34 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Natika Newton (Nassau Community College)
  1. Natika Newton (2012). Problem reprezentacji w teoriach poznania ucieleśnionego. Avant 3 (T).
    This paper looks at a central issue with embodiment theories in cognition: the role, if any, they provide for mental representation. Thelen and Smith (1994) hold that the concept of representations is either vacuous or misapplied in such systems. Others maintain a place for representations (e.g. Clark 1996), but are imprecise about their nature and role. It is difficult to understand what those could be if representations are understood in the same sense as that used by computationalists: fixed or long-lasting (...)
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (2005). Consciousness and Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception. John Benjamins.
    The papers in this volume of Consciousness & Emotion Book Series are organized around the theme of "enaction.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (2005). The Unity of Consciousness: An Enactivist Approach. Journal of Mind and Behavior 26 (4):225-280.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Natika Newton (2004). The Art of Representation: Support for an Enactive Approach. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):411-411.
    Grush makes an important contribution to a promising way of viewing mental representation: as a component activity in sensorimotor processes. Grush shows that there need be no entities in our heads that would count as representations, but that, nevertheless, the process of representation can be defined so as to include both natural and artificial (e.g., linguistic or pictorial) representing.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Natika Newton (2003). A Critical Review of Nicholas Maxwell's the Human World in the Physical Universe: Consciousness, Free Will, and Evolution. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):149 – 156.
    Nicholas Maxwell takes on the ambitious project of explaining, both epistemologically and metaphysically, the physical universe and human existence within it. His vision is appealing; he unites the physical and the personal by means of the concepts of aim and value, which he sees as the keys to explaining traditional physical puzzles. Given the current popularity of theories of goal-oriented dynamical systems in biology and cognitive science, this approach is timely. But a large vision requires firm and nuanced arguments to (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Ralph D. Ellis, Natika Newton & Peter Zachar (2002). Irwin Goldstein. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (1):21-33.
  7. Ralph D. Ellis, Natika Newton & Peter Zachar (2002). Luc Faucher and Christine Tappolet. Consciousness and Emotion 3 (2):105-144.
  8. Natika Newton (2002). Privileged Access and Merleau-Ponty. In Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), The Visible and the Invisible in the Interplay Between Philosophy, Literature, and Reality. Kluwer. 71--78.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Natika Newton (2001). Emergence and the Uniqueness of Consciousness. Journal Of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10):47-59.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Natika Newton (2001). The Function of the Cerebellum in Cognition, Affect and Consciousness: Empirical Support for the Embodied Mind--Introduction. Consciousness and Emotion 2 (2):273-276.
  11. Natika Newton (2001). The Role of Action Representations in the Dynamics of Embodied Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):58-59.
    Thelen et al. present a convincing explanation of the A-not-B error, but contrary to their own claims, their explanation essentially involves mental representations. As is too common among cognitive scientists, they equate mental representations with representations of external physical objects. They clearly show, however, that representations of bodily actions on physical objects are central to the dynamical system producing the error.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.) (2000). The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization--An Anthology. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.
    CHAPTER 1 Integrating the Physiological and Phenomenological Dimensions of Affect and Motivation Ralph D. Ellis Clark Atlanta University A neglected but ...
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.) (2000). The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization- An Anthology. Advances in Consciousness Research. John Benjamins.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (2000). The Interdependence of Consciousness and Emotion. Consciousness and Emotion 1 (1):1-10.
  15. Natika Newton (2000). Conscious Emotion in a Dynamic System: How I Can Know How I Feel. In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, Affect and Self-Organization - an Anthology. John Benjamins.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Natika Newton (2000). Humphreys Solution. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):62-66.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Natika Newton (1999). Arguing About Consciousness: A Blind Alley and a Red Herring. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):162-163.
    O'Brien & Opie hold that phenomenal experience should be identified with “stable patterns of activation” across the brain's neural networks, and that this proposal has the potential for closing the ‘explanatory gap' between mental states and brain processes. I argue that they have too much respect for the conceivability argument and that their proposal already does much to close the explanatory gap, but that a “perspicuous nexus” can in principle never be achieved.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Natika Newton (1999). Introspection and the Secret Agent. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):629-629.
