternatives for Similarities and Some Other Concepts. Erkenntnis 16 (1):73 - 102.
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  21. Nathan Stemmer (1981). The Objective Confirmation of Hypotheses. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):395 - 404.
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  22. Nathan Stemmer (1979). On the Nature of Meanings. Semiotica 27 (4).
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  23. Nathan Stemmer (1979). Projectible Predicates. Synthese 41 (3):375 - 395.
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  24. Nathan Stemmer (1978). A Partial Solution to the Goodman Paradox. Philosophical Studies 34 (2):177 - 185.
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  25. Nathan Stemmer (1978). The Reliability of Inductive Inferences and Our Innate Capacities. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 9 (1):93-105.
    One of the important problems that have to be dealt with in the Philosophy of Science is to account for the high reliability of a very large part of our inductive inferences. This reliability is noteworthy because not only were many of these inferences made by ordinary people, even by children, but they were very often based on the observation of just a few positive instances. In the present paper, I deal with this problem by treating it as a normal (...)
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  26. Nathan Stemmer (1977). Una solución a la paradoja de Hempel. Teorema 7 (2):119-128.
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  27. Nathan Stemmer (1975). A Relative Notion of Natural Generalization. Philosophy of Science 42 (1):46-48.
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  28. Nathan Stemmer (1975). The Goodman Paradox. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 6 (2):340-354.
    Summary With the help of psychological and biological concepts it is possible todescribe adequately a fundamental class of inductive inferences that are intuitively correct. Moreover, by relying on evolutionary theories it is possible tojustify them, because they reflect innate, hence useful, capacities. These inferences, however, refer to the past, i.e. the inferred generalization is of the form All Awere B . The reason is that evolutionary theories only claim that innate capacitieshad survival value. With respect to inductive inferences about the (...)
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  29. Nathan Stemmer (1973). Brody's Defense of Essentialism. Philosophy of Science 40 (3):393-396.
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  30. Nathan Stemmer (1971). Innate Ideas and Quality Spaces. Semiotica 3 (3).
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  31. Nathan Stemmer (1971). Three Problems in Induction. Synthese 23 (2-3):287 - 308.
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