Search results for 'Natural kind terms' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Corine Besson (2012). Empty Natural Kind Terms and Dry-Earth. Erkenntnis 76 (3):403-425.
    This paper considers the problem of assigning meanings to empty natural kind terms. It does so in the context of the Twin-Earth externalist-internalist debate about whether the meanings of natural kind terms are individuated by the external physical environment of the speakers using these terms. The paper clarifies and outlines the different ways in which meanings could be assigned to empty natural kind terms. And it argues that externalists do not (...)
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  2. Corine Besson (2010). Rigidity, Natural Kind Terms, and Metasemantics. In Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Routledge 25--44.
    A paradigmatic case of rigidity for singular terms is that of proper names. And it would seem that a paradigmatic case of rigidity for general terms is that of natural kind terms. However, many philosophers think that rigidity cannot be extended from singular terms to general terms. The reason for this is that rigidity appears to become trivial when such terms are considered: natural kind (...)
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  3.  38
    Igor Douven & Jaap van Brakel (1998). Can the World Help Us in Fixing the Reference of Natural Kind Terms? Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 29 (1):59-70.
    According to Putnam the reference of natural kind terms is fixed by the world, at least partly; whether two things belong to the same kind depends on whether they obey the same objective laws. We show that Putnam's criterion of substance identity only “works” if we read “objective laws” as “OBJECTIVE LAWS”. Moreover, at least some of the laws of some of the special sciences have to be included. But what we consider to be good special (...)
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  4. Michael P. Wolf, Rigid Designation and Natural Kind Terms, Pittsburgh Style. Normative Functionalism and the Pittsburgh School.
    This paper addresses recent literature on rigid designation and natural kind terms that draws on the inferentialist approaches of Sellars and Brandom, among others. Much of the orthodox literature on rigidity may be seen as appealing, more or less explicitly, to a semantic form of “the given” in Sellars’s terms. However, the important insights of that literature may be reconstructed and articulated in terms more congenial to the Pittsburgh school of normative functionalism.
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  5.  98
    Michael P. Wolf (2002). Kripke, Putnam and the Introduction of Natural Kind Terms. Acta Analytica 17 (1):151-170.
    In this paper, I will outline some of the important points made by Kripke and Putnam on the meaning of natural kind terms. Their notion of the baptism of natural kinds- the process by which kind terms are initially introduced into the language — is of special concern here. I argue that their accounts leave some ambiguities that suggest a baptism of objects and kinds that is free of additional theoretical commitments. Both authors suggest (...)
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  6. Christian Nimtz (2004). Two-Dimensionalism and Natural Kind Terms. Synthese 138 (1):125-48.
    Kripke and Putnam have convinced most philosophers that we cannot do metaphysics of nature by analysing the senses of natural kind terms -- simply because natural kind terms do not have senses. Neo-descriptivists, especially Frank Jackson and David Chalmers, believe that this view is mistaken. Merging classical descriptivism with a Kaplan-inspired two-dimensional framework, neo-descriptivists devise a semantics for natural kind terms that assigns natural kind terms so-called 'primary intensions'. (...)
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  7.  79
    John M. Collins (2006). Temporal Externalism, Natural Kind Terms, and Scientifically Ignorant Communities. Philosophical Papers 35 (1):55-68.
    Temporal externalism (TE) is the thesis (defended by Jackman (1999)) that the contents of some of an individual’s thoughts and utterances at time t may be determined by linguistic developments subsequent to t. TE has received little discussion so far, Brown 2000 and Stoneham 2002 being exceptions. I defend TE by arguing that it solves several related problems concerning the extension of natural kind terms in scientifically ignorant communities. Gary Ebbs (2000) argues that no theory can reconcile (...)
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  8.  31
    Mohan Matthen (1984). Ostension, Names and Natural Kind Terms. Dialogue 23 (1):44-58.
    It has been suggested that the theory of reference advanced by Kripke and Putnam implies, or presupposes, an aristotelian vision of natural kinds and essences. I argue that what is in fact established is that there are degrees of naturalness among kinds. A parallel argument shows that there are degrees of naturalness among individuals. A subsidiary theme of the paper is that the definition of "natural kind term" as "rigid designator of a natural kind" is (...)
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  9. J. Brown (1998). Natural Kind Terms and Recognitional Capacities. Mind 107 (426):275-303.
    The main contribution of this paper is a new account of how a community may introduce a term for a natural kind in advance of knowing the correct scientific account of that kind. The account is motivated by the inadequacy of the currently dominant accounts of how a community may do this, namely those proposed by Kripke and by Putman. Their accounts fail to deal satisfactorily with the facts that (1) typically, an item that instantiates one (...) kind instantiates several - 'the higher-level natural kinds problem', and (2) natural kinds often occur in nature in impure form - 'the composition problem' .On the account I propose, a term for a natural kind gains its reference by being associated with a recognitional capacity for that kind. I show how members of a scientifically ignorant community could have a recognitional capacity for a natural kind, say gold, as opposed to a certain kind of appearance, for instance the appearance that gold actually has. I argue that members of such a community can have recognitional capacities for particular natural kinds despite the actual or possible existence of duplicate kinds, e.g. water. After developing the account in detail, I show how it can deal with the two problems faced by Kripke's and Putnam's problem. The case of natural kind terms is crucial to the central debate in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind about whether we can refer non-descriptively to objects and kinds in the world. I take the account I propose to be a non-descriptive account of linguistic reference to natural kinds that can be used to support externalism in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)
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  10.  33
    Stephen P. Schwartz (2013). Mill and Kripke on Proper Names and Natural Kind Terms. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (5):925 - 945.
