Search results for 'Nathan Wales' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
  1.  57
    Benjamin G. Purzycki, Daniel N. Finkel, John Shaver, Nathan Wales, Adam B. Cohen & Richard Sosis (2012). What Does God Know? Supernatural Agents' Access to Socially Strategic and Non-Strategic Information. Cognitive Science 36 (5):846-869.
    Current evolutionary and cognitive theories of religion posit that supernatural agent concepts emerge from cognitive systems such as theory of mind and social cognition. Some argue that these concepts evolved to maintain social order by minimizing antisocial behavior. If these theories are correct, then people should process information about supernatural agents’ socially strategic knowledge more quickly than non-strategic knowledge. Furthermore, agents’ knowledge of immoral and uncooperative social behaviors should be especially accessible to people. To examine these hypotheses, we measured response-times (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  2. Thomas Daniell, James Wales, Henry Salt & Roland Steffan (1991). Malerische Reise Durch Indien, 1786-1794 Aquarelle von Thomas Und William Daniell, Sowie James Wales Und Henry Salt : [Ausstellung], Sammlung Für Völkerkunde, September 1990 Bis Februar 1991. [REVIEW] Stiftung St. Galler Museen.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  3
    N. M. L. Nathan (1980). Evidence and Assurance. Cambridge University Press.
    A systematic study of rational or justified belief, which throws fresh light on current debates about foundations and coherence theories of knowledge, the validation of induction and moral scepticism. Dr Nathan focuses attention on the largely unsatisfiable desires for active and self-conscious assurance of truth liable to be engendered by philosophical reflection about total belief-systems and the sources of knowledge. He extracts a kernel of truth from the doctrine that a regress of justification is both necessary and impossible, contrasts (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  4. N. M. L. Nathan (2009). Evidence and Assurance. Cambridge University Press.
    A systematic study of rational or justified belief, which throws fresh light on current debates about foundations and coherence theories of knowledge, the validation of induction and moral scepticism. Dr Nathan focuses attention on the largely unsatisfiable desires for active and self-conscious assurance of truth liable to be engendered by philosophical reflection about total belief-systems and the sources of knowledge. He extracts a kernel of truth from the doctrine that a regress of justification is both necessary and impossible, contrasts (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Nicholas Nathan (2000). The Price of Doubt. Routledge.
    The Price of Doubt is an important contribution to the problem of scepticism. It offers a new standard for the appraisal of philosophical arguments. Nicholas Nathan confronts the sceptic. He questions the value of his argument and the knowledge it contains and provides a potential remedy to the frustrations of anti-sceptical epistemology.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  14
    N. M. L. Nathan (2000). The Price of Doubt. Routledge.
    Are any of our beliefs justified? Are they rational? The skeptic thinks that our epistemic justifications are undeserved. Nicholas Nathan confronts the skeptic and questions the value of his argument. Skeptical arguments are against justified and rational belief as well as for ignorance. Nathan argues that the truth value of trivial arguments are a matter of indifference. He tests this conjecture with a varied collection of counterexamples: arguments for ignorance, neo-Cartesian and infinite regress arguments, and also more critically (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. N. M. L. Nathan (1992). Will and World. Oxford University Press.
    Beneath metaphysical problems there often lies a conflict between what we want to be true and what we believe to be true. Nathan provides a general account of the resolution of this conflict as a philosophical objective, showing that there are ways of thinking it through systematically with a view to resolving or alleviating it. The author also studies in detail a set of interrelated conflicts about the freedom and the reality of the will. He shows how difficult it (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  68
    N. M. L. Nathan (2004). Stoics and Sceptics: A Reply to Brueckner. Analysis 64 (283):264–268.
  9. N. M. L. Nathan (1981). On an Argument of Peacocke's About Physicalism and Counterfactuals. Analysis 41 (3):124-125.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. N. M. L. Nathan (1975). Materialism and Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (4):501-511.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  94
    Daniel O. Nathan (1982). Irony and the Artist's Intentions. British Journal of Aesthetics 22 (3):245-256.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12.  91
    Jonathan Barnes, W. von Leyden, David Pole, Anthony Manser, W. H. Walsh, Michael Leahy, Gerard J. Hughes, Guy Robinson, Keith Jones, John Williamson, Alan Motefiore, Dorothy Emmet & N. L. Nathan (1973). New Books. [REVIEW] Mind 82 (326):292-320.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. N. M. L. Nathan (2005). Direct Realism: Proximate Causation and the Missing Object. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 20 (36):3-6.