    The notion of introspection is unparsimonious and unnecessary to explain the experiential grounding of our mentalistic concepts. Instead, we can look at subtle proprioceptive experiences, such as the experience of agency in planning motor acts, which may be explained in part by the phenomenon of collateral discharge or efference copy. Proprioceptive sensations experienced during perceptual and motor activity may account for everything that has traditionally been attributed to a special mental activity called “introspection.”.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (1998). Three Paradoxes of Phenomenal Consciousness: Bridging the Explanatory Gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (4):419-42.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Natika Newton (1997). Review of The Bodily Nature of Consciousness by Kathleen V. Wider, Cornell University Press, 1997, 207 Pp. [REVIEW] Behavior and Philosophy 25 (2).
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Natika Newton (1996). Foundations of Understanding. John Benjamins.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Natika Newton (1995). Metacognition and Consciousness. Pragmatics and Cognition 3 (2):285-297.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Natika Newton (1993). The Sensorimotor Theory of Cognition. Pragmatics and Cognition 1 (2):267-305.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Natika Newton (1992). Dennett on Intrinsic Intentionality. Analysis 52 (1):18-23.
  25. Natika Newton (1991). Consciousness, Qualia, and Re-Entrant Signaling. Behavior and Philosophy 19 (1):21-41.
    There is a distinction between phenomenal properties and the "phenomenality" of those properties: e.g. between what red is like and what it is like to experience red. To date, reductive accounts explain the former, but not the latter: Nagel is right that they leave something out. This paper attempts a reductive account of what it is like to have a perceptual experience. Four features of such experience are distinguished: the externality, unity, and self-awareness belonging to the content of conscious experience, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Natika Newton (1989). Error in Action and Belief. Philosophia 19 (4):363-401.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Natika Newton (1989). Machine Understanding and the Chinese Room. Philosophical Psychology 2 (2):207-15.
    John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of 'understanding'. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a formal and an intentional. The central question, then becomes whether a machine could possess the intentional component with or without the formal (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Natika Newton (1989). On Viewing Pain as a Secondary Quality. Noûs 23 (5):569-98.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Natika Newton (1989). Visualizing is Imagining Seeing: A Reply to White. Analysis 49 (March):77-81.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Natika Newton (1988). Introspection and Perception. Topoi 7 (March):25-30.
    Sydney Shoemaker argues that introspection, unlike perception, provides no identification information about the self, and that knowledge of one''s mental states should be conceived as arising in a direct and unmediated fashion from one''s being in those states. I argue that while one does not identify aself as the subject of one''s states, one does frequently identify and misidentify thestates, in ways analogous to the identification of objects in perception, and that in discourse about one''s mental states the self plays (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Natika Newton (1988). Machine Understanding and the Chinese Room. Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):207 – 215.
    John Searle has argued that one can imagine embodying a machine running any computer program without understanding the symbols, and hence that purely computational processes do not yield understanding. The disagreement this argument has generated stems, I hold, from ambiguity in talk of 'understanding'. The concept is analysed as a relation between subjects and symbols having two components: a formal and an intentional. The central question, then becomes whether a machine could possess the intentional component with or without the formal (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Natika Newton (1986). Churchland on Direct Introspection of Brain States. Analysis 46 (March):97-102.
  33. Natika Newton (1985). Acting and Perceiving in Body and Mind. Philosophy Research Archives 11:407-429.
    In this paper I sketch an account of (a) the origin of the terms and concepts of folk psychology, and (b) the true nature of mental states. I argue that folk psychology is built on metaphors for the functioning physical body, and that mental states are neurological traces which serve as schematic ‘mental images’ of those same functions. Special attention is paid to the folk psychology of self-consciousness. In particular, I argue that the notion of introspection is mistaken, and I (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Natika Newton (1982). Experience and Imagery. Southern Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):475-87.