    Saul Kripke in his revolutionary and influential series of lectures from the early 1970s (later published as the book Naming and Necessity) famously resurrected John Stuart Mill's theory of proper names. Kripke at the same time rejected Mill's theory of general terms. According to Kripke, many natural kind terms do not fit Mill's account of general terms and are closer to proper names. Unfortunately, Kripke and his followers ignored key passages in Mill's A System of (...)
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  11.  43
    Sanford Goldberg (2006). An Anti-Individualistic Semantics for 'Empty' Natural Kind Terms. Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (1):147-168.
    Several authors (Boghossian 1998; Segal 2000) allege that 'empty' would-be natural kind terms are a problem for anti-individualistic semantics. In this paper I rebut the charge by providing an anti-individualistic semantics for such terms.
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  12. Kathrin Koslicki (2008). Natural Kinds and Natural Kind Terms. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):789-802.
    The aim of this article is to illustrate how a belief in the existence of kinds may be justified for the particular case of natural kinds: particularly noteworthy in this respect is the weight borne by scientific natural kinds (e.g., physical, chemical, and biological kinds) in (i) inductive arguments; (ii) the laws of nature; and (iii) causal explanations. It is argued that biological taxa are properly viewed as kinds as well, despite the fact that they have (...)
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  13. Carleton B. Christensen (2001). Escape From Twin Earth: Putnam's 'Logic' of Natural Kind Terms. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (2):123-150.
    Many still seem confident that the kind of semantic theory Putnam once proposed for natural kind terms is right. This paper seeks to show that this confidence is misplaced because the general idea underlying the theory is incoherent. Consequently, the theory must be rejected prior to any consideration of its epistemological, ontological or metaphysical acceptability. Part I sets the stage by showing that falsehoods, indeed absurdities, follow from the theory when one deliberately suspends certain devices Putnam (...)
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  14.  85
    Harry Deutsch (1994). Semantic Analysis of Natural Kind Terms. Topoi 13 (1):25-30.
    This paper develops a model theoretic semantics for so called “natural kind terms” that reflects the viewpoint of (Kripke, 1980) and (Putnam, 1975). The semantics generates a formal counterpart of the “K-mechanism” investigated in (Salmon, 1981) and in unpublished work by Keith Donnellan.
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  15.  34
    Barbara Abbott (1989). Nondescriptionality and Natural Kind Terms. Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (3):269 - 291.
    The phrase "natural kind term" has come into the linguistic and philosophical literature in connection with well-known work of Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1970, 1975a). I use that phrase here in the sense it has acquired from those and subseqnent works on related topics. This is not the transparent sense of the phrase. That is, if I am right in what follows there are words for kinds of things existing in nature which are not natural kind (...)
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  16.  41
    Ari Maunu (2002). Natural Kind Terms Are Similar to Proper Names in Being World-Independent. Philosophical Writings 19:51-68.
    According to the New Theory of Reference, proper names (and indexicals) and natural kind terms are semantically similar to each other but crucially different from definite descriptions and “ordinary” predicates, respectively. New Theorists say that a name, unlike a definite description, is a directly referential nondescriptional rigid designator, which refers “without a mediation of the content” and is not functional (i.e. lacks a Carnapian intension). Natural kind terms, such as ‘horse’ and ‘water’, are held (...)
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  17.  12
    Igor Douven & Jaap Van Brakel (1998). Can the World Help Us in Fixing the Reference of Natural Kind Terms? Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 29 (1):59 - 70.
    According to Putnam the reference of natural kind terms is fixed by the world, at least partly; whether two things belong to the same kind depends on whether they obey the same objective laws. We show that Putnam's criterion of substance identity only "works" if we read "objective laws" as "OBJECTIVE LAWS". Moreover, at least some of the laws of some of the special sciences have to be included. But what we consider to be good special (...)
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  18.  23
    Bernard Linsky (1977). Putnam on the Meaning of Natural Kind Terms. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):819 - 828.
    In "the meaning of 'meaning'," hilary putnam uses three "twin earth" examples to argue that natural kind terms do not have a sense. I argue that the first two only show that kind terms are like indexicals and that they are rigid designators but that this is compatible with having a sense. The third argument relies on a theory about the epistemological role of kind terms and the claim that there are no analytic (...)
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  19. Michael Padraic Wolf (1999). An Inferentialist Semantics for Natural Kind Terms. Dissertation, Georgetown University
    My dissertation is concerned with natural kind terms; its most basic goal is to provide a semantic account of the role these play in scientific discourse. Since my broad semantic approach follows Sellars and Brandom in looking to the pragmatically articulated inferential role of sentences rather than their relation to the world, I manage to set aside metaphysical questions regarding the nature of kinds. I begin with an account of the central role played by natural (...) terms in theoretical explanation. I show how natural kind terms are essential to the explanatory function of scientific laws as inference licenses of a certain sort. I turn then to the curious fact that natural kind terms occur in multiple grammatical positions: as parts of attributive predicates and as apparently singular referents . This latter role is at times one that seems to involve a quantificational attribution to all members of the kind, but at other times is more robust . My account demonstrates the utility of just such ambiguity to the role played by kind terms in explanation. I go on to account for a number of other puzzling features of natural kind term usage and to explain the distinction between natural kind terms and other sortals on grounds of their distinctive pragmatic significances. I conclude by laying out how my view can be extended to give a semantics for other sorts of kind terms . This allows us to draw a substantial distinction between gerrymandered kind terms and those that our theories should genuinely commit us to, while acknowledging that the entire natural/social divide among the kind terms stands or falls with our ability to show that there is an important fundamental distinction between different sorts of theories. (shrink)
     