    Direct Realists believe that perception involves direct awareness of an object not dependent for its existence on the perceiver. Howard Robinson rejects this doctrine in favour of a Sense-Datum theory of perception. His argument against Direct Realism invokes the principle ‘same proximate cause, same immediate effect’. Since there are cases in which direct awareness has the same proximate cerebral cause as awareness of a sense datum, the Direct Realist is, he thinks, obliged to deny this causal principle. I suggest that (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  83
    N. M. L. Nathan (1982). Conscious Belief. Analysis 42 (March):90-93.
  15.  17
    N. M. L. Nathan (1997). Self and Will. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1):81 – 94.
    When do two mental items belong to the same life? We could be content with the answer -just when they have certain volitional qualities in common. An affinity is noted between that theory and Berkeley's early doctrine of the self. Some rivals of the volitional theory invoke a spiritual or physical owner of mental items. They run a risk either of empty formality or of causal superstition. Other rivals postulate a non-transitive and symmetrical relation in the set of mental items. (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16.  21
    Amos Nathan (1986). How Not to Solve It. Philosophy of Science 53 (1):114-119.
    Six recently discussed problems in discrete probabilistic sample space, which have been found puzzling and even paradoxical, are reexamined. The importance is stressed of a sharp distinction between the formalization of mathematical problems and their formal solution that, applied to probability theory, must lead through the explicit partitioning of a sample space. If this approach is consistently followed, such problems reveal themselves to be either inherently ambiguous, and therefore without solution, or quite straightforward. In both cases nothing remains of any (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  17.  51
    N. M. L. Nathan (2001). Book Review. The Nature of Perception John Foster. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (438):455-460.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  34
    Daniel O. Nathan (1973). Categories and Intentions. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 31 (4):539-541.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  19.  42
    N. M. L. Nathan (1997). Naturalism and Self-Defeat: Plantinga's Version. Religious Studies 33 (2):135-142.
    In "Warrant and Proper Function" Plantinga argues that atheistic Naturalism is self-defeating. What is the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable, given this Naturalism and an evolutionary explanation of their origins? Plantinga argues that if the Naturalist is modest enough to believe that it is irrational to have any belief as to the value of this probability, then he is irrational even to believe his own Naturalism. I suggest that Plantinga's argument has a false premise, and that even if (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  42
    N. M. L. Nathan (1983). `Egalitarianism'. Mind 92 (367):413-416.
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  32
    N. M. L. Nathan (1991). Mctaggart's Immaterialism. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):442-456.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  12
    Nicholas Nathan (1986). Simple Colours. Philosophy 61 (July):345-353.
    [Colour is king in our innate quality space, but undistinguished in cosmic circles.] Most philosophers would agree with at least the second half of Quine's dictum. It is indeed on the general view wrong to believe that, as qualities, colours are extra-mentally actual in even the humblest role. Mind-independent material things have on the general view powers to cause sensations of red or blue, but if, in [sensations of red or blue], [red] and [blue] name qualities, we are not to (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  23.  32
    N. M. L. Nathan (2006). Jewish Monotheism and the Christian God. Religious Studies 42 (1):75-85.
    Some Christians combine a doctrine about Christ which implies that there is more than one divine self with the doctrine that God revealed to the Jews a monotheism according to which there is just one divine self. I suggest that it is less costly for such Christians to achieve consistency by abandoning the second of these doctrines than to achieve it by abandoning the first.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  30
    Amos Nathan (1984). False Expectations. Philosophy of Science 51 (1):128-136.
    Common probabilistic fallacies and putative paradoxes are surveyed, including those arising from distribution repartitioning, from the reordering of expectation series, and from misconceptions regarding expected and almost certain gains in games of chance. Conditions are given for such games to be well-posed. By way of example, Bernoulli's "Petersburg Paradox" and Hacking's "Strange Expectations" are discussed and the latter are resolved. Feller's generalized "fair price, in the classical sense" is critically reviewed.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  29
    Amos Nathan (2006). Probability Dynamics. Synthese 148 (1):229 - 256.