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  20.  18
    Ann-Sophie Barwich (2013). A Pluralist Approach to Extension: The Role of Materiality in Scientific Practice for the Reference of Natural Kind Terms. Biological Theory 7 (2):100-108.
    This article argues for a different outlook on the concept of extension, especially for the reference of general terms in scientific practice. Scientific realist interpretations of the two predominant theories of meaning, namely Descriptivism and Causal Theory, contend that a stable cluster of descriptions or an initial baptism fixes the extension of a general term such as a natural kind term. This view in which the meaning of general terms is presented as monosemantic and the referents (...)
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  21. Richard Gray (2006). Natural Phenomenon Terms. Analysis 66 (290):141–148.
    In lecture III of Naming and Necessity, Kripke extends his claim that names are non-descriptive to natural kind terms, and in so doing includes a brief supporting discussion of terms for natural phenomena, in particular the terms ‘light’ and ‘heat’. Whilst natural kind terms continue to feature centrally in the recent literature, natural phenomenon terms have barely figured. The purpose of the present paper is to show how the apparent (...)
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  22.  25
    Stephen P. Schwartz (1980). Formal Semantics and Natural Kind Terms. Philosophical Studies 38 (2):189-98.
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  23. P. Kyle Stanford & Philip Kitcher (2000). Refining the Causal Theory of Reference for Natural Kind Terms. Philosophical Studies 97 (1):97-127.
  24. Åsa Wikforss (2010). Are Natural Kind Terms Special? In Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Routledge
     
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  25.  3
    Stephen P. Schwartz (1979). Natural Kind Terms. Cognition 7 (3):301-315.
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  26. Harold Noonan (2010). The Commonalities Between Proper Names and Natural Kind Terms : A Fregean Perspective. In Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Routledge 1--84.
     
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  27.  64
    David Braun (2006). Names and Natural Kind Terms. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press 490--515.
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  28. Keith S. Donnellan (1983). Kripke and Putnam on Natural Kind Terms. In C. Ginet & S. Shoemaker (eds.), Knowledge and Mind. Oxford Univresity Press 84-104.
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  29.  54
    P. Kyle Stanford (1998). Reference and Natural Kind Terms: The Real Essence of Locke's View. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1):78–97.
    J. L. Mackie's famous claim that Locke ‘anticipates’ Kripke's Causal Theory of Reference rests, I suggest, upon a pair of important misunderstandings. Contra Mackie, as well as the more recent accounts of Paul Guyer and Michael Ayers, Lockean Real Essences consist of those features of an entity from which all of its experienceable properties can be logically deduced; thus a substantival Real Essence consists of features of a Real Constitution plus logically necessary objective connections between them and features of some (...)
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  30.  25
    Michael P. Wolf (2002). The Curious Role of Natural Kind Terms. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (1):81–101.
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  31.  96
    A. D. Smith (2005). Natural Kind Terms: A Neo-Lockean Theory. European Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):70–88.
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  32.  48
    Danielle Macbeth (1995). Names, Natural Kind Terms, and Rigid Designation. Philosophical Studies 79 (3):259 - 281.
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  33.  22
    Erik Anderson (1994). Kant, Natural Kind Terms, and Scientific Essentialism. History of Philosophy Quarterly 11 (4):355 - 373.
  34.  27
    Scott R. Sehon (1997). Natural Kind Terms and the Status of Folk Psychology. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (3):333-44.
  35.  11
    Harry Deutsch (1993). Semantics for Natural Kind Terms. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):389 - 411.
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  36.  61
    David Braddon-Mitchell (2005). Conceptual Stability and the Meaning of Natural Kind Terms. Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):859-868.
  37.  21
    Thomas McKay & Cindy Stern (1979). Natural Kind Terms and Standards of Membership. Linguistics and Philosophy 3 (1):27 - 34.
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  38.  24
    Lawrence Poncinie (1985). Meaning Change for Natural Kind Terms. Noûs 19 (3):415-427.
  39.  9
    Lifeng Zhang (2014). The Logic of Natural Kind Terms. Philosophical Forum 45 (3):199-216.
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  40.  34
    Daniela A. Krasner (2005). The Semantics of Names and Natural Kind Terms. Philosophia 33 (1-4):149-172.
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  41.  31
    Philip L. Peterson (1999). The Meanings of Natural Kind Terms. Philosophia 27 (1-2):137-176.
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  42. J. Brown (1998). Recognitional Capacities and Natural Kind Terms. In Daniel N. Robinson (ed.), The Mind. Oxford University Press 107--275.
     
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  43.  5
    Luis Fernández Moreno (2012). Kripke and Mill on Natural Kind Terms. In Piotr Stalmaszcyzk (ed.), Philosophical and Formal Approaches to Linguistic Analysis. Ontos Verlag
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  44. Luis Fernández Moreno (2012). Natural Kind Terms, Rigidity and the Path Towards Neccessity. Acta Philosophica 21 (2):337 - 350.
     
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  45. Ezequiel Zerbudis (2012). Natural Kinds, Natural Kind Terms and the Notion of Rigidity. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):171-185.
     
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  46. Finn Collin (2001). Faye on the Semantics of Natural Kind Terms. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):162-166.
     
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  47. Katharina Dulckeit (2009). Unlikely Bedfellows? Putnam and Hegel on Natural Kind Terms. In Angelica Nuzzo (ed.), Hegel and the Analytic Tradition. Continuum
  48. Luis Fernandez Moreno (2012). Natural Kind Terms, Rigidity and the Path Towards Necessity. Acta Philosophica 21 (2):337 - 350.
     
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  49. Bernard Linsky (1975). Natural Kinds and Natural Kind Terms. Dissertation, Stanford University
     
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  50. Luis Fernández Moreno (2007). On Rigidity, Direct Reference and Natural Kind Terms. In María José Frápolli (ed.), Saying, Meaning and Referring: Essays on François Recanati's Philosophy of Language. Palgrave Macmillan
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