    ‘Probability dynamics’ (PD) is a second-order probabilistic theory in which probability distribution d X = (P(X 1), . . . , P(X m )) on partition U m X of sample space Ω is weighted by ‘credence’ (c) ranging from −∞ to +∞. c is the relative degree of certainty of d X in ‘α-evidence’ α X =[c; d X ] on U m X . It is shown that higher-order probabilities cannot provide a theory of PD. PD applies to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  20
    Amos Nathan (1984). The Fallacy of Intrinsic Distributions. Philosophy of Science 51 (4):677-684.
    Jaynes contends that in many statistical problems a seemingly indeterminate probability distribution is made unique by the transformation group of necessarily implied invariance properties, thereby justifying the principle of indifference. To illustrate and substantiate his claims he considers Bertrand's Paradox. These assertions are here refuted and the traditional attitude is vindicated.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  24
    Daniel O. Nathan (1990). Skepticism and Legal Interpretation. Erkenntnis 33 (2):165 - 189.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  3
    J. Wolfe & George J. Nathan (1968). The Identity Theory as a Scientific Hypothesis. Dialogue 7 (3):469-72.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  1
    N. M. L. Nathan (1971). A Difficulty About Justice. Mind 80 (318):227-237.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  30.  14
    N. M. L. Nathan (1975). Compatibilism and Natural Necessity. Mind 84 (April):277-280.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  13
    N. M. L. Nathan (2001). Knowledge and its Limits by Timothy Williamson, Oxford University Press, 2000, Pp. XI + 340, £25. Philosophy 76 (3):460-475.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  10
    N. M. L. Nathan (1987). Projectivist Utilitarianism: Reply to Gordon. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 26 (1):129 - 130.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33.  9
    George J. Nathan & Julian Wolfe (1968). The Identity Thesis as a Scientific Hypothesis. Dialogue 7 (December):469-472.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  9
    N. M. L. Nathan (1976). On the Non-Causal Explanation of Human Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 6 (3):241-243.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35.  9
    Daniel O. Nathan (1979). On the Factual Basis of Moral Reasoning. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (2):157 – 162.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  8
    N. M. L. Nathan (2001). Vicious Regression and the Value of Belief. Philosophia 28 (1-4):369-372.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  7
    N. M. L. Nathan (1984). A New Incompatibilism. Mind 93 (369):39-55.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  7
    N. M. L. Nathan (1983). Projectivist Utilitarianism. Erkenntnis 20 (2):207 - 211.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39.  2
    N. M. L. Nathan (1970). Some Prerequisites for a Political Casuistry of Justice. Inquiry 13 (1-4):376 – 393.
    After briefly vindicating casuistries which successively apply a number of different moral principles, I describe some of the principles of justice liable to figure in such casuistries, assess the relative popularity of these principles and show that some of the most popular cannot be consistently applied in all circumstances.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  1
    N. M. L. Nathan (1994). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Mind 103 (412):565-568.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  4
    N. M. L. Nathan (2008). Being Reasonable About Religion William Charlton Ashgate: Aldershot, 2006, Pp. 170, £45. Philosophy 83 (1):145-149.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  3
    N. M. L. Nathan (1970). History, Literature and the Classification of Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):213 – 233.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  1
    N. M. L. Nathan (1992). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Mind 101 (403):565-568.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. N. M. L. Nathan (1996). Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Norman Nathan (1975). Prince William B.: The Philosophical Conceptions of William Blake. Mouton.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  2
    N. M. L. Nathan (1971). The Concept of Justice. London,Macmillan.
  47. N. M. L. Nathan (1996). Weak Materialism. In Howard Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  1
    John N. Wales (1979). Prologue to Education: An Enquiry Into Ends and Means. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
    Whatever the world thinks, he who hath not much meditated upon God, the human mind, and the summum bonum, may possibly make a thriving earthworm, ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. H. G. Quaritch Wales (1977). The Universe Around Them: Cosmology and Cosmic Renewal in Indianized South-East Asia. A. Probsthain.
  50.  60
    Howard Robinson (2005). Reply to Nathan: How to Reconstruct the Causal Argument. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 20 (36):7-10.
    Nicholas Nathan tries to resist the current version of the causal argument for sense-data in two ways. First he suggests that, on what he considers to be the correct reconstruction of the argument, it equivocates on the sense of proximate cause. Second, he defends a form of disjunctivism, by claiming that there might be an extra mechanism involved in producing veridical hallucination that is not present in perception. I argue that Nathan’s reconstruction of the argument is not the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
1 — 50 / 1000